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ABSTRACT
This study has discussed the policy process of the European Union in order to illuminate major
aspects of the nature of this peculiar and unique political system. The discussion necessarily
involves an examination of traditional integration theories, but it concentrates primarily on policy
analysis which is based on extensive empirical research and supported by secondaiy literature and
theoretical deliberations. The major research for this project was carried out between 1990 and
1994, in the form of mail surveys, interviews, non-participatory observation and scrutiny of
documentation and secondary literature. The empirical approach adopted here is regarded as
superior to purely theory-based research, because the former provides more insight into the nature
of the European Union than the latter.
The thesis consists principally of a discussion of the general nature of the policy process in the
European Union, but contains also a more detailed case study on food policy-making. The findings
in this study confirm that there is a marked gap between formal policy procedures and the way in
which policy is actually carried out Consequently, policy-making in the European Union is very
varied and dynamic, and cannot be encapsulated into a single static conceptual framework. The gap
is explained in terms of the influence of informal factors on policy-making, namely the
involvement of private interests, the varied interpretations of the formal provisions which flourish
due to Treaty ambiguities and the mediating effects of manifold political and cultural agendas. The
actual influence of private interests is difficult to measure, and data are contradictory, but it is
nonetheless evident that influence is disproportionately low compared to the extent of consultation
and lobbying that characterises policy-making in the European Union. However, as far as broad
developments are concerned, business and other economic interests have had significant influence
on EU developments - but only if their interests did not diverge too markedly from the political
priorities of the most senior European politicians. This finding confirms that, despite many
bureaucratic and technocratic elements, the European Union is an intensely political system.
Within the realm of politics, national self4nterests remain dominant, even though they are
constantly challenged and mediated by other political and non-political concertinos. The
predominance of national concerns is however constantly reinforced by the hybrid structures of the
European Union.
It is argued in the thesis that empirical policy studies must be embedded in a suitable conceptual
framework so that they do not result lii purely descriptive exercises. Therefore, considerable
attention has been given to constructing such a framework. The latter is based broadly on policy
networks analysis but emphasises the problems and limitations of this approach and expands the
basic concept in order to take account of the idiosyncrasies of the European Union which is a
unique political system.
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ChAPTER ONE:
INTRODUCTION
Scholars from many disciplines have sought to explain the vagaries of European
integration and unity throughout the post-war era. Research into the nature of the
European Community, now the European Union (EU) l , has been particularly
intense, and also very controversial. The thesis fits into this tradition of research and
discusses the nature of the EU by way of a study of EU policy-making. In addition,
it seeks to design a suitable conceptual framework within which the EU policy
process can be discussed.
Section 1.1 highlights the relevance of the EU for political scientists, Section 1.2
demonstrates that the policy analytic approach is a suitable tool for a study of the
EU and Section 1.3 outlines the broad structure of the thesis and justifies the choice
of case study. Section 1.4 contains a more detailed statement about the exact aims of
the thesis. The final part of the Introduction (1.5) provides a synopsis of the field
data on which this policy study is based.
Legally, there are three separate Communities: the European Coal and Steel Community
(ECSC, 1951), the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC or Euratom, 1957) and the
European Economic Community (EEC, 1957). In everyday language, the term European
Community - as opposed to European Communities - has however been used frequently to refer
to all Communities and the same terminology has been adopted here. The Treaty on European
Union (TEU, 1993) incorporated the European Communities legally: the European Union (EU)
"shall be founded on the European Communities, supplemented by the policies and forms of co-
operation established by this Treaty" {Treaty on European Union, commonly referred to as
Maastricht Treaty, Title I, Article A, Paragraph 3, 1992}. The Treaty also added two new
pillars of co-operation (Common Foreign and Security Policy; Common Justice and Home
Policy) and expanded on existing policy provisions; hence, with the ratification of the TEU, the
European Community (EC) transformed itself into the European Union (EU). In the thesis the
label 'EC is mainly used when referring specifically to the pre-Maastricht era. In general
discourse and in relation to recent events, the abbreviation EU is usually employed; there may
however be some inevitable overlaps in the use of the two abbreviations.
1
1.1.	 The Importance of European Integration and the European Union
Throughout history leading political elites have devised mechanisms through which
they can reduce costly and devastating excesses of rivalry and/or increase their own
power and wealth. Prominent examples are marriage, moral obligations arising from
the adoption of similar belief systems and public contractual arrangements such as
treaties, unions, international organisations and international law.2 The success of
these arrangements has been mixed. Nevertheless, the search for successful and ever
more sophisticated negotiating and conflict reducing mechanisms continues because
the threat of trade or military wars has not diminished. The European Union is part
of this tradition of creating mechanisms for "jaw jaw" that aspire to prevent "war
war" .
The devastations caused by two major world wars brutally illustrated the
catastrophic effects of major military conflict and it was evident that a mechanism
had to be created that would prevent any future recurrence of European and/or
world-wide fighting. It seemed clear, too, that such a mechanism would have to
facilitate economic growth and, in turn, political stability. However, there was no
agreement about the exact form, nor about the extent to which it would have to
impinge upon national sovereignty in order to achieve its aims. This lack of
agreement explains in part the strange institutional arrangements of the original
European Communities, the continuous remoulding of the EU and the large number
2 For example, the marriage of Henry Tudor to the Yorkist princess Elizabeth; the conversion to
Christianity of many Asians during the Middle Ages by Christian traders so as to ensure safety
along trading routes in the East; the Peace Treaties of Westphalia (1648); the UN Charter on
Human Rights (1946) and the European Convention of Human Rights (1950). For further
illustrations and discussions, see G. Barraclough (ed.), The Times Atlas of World Histo,y,
Times Books Ltd., 1981, or, P. Allum, State and Society in Western Europe, Polity Press, 1995.
An expression usually attributed to Winston Churchill, former prime minister of Great Britain.
2
of uneasy compromises agreed to by politicians and bureaucrats during this
continuing process of reshaping.
Early post-war negotiations led, among other things, to the eventual creation of the
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC, 1951) and later the European Atomic
Energy Community (EEA, 1957) and the European Economic Community (EEC,
1957). It is argued here that, together, and in the expanded form of the current
European Union, these organisations now constitute one of the most sophisticated,
complex and potent mechanisms for peaceful4 interaction between diverse peoples.
However, the intricacy and sophistication of the mechanism does not necessarily
guarantee its success, especially in the long run, since interactions themselves are
complex, even volatile. Nonetheless, to date the mechanism has fulfilled its
objectives fairly well, in that it has prevented trade and military war among member
states and has created relative economic and political stability. Sceptics may
attribute this success to external factors, namely US policy towards Europe and the
advent of the Cold War, 5 or argue that economic growth had been higher and
political stability deeper without formal European integration.6
It is not the concern of the thesis to get involved in such speculations. Despite its
somewhat fragile infancy, the EU has adjusted to the needs of those who use it as a
negotiating mechanism and has evolved as an ever more intricate web of exchanges
' In this context, "peaceful" is not synonymous with "no conflict", but refers to interactions that
do not lead to outright trade and/or military war and that are guided by the desire to avoid war.
This view of European integration is frequently expressed by Neo-Realist scholars whose
reasoning is examined in Chapter three of the thesis.
6 This view is for example held by some UK "Euro-sceptics" such as Tim Congdon or Alan Sked
{BBC Radio 4 programme on the European Union; chaired by Brian Redhead; December 3,
1992}.
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that continues to weather assaults fairly well, both from within and from external
pressures. Yet, it would be absurd to assume that a negotiating mechanism ever
achieves independence from those who use and shape it. Consequently, the EU
cannot be regarded as a fully autonomous system, unconstrained by the various
national influences upon it. Hence, neither its exact shape nor its life span can be
taken for granted, although it has developed significant mechanisms of self-
preservation that now mediate the impact of outside influences. Two points follow
from this observation. All deterministic theories about European integration are
bound to have serious flaws, however parsimonious they are. The nature and
solidity, and hence, ultimately the long term success of the European Union as a
stabilising force, remains in the hands of its stake holders and of internal and external
influences, some of which can obviously not be predicted.
It is essential to study negotiating mechanisms that aim to prevent military and trade
conflict, however faulty they may be, because the price of war is so horrendous. It
follows that the study of the EU is of fundamental importance because it constitutes
one of the most complex, sophisticated and advanced of these mechanisms. Most
such mechanisms comprise of many spheres, notably economic, political, cultural
ones. The thesis concentrates principally on the political characteristics of the EU.
1.2.	 The Importance of Policy Studies
The production of common policies has been a major aim of the ECSC, the EEC,
Euratom and the EU and the policy scope and output has constantly increased. It
now directly affects nearly 400 million EU citizens7, while many people outside the
There is ample evidence of the growing impact of European policy on its citizens, and the
recognition of that impact. For example, Jacques Delors reckoned that by the end of the century
over 80% of economic and social policy will originate in the EU. {See J-D. Giuliani,
Marchands d'influence: les lobbies en France, Editions du Seuil, 1991, p.204.)
4
EU have felt indirectly the consequences of particular policy outputs, including the
results negotiated during the Uruguay round between members of GATT, aid policy
or the blunders over a common foreign policy with regard to the break-up of
Yugoslavia. The widespread impact of EU policies alone justifies the emphasis on
policy making in this thesis.
Furthermore, there are some obvious merits to a policy analytic approach. Although
not all government 8 activities result in policy output, policies ".. .are the most
fundamental government actions.° 9 Therefore, the study of how policies are made
The tremendous impact of the EC, and now EU, on its citizens, on the structures of the member
states and on its wider environment, is also frequently discussed in general terms. See for
example, F. Gonzalez, 'The Social Dimension: a Political Challenge' in Dankert, P. &
Kooyman, A. (eds.) Europe Without Frontiers, Mansell Publishing, 1989, pp.59-66, or, Der
Spiegel, 'Europa: 1st der Maastricht-Vertrag verfassungswidrig?', Jg. 47(26), 28, Juni 1993,
pp.3 1-4, or, L. Tsoukalis, The New European Economy, Oxford University Press, 1993, 2nd
edition, Prefaces and Introduction.
8 It will be argued later that the EU is presently not a state, but has the potential to become one,
though not automatically, nor necessarily. It would require the political will of its members to
become a state. Nonetheless, the current body politic that constitutes the EU has a recognisable
government, even though it lacks democratic legitimacy and is responsible only for certain
policies and related activities. See for example Sidjanski on this point: "Certes, la CE n'a pas
encore la soliditd et ni la capacitd des structures socio-politiques des Etats membres. Cependant,
bien qu'en pleine fonnation, elle porte, du moms potentiellement, les principales marques d'une
communautd politique naissante." {The EC is certainly not as yet as established, nor as
functional in socio-political terms as its member states, but - although it is still being formed - it
shows, at least potentially, the major characteristics of a nascent political community. D.
Sidjanski, 'Les groupes d'intérêt de lEurope du sud et leur insertion dans Ia CE', Revue du
Marché Co,n,nun, (325), mars 1989, p.164.)
** All foreign language quotes contained in the thesis are freely translated by the author of the
thesis, unless otherwise stated.
T. 1. Lowi, 'Public Policy and Bureaucracy in the United States and France' in Ashford, D.E.
(ed.) C'omparing Public Policies: New Concepts and Methods, Sage, 1978, p.179.
and implemented reveals a great deal about the nature of a political system.'° Policy
studies are action oriented, that is they are first and foremost concerned with what
policy makers" actually do, particularly if they are faced with unresolved tasks or
problems.' 2 Policy studies also examine how their activities deviate from the formal
policy process: "In politics, the decision centre and the moment when the decision is
made are not always the same as the place and time formally defined."3
Consequently, students of the policy process are as interested in the ideas and
behaviour of policy makers, their exchanges with each other, their resources and
their position and role in the political system as they are concerned with the
institutional and legal framework of a system. Policy studies thus take into account
formal and informal aspects of the political and governmental process, so
overcoming the limitation of institutional approaches, without however neglecting
the mediating power of the institutional framework. As a result, light can be cast on
many central political issues such as the relationship between state agencies and civil
society, the extent to which political actions mediate the institutional framework, the
10 There has long been widespread support for this claim, see for example, E.D. Ellis, 'The
Pluralist State', American Political Science Review', 14(3), August 1920, pp.393-407; B.
Reissert, F.W. Scharpf & F. Schnabel, 'Policy Effectiveness and Conflict Avoidance in
Intergovernmental Policy Formation', in 1{anf K. & Scharpf, F.W. (eds.) Interorganizational
Policy-Making: Limits to Coordination and Central Control, Sage, 1977, pp.57-112; G.
Lelimbruch & P. Schrnitter (eds.), Patterns of Corporatist Policy-Making', Sage, 1982; R
Mayntz, 'The Conditions of Effective Public Policy: a New Challenge for Policy Analysis',
Policy and Politics, 11(2), 1983, pp.123-43; A. Cawson, Organized Interest and the State,
Sage, 1985.
In the thesis, the terms "policy makers" and "policy actors" are used as synonyms and both
include formal (e.g. members of the Council of Ministers) as well as informal (e.g. lobbyists)
participants in the policy process. The policy process incorporates the stages of policy
formulation, policy implementation, policy impact and policy evaluation. "Policy-making" is
used in a general nrnnner as a synonym for "policy process".
12 For support of this view, see for example Wallace who defined policy-making as a "process
through which a variety of agencies, groups and individuals interact to perform certain tasks
and to grapple with common problems". {H. Wallace, 'Negotiation, Conflict, and Compromise:
the Elusive Pursuit of Common Policies', in Wallace, H., Wallace, W. & Webb, C. (eds.)
Policy-Making in the European Com,nunity, John Wiley and Sons, 1983, 2nd edition, p.45.
13 D. Sidjanski, Introduction in Sidjanski, D. (ed.) Political Decision-Making Processes, Elsevier,
1973, p.3.
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systemic diversity caused by such mediations, the implications for accountability and
democratic values arising from the effects of informal influences and the forces that
make for policy change, including the division and location of political power.'4
Scrutiny of the policy process also reveals the types of policies produced. For
example, with regard to the EU, it is particularly relevant to distinguish between
regulatory and distributive policies. 15 EU policies have so far been predominantly
regulatory and distributive,' 6 but the money available for distribution has been
14 The strengths and advantages of policy studies have been discussed more comprehensively
elsewhere. See for example, B. Jenkins & A. Gray, 'Bureaucratic Politics and Power:
Developments in the Study of Bureaucracy, Political Studies, 3 1(2), 1983, pp.177-93, or, M.
Burch & B. Wood, Public Policy in Britain, Basil Blackwell, 1989, 2nd edition, or, S. Bulmer,
'Setting and Influencing the Rules', Paper presented at the ESRC Conference on the Evolution
of Rules for a Single European Market, University of Exeter, 8-11 September 1994. Political
philosophers have, on occasions, expressed concern that the concept of power has been used in
a careless way by policy analysts. While this reservation is justified in many instances, it is not
possible to enter into an extensive discussion on the exact meaning(s) of the notion of power or
the related notion of political influence within the scope of the thesis. In the context of this
study, the concepts basically refer to the extent to which individual policy actors shape the final
outcomes of policies. (For lucid philosophical accounts of the concept of power, see for
example, S. Lukes, Power: a Radical View, Cambridge University Press 1974 or P. Morriss,
Power: a Philosophical Analysis, Manchester University Press, 1987. }
For a brief general discussion on the importance of distinguishing between the types of
legislation produced in the European Union, see for example, B. Axford, & B. Boyce,
'Changing Rules of the Game: New Ways of Reading European Unity', Paper presented at the
ESRC Conference on the Evolution of Rules for a Single European Market, University of
Exeter, 8-11 September 1994. Bulmer op.cit. and Majone also distinguish usefully between
types of policies, especially with regard to regulatory policies, distributive policies, 'enabling'
policies, etc. ('enabling' policies provide opportunities for those who are affected by them).
Majone's work usefully locates the discussion on different types of policies within a broader
conceptual framework, concerned with the 'nature' of political systems in general, and the
changing nature of European polities during the past few decades in particular. Where
appropriate, the thesis contains more detailed references to this issue. (See notably, G. Majone,
'Cross-national Sources of Regulatory Policymaking in Europe and the United States', Journal
of Public Policy, 11(1), 1991, pp.79-106; G. Majone, 'The European Community Between
Social Policy and Social Regulation', Journal of Co,n,non Market Studies, 31(2), June 1993,
pp.153-70; G. Majone, 'The Rise of the Regulatory State', West European Politics, 17(3), 1994,
pp.77-102.)
16 See for example Lange's (1992; 1993) work on social policy in the EU which indicates that
much policy in this sector is regulatory, with no or limited financial commitment on behalf of
the EU. (P. Lange, 'The Politics of the Social Dimension' in Sbragia, A.M. (ed.) Euro-Politics,
The Brookings Institution, 1992, Ch. 7; P. Lange, 'Maastricht and the Social Protocol: Why Did
They Do It?', Politics and Society, 2 1(1), 1993, pp.5-36.)
minimal. Regulation is thus very attractive, especially if it does not directly affect the
EU's own financial resources. Since European integration has been deliberately
advanced through the use of common policies, the emphasis on regulation explains
in part why many critics have accused the EU of over-regulation. The limits to the
EU's own financial resources, on the other hand, indicate the limitations to genuine
Euro-federalism (see also Chapter three) and the difficulties in achieving aims such
as economic and social cohesion through distributive policies.
The policy analytic approach has a further advantage. It is notoriously difficult to
keep track of policy initiatives that were prevented or abandoned, the policy
approach uncovers some such dead ends, thereby further revealing systemic
tendencies such as pressures towards non-intervention.' 7 Finally, the policy analytic
process justifiably emphasises the centrality of empirical research, 18 yet, usefully
embeds empirical data within theoretical frameworks.
7 Sometimes, the withdrawal of a policy initiative in the European Union is guided by common
sense. An appropriate example was the policy initiative that would have led to rescue services
being able to be sued for negligence, unless they could prove that they could not help the
rescued more than they had actually done. { See 'Lifeboat crews/mountain rescue teams may be
sued for negligence for any injuries suffered by the people they rescue', in The European
Co,nmunily: Facts and Fairytales, Publication of the Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 1993,
p.12.) Sometimes, it is however driven by political andlor ideological motivation. For example,
some of the policies scrapped since the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, have been the results
of political and/or ideological pressures for non-intervention at the European level.
Unsurprisingly, justifications have involved the concept of "subsidiarity". {See for example, The
Economist, 'Scapegoat Passes Buck', 325(7779), 1992, p.49.)
18 All single-track methodological approaches to research pose problems and suffer from
weaknesses. Consequently, a balance between empirical and theoretical considerations has been
attempted in the research project. However, primacy has been given to the analysis of extensive
empirical data, resulting from intense field work including two major mail questionnaire
surveys, a very large number of interviews, non-participant observation and extensive text
analysis of primary documentary sources. There is support for this approach elsewhere, e.g. in
M.P. Petracca, 'Tilling the Field of Interest Group Research: an Overview of New Insights',
Perspectives on Political Science, 22(2), spring 1993, pp.61-9.
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Inevitably, traditional policy studies suffer from a number of shortcomings. For
example, contextual influences, like political and economic pressures arising within
the international context or consumer consumption patterns, are often ignored even
though they can significantly mediate policy outcomes.' 9 Sometimes it is difficult to
distinguish if someone or some organisation is a genuine policy actor or a contextual
factor that influences indirectly policy outcomes. For example, business
organisations form part of the policy context, but business people, who are actively
involved in lobbying, are also informal policy-makers. In the thesis the distinction is
made as follows: anybody who attempts to directly influence policy is considered a
policy-maker; any indirect influences - like American trade policy, movements in the
main financial markets, business organisations that do not take advantage of new
opportunities arising from changes in EU legislation - count as part of the wider
policy context. For reasons of manageability, less attention is paid to such factors
than to policy making per Se. However, the importance of outside factors is
recognised and illustrated in Chapter seven.
Measuring the influence of individual actors or factors on policy outcome is
notoriously difficult; a point frequently made by questionnaire respondents and
interviewees and confirmed by academic literature. 20 Consequently, there are very
19 There is sporadic evidence for this claim throughout the thesis as well as in established
literature on policy studies, e.g. C.W. Anderson, 'The Logic of Public Problems: Evaluation in
Comparative Policy Research in Asliford, D.E. (ed.) op.cit., pp.19-43.
20 This point is for example made by J. Potters & F. Van Winden, 'Modelling Political Pressure as
Transmission of Information', European Journal of Political Economy, 6(1), 1990, pp.61-88.
The authors acknowledged the shortage of such models and hence, sought themselves to
establish a model that overcomes this problem. As indicated in footnote 21, they were however
only partially successful.
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few systematic approaches to measuring influence, with the exception of some
mathematical models that usually create almost as many problems as they solve.2'
There is much evidence in the thesis and elsewhere that the number of variables that
mediate influence is variable and that the behaviour of mediators is volatile.
Consequently, commonly named factors making for strong influence, notably size,
financial resources of pressure groups, pivotal structural positions of policy-makers
in the policy cycle, are not always as dominant as has widely been assumed. 22 The
problem of measuring influence is aggravated by the veil of secrecy which surrounds
policy-making, particularly in the EU's Council of Ministers (CoM), and the
subsequent lack of some key information. The virtual impossibility of truly neutral
observation and analysis causes ftirther problems. These complications are not
discussed here at length, since they are adequately addressed elsewhere. 23 However,
they are borne in mind throughout the thesis.
21 See for example, 0. Becker, 'A Theory of Competition amongst Pressure Groups for Political
Influence', Quarterly Journal ofEconomics, 98(3), August 1983, pp.371-400, or, Potters & Van
Winden op. cit. The latter produced a rather sophisticated model of influence measurement
which was based on game theory and which allocated variables to incomplete information and
uncertainty. Yet, they themselves accepted the limitations of such prototypes. Notably, the latter
tend to contain built in assumptions that enable theorists to limit the number of variables and to
simplif r the predicted behaviour of these variables so as to keep calculations and analysis
tractable. Justifiably, Potter & Van Winden, op.cit., nonetheless emphasised the contributions
made by their, and similar, quantitative approaches to the measurement of political influence in
the policy process.
22 See for example, B. Keller, 'Interessenorganisation und Interessenvermittlung', KOlner
Zeifschrfl für Soziologie und Sozia!psychologie. 42(3), 1990, pp.502-24. Keller convincingly
argued that the relationship between resources and iniluence was much more complex and
varied than had sometimes been assumed. Keller's argument is relevant to the European Union,
where diffuse patterns of influence have emerged; a point confirmed for example in, C. Harlow,
'A Community of Interests? Making the Most of European Law', The Modern Law Review,
55(3), 1992, pp.331-50. Furthermore, field data collected for the thesis confirms that the
relationship between resources and influence is not necessarily straightforward. For example,
UNICE, the European Trade Association for Industry and Business, have not always achieved
the level of influence on policy outcomes that was widely expected of them, given their human
and financial resources. This point is developed in Chapter five of the thesis.
23 See for example A.R Ball, Modern Politics and Government, Macmillan, 1983, 2nd edition,
Part 2, Ch. 6, or, R. Breitling, 'The Concept of Pluralism' in Ehrlich, S. & Wootton, G. (eds.)
Three Faces ofPluralism, Gower, 1980, Ch. 1.
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Some policy studies suffer from excessive optimism and are full of inappropriate
sweeping generalisations. These shortcomings apply particularly to some early
efforts whose overriding objective was the creation of a general theory or model of
policy making. 24 Nowadays, the emphasis tends to be on case studies of particular
policy sectors and generalisations are either avoided or very tentative. Given the
diversity of policy making in all political systems, case studies are indeed preferable,
provided that they are put into a conceptual framework and do not become purely
descriptive exercises. Hence, Chapter six concentrates on the elaboration of a
suitable conceptual framework for policy case studies, drawing extensively, but not
exclusively, on the literature of policy networks analysis. Furthermore, such studies
should not altogether loose sight of the macro- and micro-level of analyses.25
The thesis contains a case study on food policy, including policy formulation,
implementation and impact (Chapter seven). The function of this chapter is two-fold:
it presents and analyses empirical data in greater depth than the more general
discussions in Chapters four and five and it tests and discusses some of the analytical
issues raised in Chapter six. In Chapter seven, the role of implementation and policy
impact are stressed, along with policy formulation, because they can significantly
alter policy outcome. Occasionally, policy studies have omitted reference to policy
implementation and impact, yet it is now widely acknowledged that these aspects
can significantly distort policy output and may well influence future policy decisions.
24 See for example, A.F. Bentley, The Process of Government, Harvard University Press, 1908, or
even, R.A. Dahi, Who Governs?, Yale University Press, 1961. It must be said, though, that
these works, despite their shortcomings, constituted extremely valuable and path breaking
contributions to the study of policy making and interest group representation.
25 On this point, see particularly Chapter six, but also, for example, K. Dowding, 'Policy
Networks: Don't Stretch a Good Idea Too Far' in Dunleavy, P. & Stanyer, J. (eds.)
C'ontemporary Political Studies, Vol. 1, Political Studies Association Publications, 1994, pp.59-
78; M. Mills & M. Saward, 'All Very Well in Practice, but What about the Theory?, in ibid.,
pp.79-92.
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Chapter seven elaborates on these points and demonstrates that these policy stages
have been particularly relevant as far as the EU is concerned, since there have been
significant problems with implementation and, sometimes, disappointing reactions to
the potential arising from 'enabling' policies.26
1.3.	 Structure of the Thesis
Policy studies still need to be based on an understanding of the formal structures,
institutions and linkages within a political system. Chapter two explores these
features, but concentrates on the complex historical legacy of the EU, and its
ambiguities and intricacies, rather than on a basic description of the EU's
institutional make-up and its formal policy structures. It is not necessary to delineate
the latter in detail, because this task has been undertaken at length elsewhere and
another factual description would not provide new insights.27
The policy approach is not limited by assumptions on the role of territoriality in the
same way that traditional institutional studies are. This is particularly welcome in
respect of the EU where much policy-making takes place within policy spaces that
transcend the boundaries between sub-national, national and European levels.
However, the dichotomy between national and supranational influences in the EU
remains sufficiently marked that it has to be taken into account. Chapter three
contains a discussion on this dichotomy and looks at various attempts to
conceptualise the phenomenon. A synopsis of the major integration theories is
provided, highlighting their limitations but also, where appropriate, their merits.
Discussions are limited for two good reasons. Integration theories are widely
26 See footnote 15.
27 See Chapter two for further details.
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discussed elsewhere and there is neither the necessity nor the scope to exhaustively
deal with them here. 28 The thesis focuses on policy analysis; material on European
integration is used primarily to enhance the benefits of policy analysis. In view of the
'schizophrenic' nature of the EU, integration discourse must be incorporated into any
examination of this peculiar political system. However, on its own, integration
discourse is no longer an adequate approach to the exploration of the EU because it
provides too little insight into the workings of the system and concentrates
excessively on the relationship between specific territorial entities within this
system.29
Chapters four, five and seven provide empirical evidence for the duality between
national and supranational forces. Chapters four and five aim however principally to
test the suitability for EU policy-making of some well established macro-level
conceptual frameworks. Both chapters revolve around the presentation and analysis
of large parts of the field data carried out for the thesis, but include, where
appropriate, references to other studies of policy-making in the EU.
Chapters four and five also demonstrate that the variety in the EU policy processes
necessitates a more flexible, case studies based, conceptual framework.
Consequently, chapter six centres on a discussion of policy networks analysis, which
is now widely used to conceptualise policy case studies, and assesses the merits and
limitations of this analytic approach to EU policy case studies. It is argued that the
28 The material on European integration theories is now vast, but some particularly salient
(though not unproblematic) and recent discussions on this topic are: W. Wallace, 'Introduction:
the Dynamics of European Integration' in Wallace, W. (ed.) The Dynamics of European
Integration, Pinter Publishers, 1990, pp. 1-26; S. Hix, 'Approaches to the Study of the EC: the
Challenge to Comparative Politics', West European Politics, 17(1), 1994, pp.1-30. Nelsen and
Stubb (1994) have recently also produced a badly needed reader on European Integration
Discourse: B.F. Nelsen & A. C-G. Stubb (eds), The European Union: Readings on the Theory
and Practice of European Integration, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994.
29 This point will be argued in greater detail in Chapter three.
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value of policy networks analysis as an explanatory tool is controversial, but that it
constitutes a useful point of departure for the design of a more satisfactory
framework for the analysis of EU policy case studies. Chapter seven, which contains
the case study on food policy-making, attempts to test the main premises elaborated
in Chapter six. As stated earlier, it also provides more detailed and in-depth
empirical data on policy-making in the EU at the sub-systemic level. Hence, this
chapter revolves around the presentation and analysis of the data collected during
the field research for the thesis, too. The case study in Chapter seven focuses on
food policy for the following reasons:
1. Common food policy making has a long tradition in the EC and the first EC
directive adopted by the Council of Ministers (1962) concerned food
colouring.30
2. Food policy symbolises the recent fundamental change in the EC's approach to
legislation, following the Cassis de Dijon ruling by the European Court of
Justice (ECJ) in 1979.'
3. Food policy-making is directed by an extraordinary mixture of political,
technical, socio-cultural and economic considerations.32
30 D. Buchan & N. Coichester, Europe Relaunched, Hutchinson Business Books, 1990.
31 See Chapter two.
32 Numerous interviews confirmed that food policy had indeed been a mixture of technical and
highly political, and thus potentially ignitable, policy making (see also quotes in Chapter
seven). The observation sessions in the ESC (see Section 1.4.5.) corroborated these findings:
some policies raised purely technical queries, others were clearly guided by political, indeed
even philosophical, convictions. This interpretation is further borne out in appropriate
literature, e.g. P. Gray, 'How EC Legislation will Affect your Future' in Brace, G. & Patten, L.
(eds.) Food and Beverage: Europe 1993, Sterling Publications, 1992, pp.31-3. (For further
references, see also Chapter seven.)
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4. Food policy-making in the EU has been closely mediated by the Common
Agricultural Policy (CAP), so demonstrating the interdependent nature of
much sectoral policy-making.
5. Food policy-making in the EU takes place at the interface between nationalism
and supranationalisrn, so reflecting the dichotomous character of the EU.33
6. European food policy output directly affects every person living in the EU, but
is obviously of particular significance to the European food and drinks
processors who, in total, are the biggest contributors to jobs and value added
in the EU.34
7. Some areas of the food and drinks processing industries were already highly
integrated at the European levels, others were not, when the Single European
Act was signed in 1986. Consequently, it is an important case study to monitor
the varied impact of this policy package on European industry. The validity of
this study is further enhanced because the food sector contains firms of all
sizes and, hence, demonstrates how size - which is frequently related to
economic power - can mediate policy impact.
The level of integration is extremely varied for different policy sectors, with some of
the key sectors, like foreign and security policy, not having developed much beyond
a commitment towards greater consultation and co-operation. Consequently, it
See especially Chapters two, three and five on the interaction between nationalism and
supranationalism in the EU.
For further details, see Chapter seven as well as, e.g. P. Cecchini, M. Catinat & A. Jacqueniin
(eds.), The European Challenge 1992 - the Benefits of a Single Market, Wilwood House
Publishing, 1988, pp.57-61.
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would be truly absurd to draw general conclusions from the case study which fulfils
nonetheless three, more limited, aims. It demonstrates the variety of policy patterns
in the EU, even within one particular sector. It reveals that, even in a long
established EU policy sector, national interests continue to mediate quasi-
supranational policy-making. It constitutes a testing ground for policy networks
analysis as adapted for EU policy-making in Chapter six.
Unless a post-modern view of policy making is adopted, questions about how
individual case studies reflect upon the nature of an entire political system are
nonetheless indispensable. 35 The Conclusion (Chapter eight) includes therefore a
brief discussion on the relationship between case studies and the wider political
system, based on the findings in the thesis.
It is not the purpose of the thesis to discuss in great detail the respective merits of post-
modernism and modernism. Nonetheless, Chapter three contains some brief references to post-
modernism and the European Union. However, the thesis takes a quasi-modernist approach in
that it rejects the idea that there is no essence to phenomena such as the European Union. By
contrast to traditional modernist belief; the project questions whether such an essence can be
captured adequately and during the evolution of a body politic, rather than in hindsight only. In
this respect, some of the deliberations on the nature of the EU in the thesis are philosophically
related to the existentialist belief that complete essence is achieved only at the moment of death
or another form of total stagnation, such as the full-scale collapse of a body politic, and is
therefore only then fully accessible to analysis. Essence is thus seen as a process which achieves
its apex at the point of stagnation only, but which is nonetheless continuously evolving, with
certain elements becoming irretrievably part of the final essence, but with the persistent
opportunity for change through wilful interaction. The relationship between existence and
essence and the role of the latter in human beings' lives has been widely discussed by
existentialist philosophers, but is particularly poignantly depicted in Huis-Clos, a short theatre
piece by Jean-Paul Sartre. {J-P. Sartre, Huis-Clos, Methuen Educational Library, 1987. }
Although existentialists were concerned with human essence, there is a case to be made for the
application of some of their views to a body politic, since the latter is formed and influenced by
human behaviour. The relationship between such behaviour and institutionalisation will be
further discussed in Chapters two and three, but this relationship is undoubtedly interactive, and
hence, affected by wilful human action. It is not appropriate to mount a critique of
existentialism in this thesis but its shortcomings are partially related to an excessive belief in
free human will and the potential of humans to reshape institutions, etc. In this respect, further
discussions on the topic will distance themselves noticeably from classical existential
arguments, although they strongly endorse the existentialist rejection of philosophical, social
and political determinism.
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1.4.	 Aims of the Thesis
The main aims of the thesis derive from the above observations and are as follows:
1. To examine the formal and informal aspects of the policy process
(formulation, implementation, impact) in the European Union by way of a
comprehensive policy study. The study includes general considerations as well
as a case study of food policy-making and is based primarily on field research
(mail surveys, interviews, non-participatory observation, examination of
documentation). Where appropriate, secondary literature on other EU policy
studies is utilised, too.
2. To explain how and to what extent the examination of the policy process
reveals the dynamics and characteristics of the European Union.
3. To devise a suitable conceptual basis for the study of the EU policy process,
through a critical appraisal of established approaches to policy-making and an
adaptation of policy networks analysis.
4. To test the adapted conceptual framework by way of a policy networks case
study (on food policy; see also aim 1).
5. To critically evaluate the methodological approaches used to collect original
data for the thesis.
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1.5.	 Methodology
1.5.1.	 Introduction to the Discussion on Methodology
Several techniques were used to compile the 'raw material' for this thesis: two
independent mail surveys, including a pilot and a small follow up survey relating to
the second mail survey; semi-structured and informal interviews; non-participant
observation, study of documentation such as annual reports of trade associations,
minutes of meetings; attendance of relevant seminars (mainly on food law and food
policy), study of secondary literature and audio-visual information.
The main features of the mail surveys, interviews and non-participant observation
are briefly summarised below, but the other techniques are not discussed separately,
since they are part and parcel of any academic research. Appropriate questionnaires,
sets of interview questions and a list of interviewees are all in Appendices I to 111.36
Appendix I contains in addition a detailed discussion of the learning experience
gained from the larger of the two mail surveys undertaken, because this cross-
national survey raised many interesting methodological points, which could not
possibly be adequately summarised within the main structure of the thesis.
Nonetheless, a brief outline of its main features is provided below for reference
purposes.
The results of the field work are not discussed in one or two specific chapters -
although Chapters four, five and seven contain the bulk of the field data that were
36 All questionnaires were designed in English and then translated into French and German by the
author of the thesis; however, for reasons of manageability, Appendices I and II contain the
English versions oniy. The same goes for all related correspondence and the pool of interview
questions (see Appendices 1-111).
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selected for presentation and analysis - but are introduced throughout the thesis, as
appropriate, and are interlaced with secondary literature and theoretical
considerations. This approach reflects the close relationship between theory and
empirical data that informs policy analysis.
1.5.2.	 Mail Survey on the Perceptions of. and Responses to, the Single
European Market by British. French and German Food and Drinks
Processors
The field work for the MPhil stage of this thesis was based on a large cross-national
mail survey (France, Germany, UK) on the perceptions of; and responses to, the
Single European Market (SEM) by British, French and German food and drinks
processors. A pilot of 20 questionnaires took place in early 1990. Five completed
questionnaires (25%) were returned and, after some appropriate amendments, the
main survey was launched in October 1990, with addresses taken from a computer
based random access search of Dunn & Bradstreet's list of food and drinks
processors. 37 Data analysis began in autumn 1991. Questionnaires contained 39 pre-
coded questions, including a number of multi-variables, and an explanatory letter,
instructions and two support letters (see Appendix I) from relevant official
organisations. Two follow up letters were mailed but for financial reasons they
contained no further questionnaires, nor stamped addressed envelopes.
A total of 2,100 questionnaires were dispatched; 700 to each participating country.
Some 102 valid responses were obtained in total, although not all questions have
been answered, or answered properly, on each valid response. Hence, in certain
areas valid responses may be as low as 75 or thereabouts. The distribution along
7 For a brief discussion of the problems associated with this choice, see Appendix I.
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national lines is relatively even (UK:41; F:29; G;32). Appendix I contains a
discussion on the reasons for the low response rate.
In the sample, small businesses dominated heavily in that 87% of respondents
employed 250 or less staff; with only 6% of respondents employing 1,000 or more
staff. This peculiar profile reflects more or less the actual structure of the European
food and beverage industries and has been taken into account during the discussion
of the findings.
The survey data were analysed with the help of SPSS/PC and, following Bryman
and Cramer's recommendations, the resulting tables and figures are based on
univariate and bivariate analysis (cross-tabulation), including, in the latter case, Chi-
square tests so as to establish the absence or presence of a significant relationship.38
The data are not representative, given the small number of responses and statistically
relevant relationships. 39 Nonetheless, it was feasible to use the results as indicators
of probable trends. Hence, they provided a useful basis for further in-depth
investigation through qualitative approaches. Although not all the data are directly
referred to, they inform many of the discussions in the thesis and are particularly
relevant to the case study on food policy in Chapter seven.40
38 A. Bryman & D. Cramer, Quantitative Data Analysis for Social Scientists, Routledge, 1990.
Chapter seven and parts of several earlier chapters reveal the very small number of statistically
relevant relationships and, simultaneously, acknowledge that, where such relationships appear,
they are probably not representative because of the small size of samples; a problem illustrated
here as well as in two publications by the author and based on the survey data: B. Boyce, 'The
Single European Market and the Food and Drinks Processing Industries of France, Germany
and the UK', European Research, 3(3), 1992, pp.6-li, and, B. Boyce, 'Human Resources
Development, Training, and the Single European Market: A Case Study of the Food and Drinks
Processing Industries of the United Kingdom, France and Germany' in Shaw, J.B., Kirkbride,
P.S., Rowland, K.M. & Ferris, G.R. (eds.) Research in Personnel and Human Resources
Management, International Human Resources Management, Supplement 3, 1993, pp.2 11-38.
40 The synopsis of the questionnaire results in Appendix I confirms that it was not necessary to
present the results of each individual question in the main body of the thesis, since a number of
recurring trends can be deduced from the responses.
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1.5.3.	 Mail Survey on Lobbying and the Single European Market
The main stage of the field research that informs the thesis centred on an
examination of interest representation and policy-making in the EU. This material
forms the basis for the discussions of Chapters four, five and seven, and informs
many of the debates in other chapters of the thesis.
Due to financial and time restraints, it was impossible to exploit by interview alone
the wealth of relevant data on policy-making and lobbying in the EU, available from
Eurocrats, MEPs, trade officials, lobbyists, industrialists and politicians. Hence, in
addition to widespread interviewing (see 1.5.4), a mail survey for this stage of the
research was carried out between autumn 1991 and summer 1992 so as to tap at
least some of the insider knowledge in a relatively cheap and uncomplicated way.
The questionnaires were again produced in English, French and German (see
Appendix II for a speciment in English); they were not precoded, but requested
short written answers in order to be more compatible with the data collection by
way of interviews (see Section 1.5.4.). However, in a few cases, numerical analysis
was worthwhile, as can be seen from the appropriate discussions in the thesis.
The 300 questionnaires which were dispatched produced 87 valid answers; that is a
response rate of 29 %. Although this response rate is much sounder than the one for
the first mail survey (see Appendix I), it cannot be regarded as representative either,
given that the response rate is still well under 50% and that the sample is small.4'
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Yet, the data can again be used as indicators of possible trends, because every effort
has been made to be as precise as possible during the collection and analysis of data.
Moreover, collected data can be meaningftil, even if it is neither statistically
significant, nor representative. 42 Given the limitations of scope and manageability,
meaningful data is all that has been aimed at in the thesis.
1.5.4.	 Interviews
Approximately one hundred interviews were carried out for the thesis (see Appendix
III), mainly, but not exclusively, between April 1991 to April 1992. Interviewees
came from various walks of life and included, local, national and European
politicians, local, national and European civil servants, consultants and lobbyists,
41 On the issue of representativeness, see for example M.B Youngman (ed.), Designing and
Analysing Questionnaires, TRC-Rediguides Publications, 1982. Youngman maintained quite
correctly that any response rate under 50% was suspect with regard to representativeness,
particularly in a small sample where only response rates above 80% could be claimed to be
genuinely representative. Bearing these considerations in mind, it follows that both surveys, and
especially the larger one, are intrinsically problematic where representativeness is concerned.
The issue is pursued in more depth in Appendix I, during the detailed discussion on
methodology with regard to the larger of the two mail surveys.
42 See for example L. Kish, 'Problems in Statistical Analysis' in Hayes, L.D. & Hedlund, RD.
(eds.) The Conduct of Political Inquiry: Behavioural Political Analysis, Prentice-Hall, 1970,
pp.153-8. Kish persuasively discussed the complex relationship between the terms "statistically
significant" and "meaningful". The discussion stressed the importance of the size of sample in
relation to these tenns, since, in small samples, results that were meaningful would more often
appear as statistically insignilicant than in large examples, where a statistically significant
relationship was more likely to be uncovered. Meaningful, in Kish's terms, meant something
that needed to be explained or that was worthwhile explaining. While this interpretation is
inevitably subjective, it is nonetheless a useful indicator of the notion of meaningfulness, and
hence, has been adopted in the thesis; particularly since Kish's discussion illustrated that there
was also a certain subjectivity surrounding the concept of "statistically relevant". A similar line
of thought was adopted by D.A. De Vaus, Surveys in Social Research, Unwin Hyman, 1990,
2nd edition. De Vaus emphasised that cross-tabulation was in the first instance concerned with
whether there was an association of some kind between two variables or whether these were
entirely independent. Hence, in De Vaus' view, a relationship was meaningful if two variables
were in some way(s) and/or to some extent associated with one another. For small scale
research, the discovery and evaluation of such relationships is the only appropriate way of
handling data. Any attempts to make much of statistically relevant or irrelevant correlations is
absurd.
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industrialists, representatives from trade unions and trade associations, academics.43
In an effort to update the interview material, 10 re-interviews (see Appendix III)
were carried out in early 1994. Answers did not seem to vary significantly which
was reassuring, given the inevitable time lapse between the earlier interviews and the
presentation of the evaluated data.
A small number of interviews centred on organisational responses to the SEM, but
the bulk concentrated on the main theme of the thesis, that is European policy-
making and integration. Given the variety of interviewees it would have been
nonsensical to have one fixed interview schedule; hence, appropriate interview
schedules were designed individually, "dipping" into a pool of questions (see
Appendix Ill). In addition, all interviewees were given an opportunity to add their
own comments. This strategy proved to be fruitful and so was the occasional
probing. Given this approach, interview length varied considerably - between 15
' Regrettably, many interviewees insisted on anonymity, but evezy effort has been made in the
thesis to indicate the sources of quotes and specific information in the thesis as closely as
possible. Appendix III contains a list of interviewees.
' Various "re-interviewing" or "follow -up interviewing" techniques have been used in the thesis
on a small scale. The 1994 interviews aimed to test whether people had significantly changed
their minds about issues, given the arrival and ratification of the Maastricht Treaty between
1991 and 1994. For reasons of manageability these interviews were limited to Brussels. With
regard to both mail surveys, some follow-up work was carried out: willing participants were
given open ended follow up questionnaires; alternatively they were visited or contacted by
telephone so as to obtain further information and/or to check that they had not changed their
mind in the meantime. The re-interviewing and follow-up interviewing techniques produced
much valuable material, albeit from a specifically willing and enthusiastic group. Although the
contexts are all different, the validity of returning in one way or another to original sources of
information is acknowledged in discussions such as A. Bryman, Quantity and Quality in Social
Research, Unwin Hyman, 1988, or, D. Buchanan, D. Boddy, & J. McCalman, 'Getting in,
Getting on, Getting out, Getting back' in Bmyman A. (ed.) Doing Research in Organizations,
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1988, pp.53-67, or, G. Hahlo, 'Examining the Validity of Re-
interviewing Respondents for Quantitative Surveys', Journal of the Market Research Society,
34(2), 1992, pp. 99-1 17.
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minutes and 3 hours approximately. About two thirds of the interviews were taped;
notes were taken during the other meetings.45
Cross-national interviewing is costly and time consuming, but, with regard to this
project, it has produced a wealth of usable data, based on the contributions of an
extremely varied target group. Interviewing was the most successful technique to
retrieve helpful information from such a wide range of participants and with regard
to so many different aspects of European policy-making and integration. Inevitably,
the material cannot be considered representative, given the heterogeneity of the
target groups, the variety of sub-themes within interviews and the limited number of
interviewees. However, as stipulated above, the overall aim of the field work was
not to produce representativeness, but to produce meaningful material for debate.46
Efforts were made to respect the cultural environment of the interviewees, including
adequate preparation for interviews, time-keeping, respect for professional limits to
openness, adoption of the preferred language of the interviewee whenever possible.
' There were two reasons for not taping interviews. Some interviewees refused, but some
interviews were not taped so as to see if this produced more intimate information. Differences
seemed slight, but there were more very frank remarks among those interviewees that were not
taped. For highly sensitive subjects, it may thus be more fruitful not to tape, even though taping
is usually advised; see for example W. Belson, 'The Methods of Survey Interviewing:
Fundamental Skills and Advanced Techniques', 1 Day Course run by William Belson Ltd.
Survey Research Centre, attended by the author of the thesis in 1990, as well as, C.A. Moser &
G. Kalton, Survey Melhods in Social Investigation', Gower, 1989, 2nd edition. In the final
analysis, a decision has to be made for each interview, taking into account circumstances.
46 Two further comments on representativeness are necessaiy. First, when discussed, the notion of
representativeness is ofien wrongly based on the assumption that target groups are relatively
homogenous and/or tangible. For example, many social surveys are concerned with even
distribution between genders, between age ranges, class, etc. However, in the case of this study,
the target groups are complex and relatively intangible. For example, food processors can also
be lobbyists or experts working for the European Commission, so they cannot simply be
grouped into one or other target group. Furthermore, groups such as Euro-lobbyists are an ill-
definable, constantly changing entity, and it would be almost impossible to put a number to
such a group, hence it would be equally impossible to determine what proportion the sample
constituted. The second point is related: given that the thesis is concerned with several, albeit
linked target groups, all of which are sizeable, it would be nonsensical to aim at creating overall
representativeness, given the limited scope of the thesis.
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Given the friendly reception by most interviewees these efforts paid off. 47 It was
hardest to arrange interviews in France, even though interviewees were very helpful
once they had agreed to participate. This finding may be coincidental but it does fit
in with the considerable evidence that in France people have traditionally felt uneasy
about discussing the role of informal influences in the decision-making processes.48
1.5.5.	 Non-Participant Observation in the Economic and Social Committee
During April 1992, non-participant observation of some ESC working sessions took
place. Although this experience was more limited in scope than the surveys and
interviews, it provided unprecedented insight into one part of the decision-making
processes of the European Union. 49 In combination with the other methods it proved
very useful. Extensive non-participatory observation at all levels and stages of EU
policy-making would have been ideal, but was neither permitted nor feasible from
the point of view of resources. Moreover, the material gathered by survey and
interview helped to make sense of the observed situations which were characterised
very much by insider rituals and language that may not be comprehensible to
somebody who had not already acquired prior knowledge of the cultural setting. In
47 Literature confirms the importance of respecting such basic cultural aspects. See for example, J.
Rothman, Using Research in Organizations: a Guide to Successful Applications, Sage, 1980,
or, Management Decision, 1-low should Questionnaires and Interviews be Planned?', 28(5),
1990, pp.28-31.
48 For appropriate references, see Chapters five and seven.
Observation is widely used in social science research but its merits are frequently challenged,
particularly by proponents of quantitative approaches to research, due to associated problems
with subjectivity. On the other hand, it has tended to be a favourite approach with
ethnographers. This research study benefited from the addition of observation, but, as stated
above, within the context of a broader methodological framework. For valuable discussions on
this controversy and/or observation as a methodological tool in general, see for example De
Vaus op. cit.; M. Mies, 'Towards a Methodology for Feminist Research', in Hammerstey, M.
(ed.) What's Wrong with Ethnography?, Routledge, 1993, pp.64-82.
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the case of said observation, the possession of such knowledge therefore vastly
outweighed the complications arising from cultural filtration.50
1.5.6.	 Methodology: Some Concluding Remarks
It is evident from the above discussion that the collection of data is intrinsically
problematic and controversial, whatever the methods and the standards used. Every
effort has been made throughout the research to take these difficulties into account
and the same goes for the dilemmas and shortcomings specific to this study. Hence,
analysis is generally cautious and generalisations have been avoided, but the data
have been exploited as much as possible. The thesis is therefore laced with
references to the material gathered during the field research. The overall quality of
this research data has been improved considerably by combining considerable
quantitative and qualitative material, 5 ' because it allowed simultaneously for wide
and deep perspectives. Hence, the basic research design for this study has been
successftil, given the limitations imposed by resources and accessibility.
50 It is probably impossible to make sense of observations entirely outside one's own cultural
framework, thereby mediating observed facts; an issue which has been thoroughly debated
elsewhere and is taken into account here. For a lucid debate on the issue, see for example S.
Korner, 'On the Relation Between Conimonsense, Science and Metaphysics' in Griffiths, P.
(ed.) A.J. Ayer: Memorial Essays, Cambridge University Press, 1991.
1 This is not the place to discuss the respective merits of quantitative and qualitative research
and to challenge the traditional view that there is a non bridgeable gulf between the two
approaches. Nonetheless, it must be emphasised that, as is the case here, the two approaches are
increasingly used in conjunction, and the wisdom that they should not be linked has been
widely challenged. This challenge is especially justified since "quantitative methodology" has
oflen been treated as if it were simply synonymous to numerical data analysis and "qualitative
methodology" to non-numerical research. In reality, the matter is much more complicated, but
also less clear cut than this dichotomy assumes, because the notions of quantitative and
qualitative have in the past wrongly been associated with those of objective and subjective
respectively. The rejection of the simplistic dichotomy is confirmed and discussed in many
competent works on research methodology, e.g. Bryman (ed.) op.cit., 1988; Hammersley,
op. cit.
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CHAPTER TWO:
THE EU: LE THEATRE DE L'AMBIGU'
2.1.	 Introduction
Chapter two provides a brief account of the pressures that led to the formation of
the European Communities. It is important to be aware of the major pressures for
formal European integration, since they set the parameters within which debate over
the shape and objectives of the EC has taken place since. Within these parameters
there have always been conflicting points of view and visions and, hence, the EC
became complex, institutionally diffuse and rather 'cobbled together'. As such it had
to be riddled with ambiguities. 2 It has developed significantly since the late 1950s
Calvet, a French journalist, eloquently referred to the TEU as "le théâtre de l'ambigu". {J.
Calvet, 'Maastricht, le théátre de l'ambigu', Le Monde, 9 avril 1992, p.2.} It is a suitable way of
referring to the EU in general, since the expression immediately draws attention to the
"...complex, halting and uneven progress of European integration..."that is " . ..susceptible to a
number of interpretations." {R. Morgan, 'European Integration and National Interests',
Government and Opposition, 29(1), 1994, p.128.}
While there was basic agreement on the need for a mechanism that would promote economic
growth and political stability, there was no agreement as to what exact shape such a mechanism
should take. Views were vezy different, often cutting across established organisations such as
political parties, trade unions, etc. The matter was exacerbated by the absence of an autonomous
European ideology, since, to some, Europeanism was merely a vague notion of a common
Europe. "Clearly an attachment to 'European' values is the monopoly of no School of
Thought. ..Europe is...a symbol which seems useful to Conservatives, Liberals, Christian
Democrats and Socialists, to lawyers, economists, geographers and political scientists..." {E.B.
Haas, The Uniting of Europe, Stanford University Press, 1958, pp.20-8. } On the basis of this
evidence, Europeanism can also be understood as a symbol for the interaction of established sets
of ideas, e.g. Christian democracy, social democracy, liberalism, pluralism, etc.. Arguably
Europeanism is still not an autonomous ideology, a point which is briefly developed in B.
Boyce, 'Interest Representation in the European Community, European Integration and the
Concept of Europeanisni', History of European Ideas, 19(1-3), 1994, pp.153-9 (copy of
publication is enclosed in a folder at the end of the thesis) and developed further in B. Boyce,
'What is Europeanism? Paper presented at the IVth International Conference for the Study of
European Ideas, Karl-Franzens-Universitiit, 22-27 August 1994. The validity of reading
Europeanism in this particular way is supported elsewhere, e.g. in P. Schlesinger, 'Europeaness'
- a New Cultural Battlefield?' in Pohoryles, R.J. et al. (eds.) European Transformations: Five
Decisive Years at the Turn of the Century, Ashgate Publishing, 1994.
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but its original design has continued to influence this development; a point expanded
upon during this chapter. The chapter also contains a selective institutional inquest -
an integral part of any policy analysis - covering the intricacies and controversies
that are endemic to the formal structure of the EU. 3 The conclusion sets out to
demonstrate that, despite many grey areas, the EU is not simply an "unidentifiable
political object". 4 It is undoubtedly "a strange animal" which is difficult to analyse
and "not easily understood", but even the preliminary deliberations in this chapter
uncover some signposts and basic rules of the game.4
There is no scope to consider in detail the many grey areas of European politics, let alone the
entire institutional set-up. Furthermore, a lengthy discussion is not necessaiy since it would
simply lead to the same points being made over and over again and/or repeat work already
successfully carried out elsewhere.
For more complete institutional analysis, see for example a range of general texts, such as N.
Nugent, The Government and Politics of the European Union, Macmillan, 1994, 3rd edition;
D. Dinan, Ever Closer Union? An Introduction to the European Community, Macmillan, 1994.
There are also many useful texts on individual institutions, e.g. M. Westlake, A Modern Guide
to the European Parliament, Pinter Publishers, 1994; S. Bulmer & W. Wessels, The European
Council: Decision-making in European Politics, Macmillan, 1987. E. Kirchner, Decision-
making in the European Community: the Council Presidency and European Integration, St.
Martin's Press, 1992. P. Ludlow, 'The European Commission' in Keohane, RO. & Hoffmann,
S. (eds.). The New European Community: Decision-making and Institutional Change, Westview
Press, 1991, Ch. 3; N.L. Brown & F.G. Jacobs, The Court of Justice of the European
Communities, Sweet & Maxwell, 1989, 3rd edition. F. Snyder (ed.), European Community Law,
Volumes I and II, Dartmouth Publishing, 1993.
4 Jacques Delors used the expression "unidentifiable political objects", albeit apparently in a light
hearted manner. {See Allum op.clt., p.17.)
Tyszkiewicz talked about a "strange animal". {Z.J.A. Tyszkiewicz, 'Influencing the European
Legislator', Speech by the Secretary General of UNICE, 1990.)
A.M. Sbragia, 'Thinking about the European Future: The Uses of Comparison' in Sbragia
op.cit., p.257, conceded that it was extremely difficult to understand the nature of the EU.
Recently, Guggenbuhl added to the game of words that aims to conjure up the mysterious nature
of the EU: A. Guggenbuhi, 'L'Union européenne, un drôle d'ani,nal social', European Institute
of Public Administration, No.2, 1995, pp.134
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2.2.	 The Main Pressures for European Integration:
Economic and Political Considerations
At the end of the second World War the time to unify Europe seemed ripe.
Excessive nationalism was politically and morally discredited. In the final analysis,
the close marriage between capitalism and nationalism had not led to long term
economic health. 5 On the contrary, Europe was economically destroyed. The search
for a forum that would facilitate economic growth and - so it was assumed -
subsequent political stability, thus began. For example, Winston Churchill talked
about providing the "European Family" with "...a structure under which it can dwell
in peace, in safety and in freedom." 6 Robert Schuman was likewise convinced that
"world peace cannot be safeguarded without the making of creative efforts
proportionate to the dangers which threaten jt." After a number of abortive
attempts, the European Communities finally emerged between 1951 and 1957. In
view of the major pressures for unification, their primary purpose was to create
economic wealth and political stability, and not to supplant the nation state! For the
For valuable discussions on this relationship, see for example it Dahrendorf Der Liberalism us
und Europa, R. Piper & Co. Verlag, 1979. J. Mayall, Nationalism and International Society,
Cambridge University Press, 1990. J.R. Lobera, The God ofModernity, Berg Publishers, 1994,
Ch. 3. P.M. Pilbeam (ed.), Themes in Modern European History: 1780-1830, Routledge, 1995.
6 W.S. Churchill, 'Complete Speeches, 1897-1963, Vol. VII, 1943-1949': Speech at ZUrich
University, 19 September 1946', Reprinted in Nelsen & Stubb op.cit., p.6.
it Schuman, 'Europe-A Fresh Start: the Schuman Declaration, 1950-90: Opening Speech to
Introduce the Plan for the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community', Reprinted in
Nelsen & Stubb op.cit., p.11.
8 Noticeably, the abortive efforts to create a United States of Europe that led, in 1948/9, to the
Council of Europe and the failed attempt in 1954 to create a European Defence Community.
For detailed examinations into these events, see for example E. Fursdon, The European
Defence Co,nmunily: a History, Macmillan, 1980; it Mayne, Federal Union: the Pioneers,
Macmillan, 1990; D. Weigall & P. Stirk (eds.), The Origins and Development of the European
Community, Leicester University Press, 1992.
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vast majority of Europeans, a reduction in national autonomy was merely a price
that had to be paid, and not an end in itself. Yet, there are clear indications in the
Treaties of the European Communities that it would be inevitable, or indeed
desirable, to restructure the entire European system of nation states in order to
achieve the primary objectives of European integration. In other words, it was
thought that economic 'engineering' could not take place without political
'engineering' and that European integration had to be political as well as economic.9
This crucial assumption has however repeatedly been challenged by proponents of a
purely economic structure and, hence, deserves further attention.
Holland argued that the stark contrast between the relative success of brief
economic co-operation in the nineteenth century, culminating in the creation of the
Zollverein (1834), and the disastrous outcomes of the two world wars promoted the
view that European unity in the economic area became the precondition for
prosperity.'0 Nonetheless, early attempts to create European unity involved overt
political ambitions, but, following the failures to establish fully blown defence and
political unions in 1948/9 and 1954, efforts increasingly concentrated on economic
integration, at least in the first instance. Yet, even though "European integration
has been and continues to be largely about economics...", it is about "...economics
which has wider political ramifications." This assessment is symbolised in the
preambles to the ECSC and the EEC Treaties. The point is particularly obvious in
the preamble to the ECSC Treaty which reads as follows:
See notably, J. Monnet, 'A Ferment of Change', Journal of Common Market Studies, 1(2), 1962,
pp.203-il, but also, e.g. Ionescou who regarded the Common Market merely as "...thin end of a
thick political wedge." { G. Ionescou 'Introduction' in Ionescou, 0. (ed.), Between Sovereignty
and Integration, Croom Helm, 1974, p.15.)
10 M. Holland, Unconmon Market: Capital, Class and Power in the European Community,
Macmillan, 1980.
11 L. Tsoukalis op.cit; p.2.
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"Resolved to substitute for age-old rivalries the merging of their essential interests; to
create, by establishing an economic community, the basis for a broader and deeper
community among peoples long divided by bloody conflicts; and to lay the
foundations for institutions which will give a direction to a destiny henceforward
shared,..."12
Following the rejection of the 1954 proposals by the French National Assembly,
references to political ambitions are veiled, but nonetheless present:
"Determined to lay the foundations of an ever closer union among the peoples of
Europe, resolved to ensure the economic and social progress of their countries by
common action to eliminate the barriers which divide Europe,.. .affirming as the
essential objective of their efforts the constant improvement of the living and
working conditions of their peoples,..."2
The preamble to the EEC Treaty also expresses the desire to create a Customs
Union and underlines the wish to create wealth through economic integration for the
peoples of Europe. Indeed, during the initial stages, the merging of economic
resources led to a significant increase of intra-EEC trade and to rapid economic
growth during the 1950s and 1960s which outstripped growth rates in other
European countries and in most non-European countries 13 Hence, the logic of
economic integration seemed wholly convincing, thereby legitimising the joint
European venture.14
12 Preamble to the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (1951) and
Preamble to the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (1957), in Treaties
Establishing the European Co,nrnunities, Publications of the European Communities, 1987,
abridged edition.
13 D.H. Aldcroft, The European Economy: 1914-1980, Croom Helm, 1978.
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It is beyond doubt that the twentieth century has experienced growing economic
interdependence.' 5 However, in most instances such interdependence has not led to
4 Many studies argue that the growth in trade among EC members, resulting from growing
economic interdependence, primarily accounts for the expansion of economic integration and
the success of the early EEC in creating a Customs Union. establishing a place in the
international forum and attracting interest from other European countries for membership, i.e.
initially mainly from Britain. Increased intra-EEC trading was especially important for
economic integration because it was the consequence of genuine trade creation and not simply
trade diversion. For more detailed elaborations on this topic, see for example, P. Robson, The
Economics of International Integration, Allen and Unwin, 1987, 3rd edition. D. Mayes, 'The
Effects of Economic Integration on Trade' in Jacquemin, A. and Sapir, A. (eds.) The European
Internal Market, Oxford University Press, 1989.
This legitimation of the economic validity of the EC must however be viewed with caution since
it is impossible to determine what would have happened in terms of the member states' trade
patterns and economic growth rates if they had operated outside the newly formed structures of
the EC framework or if there had not been a common framework. Davenport also mentioned
how difficult it was to make sense of longitudinal data on the economic performance of
European countries, given that these economies had undergone vast changes during the post-
war era; hence, figures must be carefully interpreted. {M. Davenport, 'The Economic Impact of
the EEC' in Boitho, A. (ed.) The European Economy: Growth and Crisis, Oxford University
Press, 1982, Ch. 8. } Moreover, the economies of the member states have not been protected
from the vicissitudes of economic performance. Some accounts are therefore sceptical about the
economic benefits of the EEC, particularly in respect of individual countries. On this point, see
for example, N. Store, The Cost of Europe: History Casts Doubts on the European Dream,
Manchester University Press, 1992.
Numerous significant setbacks have also bedevilled economic integration, e.g. the collapse of
the Bretton Woods system and the all but nominal failure of the Exchange Rate Mechanism
(ERM). Obviously, such problems have tended to fuel doubts about claims of great economic
benefits, arising from economic integration. {For a confirmation of the ERM's shortcomings,
especially following the introduction of +1-15% bands, see for example T. Sancton, 'After the
Débâcle', TiME, 142(6), 16 August 1993, pp.16-23; The Economist, 'Green Shoots and Brussels
Sprouts', 332(7878), 27 August 1994, pp.21-2; T. Naudin, 'Bankers Confused over EMIJ
Agenda', The European, 9-15 December 1994, p.l7.} In view of the chequered past of
European economic integration, it is not surprising that the controversy over the benefits and
shortcomings of economic integration for member states and for the European Union as a whole
has continued to date, now centring primarily on full Economic and Monetaiy Union (EMLJ),
both with regard to its desirability and its feasibility. For pleas in favour of EMTJ, see for
example: P. Salin, 'Monetary Union or International Monetary Order', Economic Affairs, 9(6),
1989, pp. 13-6; C. De Boissieu, 'Communauté européenne: les avantages de l'union économique
et monétaire', Problè,nes Economiques, no. 2214, 27 février 1994, pp.1-5; M. Emerson & C.
Huhne, The ECU Report, Pan Books, 1991. Support for EMU continues, even in the Hpost..
ERM-débácle" era: Federal Trust for Education and Research, 'Towards the Single Currency,
PSI Publishing, 1995. For the case against EMIJ, see for example, M. Spicer, A Treaty Too Far:
a New Policy for Europe, Fourth Estate, 1992; I. Milne, Maastricht: the Case Against
Economic and Monetary Union, Nelson & Pollard, 1993.
See also Chapter three on this point.
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greater interstate integration. Consequently, non-economic incentives have to
interact with economic ones in order to lead to new interstate structures, particularly
if they are comprehensive and consist of genuine integration and not merely
formalised co-operation. 16 For these reasons, some observers have emphasised the
strong political connotations of the EC and argued that there has always been an
independent political agenda and that politics has not just come into European
integration as an overspill of economics, but in its own right.' 7 This claim is
supported by Jean Monnet's Memoirs, but these also show that the two spheres have
been indivisibly entwined, since economic logic and discourse has been used as the
16 A view supported, for example by B. Balassa, 'Introduction', The Theory of Economic
Integration, Allen and Unwin, 1962; A. Bressand, 'The 1992 Breakthrough and the Global
Economic Integration Agenda' in Story, J. (ed.) The New Europe: Politics, Government and
Economy since 1945, Blackwell, 1993, Ch. 13.
17 Resnick, Hinsley and Sbragia make good cases for this view, even prior to the adoption of the
TEU. (P. Resnick, 'The Function of the Modern State: in Search of a Theory' in Kazancigil, A.
(ed.) The State in Global Perspective, Gower Publishing, 1986, pp.155-82; F.H. Hinsley, 'The
European Community: a Body-politic or an Association of States?' The World Today, January
1989, pp.1-3.; Sbragia op.cit.)
Since 1993, it has become almost impossible to argue that there are no political ramifications to
European integration (See for example, H. Atkinson, 'Is Economic and Monetary Union in
Europe Possible Without Political Union?', Paper presented at the ESRC Conference on the
Evolution of Rules, Exeter University, 8-11 September 1994; A. Busch, 'The Crisis in the EMS',
Government and Opposition, 30(1), 1995, pp.80-96. ) Yet, there remain some die-hards who
maintain that the economic and political spheres can be separated, and hence advocate purely
economic integration, that is if they advocate any form of integration at all. Not surprisingly,
this view is mainly found among nec-liberals and/or monetarists. (See for example, R. Lewis,
'Bruges or Brussels?', Economic Affairs, 9(6), 1989, pp.6-8. Similarly, the founder of the
Bruges Group, P. Robertson, 'The Road from Bruges', Economic Affairs, 9(6), 1989, pp.8-10.
Certain well known contemporary politicians also play down the penetration of the political into
economic matters. For example, Kenneth Clarke (1995), British Chancellor since 1993,
recently claimed that it was possible to achieve EMU without treading on political ground.
{BBC 2 Television, Newsnight, spring 1995.) More commonly, the interlinking of the
economic and political realms is accepted, but sometimes reluctantly. (On this point, see for
example Dahrendorf op. cit; M. Howe, Europe and the Constitution After Maastricht, Nelson, &
Pollard, 1992.)
However, usually, debate centres on the following question: Is political integration primarily a
function of economic integration or do both forms of integration have independent, if
intertwined, agendas? The evidence in this thesis and elsewhere suggests that the latter is a
more convincing interpretation of European integration, although genuine political integration
is (a) still largely directed by economic concerns and (b) greatly hampered by nationalistic
politics.
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main driving force to pursue political aims. In 1950 Jean Monnet informed Robert
Schuman, the then French Foreign Minister, that "this proposal (ECSC) has an
essential political objective: to make a breach in the ramparts of national sovereignty
which will be narrow enough to secure consent, but deep enough to open the way
towards the unity that is essential to peace." 18 Not all those who have been involved
in European integration have held such political ambitions, and many may have
disapproved of them. For example, Lady Thatcher argued that "the Treaty of Rome
itself was intended as a Charter for Economic Liberty. But, that is not how it has
always been read, still less applied." 19 Undeniably, political ambitions were built into
the original Treaties and have arguably been reinforced in the Single European Act
(SEA, 1987) and the TEU. The political undercurrents have also surfaced on the
many occasions when senior European politicians have blatantly intervened in the
design and development of the EU.
During the immediate post-war era, Christian Democrat politicians such as Konrad
Adenauer (Germany), Robert Schuman (France), Alcide de Gasperi (Italy), Joseph
Bech (Luxembourg) were "...untiring advocates of European integration..." and
"...they were amongst the most important architects of European unity in the 1940s
and 1950s."2° These Christian Democrats rejected untamed economic liberalism and
insisted that European integration should amount to more than the creation of a free
18 j Moimet, Memoirs, Collins, 1978.
19 M. Thatcher, Speech given at the opening ceremony of the 39th academic year of the College of
Europe, Bruges, 20 September 1988, issued by the British Embassy Press Service in Brussels.
20 R.E.M. Irving, The Christian Democratic Parties of Western Europe Allen & Unwin, 1979,
p.234.
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market zone.21 Socialists too, reject purely economic integration. In fact, the
prospect of a market dominated Europe has caused much suspicion towards
integration, and the European Socialists have had a very chequered history with
regard to this issue, especially during the early post-war years when Paul-Henri
Spaak (Belgium) and Sicco Mansholt (The Netherlands) were the only prominent
Socialists directly associated with initiatives towards integration. 22 Socialists have
nonetheless always "actively participated in European debates..." 23 and have
increasingly advanced the political agenda for European integration in that they have
insisted that social, and increasingly, cultural and environmental issues figured on
Europe's agenda. 24 Besides a commitment towards comprehensive integration, post-
21 The influence of individual politicians, and in particular Christian Democrats, has widely been
acknowledged. The same goes for their reservations about freewheeling liberalism. See for
example, ibid or A. Daltrop, Political Realities: Politics and the European Community,
Longman, 1986, 2nd edition. H. Hürten, Der Beitrag Christlicher Demokraten zum geistigen
und politischen Wiederaufbau und zur europaischen Integration nach 1945: Bundesrepublik
Deutschland', pp.213-24. J-M. Mayeur, 'Einige Betrachtungen uber die Rolle der Christlichen
Demokratie in Frankreich beim AuThau der Demokratie und Europas nach 1945', pp.225-34. 0.
Vecchio, Der Beitrag der Christlichen Demokraten zum politischen Wideraufbau Italiens',
pp.235-68. All three accounts are published in Becker, W. & Morsey, R (Hg.). Christliche
De,nokratie in Europa, BOhlau Verlag, 1988. A recent paper, discussing the contribution of the
Church to European integration, made a similar point: M. Watson, 'The Churches and the 'New
Europe', Paper presented at the IVth International Conference for the Study of European Ideas,
Karl-Franzens-Universitiit, 22-27 August 1994.
22 A point confinned in K. Featherstone, Socialist Parties and European Integration, Manchester
University Press, 1988. Featherstone's work is in fact one of the most comprehensive accounts
of Socialist parties' attitudes and policies towards European integration, particularly as far as
the first few decades of integration are concerned. Note should be taken of Featherstone's
findings that the domestic context has been a powerful mediator in party attitudes and, also,
that Socialist parties must not be treated as homogenous entities with regard to their attitudes
towards European integration. This argument corresponds broadly with Bulmer's insistence that
the nature of the EU could only be understood, if domestic politics was taken into account. This
point is discussed in Chapter three. {S. Bulmer, 'Domestic Politics and European Community
Policy-making', Journal of Common Market Studies, 2 1(4), 1983, pp.349-63.}
23 • Mansholt in Featherstone op.cit., vii. For recent statements on European integration by
leading socialist and social democratic politicians, see for example, P. Dankert & A. Kooyman
op.cit, R. Ladrech, 'Social Democratic Parties and EC Integration: Transnational Party
Responses to Europe 1992', European Journal of Political Research, 24(2), August 1993,
pp.195-210.
24 See for example ibid., as well as, F. Prosche, Vers une Europe post-industrielle?, Economica,
1993.
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war politicians were driven by domestic political agendas. In each case, there were
good reasons to favour European integration. For example, integration was an ideal
recipe for preventing renewed excesses in Franco-German rivalry on the European
mainland. 25 Moreover, it gave both countries an opportunity to rehabilitate
themselves and assume increasingly joint - though not unchallenged - leadership.26
The BENELUX countries and Italy perceived European integration as the only
realistic means of exerting some influence on European reconstruction. In the case
of Italy, membership also offered an opportunity to bury the fascist past and to
alleviate internal political instability and the threat of a Communist Italy. 27 These
25 There are several lucid accounts that examine the post-war relationship between Germany and
France, notably, H. MUller-Roschach, Die deutsche Europapolitik: 1949-19 77, Europa-Union
GmbH Verlag, 1980; H. Simonian, The Privileged Partnership: Franco-German Relations and
the European Community: 1969-1984, Clarendon Press, 1985; P. Maillard, De Gaulle et
l'Allemagne: le rêve inachevé, Plon, 1990.
26 Franca-German, or increasingly sole German dominance has been a recurring theme in recent
years. See for example, A. Dauvergne, 'A Rendez-vous with Destiny, The European, 2 1-27
April 1995, p.9. There is some validity in Dauvergne's argument that, increasingly, Germany is
dominating over France too, but the argument is carried too far, ignoring the limits to
Germany's manoeuvrability. There are some more balanced accounts, e.g. R. Fritsch-
Bournatzel, 'Europa und die deutsche Einheit, Verlag Bonn Aktuell, 1990; B. Lippert & R.
Stevens-Ströhmann, German Unflcation and EC Integration, Pinter Publishers, 1993 K.
Goldmann, The Logic of Internationalism, Routledge, 1994. There are also some relatively
balanced views to be found in certain newspapers and magazines, particularly in the light of the
closing Mitterrand era in France; for example: A recent account in Der Spiegel discussed
certain strains in the Franco-German relationship and contemplated possible de-stabilising
effects, if this relationship was to suffer in the long-term, for example as a result of a turn
around in French European policy in the post-Mitterrand era. (Der Spiegel, 'Die EG lebt
gefährlich', Nr.35, 30. August 1993, S.134-6.) A recent article in The European expressed
similar concerns: V. Smart & I. Mather, 'Cracks Grow in Franco German Axis', The European,
21-27 October 1994, p.1. The impact of Jacques Delors' departure from European and national
politics on the Franca-German alliance has also been of concern, particularly to the French who
fear greater German dominance but, to some extent also to the Germans, especially with the
arrival of a non-Socialist French president. It is however as yet to early to consider the full
implications arising from the departure and arrival of key political figures. (For a brief account
of these concerns, see for example, A. Gumbel, 'Delors's 'no' derails French Socialists', The
Guardian, 12 December 1994, p.9.)
27 See for example, Vecchio op.cit.; Nugent op.cit.
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dynamics should not be underestimated but, in addition, the crucial political
influence of the USA on post-war West European development must be stressed.28
The USA wished to embed Germany firmly in a co-operating and stable Western
Europe, particularly following the division of Germany in 1949, the outbreak of the
Korean war in 1950 and the escalation of the Cold War throughout the 1950s and
beyond. Thus, Marshall Plan aid and political meddling in European reconstruction
came as a package deal; a point well put by Van der Beugel: "From the moment of
launching the Marshall Plan, it became apparent that European integration was a
major objective of American foreign policy." 29 Therefore, it must be concluded that
European integration has always been guided by a combination of economic and
political considerations, even though the association with economic well being has
remained the driving force and main legitimation for integration.
2.3.	 Marginal Pressures for European Integration:
Historical 1 Cultural and Geographical Considerations
Some supporters of a united Europe have argued that integration should come quite
naturally as a consequence of common historical, and to a lesser extent, cultural
experiences. For example, Hallstein was convinced that "...[united] Europe is no
creation. It is a rediscovery."30 This view is still held by a minority of today's
28 The crucial importance of US policy towards Europe and the arrival of the Cold War for
European integration is repeatedly made; see for example: J. Boesch, Weltgeschichte: von der
Aujklarung bis zur Gegenwart, Eugen Rentsch Verlag, 1977, Kpt. 43; F. Duchêne, 'Less or
More Europe? European Integration in Retrospect' in Crouch, C. & Marquand, D. (eds.) The
Politics of 1992: Beyond the Single European Market, Blackwell, 1990, Ch. 2; R.O. Keohane
& J.S. Nyc, 'Introduction: the End of the Cold War in Europe' in Keohane, R.O., Nye, J.S. &
Hoffmann, S. (eds.) After the Cold War: International Institutions and State Strategies in
Europe, 1989-1991, Harvard University Press, 1993, pp.1-22.
29 E.H. Van der Beugel, From Marshall Aid to Atlantic Partnership: European Integration as a
Concern ofArnerican Foreign Policy, Elsevier, 1966, p. 215.
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commentators on European integration.3 ' There are certainly some shared traditions,
especially prior to the Renaissance and Reformation periods, based mainly on what
Haas termed "...a unique amalgam of Greek-humanist, Roman-legal and Christian-
spiritual values". 32 Moreover, in its embryonic form, the idea of a united Europe pre-
dates the current century and can be traced back to the Middle Ages.33
The extent of a common heritage is however frequently exaggerated: "A thousand
years ago, Europe did not exist. A decade before the Millennium, the roughly thirty
million people who lived at the western end of the Eurasian land mass had no
compelling reason to think of themselves as a single set of people, connected by
history and common fate. Nor did they." 34 Tilly was referring to post-Greek and
post-Roman "Europe"! Other scholars have also come to the conclusion that early
developments in the geographical region that is now loosely termed "Europe" have
not created as much unity as is sometimes assumed. For example, de Sainte Lorette
confirmed that "L'histoire méme n'a pas rapproché les habitants de l'Europe autant
30 w Hallstein, 1972, as quoted in Nugent op.cit., pp.12-3. Walter Halistein was the first
President of the Commission of the European Communities.
31 For example, W. Van Grit, 'Early Milestones in European UnjJication, Paper presented at the
IVth International Conference for the Study of European Ideas, Karl-Franzens-Universitiit, 22-
27 August 1994; M. Dogan, 'The Decline of Nationalism within Western Europe', Comparative
Politics, 26(3), 1994, pp.281-306.
32 }I	 op.cit., p.20.
The earliest example usually cited is Pierre Dubois in the 13th Century, Duke of Sully, a French
Minister under Henri IV. The 17th Century British quaker, William Penn, talked about "a
European Dyet, parleament of ententes". In the 18th Century, Immanuel Kant wrote
Ewigen Frieden (Perpetual Peace) and in the 19th Century Victor Hugo stood out with his
passionate vision of a peaceful, united Europe. {I. Kant, Perpetual Peace, Westwood Village,
1932. }These are just a few examples of early notions of a united Europe. The peace theme is
usually central. However, none of these works amount to a political blueprint for a united
Europe. For valuable discussions on this topic, see for example L. de Sainte Lorette, L'idée
d'union federale européenne, Collection Armand Cohn, 1955. C. Schondube, Europa:
Taschenbuch, Europa Union Verlag, 1970. Goldmann op.cit., pp.1-17.
C. Tihly, Coercion, Capital and European Slates: AD 990-1992, Blackwell, 1992, revised
edition, p.38.
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qu'on l'imagine parfois, malgré un fonds commun."35 The argument of unity based
on Christian faith became farcical after the reformation, given the "murderous
squabbles and massacres" that followed the major division of the Christian
Church." 36 The onset of modernity and the evolution of the nation state halted any
previously existing cultural cohesion and feeling of an historically evolved unity,
leading to an era of increased fragmentation and rivalry. The extent to which this
development has led to spiritual, cultural and political diversity has been widely
documented.37
"The tradition of Europe thus means differentiation, individualism, and spiritual and
intellectual diversity." 38 Notwithstanding this heritage, after two world wars, efforts
were made to rekindle a sense of common European destiny, based on a distant, and
apparently harmonious, past. The fragmentation and its repercussions were usually
downplayed, arguing that nationalism was a recent phenomenon that had not entirely
displaced earlier oneness. These arguments are suspect. Moreover, if artificially
nurtured, they are bound to backfire sooner or later. For example, Schlesinger
warned that a renewed emphasis on Christian-spiritual values was hardly going to
allay multi-ethnic conflict in European member states or force Europe to come to
terms with the Jewish Holocaust. 39 Dwelling in the past thus lacks credibility and
"History has not brought the Europeans as closely together as is often assumed, despite some
common ground." de Sainte Lorette op.cit., p.5.
36 Patrice Chéreau, Director of many films, including La Reine Margot, used these expressions to
describe religious conflict between Catholics and Protestants in a recent interview with the
Neue Zurcher Zeitung, 'Europa - em Gemetzel', 18/19. September 1994, S.31.
See for example the following classical accounts of nationalism: E. Geilner, Nations and
Nationalism, Blackwell, 1983. E.J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780,
Cambridge University Press, 1992, 2nd edition.
38 B. Landheer, Limits and Problems of European Integration, Martinus Nijhoff, 1963, p.3.
Schlesinger op. cit.
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pragmatic value. There is little evidence that contemporary interpretations of
European identity are more promising, especially since it is increasingly unclear as to
what constitutes 'Europe', and hence European culture. It is disturbing that some
recent attempts to define Europeanity have been based on negative denominators,
namely the tendency to regard Europe as a fortress whose aim it is to defend
economic health and keep out undesirable immigrants. 4° O'Kane's finding that civil
war has historically been a greater incentive for unification than external enemies
casts additional doubt on such moribund endeavours, since, thankfully, this ploy may
not work as well as is sometimes assumed.41
The problems for those who push the idea of natural European unity do not stop
here. While it is undeniable that geographical and climatic factors have influenced
40 There is indeed a fairly marked trend to define "European commonness" in a negative way. For
conceptually based accounts supporting this view, see for example, P. Schlesinger, Media, State
and Nation: Political Violence and Collective Identities, Sage, 1991; P. Schlesinger, 'Media,
the Political Order and National Identity', Media, Culture and Society, 13(3), 1991, pp.297-
308. For empirical evidence of this assertion, see for example BBC Television 2, 'Europe on the
Brink', special programme on European identity, spring 1993; C. Alder, 'Wozu Europa, wenn
der Gegner fehit?' Neue Zurcher Zeitung, 19. Januar 1994, S.9; J. Carve! & M. White, 'EU
Moves to Tighten Frontiers', The Guardian, 14 February 1995, p.1.
The dire consequences that could follow from such negative interpretations have been
contemplated by a number of observers, many of whom are already well known critics of the
tradition of European imperialism. See for example, J. Derrida, 'White Mythology: Metaphor in
the Tex't of Philosophy', New Literary History. 6(1), 1974, pp.5-74; M. Serres, Tiers-Instruit,
François Bourin, 1991; E. Said, Culture and Imperialism., Knopf, 1993. Although some of
these accounts are excessively pessimistic, they nonetheless constitute an important warning
sign against socially engineered European commonness that is based on an exaggerated
division between the 'sell' and the 'other', with associated notions of superiority in relation to the
'sell'. All these accounts proof that the issue of negative commonness deserves to be given some
thought: even though it is not a main topic of this thesis it is a crucial factor in the development
of the EU and its stability, particularly in view of continuous enlargement eastwards and,
possibly, southwards (Malta, Cyprus).
41 O'Kane's theory is not beyond doubt and challenges conventional wisdom on nation state
building, as for example, espoused by T. Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions: a
Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China, Cambridge University Press, 1979.
However, it O'Kane produces some convincing material in her article on 'The National Causes
of State Construction in France, Russia and China', Political Studies, 43(1), 1995, pp.2-2 1.
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political constellations, 42 history has nonetheless cast doubts on the belief that
geographical proximity has produced natural feelings of closeness among Europeans
which have helped to facilitate integration. For example, there appears to be little
natural affinity between the Walloons and the Flemish or even between many
Northern and Southern Italians.
Given the challenges mounted against the notion of natural unity, the idea has
become marginalised, even by ardent Europeanists such as Jacques Delors: "Our
Community is the fruit not only of history and necessity but also of political will."43
Yet, emotional appeals to natural closeness and the importance of a common
European identity remain part of the European idealists' box of magic tools. To a
lesser extent, they also permeate the broader debate on European unity, particularly
since the calls for a cultural, as well as politico-economic Europe, are steadily
growing.44
42 This view is widely supported elsewhere; see for example, G. Parker, The Logic of Unity: a
Geography of the European Economic Community, Longman, 1981, 3rd edition; RD. Sack,
'Territorial Bases of Power', in Burnett, A.D. & Taylor, P.J. (eds.) Political Studies from Spatial
Perspectives: Anglo-American Essays on Political Geography, Wiley, 1981, Ch. 3 (dealing
with this point in more general terms); K.J. Holsti, International Politics: a Framework for
Analysis, Prentice Hall, 1992, 6th edition; Schlesinger op.cit., 1994.
J. Delors, Speech at Bruges, 1989, quoted in the title page of 'The Commission of the European
Communities', European Union, Commission of the European Communities Publications,
1989.
See for example, Prosche op.cit., p.216, quoting Jean Monnet, shortly before Monnet's death:
"Si c'était a refaire, je commencerais par la culture." {If Europe had to be remade, I would start
by way of cultural integration. } E. Meehan, Citizenship and the European Community, Sage,
1993. The possible need for a common culture in response to global developments in the post-
Communist world is also widely reported in journalistic literature, e.g. J. Gray, 'The Great
Atlantic Drift', The Guardian, 12 December 1994, p.18.
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2.4.	 The Birth of the European Community
The multiplicity of pressures that led to European integration, the absence of a
precedent and the variety of preferences explain the lack of concord among the
European elites about the ways in which European integration should come about
and develop. Ironically, the extensive debate eventually permitted a small group of
key personnel, headed by Jean Monnet, to design, quietly and away from the
limelight of publicity, the Treaties of Paris and Rome. 45 Although Europe's key
politicians significantly altered Monnet's drafts, the civil servant's input had a crucial
effect on the shaping of European integration. Despite his own federalist
convictions,46 Monnet initiated an incrementalist approach to unity which is
eternalised in the preamble to the ECSC Treaty and by the cryptic reference to an
"ever closer union" in the preamble of the EEC Treaty.
This point is frequently reiterated, particularly when explaining the "bureaucratic" nature of the
EU. See for example, D. Pourquery, 'Jean Monnet', Science et Vie Economie, no.78, ddcembre
1991, pp.52-5, or, K. Featherstone, 'Jean Monnet and the Democratic Deficit in the EU',
Journal of Common Market Studies, 32(2), 1994, pp.149-70. For an extensive discussion on the
actual extent of bureaucracy in the EU, see also Chapter four.
46 Monnet's federalist inclinations were revealed by his comment that "there will be no peace in
Europe if States are reconstituted on a basis of national sovereignty with all that implies in
terms of prestige politics and economic protectionism. ..Prosperity and vital social progress will
remain elusive until the nations of Europe form a federation or a "European entity...". P.
Fontaine, Jean Monnet, a Grand Design for Europe, Official Publications of the European
Communities, 1988, pp.20-I.
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Monnet's quasi-functionalist47 design has had a long term impact on the European
Communities in that the Commission has had an extraordinarily high profile, given
its lack of political accountability. Moreover, contact with functional interests has
been nurtured by the Commission and some of these interests have consequently
enjoyed easy, and semi-permanent access to most European institutions. The co-
operation between certain functional interests and the Commission has led to a
curious form of semi-institutionalised pluralism which is typified, on the one hand,
by the existence of the Economic and Social Committee (ECOSOC or ESC) and
now the Committee of Regions and, on the other hand, in the numerous consultation
procedures, involving sectional interests. Other aspects of Monnet's quasi-
functionalist legacy are also still salient; namely, the elitist and top down nature of
many aspects of European public administration; for example the belief that a
common European culture can be engineered through appropriate projects, initiated
by an efficient and enlightened team of bureaucrats. 48 In line with functionalist
Theoretical accounts on functionalism are for example, L. Woolf, international Government,
Allen & Unwin, 1916, 2nd edition; D. Mitrany, The Functional Theory of Politics, Martin
Robertson, 1975 edition. It remains unclear as to whether Monnet was aware of these
theoretical works. However, there are certainly functional elements in his original design of the
EEC, namely the emphasis on functional interests and the strong position attributed to a non-
elected administrative, rather than political body, that is. the Commission. As Featherstone
op.cit, 1994, pointed out, the latter also fits in with Monnet's background as a French
administrator who believed in planning and managing in a rational manner, rather than in
political decision-making. It follows that political legitimacy or accountability were not primaiy
concerns for the civil servant. As it were, the Commission has not turned out to be an apolitical
body, particularly with regard to its higher echelons, but that happened despite Monnet's efforts,
not as a result of them. Regretfully, it however still lacks accountability and political legitimacy.
48 Some of the provisions in the TEU insinuate for example a strong belief in the manipulative
powers of the Community on the development of common cultural understanding and
development. See for example, Title II, Title VIII on Social Policy, Education, Vocational
Training and Youth, Articles 1 lSa(2), 123, 125, 126, 127, or Title II, Title IX on Culture,
Article 128 in the TEU (1992) op.cit. More precisely, the changes to the ERASMUS
Educational programme under the new and broader SOCRATES wnbrella evidently contain
elements of top down bureaucratic manipulation of cultural issues.
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thought, European integration has also progressed in a gradualist manner. Contrary
to functionalist ambitions, political conflict has however thrived in the EU, both
because of the institutional amendments to the original draft treaties and because of
the intrinsically political nature of conflict management between nation states.
According to George the insistence on a Council of Ministers distorted Monnet's
endeavours further in that they prevented genuine supranationalism and partially
tamed the bureaucratic interventionism that is intrinsic in functionalist theory and
that is often referred to as "dirigisme". 49 However, George highlighted that dirigisme
has nonetheless bedevilled European integration. The redesign of Monnet's original
proposals also created institutional complexity, particularly with regard to the
decision-making process. Over the years, this complexity has been deepened further,
notably, but not exclusively, by the increasingly relevant role of the European
Parliament as a contributor in decision-making.
Cope argued that the resulting institutional interdependency has forced individual
policy actors to bargain and seek accommodation and compromise and that,
The widespread hesitations about SOCRATES and its ambitious aims and early problems with
implementation indicate the limitations to this top down cultural approach. (At the time of
writing, the programme has not even been accepted finally by the Council of Ministers but is
due to come into action within a year or two in some form or another, hence, Universities and
other Higher Education Institutions across the EU are already preparing for the programme.
For a brief outline of the legislative draft, see for example: CEC, 'Background Report on New
Community Action Programmes for Education and Training', ISECIB 12/94.) Interview data for
this thesis exposes these limitations even more clearly; i.e. it shows the problems of genuine
communication associated with such an approach. (See for example also Chapter seven on the
effects of SEA policy on industrialists and the problems in establishing effective
communication. This point is also discussed more extensively in Boyce op.cit. International
Human Resources Management, 1993. At a recent conference, Ms Symes made a similar point.
{S. Symes, 'Introductory Talk', Conference on the European Parliamentaiy Elections, held at
the EP's London Headquarters, June 1994.) On the other hand, Dogan op.cit. completely
missed this problem in a recent article, covering related issues.
S.A. George, Politics and Policy in the European Community, Oxford University Press, 1991,
2nd edition.
44
consequently, European policy-making was imbued with a general spirit of
conciliation. 50 This claim will be further examined in subsequent chapters. However,
it must be reiterated that opinions about the development of European integration
have always differed and that compromises have frequently been preceded by
considerable political bickering. Moreover, the outcome of negotiations has not
always been satisfactory, nor clear. Over the years, some controversies have been
cleared up and certain ambiguities have been clarified, but many are still there and
new ones are constantly developing which is not surprising, given the complexities
of the policy process. Analysis is thus equally complicated which is illustrated by
way of some topical examples in the next two sections of the chapter.
2.5.	 Grey Areas of European Politics: Some Illustrations
2.5.1.	 Sovereignty
Where in the EU is sovereignty5 ' located? Apparently it is divided between the
European level and the member states: "member states no longer have supremacy
5° N. Cope, Diet of Brussels, Business, August 1989, pp.66-71.
51 This short discussion concentrates on the constitutional, or de jure, location of sovereignty only
and does not take into account now widely held views that governments, at whatever level, have
been loosing defacto sovereignty to other areas of operation, e.g. international money markets.
For arguments of this kind, see for example Maull, who stressed the "...growing perforation of
national boundaries..." {H.W. Maull, 'Europe and the Changing Global Agenda' in Story, J.
(ed.) op.cit., 1993, Ch. 5, p.144.) and emphasised, like many other scholars, the growing
interdependence of many policy areas. This point is pursued a little further later in this chapter
and in Chapter three.
Sovereignty is a particularly illusive and disputed concept and this is not the place to engage in
the ongoing discussions. {For three excellent monographes on the subject, see L.L. Blake,
Sovereignty, Shepheard-Walwyn, 1982; F.H. Hinsley, SovereIgnly, Cambridge University Press,
1986, 2nd edition; A. James, Sovereign Statehood, Allen & Unwin, 1986.) It is nonetheless
relevant to notice here that, in the first instance, "...sovereignty is the legal formula which
grants a state a formal equality with all of the people living together in a territory with their
own internal organization and laws." {J. Story, 'Europe in the Global State and Market System'
in Story, J. (ed.) op.cit., Ch. 1, p.5.; emphasis by the author of the thesis.) Hence, any
investigation must initially concentrate on the de jure location of sovereignty.
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over all other authorities within their traditional territory, nor are they independent
of outside authorities..." 52 This widely accepted assessment is not incorrect, but fails
to tell the whole story. Where applicable, EU law is now supreme, but the EEC
Treaty contains no guidelines for dealing with cases where national and EU law
clash. Hence, the supremacy of EU law was not explicitly spelt out in this Treaty.53
The explicit curtailment of national sovereignty and the confirmation of the
supremacy of EU law was finally left to the European Court of Justice: H .The
Community constitutes a new legal order in international law, for whose benefits the
States have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields." 54 In line with
this precedent, the ECJ has gradually developed its own jurisprudence on the
supremacy of EC law, usually interpreting ambiguities in favour of the latter.55
However, as Scruton (1982) notes, there is also a de facto aspect to sovereignty and the two
aspects may not necessarily overlap entirely. Geddes (1993) makes a similar point and
distinguishes between formal and informal sovereignty. This distinction is important with
regard to the EU and is thus addressed in the thesis. In his simple book on EU and UK
relations, Geddes refers to those who maintain that too much concern at the loss of formal
sovereignty is usually displayed, particularly in the case of the UK's relationship with the EU, at
the expense of a constructive debate on the loss of informal sovereignty in an interdependent
world. There can be a disequilibrium, but the mere fact that the formal location of sovereignty
continues to be a topic of great saliency is a justification for studying it. Moreover, discussions
in Chapter three reveal that formal rules still matter in the constellation of and interaction
between political systems. Hence, it would be utterly inappropriate to neglect the de jure
location of sovereignty, particularly in a case where it is extremely difficult to locate it in the
first instance. Finally, the meddling of the two aspects of sovereignty confuses the issue more
rather than less, thereby certainly not alleviating apprehension and bewilderment among many
EU citizens. Franklin and Wilke's (1990) brief discussion on sovereignty and the British
attitude towards the concept is an example of such an unhelpful approach. {R Scruton, A
Dictionary of Political Thought, Macmillan, 1982, pp.440-i; M. Franidin & M. Wilke,
Britain's Future in Europe, Pinter Publishers, 1990, pp. 9-11; A. Geddes, Britain in the
European Community, Baseline Books, 1993.)
52 R.O Keohane & S. Hoffmann, 'Institutional Change in Europe in the 1980s' in Keohane &
Hoffmann op.cit., Ch. 1, p.13.
For a more detailed discussion on the topic, see for example, D. Coombes, 'Concertation' in the
Nation-state and the European Community' in Ionescou op.cit. pp.86-99. T.C. Hartley, The
Foundations of European Community Law, Clarendon Press, 1988, 2nd edition. P. Kent,
European Community Law, Pitman Publishing, 1992.
54 This is an extract from the ECJ's decision on Van Gend en Loos (Case 26/62).
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Hence, the former French Prime Minister Debré's accusation that the European
venture amounted to "integration by judicial fiat"56 and that the ECJ suffered from
"morbid megalomania". 57 Accusations against the predatory nature of the ECJ have
also been made elsewhere; for example by some of the people interviewed for the
thesis. 58 Most discussions on the role of the ECJ for European integration have been
more measured, but it is widely acknowledged that the ECJ interpreted the Treaty
text generally in favour of greater integration, thereby probably deliberately
underplaying the ambiguities of the original, Treaty-based, de jure situation with
regard to sovereignty. 59 It follows that, in reality, sovereignty may have "leaked" or
"seeped" away, helped by the ECJ's interpretations, rather than have deliberately
been "pooled" by key politicians at the inauguration of the Treaties of Paris and
Rome.6°
Kent op.cit. See also, A. Bzdera, 'The Court of Justice of the European Community and the
Politics of Institutional Reform', West European Politics, 15(3), 1992, pp.122-36, or, J.H.H.
Weiler, 'Journey to an Unknown Destination: a Retrospective and Prospective of the European
Court of Justice in the Arena of Political Integration', Journal of Common Market Studies,
3 1(4), 1993, pp.417-46.
56 Debrd, as quoted in M.L. Volcansex, 'The European Court of Justice: Supranational Policy-
making', West European Politics, 15(3), 1992, p.117.
' Debré as quoted in G.F. Mancini, The Making of a Constitution for Europe in Keohane &
Hoffmann op.cit., 1991, Ch. 6, p.177.
58 A small number of interviewees expressed concern over the powers of the ECJ; these included
MEPs, politicians, lobbyists and industrialists. Both Euro-sceptics as well as pro-integrationists
had reservations about the ECJ; MEPs as well as lobbyists, industrialists and The former were
predominantly concerned with the supranational tendencies of the ECJ; the latter with the
comparatively powerful position of an institution with non-elected members vis-à-vis the
limited powers of the EP. Concern over the powers of the ECJ has also been reported in
newspapers, e.g. P. Taylor, 'Guardians of the Law or a Court without Appeal?', The European,
2 1-27 July 1995, p.9.
See for example all references in footnotes 53 and 55, as well as A-M. Burley & W. Matth,
'Europe Before Court: a Political Theory of Legal Integration', International Organization,
47(1), 1993, pp.41-76; A-M. Slaughter Burley, 'New Directions in Legal Research on the EC',
Journal of Co,nmon Market Studies, 31(3), 1993, pp.391-406; K. Van Kersbergen & B.
Verbeek, 'The Politics of Subsidiarity in the European Union', Journal of Common Market
Studies, 32(2), 1994, pp.2l5-36; C.H. Church & D. Phinnemore, European Union and
European o,nm unity: A Handbook and Commentary on the Post-Maastricht Treaties,
Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1994.
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Sovereignty remains a complicated issue, even if the constitutionality of the
supremacy of EC law is not questioned. For example, by way of the national veto,
member states can still block the extension of the acquis communciulaire and
therefore prevent further erosion of sovereignty. 6 ' This provision symbolises the
60 According to an article in The Independent, the term "seeped" has been used by well known
anti-Europeans in the Westminster Parliament, noticeably by Enoch Powell and Tony Benn but
also by Jacques Delors. The term "leaked" has repeatedly been used by one of the Netherlands
foremost political historians and expert on European history: (The Independent, 'A Seepage of
Sovereignty, 8 June 1988, p.16; B. Tromp, 'The State of the State: Some Speculations', Paper
presented at the Ilird Conference of the International Society for the Study of European Ideas,
Aalborg University, 24-29 August 1992; B. Tromp, 'European Unity in Historical Perspective',
Paper presented at the IVth International Conference for the Society of European Ideas, Karl-
Franzcns Universität, 22-27 August 1994. The notion that the EC members have pooled
sovereignty is widespread. Politically this is correct but legally, the situation is less certain. For
views that endorse the "pooling" idea, see for example, Franidin & Wilke op.cit, S. Williams,
'Sovereignty and Accountability in the European Community' in Keohane & Hoffmann op.cit.,
1991, Ch. 5, p.156. Perhaps those referring to the term 'pooling' did not deliberately create this
distinction but, in the legal context, the choice of words can quickly alter the meaning of a
message!
61 These provisions date back to the famous Accords de Luxembourg of 1966 which profoundly
affected decision-making procedures in the Council, even though these Accords had no
constitutional status and were the result of France's dispute with the rest of the EC member
states between 1965-1966, principally brought about and manipulated by the then French
president, Charles de Gaulle. Point II of the official communiqué which reads that "With regard
to the preceding paragraph, the French delegation considers that where very important interests
are at stake the discussion must be continued until unanimous agreement is reached."
Gradually, this phrase was interpreted as a right to national veto, if crucial national interests
were at stake. The member states themselves can determine when this is the case! However, as
Nugent op. cit. noticed, the veto has not been used on a regular basis, instead members have
preferred not to make decisions at all, if they could not agree on an issue (sign a the basic
commitment among European politicians and officials to engage in policy-making that arrives
at some kind of consensus/compromise). This development was particularly marked in the
1970s and facilitated "Eurosclerosis" and was, undoubtedly reinforced by the fact that
threatening to use the national veto is often as effective as actually using it, at least on a
temporary basis. (See for example France, during the negotiations to find agreement during the
GATF Uruguay Round: L. Elliott & J. Wolf, 'French Find Allies Against GAll' Deal', The
Guardian, 27 November 1992, p.14; J. Nundy & T. Jackson, 'France Whips up Hostility to
GAiT, The Independent, 19 November 1992, p.1; J. Nundy & A. Marshall, 'France Gains
Allies Against GA'VF Deal', The Independent, 19 November 1992, p.1; Le Quotidien de Paris,
'Agriculture: l'Europe Victime du GATT...et de la Commission', 19 mars 1992, p.11.}
Hence, the introduction of more qualified majority voting with the SEA and the TEU. However,
it must be stressed that the introduction of qualified majority voting has neither fully eliminated
the notion of "national veto" nor the desire to produce consensual decision-making, by way of
seeking unanimous agreement. However, the constitutional commitment to qualified majority
voting means that, in the areas where it applies, decision-making cannot be postponed for ever.
This situation does alter the balance in favour of more decisions being made, but it does not
essentially supersede the "national veto" option.
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unusual relationship between the central and sub-central levels in the EU. Politically
it is, however, not feasible to make frequent use of the veto or even to threaten to
invoke it on a regular basis. Yet, the mere tradition of national vetoing and
unanimity voting can significantly hinder integration.61
The existence of Article 240 of the EEC Treaty complicates matters further. This
article can be interpreted as a legal means for secession from the EC by any member
state, or, depending on national arrangements, by part of a member state.
(Greenland's secession from the EU in 1984 is the classical example.) Such a move
would mean that a departing member state regains its entire legal sovereignty by
liberating itself from the supremacy of EC law. This option indicates that, in
constitutional terms, sovereignty has been transferred only temporarily - if
indefinitely - and, hence, national sovereignty retains a significant role in the
discourse on EU integration. 62 This notwithstanding, the idea of secession may be so
unacceptable in practical terms that it is not a feasible option for member states.
Moreover, fUll legal sovereignty is only recoverable as a wholesale package and
cannot be reclaimed with regard to individual EC laws, which signals an effective
62 See for example, Coombes op.cit., or, K. Minogue, Contribution to a Radio BBC 4 Programme,
op.cit. The importance of Article 240 has been highlighted recently in the challenge to the
constitutionality of the TEU in Germany, without a popular referendum. The German
Constitutional Court has used the reversibility argument, based on Article 20 of Germany's
Basic Law, to rule that the TEU was constitutionally compatible without amendment to the
Basic Law, Germany's Constitution, which needs popular approval. The German Constitutional
Court ruled that Europe was not a "Bundesstaat, but a Staatenverbund", that is not a federal
state but a type of confederation. It came to this conclusion because the common powers of the
EU were "delegated upwards" to the European level which had no independent sovereignty
because, "...die Zugehorigkeit zur Union konne letztlich durch einen gegenlaufigen AICt
(Deutschlands) auch wieder aufgehoben werden...Damit wahre Deutschland die Qualitat eines
souveränen Staates aus eignem Recht..." (...the membership of the Union could ultimately be
rescinded by an appropriate new Act (by Germany).. .Therefore Germany remains a sovereign
State, based on its own legal sources... "; author's own translation) The German Constitutional
Court however recognised the unique constitutional status of the EU in that it labelled it "eine
Gemeinschaft elgener Art" (a unique community) and produced nearly 80 pages of explanation,
supporting its ruling. A summary of the ruling can for example be found in Neue Zurcher
Zeitung, Die EG-Mitgliedstaaten bleiben souverän', 22. Oktober 1993, S.7.
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loss of some sovereignty for all member states during their entire period of
membership.63
The EU's situation with regard to sovereignty is thus currently unique and frequently
creates bewilderment or unease. Those who embrace the Hobbesian notion of
sovereignty as an indivisible entity are most perturbed about this complicated
predicament. However, there are other conceptualisations of sovereignty that do not
63 The German Constitutional Court's ruling is legally tenable. However, by emphasising the
delegated nature of sovereignty, it did not fully capture the reality of the situation, whatever its
explanations in support of its ruling. The fact remains that the supremacy of EU law, where
applicable, has now so often been confirmed by ECJ rulings that an independent jurisprudence
is emerging that would be vely difficult to challenge by member states, other than through
secession from the Union. This seems to suggest that, in areas where EU law applies, a
politically motivated de facto sovereignty at the EU level is slowly being legally institutionalised
by the ECJ's actions. Politicians are either not aware of this, which seems implausible, or have
largely tolerated it; perhaps because it has helped pro-integrationists to achieve their aim
relatively stealthily and with little need to ask for political legitimacy. Moreover, occasionally,
politicians have been able to shelter behind the ECJ's proactive attitude.
At least two points follow from the developments with regard to sovereignty in the EU. During
the evolution of the EC, there appears to have frequently been a tacit marriage of convenience
between legalistic and political integrationists. In view of the ruling of the German
Constitutional Court, it has now been argued that the latter too has been "considerate" of
political pressures. {See for example, Der Spiegel, 'Besonderes Organ', 47(26), 1993, S.31-4.
Similarly, Wagner noticed a "smell of political manipulation" during the debate on the
compatibility of the TEU with the German Basic Law: H. Wagner, 'Europa in Richterhand',
Focus, Nr.23, 9. August 1993, S.30.) Moreover, de facto sovereignty is split in the EU between
the European and national (and in some cases sub-national governments) and it is increasingly
plausible that this has also become a de jure division, given the ECJ's jurisprudence. The full
consequences cannot be discussed here, but they are significant, in that the situation is leading
to a genuine, and not a delegated, division of de jure sovereignty, so long as member states
remain part of the EU. For a sophisticated account of the legal complexities of the EU see for
example, R. Bieber, 'Zur Bedeutung der einheitlichen Europaischen Akte fur
Rechtsentwicklung und Integrationskonzept der Europaischen Gemeinschaft', Oesterreichische
Zeitschrfl fur Qeffentliches Recht und VOlkerrecht, 3 9(3), 1988, pp.211-36. Similar points are
also made in another important article on regulation in the EU: P.A. Vipond, 'The
Liberalisation of Capital Movements and Financial Services in the European Single Market: a
Case Study in Regulation', European Journal of Political Research, 19(2&3), 1991, pp.227-44.
It should be noticed that these discussions are applicable, even with the arrival of the TEU
because the latter did not fundamentally change the arguments over the sovereignty issue, as it
built on an existing situation. Legally, the SEA was probably more fundamentally innovative,
since it established qualified majority voting.)
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necessarily envisage the concept to be indivisible. 64 Yet, even if it proves impossible
or impracticable to reconceptualise the dominant Anglo-Saxon interpretation of
sovereignty, the actual situation in the EU is extremely unlikely to change, because
of the constant need to balance national and European pressures. As seen in the
previous section, compromises are responsible for the EU 1s hybrid nature which, in
turn, is directly responsible for the complex situation with regard to sovereignty.
2.5.2.	 Policy Scope and Political Power Games
There have often been arguments over the legislative scope of the Commission. The
latter, using its exclusive right to formally initiate legislation and referring to the
rather obscure Article 235 of the EEC Treaty, has tended to extend its policy scope
whenever its political fortunes allowed for 'expansionism'. For example, the Treaties
of Paris and Rome make no mention of environmental policy-making at the
Community level but the Commission has adopted this policy area as one of its
hobby horses, introducing, over time, around two hundred regulations, directives
and decisions. 65 Eventually, the Commission's involvement in green issues became
commonplace and was given a legal basis, first in the Single European Act and then
the TEU. The Commission's tendency to extend its policy scope, and the ECTs
proactive role in European integration have frequently been cited as evidence of the
'predatory nature' of the EC.66
64 See for example, Prosche op.cit., as well as R. Prokhovnik, 1994, 'Sovereignly in Hobbes,
Spinoza and Contemporary Europe', Paper presented at the lVth International Conference for
the Study of European Ideas, Karl-Franzens-Universität, 22-27 August 1994.
65 On this point, see for example, J. Spear, 'The Enviromnental Agenda' in Rees, G.W. (ed.)
International Politics in Europe: the New Agenda, Routledge, 1993, Ch. 7, or, Y. Paleokrassa,
'A New Approach To the Environment', Monthly Newsletter of the European Commission,
No.2, European Communities Publication, February 1994.
66 Spicer, a UK Euro-sceptic Conservative MP, endorses this view, for example, especially in his
now well known book op. cit.
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In recent years the debate over legislative scope has increasingly centred on the
concept of subsidiarity which has been enshrined in Article 3b of the T.EU.
However, this article is too vague to give strong guidelines. 67 In particular, there are
no formal mechanisms that divide the responsibilities for policy-making between the
various levels of government. The allocation to date has therefore been based on
political and economic realities. 68 Thus, debate over the legislative scope of each tier
has been reinforced, not eliminated.
67 The vagueness of Article 3b has been widely discussed in recent years, see for example by M.
Rhodes, 'The Future of the 'Social Dimension': Labour Market Regulation in Post-1992 Europe',
Journal of Co,n,non Market Studies, 30(1), 1992, pp.23-51; by K. Neunreither, 'Subsidiarity as
a Guiding Principle for European Community Activities', Government and Opposition, 28(2),
spring 1993, pp.206-20; by P. Spicker, 'Concepts of Subsidiarity in the European Community',
Paper presented at the EPRU Conference on Subsidiarity and Democracy, University of
Manchester, 12 November 1993, as well as by V. Bogclanor, 'Europe, Subsidiarily and the
British Constitution', Lecture presented to the University of Oxford Society, 8 December 1993;
by Van Kersbergen & Verbeek op.cit. and by P. Green, 'Subsidiarity and European Union:
Beyond the Ideological Impasse?', Policy and Politics, 22(4), 1994, pp.287-300.
68 The economic limitations with regard to costly policy making are considerable, as has been
pointed out in Neue Zurcher Zeitung, 'Maastrichts Subsidiaritätsprinzip', 13. Januar 1994, S.12.
The main reason for these limitations is the EU's extremely limited budget (compared to
national budgets) Moreover, expenses related to the EU's Common Agricultural Policy (CAP)
continue to make serious inroads in the EU's budget (see also Chapter five). For tactical reasons
the issue of direct taxation at the European level is rarely raised. However, pressures for
additional financial sources are steadily growing. See for example The European, Pressure
Mounts for EC Income Tax to Prop up Budget', 7-10 May 1992, p.28. (For an outline and
figures on the current budget situation, see for example CEC, 'From the Single Act to
Maastricht and Beyond: the Means to Match our Ambitions', COM (92) 2000 final, 11 February
1992, or, EP News, 'Budget Agreed and a Seven-year Deal, 14-18 December 1992, p.4. For
respective inputs and outputs by member states and the controversies related to these payments,
see for example R Watson, 'Count what you Put in, see Who Takes it out', The European, 18-
14 November 1994, p.9. For more comprehensive discussions on the current budget policy, see
for example, M. Shackleton, 'The Delors II Budget Package', in Nugent, N. (ed.) The European
Community 1992: Annual Review of Activities, Journal of Common Market Studies, Special
Volume, 1993, pp.11-26 and A. Scott, 'Financing the Community: the Delors II Package in
Lodge, J. (ed.) The European Community and the Challenge of the Future, Pinter Publishers,
1993, 2nd edition, Ch. 4.) The budget constraints shape European developments crucially;
however, later chapters will reveal that economic restraints have not prevented the European
Community from passing laws, but that they have forced the EU increasingly into the realm of
regulatoiy policy-making. Moreover, implementation has sometimes turned into an unpleasant
obstacle course, because it has necessitated public financial resources that are not available.
Alternatively, it has sometimes put a heavy burden on private financial outlay. These points are
pursued further in Chapter seven.
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The principle of subsidiarity was first introduced into debate during the late 1 970s
by the European Parliament, in an effort to ensure that sufficient policy was initiated
at the European level! Consequently, both the EP and the Commission welcomed
the introduction of this principle. 69 However, in recent years Eurosceptics have
hailed the same concept as the obvious means to redress the balance between
national and European legislation in favour of the former and have used it as a
propaganda tool in the fight against Brussels. 70 Governments have already
successfWly opposed new or amended legislation, particularly when they have been
able to find allies against a policy initiative from among their number. 7 ' The
69 This point is supported by, for example, Green op.cit. Interestingly, the Commission has used
the principle in two ways; where possible, and to reinforce its status, the Commission continues
to urge governments to transfer policy responsibilities upwards, by implying that many
problems cannot be resolved otherwise, e.g. poverty and social exclusion. (See for example,
CEC, Background Report: Social Exclusion and Poverty', ISEC/B1l/93, 1993, p.l.} In
addition, the Commission uses the concept as a propaganda tool and aims to demonstrate that it
is not the interventionist and supranational monster that it is sometimes made out to be. On this
point, see for example, The Economist, 'Scapegoat Passes Buck', 325(7779), 3 October 1992,
p.49 and CEC, 'Background Report: Adapting Community Legislation to Subsidiarity',
ISECIB3/94. The Commission seems nonetheless weaiy of the principle. Apparently Delors
asked John Major in particular not to use it as a weapon against the Commission's just powers.
(CEC, 'Week in Europe', WE/25/92.)
70 See for example, S. Crampton, Eurospeak Explained, Rosters, 1992, p.135, or, S. George, An
Awkward Partner: Britain in the European Community, Oxford University Press, 1994, 2nd
edition, pp. 22 1-2.
71 National governments always intended to turn the principle into a weapon for controlling
excessive Commission interventionism, as became evident during the Edinburgh Summit of the
European Council in December 1992. For examples of successful manipulation of the concept
in favour of nation state power, see for example, G. Lean, & P. Ghazi, 'Cloak of Subsidiarity is
Used to Keep Britain Polluting', The Observer, 6 December 1992, p.11, or, Neue Zurcher
Zeitung, Direktiven der EG-Kommission fur Europawahl', 30. Oktober 1993, S.2, or, A. Cox,
'Derogation, Subsidiarity and the Single Market', Journal of Com,non Market Studies, 32(2),
1994, pp.127-47. As far as can be judged at this stage, fears of creeping nationalism by way of
manipulation of the principle has however on occasions been exaggerated; for example by J.
Palmer, 'Major to Hear Delors Plan for Handing Back Powers', The Guardian, 23 June 1992,
p.1, or by, A. Stern, 'Alarm at Secret Plan to scrap EU's Green Laws', The European, 9-15 June
1995, p.1. These two articles indicate that fears are particularly acute with regard to
environmental legislation (which tends to be unpopular with many governments and national
industries due to associated costs).
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Commission, the EP and national politicians are however not the only ones seeking
to take advantage of the notion of subsidiarity. The newly constituted Committee of
Regions is set to interpret it in favour of more regional input in EU policy making,
using the philosophical origins of the concept as a means of legitimising its case.72
Subsidiarity has thus become another political game and it is too early to name a
winner. Nonetheless, over 100 European laws have already been declared void
because they contravene the principle and fears have been expressed that it will
undermine environmental policy-making at the European level. 73 However, given the
number of existing EU laws, such gestures should not prematurely be taken as final
indicators of trends. Dispute is likely to continue and the ECJ may yet get another
chance to make an important ruling by interpreting more precisely the meaning of
subsidiarily in a case of dispute brought before the Court. 74 The concept thus
A former Commissioner responsible for enviroiunental legislation has however rejected such
fears as "wild rumours". {Karel Van Miert, quoted in CEC, 'The Week in Europe', WE/30/92.}
Wilkinson and Gardner refuted the idea likewise in D. Wilkinson, 'The Freedom to Fail', The
Guardian, 11 December 1992, inset on the Environment; D. Gardner, 'Brussels' Green Sprouts.
Environmental Policy is Unlikely to Fall Victim to European Decentralisation', Financial
Times, 21 October 1992.
72 One of the most comprehensive theoretical accounts of subsidiarity is C. Millon-Delsol, L 'Etat
subsidiaire, Presses Universitaires de France, 1992. For its post-war meaning to Christian
Democracy and Federalism, see for example B.G. Peters, 'Bureaucratic Politics and the
Institutions of the European Community', in Sbragia op.cit., Ch. 3. Possible opportunities and
repercussions for regions, following the ratification of the TEU, are already discussed, too. See
for example, A. Scott et. al., 'Subsidiarily: a 'Europe of the Regions' v. the British
Constitution?', Journal of Common Market Studies. 32 (1), 1994, pp.47-68.
73 CEC, 'Week in Europe: Subsidiarity', WE142193.
74 This development is anticipated elsewhere, too, e.g. M. Shapiro, 'The European Court of
Justice', in Sbragia op.cit, Ch. 4 and in D. Judge, 'A Green Dimension for the European
Community?', Environmental Politics, 1(4), winter 1992, pp. 1-9. Judge pointed out that
uncertainty over the correct level of policy-making with regard to environmental issues
originated in the SEA, because this Treaty amendment introduced the notion of policy-making
at the level where environmental objectives can best be achieved, without stating clearly what
was meant by this idea.
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beautifully demonstrates the subtle interactions between economic, political and
legal forces in the absence of constitutional clarity and adequate precedents.
2.6.	 Major Constitutional Change: the Single European Act and
the Treaty on European Union
The Single European Act was a radical attempt to rejuvenate a stagnating
Community. It was born out of the usual mix of economic, political, legalistic and,
to a lesser extent, ideological considerations that characterises European integration.
The provisions of this Act were far reaching. Article 7 introduced qualified majority
voting in the Council of Ministers to some policy areas and Article 6 enhanced the
political power of the European Parliament. The single market legislative
programme initiated a period of unusually intense policy-making. Hence, the single
market project of the late 1980s and early 1990s stands out as a unique period in the
history of the EU, even though the commitment to a single market is contained in
the initial EEC Treaty. 75 In 1979 the ECJ had however created different
preconditions with its "Cassis de Dijon" ruling which established the "principle of
mutual recognition". 76 Together with the economic incentive and the political
Since the ECJ has already ruled on another ambiguity in the SEA with regard to environmental
policy-making (the question of basing policy drafts on Article 130s (unanimity) or lOOa
(QMV), it is likely to intervene in the question of choosing the appropriate level, too,
particularly if disputes arise on future occasions. {For a detailed discussion on the unanimity v
QMV issue, see for example, P.M. Hildebrand, 'The European Community's Environmental
Policy, 1957 to '1992': from Incidental Measures to an International Regime?', Environmental
Politics, 1(4), winter 1992, pp.13-43.}
This interpretation of the Single European Market (SEM) project has been widely accepted. See
for example, C. Crouch & D. Marquand, 'Foreword' to Crouch, C. & Marquand, D. (eds.) The
Politics of 1992: Beyond the Single European Market, Blackwell, 1990, or, J. Pinder, 'The
Single Market: a Step Towards Union' in Lodge op.cit., Ch. 3, or Bulmer op.cit, 1994.
76 The far reaching implications of the 'Cassis de Dijon' ruling have been acknowledged widely,
e.g. M.F. Braun, 'L'achèvement du grand marché communantaire' in Dominati, J. (ed.). Quel
avenir industriel pour la France?, Editions Economica, 1987, pp.73-89, or,
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dynamic, this landmark ruling made the single market possible in that it facilitated
the successful passage of so many policy drafts in such a short time, because it made
policy-making a lot easier.
Lord Cockfield captured the essence of this point very well:
"In the first of the new style directives, that dealing with pressure vessels, the
legislation extended to five pages only. Under the old approach some ten
directives each of about fifty pages would have been needed. It was a massive
reduction in bureaucracy and red tape and enormous delegation of power to
member states. So many of the criticisms made of the Community-and of the
Commission-in this particular field are based on a situation which has long
since ceased to exist."77
Analysts have stressed the integrative character of the SEA, due to Articles 6 and 7,
the intensity of the legislative programme and the new provisions in the areas of
social and environmental change. 78 However, the principle of mutual recognition can
justifiably be interpreted as a move away from strict supranationalism because it
promotes differentiation and constitutes a move away from vertical integration and
recipe type harmonisation to horizontal policy-making. 79 This shift amounts to a
C. Cockbill, 'Harmonisation of Food Law', Paper presented at the Conference of the National
Association of Master Bakers and the Scottish Association of Master Bakers, London, 27
February 1990. See also, Bressand op.cit.
For explanations of, and discussions on, the Cassis de Dijon case and the principle of mutual
recognition, see for example, D.R. Cameron, 'The 1992 Initiative: Causes and Consequences' in
Sbragia op.cit., Ch. 3, or, Shapiro op.cit., or, Pinder op.cit.
Lord Cockfield, 'The Real Significance of 1992' in Crouch & Marquand op.cit., p.6.
78 See for example, C. Archer & F. Butler, The European Community: Structure and Process,
Pinter Publishers, 1992, or, Pinder op.cit., as well as, D. Franklin 'A Rude Awakening: a
Survey of the European Community', The Econo,nist, 328 (7818), 3-9 July 1993, special inset.
This view is supported elsewhere, e.g. by CECG, 'The Participation of Consumers in National
and European Community Policy-making in the Run Up to 1992 and Thereafter', Pamphlet
89/8, 1989, and by Cockfield op.cit. and Cameron op.cit.
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significant change of the rules of the game. Moreover, it has probably saved the
European venture from collapsing altogether due to excessive intransigence.
According to The Concise Oxford Dictionary "to integrate" means to "combine
(parts) into a whole". This definition encapsulates the progression of policy-making
since the adoption of the principle of mutual recognition. 8° Hence, it must be
concluded that, in the final analysis, integration has advanced as a result of the
'Cassis de Dijon' ruling. However, the principle changed the nature of integration by
initiating an era that works increasingly towards diversity within unity. Nonetheless,
concern has been raised that the principle either leads to the 'politics of the lowest
common denominator' or to too much diversity, and hence not sufficient
harmonisation to create genuine integration. Such concerns have partially hampered
the progress of the new approach and are not entirely unfounded, though
occasionally exaggerated.8'
These considerations indicate that the formation of the integrated European market
cannot simply be conceived of in terms of more or less integration. Principally, the
SEM aims to facilitate easier interaction within the EC by doing away with excessive
and complicated legislation and by facilitating mutual acceptance between member
states. 82 These are essentially deregulatory pressures; a fact which has sometimes
80 H. W. Fowler & F.G. Fowler (eds.), The Concise Oxford Dictionary, Clarendon Press, 1951, 4th
edition, p.620.
81 For confirmation of concerns about, and resistance to the principle, see for example, Shapiro
op.cit. Evidence of concern is also uncovered in subsequent chapters. These chapters also
confirm the view that the worries are not entirely unfounded, but occasionally exaggerated.
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been missed or underestimated, because, in the short term, the single market
programme initiated a period of intense policy-making. 83 The creation of the SEM is
best understood in the context of broader ideological and political developments
which have militated against dirigisme. 84 In that sense the SEA constitutes a
qualitative change to European integration, rather than simply a quantitative one.
The rules of the game are no longer quite the same; a point made within slightly
different conceptual frameworks by a number of commentators. 85 It can therefore be
argued that the SEA brought about not only regulative, but, within limits, also
constitutive rule changes. 86 The basic 'mission' of the EEC, that is the creation of
economic wealth, and through it, political stability, had not altered. However, new
philosophical and political approaches had come to the fore as novel means of
implementing the mission. Not surprisingly, they have not entirely replaced existing
dynamics, but mingled with them, so as to create a Treaty Amendment that is
82 See for example, A. Smith, 'EC seeks user-friendly single market', The Financial Times, 2
December 1992, p.12. {It appears, however, that there is still much room for improvement, as
far as uncomplicated legislation is concerned; on this point, see for example, S. Tate,
'Wanderlust Held Back by Red Tape', The European, 25-31 March 1994, p.19.)
83 See for example, R. Dehousse, 'Integration v Regulation? on the Dynamics of Regulation in the
European Community', Journal of Common Market Studies, 30(4), 1992, pp.383-402. The
deregulatory thrust of the SEM also helps to explain why Mrs. Thatcher put her signature to the
SEA; on this point, see for example, K. Featherstone, The Successful Manager's Guide to 1992:
Working in the New Europe, Fontana, 1990, pp.10-il.
84 A point confirmed elsewhere, e.g. in Majone op.cit. (all previous references).
85 See for example, A. Shipman & D.G. Mayes, 'Changing the Rules: a Framework for Examining
Government and Company Responses to '1992ç ESRC Draft discussion paper no. 199, ESRC
initiative on the Evolution of Rules for a Single European Market, 1990; J. Ruggie,
'Territoriality and Beyond: Problematising Modernity in International Relations', international
Organization, 47(1), winter 1993, pp.139-74. B. Axford, 'Multiple Truths and Postmodern
imaginings: New Ways of Reading European Unity', Paper presented at the IVth International
Conference for the Study of European Ideas, Karl-Franzens Universitht, 22-27 August 1994.
Bulmer op.cit., 1994.
86 The distinction between regulative and constitutive rule changes dates back to J. Searle, Speech
Acts: an Essay in the Philosophy of Language, Cambridge University Press, 1965. Broadly
speaking constitutive rules (partially) re-write existing scripts, thereby introducing new
directions and rules of the game. Regulative rules are concerned with the implementation of
existing scripts and rules.
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integrationist as well as decentralising, deregulatory as well as interventionist, and
contains old as well as new elements.
There is not necessarily a direct correlation between the SEA and the TEU, but the
former initiated a period of rejuvenation that was exploited by all those who wished
to further develop the European Communities. 87 Yet, it took a lot of political
manoeuvring to finalise the Treaty, and even more so to ratify it. In line with its
predecessors, it is a compromise between many different influences, with a number
of grey areas such as Article 3b on subsidiarity, the regulations over the extended
use of qualified majority voting (QMV) by the C0M, or the new conciliation
procedure. 88 Hence, as in the case of the SEA, the contents of the TEU have been
interpreted variously. Eurosceptics have objected to its integrationist elements, that
is the extended policy scope, the provisions for full EMU, the enhanced legislative
role of the EP and the extension of QMV, the birth of the European citizen.89
This interpretation is not incorrect, but it does not tell the full story either. Many
new areas of policy making are based on co-operation, not integration, because they
87 See Chapter three for a discussion on spill-over effects, as envisaged by analysts of European
integration who embrace(d) the theoiy of neofunctionalism.
88 Under the TEU, qualified majority voting has become the standard procedure for environmental
policy. However, policies which are primarily of a fiscal nature require unanimity in the CoM.
Regrettably, the expression "primarily fiscal nature" is unclear and not further defined. This
important point was recently raised by J. B. Skjaerseth, 'The Climate Policy of the EC: Too Hot
to Handle?', Journal of Common Market Studies, 32(1), 1994, pp.25-45. For unforeseen
problems with the conciliation procedure, see for example, EP News, 'Maastricht Twist', 13-17
March 1995, p.3.
89 See for example, Spicer op.cit., but also the growing number of anti-Maastricht MEPs,
following the June 1994 elections to the European Parliament. Not all of these object to the
TEU on the grounds of its integrationist aspects, but many do so. For further details on the
elections and anti-Maastricht votes, see for example The European, 'European Elections Special
Report', 17-23 June 1994, p.10; B. Boyce, 'The June 1994 Elections and the Politics of the
European Parliament', Parliamentary Affairs. 48(1), 1995, pp.141-56; A. Guyomarch, 'The
European Elections of 1994', West European Politics, 18(1), 1995, pp.173-87.
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remain subject to unanimous agreement, even though the Treaty encourages
informal use of QMV whenever possible. 9° Numerous existing areas are also not
engulfed by QMV, particularly if they involve significant financial outlay. The
powers of the EP have indeed increased, but within limits. Notably, the co-legislative
procedure bestowed mainly negative powers upon the EP, that is it can veto
legislation, but it cannot play the major part in enacting legislation. 9 ' Besides, the
introduction of European citizenship has been a half-hearted measure. 92 Moreover,
the TEU was finalised by the European Council; the latter works on the basis of co-
operation and, thus, the outcome of the final version of the TEU was significantly
less integrationist than earlier proposals made, for example, by the EP or the then
90 See especially the declaration on voting in the field of the Common Foreign and Security Policy
in the TEU which reads as follows: "The Conference agrees that, with regard to Council
decisions requiring unanimity, Member States will, to the extent possible, avoid preventing a
unanimous decision where a qualified majority exists in favour of that decision." {TEU,
Publications of the European Conmiunities, 1992.)
91 ibid., Title II: E - In Part Five 'Institutions of the Community', pp. 62-89.
92 For worthwhile discussions on the concept of European citizenship as espoused in the TEU, see
for example, J.M. Welsh, 'A Peoples' Europe? European Citizenship and European Identity',
Politics, 13(2), 1993, pp.25-31. Welsh pointed to the limitations of the concept, both
theoretically and with regard to bringing the EU closer to the people. She concluded that,
because of the term "peoples", used in the EEC Treaty, there was never any intention of a
European citizenship in the early days of the EC. However, this conclusion seems a little
premature, particularly since Closa, who provided a more sophisticated monologue on the
subject, uncovered early pressures for the introduction of citizenship. Consequently, the formal
introduction of the concept in the TEtJ (Articles 8 and 8a) was probably not as innovative as is
sometimes thought. Closa, like Welsh, pointed to the limits of European citizenship which has
in no way superseded national citizenship. {C. Closa, 'The Concept of Citizenship in the Treaty
on European Union', Common Market Law Review, 29, 1992, pp.1137-69.) Closa and Welsh
inadvertedly supported some of the hesitations raised by Habermas' recent reflections on
citizenship, democracy and national identity in the European context. To Haberinas citizenship
is not fully separable from (political) identity, nor from the functioning of democracy.
Consequently, he argued that, since democracy was lagging behind in the process of European
integration, conditions for genuine European citizenship had so far not been met. {J. Habermas,
'Citizenship and National Identity: Some Reflections on the Future of Europe', Praxis
international, 12(1), 1992, pp.1-19.) At a recent conference, Weale produced similar
arguments {A. Weale, 'The Single Market, European integration and Political Legitimacy',
Paper presented at the ESRC Conference on the Evolution of Rules for a Single European
Market, University of Exeter, 8-11 September 1994.)
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Commission President, Jacques Delors. 93 Finally, it must be reiterated that Treaty
provisions can, and almost certainly will, partially be remoulded in the
Intergovernmental Conference that will take place in 1996. The balance between
integrationist and non-integrationist elements in the TEU is thus more finely cut than
is sometimes thought. However, this assessment applies to existing institutional
arrangements only; the newly designed institutions for the achievement of Economic
and Monetary Union (EMTJ) facilitate substantial economic integration. At the very
least they will formalise de facto economic interdependence by way of creating a
whole new set of common structures. This development will have far reaching
consequences, provided it will come to fruition.
The TEU, like the SEA, cannot be evaluated only in terms of more or less
integration. The Treaty contains statements on what kind of Europe should be
emerging, albeit often implicitly. Principally, it expands and develops many of the
new themes contained in the SEA, and does not itself introduce constitutive rule
changes! Superficially, it rebalances some of the neo-liberal aspects of the SEA in
that it expands social and environmental policy-making and, explicitly, embraces the
concept of social and economic cohesion. There is also more emphasis on
This point has been confirmed by several sources, notably The Economist, 'Samson Between
Pillars', 3 19(7710), 8 June 1991, p.64. F. Jacobs, R Corbett & M. Shackleton, The European
Parliament, Longman, 1992, 2nd edition, emphasised the proactive and instrumental role of the
EP during the drafling of the TEU, but correctly pointed to the differences between EP
proposals and the final outcome; the latter being less integrationist than desired by the majority
of Members of the European Parliaments (MEPs). A. Duff, 'Building a Parliamentaiy Europe',
Government and Opposition, 29(2), 1994, pp.147-65, on the other hand, praised the
contributions of the EP rather excessively, which is not surprising, given that he is an
enthusiastic supporter of further integration, based on the political emancipation of the EP.
See for example, J.L. Graff et al., 'Reinventing Europe', TIME, 144(12), 19 September 1994,
pp.32-41, or, EP News, 'Ideas Flow for Treaty Changes', 13-17 March 1995, p.3, or, R. Watson,
'Son of Maastricht is Conceived', The European, 24-30 March 1995, p.7.
61
decentralisation and the excessive democratic deficit 95 is rectified a little, mainly by
enhancing the role of the EP and by introducing European citizenship. The latter
also aims to overcome some of the evident elitism inherent in the single market
venture. 96 Nevertheless, the centrality of EMU and the emphasis on sound monetary
policy confirm that the TEU's principal aim is wealth creation, and hence, the
Treaty's objectives are in line with those of its predecessors.
Therefore, the greater emphasis on social engineering, democracy and the European
people does not signal a sea change; it is an attempt to make intensified economic
integration more palatable. In many instances, this attempt amounts undoubtedly to
a sincere political preference, but in some cases it is also based on tactical
considerations and, where necessary, economic rationality takes frequently
precedence over political rationality. 97 Hence, the marked decoupling of the
economic and political agendas through the introduction of an independent central
banking system.
The above findings are not surprising, given the EU's basic mission; but how do the
other two pillars of the TEU fit into this economic logic? These pillars, which
formalise and develop existing themes, deepen the political ambitions of the EU, but
are not independent developments. They bring into the open a global debate on the
For discussions on the meaning, origin, debate. etc. of the democratic deficit, see for example,
V. Bogdanor, Democralising the Community, Publication of the Federal Trust for Education
and Research, June 1990; V. Bogdanor & G. Woodcock, 'Europe and Sovereignty',
Parliamentary Affairs. 44(4), 1991, pp.481-92; B. Boyce, 'The Democratic Deficit of the
European Community', Parliamentary Affairs, 46(4), 1993, pp.458-77. Featherstone op.cit.,
1994. K. Neunreither, 'The Democratic Deficit of the European Union', Government and
Opposition, 29(3), 1994, pp.299-3 14.
96 See footnote 48 and Chapters three, four, five and seven.
See for example, Busch op.cit. on the distinction between economic and political rationalities
and the potential for clashes, especially within the context of EMU.
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relationship between economic, political and military might. The Gulf War of
1990/1991 symbolised that the European Community was an "economic giant, a
political pigmy and a military larva". 98 This war also demonstrated that, even in the
post-Cold War world, superpowers need military and political clout as well as
economic health. 99 Moreover, economic health may be threatened if it cannot be
backed up by political, and even military, might. Consequently, it has been argued
that the EU should become a superpower, because such a development was
nowadays the only guarantee to safeguard its dual goal of economic wealth and
political stability.'00
2.7.	 Conclusion
The Treaties of Paris and Rome brought forth a complicated institutional
compromise. Contrary to Jean Monnet's hopes, the ensuing system was the result of
political bargaining and was more political than functional, given the addition of the
Council of Ministers and the European Parliament. Functional elements were
98 A quote by the former Belgian foreign minister, Eyskens, in Time, 'Star-Crossed', 16, 22 April
1991, p.20.
The term 'superpower' is not easily defined. According to Buchan, the notion is indeed tied in
with military, political and economic strength and the resulting might and influence in
international relations. However, he gives no indication of the relative quantity and/or quality of
strength needed. He does however refer to the USA, Japan and Russia. In a sense, this reference
contradicts his notion that military, political and economic power are involved since Russia
lacks at least the latter and Japan is not very advanced on military power, beyond the confines
of its immediate territory. {D. Buchan, Europe - the Strange Superpower, Dartmouth
Publishing, 1993.) Other commentators undoubtedly include all three aspects. See for example,
The European, 'Where is the Voice of a United Europe?', 17-19 August 1990, p.S., or, The
Guardian, 'Europe's Fight to Find its Voice', 9 April 1991, p.18, or, G.F. Treverton, 'The New
Europe', Foreign Affairs, 71(1), 1992, pp.94-1 12.
100 The former US president Bush (1991) was for example of this view, since he stated that the
USA "looked to Europe to act as a force for stability outside its own borders." {The New World
Order, Speech by President Bush delivered on 15 April 1991. Quote taken prom page 1 of the
official text, supplied by the United States Information Service, U.S. Embassy, London.)
President Clinton also claims to support the idea of a European Superstate; see e.g. V. Smart,
'Clinton Backs United States of Europe', The European, 24-30 March 1995, p.1.
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nonetheless present, albeit in a reduced form: the central role of the Commission, the
institutionalisation of major functional interests in the Economic and Social
Committee and the encouragement given to other functional interests to participate
in the new European venture. Furthermore, the emerging EC was imbued with the
dirigiste culture that was prevalent at the time in French public administration and
that was so familiar to Jean Monnet. It manifested itself foremost in the
Commission's enthusiasm for recipe type legislation lol and planning, but it was also
anchored in certain Treaty provisions, for example with regard to the Common
Agricultural Policy. Many of these characteristics have become entrenched; notably,
the involvement of functional interests' 02 in the policy process (see Chapters four to
seven), including many quasi-institutionalised arrangements between the
Commission and these interests and the continued role allocated to the ESC. As
noted in this chapter dirigiste pressures have not entirely disappeared either. Yet,
this brief and by no means exhaustive, institutional analysis reveals that there have
been some important changes to the nature of the Community.
101 Recipe type legislation is prescriptive, both in terms of general guidelines and detailed
specifications. In the case of food legislation, recipe laws would for example prescribe the types
and amounts of ingredients that are necessary to produce a certain product, for example Tomato
Ketuchp (see Ch. 7, footnote 22). In other areas of legislation analogue prescriptions would
apply, e.g. specdIc health and safety measures to be implemented for all coal miners in all EU
member states.
102 The term functional interests is used here in a very broad way and includes all those private and
public interests (groups, single business organisations or individuals) who are promoting a very
particular interest, be this a policy, an institutional arrangement, behaviour/attitudes or values.
In other words, the traditional interest groups such as organised labour are included as well as
attitude or pressure groups such as the pro-breast feeding lobby. The justification for "lumping"
these groups and individuals together lies in their common desire to influence certain aspects of
the political system and to get as close as possible to certain formal policy actors. For lengthy
discussions on the fine distinction between functional interest groups and pressure or attitude
groups, see for example, H. Zeigler, Interest Groups in American Society, Prentice Hall, 1964;
Ball op.cit.; Part 2, Ch. 6; G. Alderman, Pressure Groups and Government in Great Britain,
Longman, 1984. A.R. Ball & F. Millard, Pressure Politics in Industrial Societies, Macmillan,
1986.
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The political character of the EU has steadily increased: the European Parliament
has gained legitimacy and power; the institutionalisation of the Heads of
Government or State in the form of the European Council has added an important
new political forum; the top levels of the Commission have become overtly political,
especially since the arrival of former Commission President Jacques Delors.'°3 In
institutional terms, political elements have thus steadily displaced the functional
aspects of European unity, without however eliminating them. Despite these
changes, the EU's basic mission remains however the same; even though the means
to the end now differ significantly from those advocate by Jean Monnet and his
disciples.
Different political views on how the goals could best be achieved exist, particularly
in the absence of indigenous Europeanism.'°4 During the early days, European
Community politics were very much dominated by Christian Democratic politics.
More recently, other influences have diluted this dominance, especially since
enlargement. The influence of ecologists is for example noticeable in the
considerable expansion of a policy area that was not even on the agenda in 1957.
Moreover, even many Christian Democrats have become less tolerant of the early
dirigiste trends in the EU. Consequently, and in line with broader ideological trends
in the West, the EU has come to perceive of itself more as a regulatory than a
dirigiste body, even though old habits die hard. The main debates thus centre on the
extent and type of regulation that is necessary to ensure that the objectives of
103 See for example, Drake's intriguing account on Jacques Delors' impact on the office of President
of the Commission of the European Union in H. Drake, Political Leadership and European
Integration: the Case of Jacques Delors', West European Politics, 18(1), 1995, pp.140-60. A
comprehensive account of Jacques Delors' impact on this office would need to go beyond an
analysis of discourse. Nonetheless, this is a valid and needed contribution.
104 See Section 2.3 and Boyce op.cit., Human Resources..., 1993 and 1994 (,publication and
presentation); Schlesinger op.cit., 1994.
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European integration, as outlined in the various Treaties, are met. Consequently, EU
policy-makers are much less concerned with the creation of detailed plans and highly
prescriptive policy programmes.'°5 Thus, the shift from dirigisme to regulation
produces a much less restrictive legal environment.
The main political conflicts now revolve around the extent of regulation and
distribution. Christian Democrats, Social Democrats, Socialists and, on the whole,
Environmentalists, continue to be concerned very much with issues of social
regulation and equality and have brought about the reform of the structural funds
and the steady expansion of social and environmental policy.'° 6 Recent enlargement
in January 1995, when three comparatively wealthy countries which have high
standards with regard to social welfare joined the EU, will probably reinforce this
pressures for social regulation, even though the philosophical principles that
motivate them are different.' 07 To a much lesser extent other influences are
noticeable, mainly in the form of MEPs or lobbyists, including regionalists,
nationalists, ultra right or left and feminist politicians. Some of these enhance
' °5 Policy action programmes are still a basic means of advancing EU policies, e.g. in the areas of
social or environmental policy, but their objectives are more limited. They aim to prevent
undesirable activities and processes by way of regulating the behaviour of those at whom the
laws are aimed. Previously, they aimed much more to actually prescribe, in considerable detail,
what behaviour should be adopted by those at whom the laws were aimed.
106 this point, see for example, M. Shackleton, 'The European Community Between Three
Ways of Life: a Cultural Analysis', Journal of Common Market Studies, 29(6), 1991, pp.575-
601; A. Weale, 'Social Policy and the European Union', Social Policy and Administration,
28(1), 1994, pp.5-19. J. Carvel, 'Delors Denounces Deregulation', The Guardian, 27 May 1994,
p.3.
107 The accession of Sweden and Finland to the EU enhances the profile of non-Catholic countries
and puts an end to the claim that the EU is little more than a Christian Democratic 'club'.
However, in terms of philosophical differences, it is more appropriate to argue that Christian
Democrats draw upon traditional religio-ethical teachings whereas other forces in the EU who
are also concerned with equality through market regulation, where appropriate, draw more
heavily on socialist, and perhaps more recently, on ecologist sources. It would go beyond the
scope of this thesis to discuss details, particularly, since the various sources are not always
completely distinctive, nor embraced in their pure forms. Moreover, in terms of policy
preferences, the differences do not matter sufficiently to prevent policy alliances.
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regulatory pressures, others reduce them, though none of them is a major player.
Since the late seventies, the influence of monetarist and neo-liberal thought in
Western politics has put significant deregulatory pressures on the EU. Ardent
proponents of neo-liberalism and/or monetarism have endeavoured to decouple
economic policy from mainstream politics, and have usually argued for economic
integration only. In reality, the centrality of economics to European integration has
however been mediated by political, and to a much lesser degree, ideological and
cultural concerns.
It has now been established that the primary goal of the EU is of an economic
nature, but that, within these parameters, a predominantly political organism, with
marked functional components, has evolved. However, the constant political
bickering and compromising has produced so many vague outcomes that judicial
review and interpretation has become a common and extremely important way to
clarifj many of these ambiguities or controversies, including the establishment of the
supremacy of EU law itself (in the applicable areas). Moreover, during periods of
political inertia, such as the early 1970s, the ECJ has upheld European integration.108
Therefore, legal developments have also significantly shaped the nature and extent of
European integration.
There are many political systems with extremely powerful supreme courts. The
recourse to the German Constitutional Court with regard to the ratification of the
TEU in Germany is a timely reminder of the powers of some national supreme
courts. However, currently, the ECJ stands out for a number of reasons. Unlike
elsewhere, ECJ Judges appear not to be blatant political appointments.' 09 This
108 Shapiro op.cit., p.!23.
109 See for example, Nugent op.cit., 1994, p.229: "There is no evidence of 'political' appointments
being made, in the way which they are to the United States Supreme Court,..."
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strategy may be desirable at one level, but given that all judges are appointed by
member states, it adds to the lack of political accountability in the EU and further
affects the legal-political equilibrium (or disequilibrium?) in the EU. Ambiguities in
constitutions provide extra opportunities for judicial review, particularly in the
absence of a dominant political force. A good example is the rise in activity of the
French Constitutional Court during periods of co-habitation."° The many
ambiguities contained in the Treaties, the diffusion of political power between
several institutions and the youth of the EU have thus almost certainly worked in
favour of the ECJ's ability to shape European integration.
The limitations of the ECJ have been most marked in the area of implementation
since it has lacked resources, like power, though not authority, human resources,
organisational structures, finance, to enforce its rulings. However, some scholars
have predicted a diminished role of the ECJ in terms of judicial review and indirect
policy-making in the near future, at least as far as landmark judgements are
concerned, due to enhanced political activity in the rejuvenated, post-1970s EU."
In view of such issues as subsidiarity, some doubt must be cast on this interpretation.
Moreover, the ECJ's role may change qualitatively, without necessarily decreasing in
importance: "Americans have learned that judicial activism can occur not only when
the courts wave the big, dramatic stick of constitutional judicial review but also
when they work small in the realms of statutory interpretation and administrative
10 discussions of the political activities of the French Constitutional Couit, see for example, Y.
Mény, Government and Politics in Western Europe: Britain, France, Italy and West Germany,
Oxford University Press, 1990, Ch. 8 on Constitutional Courts, and particularly, A. Stone,
'Where Judicial Politics are Legislative Politics: The French Constitutional Council', West
European Politics, 15(3), 1992, pp.30-49.
111 See for example, T. Loopmans, 'The Role of Law in the Next Stage of European Integration,
International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 35, October 1986, pp.925-31, or, H. Rasmussen,
On Law and Policy in the European Court of Justice: a Comparative Study in Judicial Policy-
making, Martinus Nijhoff, 1986.
68
review. 112 Given the steady increase in EU legislation there is plenty of scope for the
ECJ to work in these areas.
As a result of early influences, the European Community has been quite remote from
the European peoples. Arguably, this was not considered to be a particular problem
during its early years of development but some commentators soon voiced concern
about the lack of involvement of ordinary people and the subsequent absence of
social and/or cultural integration. l13 Consequently, the major European actors soon
began to disseminate information in the hope of creating some sense of belonging
among European peoples, for example, through regular surveys and the issuing of
Eurobarometers, that is opinion polls on European matters organised by the
Commission. These attempts have however frequently been guided by a naive belief
that top down activity would be sufficient to facilitate genuine communication
between the peoples of Europe and the architects of European integration.114
Consequently, these efforts have failed to overcome elitism and establish
112 Shapiro op.cit., p.!55.
113 See for example, B. Landheer, 'Introduction' in Landheer, B. (ed.) Limits and Problems of
European integration, Martinus Nijhoff, 1963, pp. 1-5. This point has also been made variously
in at a more general level of discussion which is however relevant to the discourse on European
integration. See for example, K.W. Deutsch, 'Communication and the Concept of a People', in
Douglas-Jackson, W.A. (ed.) Politics and Geographic Relationships, Prentice-Hall, 1964, pp.
113-7, or, M. Gaudelier, Process of State Formation', in Kazancigil op.cit., pp.3-19. Majone,
too, came to similar conclusions, although in a slightly different context. He argued that the
growth of regionalism in Europe may well be predominantly linked to feelings of cultural
identity and opportunities for participation in the public domain, rather than a result of
perceived economic gains. {G. Majone, 'Preservation of Cultural Diversity in a Federal System:
The Role of the Regions', in Tushnet, M. (ed.) Comparative Constitutional Federalism: Europe
andAmerica, Greenwood Press, 1990, pp.67-76.)
114 See footnote 48 as well as Landheer op.cit., p.2, who recognised this problem very early during
the life of the EC: "The limited participation of the Europeans in European integration may
have deeper causes, and it may not be simply a matter of more and better information." A recent
press release and background report by the CEC argue indeed rather simplistically that more
information and greater transparency (whatever that means!) will significantly improve
communication. {CEC, 'Background Report: Towards a More Open Conununity',
ISECIB23/93; CEC, 'Press Release: Information Deficit Highlighted by EC Survey',
ISEC/18/93.}
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constructive exchanges with the public on a large scale." 5 The makers of Europe
have however taken extensive additional measures to avert accusations of elitism,
following the signing of the TEU. These were reinforced after the first Danish
referendum on the TEU when said Treaty was narrowly rejected by the Danish
people. In many areas, the quality of efforts has however barely changed and the
majority of European peoples continue to feel that the EU is elitist and remote. It
will not be easy to challenge this view, particularly if promises are not kept. For
example, to date secrecy in the Council of Ministers continues to thrive even though
transparency has long been promised, in the Council and elsewhere." 6 Similarly,
European architects continue to communicate in jargon, thereby excluding many
non-specialists from their conversations." 7 Moreover, there is evidence that a
number of Eurocrats and European politicians consider these endeavours to be little
more than public relations exercises." 8 These accusations cannot be generalised,
but, in the final analysis, they are symptomatic of a continued communication gap.
115 For confirmation of this assessment, see for example, A. Louyot & F. Geoffreoy, 'Le vrai
pouvoir des Eurocrates', L'Express, no. 1, 25 septembre au 1 octobre 1992, pp.20-4.
116 1n a recent background report, the Commission admitted that progress with regard to
information, communication and openness was far from satisfactoiy. {CEC, 'Background
Report on Information, Conununication, Openness', ISECIB25/94. } For promises on more
openness, see for example the "Declaration on the Right of Access to Information in the Final
Act of the TEU op.cit., or, J. Palmer, 'Leaders Vow to Strip Veil of Secrecy from Europe', The
Guardian, 17 October 1992, p.8. Given this admission, it may well be that the Conunission is
less naive than it may seem and recognises the limitations of its public relations and
communication exercises. Consequently, some of its recent efforts may well have been attempts
to pay lip service to the political statements on more openness and nearness which have become
commonplace in the light of anti-Maastricht voices.
117 See for example, Crompton, 5. (1990). op.cit.
118 See for example, H. Wallace, 'Britain and Europe' in Dunleavy, P., Gamble, A. & Peele, 0.
(eds.) Developments in British Politics 3, Macmillan, 1990, pp.150-74, or, T. Naudin, 'Why it
is Time to Tear Down the Eurocrats' Paper Curtain', The European, 10-16 March 1995, p.21.
This view was also expressed by some of the people that were interviewed for the research
project, including a Commission official.
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The attempt to overcome elitism is part of the larger quest to add a cultural
dimension to European integration and to create a genuine European
'Gemeinschaft'. 119 Even the briefest of summaries reveals that this dimension was
largely absent from the EC and it is far from evident that it was thought desirable or
necessary by the majority of early architects of European integration. However, an
increasing number of commentators have been lamenting that European integration
lacked a "Messianic drive", or "a heart" or "a soul", or indeed "a spiritual
dimension".' 2° Undeniably, a whole range of measures and Treaty provisions have
119 Sociologists have made a clear distinction between the two concepts of 'Gesellschaft'
(association) and 'Gemeinschaft' (community), based on the different meanings of these two
German words. Each term delineates a different type of social order, with the latter referring to
a much closer type of social interaction where the interaction is an end in itself. On the other
hand, the exchanges in a 'Gesellschaft' are utilitarian and not as comprehensive as those within
a community. Obvious examples of a conununity, at the micro level, would be a fhmily, at the
macro-level, a 'Volk', as first conceptualised by Herder, or a nation. Examples of associations
abound in modern society, e.g. an interest organisation. The concepts of Gemeinschaft and
Gesellschaft are ideal-types and few social groups will neatly fit into these; a point which is
particularly true for the European Union. However, an examination of the (lack of) cultural
aspects of the EU reveals immediately that the latter is much nearer the Gesellschaft than the
Gemeinschafi end of a continuous spectrum which each ideal-type at one pole. This is perhaps
not surprising, given its utilitarian origin. The differences between the two concepts of
'Gemeinschaft' and 'Gesellschaft' were first discussed in F. TOnnies, Gemeinschaft und
Gesellschaft, 1887, as referred to, for example, in G.D. Mitchell (ed.), A Dictionary of
Sociology, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1968, pp.84-5. Many sociologists, including TOnnies,
were concerned that the arrival of modern industrialised society constituted a major assault on
communities. Nowadays, debate centres on the artificiality of the notion of community and the
possibility that it is an imagined rather than empirically unassailable concept. {See for example,
. Anderson, hnagined C'ommunities, Verso, 1989; S. Lash & J. Uriy, Economies of Signs and
Space, Sage, 1994, Ch. 12.) It is not the task of this thesis to address these issues, but they
point to the general difficulties with the concept of community that add to the specific obstacles
against the evolution of a 'Gemeinschaft' in the case of the European Union.
120 See for example, R. Aron, France Defends EDC, Praeger, 1954, p.3 16: "The European idea is
empty; it has neither the transcendence of Messianic ideologies nor the immanence of concrete
patriotism. "for "soul", see for example, R. Dahrendorf, wrote about the absence of a "European
soul" in 'Making Sense of Europe', Marxism Today, December 1990, pp.14-6. In a recent
newspaper article it was again argued that the EU lacked heart and was too rational which
helped to explain indifference and lack of knowledge among European citizens. {S. Geisel,
'Strassburg zwischen Europa und Eurokrative', Neue Zurcher Zeitung, 23. Dezember 1993,
S.6. }In his address to the EP, Vaclav Ravel, the present Czech President, argued that Europe
needed a "spiritual dimension". {EP News, 'Europe 'Needs a Spiritual Dimension', 7-11 March
1994, p.1.
71
developed over the years, and especially in the last decade, to "create a European
soul", and thereby hopefully a genuine cultural dimension to European unity. It has
long been accepted that such a dimension has to respect existing cultural diversity
and avoid attempts at imposed homogenisation.' 2 ' Yet, besides the obvious
limitations to cultural engineering from above, there are tremendous obstacles that
prevent progress in this dimension. Europeans continue to have strong regional
and/or national cultural affinities and many do not have a desire to substitute, or
even dilute, these by European affinities. 122 Unless European culture simply means a
wholesale embrace of existing cultures within the member states and an acceptance
that they have predominantly derived from a Graeco-Roman and Christian heritage,
it is extremely difficult to define what is meant by the concept. As seen, it is by no
means as natural, nor harmonious, as has sometimes been pretended. Finally, any
attempts to create a cultural dimension to European unity must fit within the
parameters of the EU's basic mission. In view of the formidable obstacles to cultural
development, it is not surprising that, at the time of writing, the European Union
lacks genuine cultural unity, if the latter is taken to be a newly created, additional
cultural layer. Yet, the fears that a growing gap between politico-economic and
cultural dimension may eventually strain further integration is probably justified,
especially in view of recent expansion.
121 On this point, see for example, H. Wallace, 'The Impact of the European Conununities on
National Policy-Making', Government and Opposition, 6(4), 1971, pp.520-38, or, J-P. Jacqué,
'La communautarisation des politiques nationales', Pouvoirs, 48, 1989, pp.29-38, or, S. Hughes,
'Socrates Set for Demand Crisis', The Tunes Higher Education Supplement, 7 July 1995, p.12.
122 See for example, T. Richel, 'One Europe? You must be Joking!', New European: Quarterly
Review, 5(6), 1992, pp.31-4!, for 'illuminating' comments by 'ordinary' Europeans from all
member states (at the time of publication), indicating that they neither have a sense of common
cultural Europeaness, nor wish to develop one.
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The preliminary discussions in this chapter also give away some clues about the issue
of integration. To put it bluntly: At the time of writing, Europe is more integrated
than after the signing of the Rome Treaties in 1957. The centrality of the integration
theme and this finding warrant a more extensive discussion on the extent and nature
of integration; this takes place in the next chapter. However, integration can only be
split from other factors for analytical purposes, because, on the whole, integration
has not been an end in itself. To reiterate it once more, the raison d'être of European
unity is still wealth creation and political stability. To the vast majority of Europeans,
integration is merely a function of this ambition and not an end in itself.
The final issue raised in this chapter concerns change. The political system that is
now the European Union is young and still comparatively underdeveloped and has,
therefore, been very amenable to mutation, as has been evident from the brief
discussions in this chapter. Developments have not been one-directional, nor
irreversible, nor always predictable. The most significant modifications have been a
(more overt) embrace of political, and possibly military, ambitions, institutional
changes, extension of policy scope, greater attempts to involve the European
peoples in the creation of unity and a move away from dirigisme and homogenisation
to regulation and mutual recognition of diversity. As argued earlier, the latter has in
many ways been the most marked qualitative shift and has partially altered the
existing rules of the game. The extent and depth of change has made for uncertainty
and unevenness in terms of the nature and expansion of European integration and
has brought forth many ambiguities, controversies and compromises. As a result,
analysis has been difficult and varied, as will become evident during the next chapter.
Yet, the extent of change must not be exaggerated, since the basic objectives of
European integration have not changed. Moreover, original constitutional and
institutional arrangements have severely mediated any attempts at alteration.
Similarly, the dominant political and ideological traditions of Western Europe have
imposed limiting parameters and the same goes for certain external factors, such as
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global economic trends, the foreign policy of the USA towards Europe. It would
therefore be wrong to consider the EU as a completely undefined organism; it is by
no means fossilised but it is not just a shapeless, viscous mass.
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CHAPTER THREE:
MAKING SENSE OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION:
PRELIMINARY THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
3.1.	 Introduction
The post-war era has witnessed the emergence of a number of approaches to
(regional) integration that have derived predominantly from international relations
discourses. Some of these have developed into filly blown theories, such as
neotünctionalism whereas others have remained less developed. Nonetheless, they
tend to be labelled as 'integration theories' and this term is used here. Analysts of
European integration have referred constantly to these conceptualisations and,
indeed, developed and redeveloped them in the light of empirical data, especially
since it soon became evident that all of them had serious flaws. This chapter
examines the main contributions and limitations of integration theories to an
understanding of European integration and policy-making in the European Union.
Besides individual faults, these theories have three major shared shortcomings:
firstly, they fail to address satisfactorily the issue of change; secondly, they do not
take adequate account of the inner workings .of the EU and, finally, they are too
general, ignoring idiosyncrasies within specific policy areas.' Consequently, it is
necessary to draw upon other theoretical material too, especially from political
1 This argument was initially developed by S. Bulmer, 'Domestic Politics and European-
Community Policy-making', Journal of Common Market Studies, 21(4), 1983, pp. 349-363 and
has since been reiterated variously, e.g. by George op.cit, 1991; Hix op.cit., 1994, and, B.
Rosamond, 'Contemporary European Integration: the Li,nits of Nation State-entrism', Paper
presented at the IVth Conference of the International Society for the Study of European Ideas,
Karl-Franzens-Universität, 22-27 August 1994.
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science and, to a lesser extent, from sociology to compensate for these
shortcomings. Appropriate discussions are therefore introduced both here and in the
three subsequent chapters.
3.2.	 Neofunctionalism
The two classical integration approaches associated with the analysis of newly
emerging international institutions, including the EC, are neoflinctionalism and
intergovernmentalism. Neoftinctionalism was first formulated by Haas and emanates
from a pluralist world view. 2 Proponents of neofunctionalism maintained that
European integration constituted an inexorable process that would lead eventually
towards a United States of Europe. In the light of Franc&s empty chair policy and
the Luxembourg Accords, the theory was rejected, even by Haas himself who
admitted that "...the assumed linearity between initially programmed impulses and
eventual outcomes is disturbed". 3 Yet, Haas never ceased to believe that ".. .initially
programmed impulses..." for integration had been built into the structure of the EC.
Certain other analysts agreed and the neofunctionalist concept of spill-over also
attracted renewed interest following the end of Euro-sclerosis in the early 1980s.
Consequently, there have since been a few attempts to use aspects of the theory or,
indeed, to resurrect it, albeit in amended forms that make use of the constant
refinement of the integrationist debate.4
2 Haas op.cit., 1958.
E.B. Haas, The Study of Regional Integration, in Lindberg, L.N. & Scheingold, S.A. (eds.)
Regional Integration, Harvard University Press, 1971, Ch. 1, p.35. See also, E.B. Haas, The
Obsolescence of Regional Integration Theory, Berkeley Institute of International Studies Press,
1976.
See for example, P. Taylor, 'The New Dynamics of EC Integration in the 1 980s', in Lodge, J.
(ed.) The European C'ommunity and the Challenge of the Future, Pinter, 1989; J. Tranholm-
Mikkelsen, 'Neo-Functionalism: Obstinate or Obsolete? A Reappraisal in the Light of the New
Dynamism of the EC', Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 20(1), 1991, pp. 1-22, or,
Burley & Mattli op. cit.
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History confirms that newly formed structures can further integration such as in the
case of Switzerland. 5 The previous chapter suggests that this finding also applies to
the EC. Consequently, limited evidence of spill-over effects can be uncovered: for
example, the expansion of policy scope, the proposals for EMU, the recourse to
qualified majority voting in some areas of policy-making, the growing role of the EP
and, above all, the supremacy of EU law. However, the previous chapter
demonstrates also that there are contra-integration pressures and that spill-over has
been limited and, where it took place, potentially reversible because of the strong
political influences on integration which have been underestimated by
neofunctionalists. Moreover, superficial signs of spill-over may in fact cover up
political manipulation and bargaining and, hence, not be as automatic as they may
appear at first sight. 6 This point is difficult to assess and it will need closer scrutiny
during the case studies. However, it is possible to argue already that, if political
pressures were to oppose spill-over pressures, the dynamics of the latter would
almost certainly be undermined. For all these reasons, neofunctionalism, with its
underlying determinism and its excessive faith in apolitical processes, is intrinsically
flawed. Nevertheless, it would be unjust to condemn neofunctionalism outright.
Neoftinctionalists have pointed usefully to the central position of the Commission,
See for example, M. Forsyth, Unions of States: the Theory and Practice of Confederation,
Leicester University Press, 1981. (for a general discussion on the structure-behaviour
relationship, within the context of his chosen topic); C.H. Church, 'The Not So Model
Republic? The Relevance of Swiss Federalism to the European Community', Paper presented at
the Political Studies Association Annual Conference, Leicester, 1993, or, W. Linder, Swiss
Democracy, St. Martin's Press, 1994. It should be noted that all these scholars make the point
about structures in relation to (con)federalism, not (neo)functionalism. However,
(con)federalists and (neo)functionalists alike believe that structural changes lead to behavioural
and value changes.
6 This point has been made repeatedly, e.g. by R.O. Keohane & S. Hoffmann, 'Conclusions:
Community Politics and Institutional Change', in Wallace op.cit., 1990, Ch. 16, or, R.J. Barry
Jones, 'The Economic Agenda', in Wyn Rees, 0. (ed.), International Politics in Europe: the
New Agenda, Routledge, 1993, Ch. 6.
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the fUnctional and bureaucratic interests that are involved in policy-making and the
pressures towards an 'ever closer union', but hey have not paid adequate attention to
all the other factors involved in European integration.
3.3.	 Intergovernmentalism
Intergovernmentalism has its roots in the Realist school of international relations
(IR)7 and relates to a particular way of describing exchanges between the member
states of the EU. The Realist school of thought adopts a Hobbesian view of human
nature and maintains that international relations are characterised by self-interest,
intense 'politicking' and the pursuit of power. Thus, political interests take
precedence over economic or other fUnctional considerations:
"The world economic system is not a prime mover, nor a God-like distributor of roles
and divider of labour, but the outcome of discrete political decisions made by the
separate units."8
International exchanges take the form of bargaining and conflict management, with a
constant possibility of a break-down in relations. With regard to the European
Union, intergovernmentalists stress the centrality of the Council of Ministers and the
European Council and regard these as microcosms of international political conflict
management. Consequently, they tend to (over)emphasise the importance of the
Luxembourg Accords.
For classical Realist accounts of international relations, see for example, R. Aron,, Peace and
War: a Theory of International Relations, Weidenleld & Nicolson, 1966, or, H-J. Morgenthau,
Politics among Nations, Knopf, 1966, or, E.H. Carr, Politics among Nations: the Struggle for
Power and Peace, Knopf 1967, or, K.N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, McGraw-Hill,
1979. For more recent, neo-Realist accounts, see for example G.H. Snyder, 'Alliance Theory: a
Neo-realist First Cut', Journal ofInternational Affairs, 44, 1990, pp.103-24.
S. Hoffmann, 'Reflections on the Nation-State in Western Europe Today', Journal of Common
Market Studies, 20(1-2), March 1982, pp.29-37.
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Although intergovernmentalists9 believe that bargaining strategies are shaped as
much as possible by the self-interests of those who participate in the bargaining
processes, they do not deny the possibility of successful conflict management or
incidental integration. However, they refute any notion of functional determinism.
Thus, according to intergovernmentalist explanations, successful conflict
management, including possible progress in respect of integration, will only be
sustained as long as there is adequate political commitment among key actors. That
commitment depends on expectations to reap self-interested benefits for individual
member states and/or politicians from the sustained involvement in conflict
management.'° In addition, the shape and outcome of international exchanges
depends on the respective strengths and skills of the key players. In turn, the
strength of key players is determined by the relative balance of authority and power
over which they dispose. For example, in the context of the EU, German
predominance is kept in check by the fact that no special authority is given to
German leadership within the institutional arrangements among the member states
but is, simultaneously, promoted by the comparative power that Germany possesses
in relation to other member states and as a result of more extensive resources like
economic might."
Stanley Hoffmann and Sir Rail Dahrendorf have been some of the most fervent advocates of
intergovernmentalism, particularly in response to neofunctionalist interpretations of European
integration. See for example, S. Hoffmann, 'Obstinate of Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State
and the Case of Western Europe', Daedalus, 85(3), 1966, pp.872-7; S. Hoffmann op.cit., 1982,
or, R. Dahrendorf 'The Future of Europe', in Dahrendorf R (ed.) Whose Europe? Competing
Visions for 1992, Institute of Economic Affairs, 1989, Ch. 1. Intergovernmentalist
undercurrents appear in recent works, too, for example in Joffe's recent discussion of the 'New
Europe'. See, I. Joffe, 'The New Europe: Yesterday's Ghosts', Foreign Affairs, 72(1), 1993,
pp.29-49. This article contains classical intergovernmentalist statements such as "...the
governments of sovereign states never behave as one; in the cnmch, they will follow their own,
and not the communal interest." {ibid, p.4O.}
O Thus, bargaining is usually seen as a 'zero-sum' game.
11 This point is picked up for example by Perry Anderson in his review on two recent works on
European integration and the European Union. See, P. Anderson, 'The Europe to Come',
London Review of Books, 25 January 1996, pp.4-7.
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In view of the above assumptions concerning international interaction,
intergovernmentalists interpret the development of the EC not as an autonomous
process but as an incidental outcome of sustained self-interested and external
pressures from powerful sources, such as the USA. As far as intergovernmentalists
are concerned, self-interest is linked directly to a desire among key actors to
safeguard the centrality of the nation slate system in the international context and
the independence of the nation state that they represent.' 2 External pressures, too,
are there to prevent a collapse of the nation state system as a result of excessive
national rivalry, followed by destructive conflict. Thus, integration is neither seen as
desirable nor justifiable in its own right; it is, and must be, a means to preserve the
predominance of the nation state. Since, to date, ". . .the Community helps preserve
the nation states far more than it forces them to wither away",' 3 limited integration
has been a price well worth paying. However, intergovernmentalists anticipate that
integration will continue or, indeed survive, only as long as it continues to enhance
the centrality of the nation state in international relations.
International bargaining scenarios sometimes overestimate the autonomy of the key
actors and, simultaneously, underestimate the constraining effects of indigenous and
exogenous pressures on actor autonomy. However, in the case of European
integration, the pivotal mediating role of the Cold-War global constellation and the
USA's positive attitude towards European integration have been acknowledged
widely.' 4 By contrast, most of the early intergovernmentalist interpretations of
12 See for example, Hoffinann op.cit., 1982. This argument has been made very strongly, more
recently, too, namely by A.S. Milward, The European Rescue of the Nation-State, London:
Routledge, 1992.
13 Hoffmann op.cit., 1982, p.36.
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European interaction fail to take account of indigenous mediating factors. In
particular, they ignore the extent to which actor behaviour is being shaped by
domestic political factors. For this reason, Bulmer's 'domestic political model', that
emphasised the extent to which key actors are constrained by internal political
scenarios, has been praised justifiably as a considerable conceptual refinement of
original intergovernmentalist discourse.'5
Intergovernmentalism is an antidote to neofunctionalism and enjoyed high prestige in
the late 60s and 70s, following the near collapse of the EC during the Gaullist era. 16
In recent decades, serious doubts about its validity as an explanation of European
integration have arisen, notably because of events such as the signing of the SEA
and the TEU and the continued dynamic of European integration, despite the end of
the Cold War era.' 7 Nevertheless, Realist interpretations of European integration
continue to play an important role in the search for a satisfactory analytical
Hoffmann op.cit., 1982. The point about the influence of the USA and the Cold War on
European stability has been raised variously, but usually with the conclusion that this was only
one aspect of integration and could not have worked without internal European dynamics. See
also earlier comments on this topic in Chapter two, or, P.O. Lewis, 'Superpower Rivahy and the
End of the Cold War', in McGrew, A.G. & Lewis, P.G. (eds.), Global Politics, Polity, 1992,
Ch. 2, or, A. Sharp & K. Ward, 'The United States and Europe, 1945 to 1991', in Waites, B.
(ed.), Europe and the Wider World, Routledge, 1993, essay 3, or, M. Gallagher et al. (eds.),
'Toward One European Government?, in Representative Government in Modern Europe,
McGraw-Hill, 1995, 2nd edition, Ch. 5.
Bulmer op.cit., 1983.
16 See for example, P. Taylor, 'Intergovernmentalism in the European Conummities in the 1970s:
Patterns and Perspectives', International Organization, 36(4), 1982, pp.741-66. There is also
recognition of the stagnating legacy of the 60s and 70s in H. Wallace, 'Negotiation, Conflict,
and Compromise: The Elusive Pursuit of Common Policies', in Wallace, IL, Wallace, W. &
Webb, C. (eds.) Policy-Making in The European Community, John Wiley and Sons, 1983, 2nd
edition, Ch. 2. Although Wallace's account is too policy-centred and too astute to be labelled
'intergovernmentalist', whatever Hix's views on the subject { See lix op. cit., 1994, footnote 21).
17 See for example, W. Wallace, 'Introduction: the Dynamics of European Integration', in Wallace,
W. (ed.), The Dynamics of European Integration, Pinter, 1990, Ch. 1, or, Nugent, 1994, op.cit.,
or, Archer & Butler op. cit.
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framework, albeit usually in refined forms. 18 There is indeed plenty of evidence of
persistent national self-interest among member states, including the compromise
appointment of Jacques Santer as Commission President (1995-1999), the dispute
over the voting rights of the new members (Finland, Austria, Sweden), Chancellor
Kohl's successful intervention to secure a top economic portfolio for Martin
Bangeman, one of the German Commissioners, the Greek refusal to consider the
Turkish membership application and the increasingly contentious issue of border
control. 19 The recent fishery disputes symbolise that the EU members are still
comparable to "a basket of crabs that keep pinching each other".2°
It is not surprising that national self-interest continues to thrive among EU member
states. Despite some claims to the contrary, national identity and nation statism still
play crucial cultural and political roles in individual member states and during
international exchanges. 2 ' Arguably, national elites perpetuate that situation by
18 See footnotes 6, 7 and, especially, 13, but also section 3.6 of this chapter.
19 Some examples were provided by interviewees, whereas others were referred to in secondaiy
literature, mainly of the journalistic type; for the latter see for example, F. Painton, 'European
Union: Hugs, but no Kisses', TIME, 143(14), 4 April, 1994, pp.26-7, or, J. Carvel & M. White,
'EU moves to Tighten Frontiers', The Guardian, 14 February 1995, p.1.
20 George Sorel, speaking of Europeans in 1908, cited in Buchan, D. Europe: The Strange
Superpower, Dartmouth Publishing, 1993, p.167. With regard to the recent fishery disputes,
there are plenty of references, e.g. Neue Zarcher Zeitung, 'Wieder Eskalation im HFjs(;hjegN
Kanada-EU', 28. März 1995, S. 2; J. Read, G. Tremlett & P.. Watson, 'No Winners in the
Halibut War', The European, 17-23 March 1995, p. 2.
21 For accounts, underlining consistent dominance of nationalism, or at least acknowledging its
strength implicitly, see footnotes 9-17; many of these pieces of work assume that nationalism
remains a dominant cultural and political force, without questioning too much, why it should
have continued appeal, given that it is a relatively recent and, arguably, contingent historical
event. Yet, a number of authors have attempted to argue, and usually quite convincingly, that
the appeal of nationalism is, at least in part, linked to the ease with which territoriality can be
conceptualised, especially if contrasted to the much more abstract notion of a-territorial
economic, political or cultural interactions, such as espoused for example in Lash & Urry op.cit.
or in K. Ohmae, Borderless World, Collins, 1990. Claims about the ease with which
territoriality can be conceptualised have been made by scholars such as Sack op.cit., (a
geopolitician), 1. Canulleri & J. Falk, The End of Sovereignty? The Politics of a Shrinking and
Frag,nenting World, Edward Elgar, 1992.
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exploiting the emotional appeal of nationalism so as to preserve their own privileged
positions. 22 However, an admission that national self-interest continues to thrive in
the EU need not amount to a full endorsement of intergovernmentalism which is,
like neofunctionalism, a one-dimensional approach that fails to capture the
intricacies of European integration. For example, intergovernmentalists downplay
the supremacy of European law and underestimate the contributions made by
supranational policy actors. Furthermore, they emphasise formal integration by state
institutions too much, at the expense of informal integration through a variety of
channels such as interest representation, economic and technological
interdependence, interpersonal communications. 23 Regrettably, many
intergovernmentalist discussions fail to concentrate on the dynamics between
national and international interaction, even if they acknowledge the influence of
Ruggie is inclined to perceive of the current world in ways similar to Ohmae op.cit. and Lash &
Urry op. cit.: and argues that the "sovereign importance of place is replaced by the sovereign
importance of movement", but he also acknowledges that "on reflection though, the reason
territoriality is taken for granted is not hard to guess. Samuel Becket put it well in Endgame:
"You're on earth; there is no cure for that." Unbundled territoriality is not located some place
else; but it is becoming another place." {J.G. Ruggie, 'Territoriality and Beyond: Problematising
Modernity in International Relations, International Organization. 47(1), winter 1993, p.173;
ibid p.174.) For a vastly overoptimistic, even, naive view on the decline of political
nationalism, see notably F. Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, Hainish
Hamilton, 1992, Chapter on nationalism.
22 Marxists almost certainly disagree with views such as espoused by Sack op. cit. or Camilleri &
Falk op.cit., because Marxists regard the manipulation of nationalism by elites as a tool that
will help them to preserve their power. It is not the role of this thesis to evaluate this particular
stance but it is nonetheless evident that self-preservation is at least one of the objectives of the
governments of EU member states and that the nurturing of nationalism is one part of their
efforts to succeed in self-preservation. Perhaps manipulation is more fruitful because the
concept can easily be understood and 'absorbed', and hence, Marxist views and views such as
espoused by Sack op.cit., need not necessarily be incompatible; they stress however different
points of an argument and have their roots in different perceptions of the world and human
nature. This interpretation seems implicit in Rosenberg's statement that "Intergovemmentalism
sounds plausible because it articulates commonly held, common sense assumptions about world
politics. This is not surprising since it mimics the vocabulary of the state's ruling ideology par
excellence." J. Rosenberg, 'What's the matter with Realism?', Review of International Studies,
16(4), 1990, p.297.
23 See for example Wallace op.cit., 1990, or, J. M. Gabriel, 'Contemporary Theories', Woridviews
and Theories ofIntern ational Relations, St. Martin's, 1994, Ch. 3.
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domestic politics on integration. Instead, all their analytical efforts focus on the
oulcomes of encounters between national politicians and diplomats. This limited
focus, which has been depicted metaphorically as the "billiard ball scenario" is
inadequate because it pays too little attention to the ways in which national politics
and international diplomacy affect each other, the nature of the bargaining
situation/mechanism and the behaviour of the key players.24
As indicated above, Bulmer's domestic politics model acknowledges the importance
of the interface between domestic politics and international exchanges, but not
adequately. However, the issue has attracted also some interest among IR specialists
who have referred to the focus on the interface between domestic politics and
international exchanges as "linkage politics". 25 The introduction into traditional
intergovernmentalist discourse of linkage politics constitutes a crucial refinement
since such accounts begin to bridge the traditional gap between political science and
ER analysis. Occasionally, political scientists or IR specialists have expressed
concern over the mixing of two analytical approaches that have, traditionally, been
24 The "billiard ball" metaphor has been used for example by G. Thompson, 'Economic Autonomy
and the Advanced Industrial State', in McGrew, A. & Lewis, P.G. (eds.) op.cit., Ch. 10, or by
M. Canel, 'Cross-national Links and European Mind', Paper presented at the ilIrd Conference
of the International Society for the Study of European Ideas, Aalborg University, 24-29 August
1992.
25 See notably, J. Rosenau, 'Toward the Study of National-International Linkages', in Rosenau, J.
Linkage Politics: Essays on the Convergence of National and International Systems, Free
Press, 1969; J. Rosenau, 'Theorizing Across Systems: Linkage Politics Revisited', in
Wilkenfeld, J. (ed.) Conflict Behavior and Linkage Politics, David McKay, 1973, particularly
p. 43. P. Gourevitch,, 'The Second Image Reversed: the International Sources of Domestic
Politics', international Organization, 32(3), 1978, pp.881-911.
Some of the works of P.J. Katzenstein and S. Krasner demonstrate the interaction between
international and domestic politics by way of case studies on foreign economic policy. In this
context, see notably, P.J. Katzenstein, 'International Relations and Domestic Structures:
Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States', International Organization, 30(4),
1976, pp.1 -45; P.J. Katzenstein (ed.), Between Power and Plenty: Foreign Economic Policies
ofAdvanced Industrial States, University of Wisconsin Press, 1978. S. Krasner, 'United States
Commercial and Monetaiy Policy: Unravelling the Paradox of External Strength and Internal
Weakness', in ibid., pp.51-87. S. Krasner, Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials
Investments and U.S. Foreign Policy, Princeton University Press, 1978.
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kept separate. However, given that the EU displays aspects of an international
organisation as well as a domestic political system, there is no doubt as to the
appropriateness of this approach in the context of formalised European integration.26
The majority of works, that are concerned with linkage politics, are concentrating
excessively on the trades off between aggregated national interests, thus failing to
synthesise the strengths of the domestic politics model with those of discourse on
linkage or the effects of multi-level, i.e. national and international, exchanges.
However, there is a notable exception to this pattern, namely Putnam's work on
diplomacy and domestic politics which emphasised the importance of the reciprocal
interaction between domestic politics, the bargaining set-up and international
exchanges. 27 Putnam's extensive empirical research on international summits led him
to conclude that "neither a purely domestic nor a purely international analysis could
account..." for many of the outcomes negotiated on such occasions. 28 His findings
inspired him to develop a conceptual framework for understanding the interactive
relationship between diplomacy and domestic politics which has a number of merits.
In line with advocates of the domestic politics model, Putnam emphasised that it is a
grave fallacy to treat the nation states, that engage in international diplomacy, as
homogenous entities since the behaviour of national representatives is shaped as
much by the dynamics of intricate domestic political forces as by the particular
26 See notably Bulmer op.cit., 1983, p.363: "The domestic politics approach... [and similar
approachesi ...might be accused of having somewhat mixed intellectual parentage," but also Hix
op.cit., 1994; Rosamond op.cit., 1994; B. Axford, 'Multiple Truths and Postmodern
Imaginings: New Ways of Reading European Unity', Paper presented at the Wth International
Conference of the Society for the Study of European Ideas, Karl-Franzens-Universitilt, 22-27
August 1994}, as well as Section 3.6. of the thesis.
27 RD. Putnam, 'Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: the Logic of Two-Level Games', International
Organization 42(3), 1988, pp.427-60.
28 ibid., p.430.
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structural positions and political self-interests of official national representatives.
Consequently, negotiators at the international level need to engage in bargaining
with national jj international actors at the same time. 29 Therefore, international
"...negotiations usually require three agreements - one across the table and one on
each side of the table". 3° Putnam coined the phrases "two-level game" and "multi-
level games" to describe such interactions. The latter phrase applies if several levels
of negotiation are involved, such as regional actors, national actors, European
actors, international actors. Inevitably, the complexity of two-level games increases
manifold if multi-level games are played, since there are negotiations at each 'game
table' as well as between each of the tables! Moreover, a change in the negotiated
outcome at each table, or between two tables, initiates a major chain reaction across
the whole game, so forcing extensive multi-level renegotiations. Such intricate multi-
level game situations arose for example during the various GATT negotiation
rounds.
Up to this point, Putnam's contribution amounts to little more than an astute
synthesis of the work of certain other scholars. 3 ' His major conceptual advancement
arises from his recognition that "...the constituents' views may themselves evolve in
the course of the negotiations." 32 Furthermore, Putnam attempted to work out why,
in many instances, it is possible to construct negotiated outcomes despite the
incredible complexity of multi-level games and the numerous occasions at which
negotiations could break down. Drawing upon empirical evidence and common
29 ibid., as well as for example, H. Raiffa, The Art and Science of Negotiation, Harvard University
Press, 1982; J.E. Twiggs, The Tokyo Round of Multilaf era! Trade Negotiations: a Case Study
in Building Domestic Support for Diplomnacy, Georgetown University Press, 1987.
30 Former American Secretary of Labour, John Dunlop, as quoted in Raiffa op.cit., p.l66.
31 See most of the references in this Section of Chapter three.
32 Putnam, op.cit., 1988, p.436.
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sense, he concluded that the perceived benefits of staying in the game have to
outweigh the factors that facilitate a break down of the game. Moreover, he
acknowledged that a positive perception of benefits is far easier to maintain if the
negotiations allow for complex trade-offs and extensive cross-issue deals, since this
broad approach facilitates flexibility and provides opportunities to satisfj the needs
of a large number of individual players. Putnam's findings support the argument in
Chapter one that, even if integration was an incidental outcome of setting up a
negotiating mechanism to keep national rivalry under control initially, it developed
its own internal dynamics that have affected the nature of the mechanism, the shape
of international exchanges, the behaviour of key actors as well as the domestic
politics of individual member states. Putnam's references to the need for extensive
trade-offs and deals is confirmed by empirical material presented later in the thesis.
The notion of multi-level games is important to the analysis of European integration
and policy-making. However, it is too narrow to be used on its own, since it says
little about issues such as the extent to which established rules of the game and
informal transnational exchanges mediate the complex formal bargaining processes
between key political and diplomatic players. Some of these points have been
addressed elsewhere in JR discourse and the most salient elements of that debate are
summarised and analysed briefly in the subsequent sections of this chapter. The
following are particularly notable and, hence, are explored in subsequent sections of
this chapter.33
Some of the terms that are frequently used in relation to integration and IR discourse must be
explained: international, intergovernmental, transgovernmental, transnational, supranational,
extra-national. The distinctions made here are synthesised from existing literature, namely from
S.P. Huntington, Transnational Organizations in World Politics', World Politics, 25, April
1973, pp.333-68. R.O. Keohane & J.S. Nyc, 'Transgovernmental Relations and International
Organizations', World Politics, 27(1), pp.39-62. C. Webb, 'Theoretical Perspectives and
Problems', in Wallace, H. et al. (eds.) op.cit.,. Ch. 1. Wallace (ed.) op.cit., 1990; C. Archer,
International Organization, Routledge, 1992, 2nd edition. Wallace (ed.) op.cit., 1990; C.
Archer, Organizing Europe: the Institutions ofIntegration, Edward Arnold, 1994, 2nd edition.
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3.4.	 Interdependence
Contrary to intergovernmentalism, but like neofunctionalism, the notion of
interdependence has its intellectual roots in philosophical pluralism and proponents
of interdependence underline the intricate and dynamic nature of the world; hence,
their liking for the networks metaphor. For example, Spiro depicted international
exchanges as a series of "...ever more complex, kaleidoscopically shifting networks
of interdependence..." 34 Consequently, it is tactically necessary for nation states to
engage in a growing number of extensive international and transnational exchanges
The desire to clari1' terminology and to distinguish between terms carries with it a risk of
oversimplification but it is nonetheless necessaiy. The two roots '-national' and '-governmental'
can be distinguished as follows: '-governmental' emphasises formal interaction, predominantly
between government and other state actors, e.g. the militaiy. '-national' implies that there are
also many non-governmental, and indeed many informal exchanges between various national
actors. The prefix 'inter' means between; it emphasises co-operation between
nations/governments so as to achieve common goals but it also underlines the persistence and
importance of boundaries. The actors, i.e. governmental and/or other national organisations
keep their autonomy and act as individual entities. The United Nations are a classical example
of an International Organisation. The prefix 'trans' can be translated with 'across' or 'beyond'.
Boundaries between nations and/or governments are therefore crossed so as to achieve one or
more common goals. Within the structures formed to achieve these goals, nations/govenunents
no longer act as individual entities but as a goal-focused unit. In other words, conunon
objectives take precedence over national interests; whereas, in the case of
internationalism/intergovernmentalism, individual national interests take precedence over
common objectives. Transnationalism or transgovernmentalism does however not subsume
individual interests or link them in permanent integration, nor does it assume constant harmony
among the actors. The World Bank is for example a transnational organisation.
Hans provided a workable definition of the term 'supranational': "A cumulative pattern of
accommodation in which the participants refrain from unconditionally vetoing proposals and
instead seek to attain agreement by means of upgrading common interests." {E.B. Hans, Beyond
the Nation-State: Functionalism and International Organization, Stanford University Press,
1964, p.65) Transnational and supranational exchanges are thus dominated by the precedence
of common interests but supranational organisations are complex multi-purpose institutions. It
is usually argued correctly that, where qualified majority voting applies, decisions in the
Council of Ministers are taken on a supranational basis and that, therefore, the EU contained
supranational characteristics even though it did not amount to a supranational organisation in
its entity.
H.J. Spiro, 'Interdependence: a Third Option Between Sovereignty and Supranational
Integration', in Ionescou (ed.) op.cit., p.159.
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so as "...to resolve the major problems endemic to the complexity of the post-
industrial era." 35 However, these amount more to "...piecemeal [actions than to]
Utopian engineering..." 36 Thus, they need not lead to greater integration nor to
international harmony. 37 However, occasionally scholars have exaggerated the levels
of "concordance" that can be achieved by way of interdependence.38
The idea of interdependence highlights several aspects that are useful to integration
theorists. The images associated with interdependence symbolise the plurality,
complexity and fluidity of exchanges and transcend assumptions that all interactions
must have a territorial basis. 39 Unlike neofiinctionalists, proponents of
interdependence recognise that international relations are fundamentally mediated by
self-interest but, contrary to intergovernmentalists, they concede that interactions
can, under certain circumstances, nonetheless develop beyond basic conflict
containment. Hence, they do not rule out lasting integration ensuing from utilitarian
interaction. Given this resistance to deterministic perceptions of international
exchanges, interdependence is a useful analytical tool, but it is far too general and
underdeveloped to constitute a working theory in its own right. Also, discourse on
J.N. Rosenau, 'The State in an Era of Cascading Politics: Wavering Concept, Widening
Competence, Withering Colossus, or Weathering Change?', Comparative Political Studies,
21(1), 1988, p.13.
36 Karl Popper quoted in R. Dahrendorf Reflections on the Revolution in Europe, Chatto &
Windus, 1990, p.151.
See for example, Gabriel's discussion on Norman Angel! who became one of the earliest
proponents of interdependence but who did not link the concept to integration. {J.M. Gabriel
op. cit., pp.65-71. } See also, R.O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the
World Political Econo,ny, Princeton University Press, 1984, or Thompson op. cit
See particularly D.J. Puchala, 'Of Blind Men, Elephants and International Integration', Journal
of Common Market Studies, 10(3), 1972, pp.267-84: "I will hypothesize that...contemporary
international integration can best be thought of as a set of processes that produce and sustain a
concordance system at the international level." (ibid, p.257.)
See footnote 18.
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interdependence failed to take full advantage of the strengths of domestic and
linkage politics and multi-level game models. Hence, ". . .the role of domestic factors
slipped more and more out of focus..." from the interdependence debate, so
weakening its intrinsic analytical potential.4°
3.5.	 International Political Economy
During the past few decades a marked internationalisation of finance, trade,
investment and economic policy-making has taken place. 4 ' This development has
undermined the autonomy of national governments, thereby sometimes causing
severe tension between economic and political considerations:
"Modern money-transmission facilities have made it increasingly difficult, for
example, for governments to impose and maintain exchange controls, and these have
been gradually discontinued. Similarly, all-day trading on the foreign-exchange
market has largely prevented governments from manipulating the values of their
currencies against the forces of supply and demand. Inflation, too, cannot be brought
under control simply by domestic action: international forces cannot be ignored in
today's more open environment. Political developments have not always matched the
changes in the economic climate. "42
"Even if the international economy is not disturbed by exceptional and unpredictable
events, and it quite often is, contemporaiy domestic governments have limited room
for manoeuvre in response to international developments."43
"National govermnents are increasingly unable to control cross-border flows
generated by these transnational practices. Because of global interdependence there is
a decrease in the effectiveness of policy instruments which would enable states to
control activities which occur within their borders."44
Putnam op.cit., p.431.
41 See for example, D. Wright & W. Valentine, Business of Banking, Northcote House, 1988, 2nd
edition; M. Allen, The Times Guide to International Finance, Times Books, 1991; W. Grant,
'Econoniic Policy in a Global Economy', The Politics of Economic Policy, Harvester
Wheatsheaf, 1993, Ch. 8.
42 Allen ibid., p.!.
Grant op.cit., 1993, pp. 114-5.
Lash & Uriy op.cit., p.280.
90
In view of these developments, some commentators have emphasised the primacy of
economics, thus moving away from focusing on the political dynamics of
international negotiations. 45 Within this context, two radically different schools of
thought exist. 46 Neo-Marxists regard capitalist economic relations as endemically
conflict-ridden and, hence, as unstable (at least in the long term) and harmful. In
their view, post-war economic interdependence has evolved because capitalism
requires ever larger markets. As a result, competition and conflict intensify,
especially between the richer and poorer regions of the world. This development
threatens global stability.47
Most neo-Marxist deliberations on international relations have been concerned with
global developments and not with European integration in particular, probably
For a confirmation and discussions of this point, see for example appropriate chapters in P.
Dunleavy & B. O'Leary, Theories of the State: the Politics of Liberal Democracy, Macmillan,
1987; R. Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations, Princeton University Press,
1987. {Gilpin discussed the role of international political economy at length but remains - in
the words of Rosamond - "an adaptive Realist"; Rosamond op.cit.; p.117n.}; E.B. Kapstein, The
Political Economy of National Security: a Global Perspective, McGraw-Hill, 1992, pp.180-
202; R. Tooze, 'Conceptualizing the Global Economy', in McGrew, A.G. & Lewis, P.G. et al.
(eds.) Global Politics, Polity, 1992, Ch. 12.
Dunleavy & O'Leaiy op. cit.; J. Edelman Spero, The Politics of International Economic
Relations, St. Martin's Press, 1990, 4th edition.
See for example H. Williams, 'Marx: the Collapse of International Capitalism', in Williams, H.
International Relations in Political Theory, Open University Press, 1992, Ch. 11, for a brief
sununaiy on Marx's predictions on the inherent instability of international capitalism. For
(neo-) Marxist interpretations of international capitalism, see for example J. O'Connor, 'The
Meaning of Economic Imperialism', in Rhodes, RI. (ed.) Imperialism and Underdevelopment:
a Reader, (Monthly) Review Press, 1970, pp.101-50; 0. Sunkel and E.F. Fuenzalida,
'Transnationalism and its National Consequences', in Villamil, J.J. (ed.) Transnational
Capitalism and National Development: New Perspectives on Dependence, Harvester, 1979,
pp.67-93. Sunkel and Fuenzalida argued that transnational organisations "...appropriate most of
the surplus produced by them..." (J).67), thereby creating a transnational hegemony with its own
culture and draining resources in the co-existent nation state system. This makes for potential
conflict between national and transnational forces. For a re-evaluated, moderate neo-Marxist
view on the relationship between international finance and conflict, see for example, F. Block,
'Marxist Theories of the State in World Systems Analysis', in Kaplan, B.H. Social Change in
the Capitalist World Economy, Sage, 1978, pp.27-37.
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because the latter is regarded as a reaction to global pressures which have created a
need for larger markets and 'economies of scale'. 48 The development of structural
funds and the elaboration of the concept of economic and social cohesion as
espoused in the TEU are regarded as embellishments that fail to tackle the intrinsic
division in capitalism. On the contrary, European integration is seen to have
reinforced this division by creating novel ways of capitalist accumulation and
dominance. Moves towards closer political and security co-operation are seen as
functions of economic developments, not as autonomous ventures.49
Marxism and its offshoots constitute a complex tradition of thought that cannot be
examined fully within the scope of this thesis but one comment is necessary.
Superficially, the neo-Marxist interpretation of European integration is not
untenable, given that the EC was founded to create economic wealth. Later chapters
will provide some evidence for the dominant role that economic interests play in
some areas of EU policy-making. Yet, economic power is never the only
48 See for example, C. Lankowski, Germany and the European Communities: Anatomy of a
Hegemonia! Relation, PhD Thesis, 1982. {This work is referred to in Hix op.cit., 1994) C.
Lankos ski (ed), Germany and the EC After the Cold War: Hegemony and Containment, St.
Martin's Press, 1993; Allen, op.cit. This point is also implicit in Rosenau's Globalisation
Theoiy since he argued that transnational economic regimes led to new and greater political
structures so as to cope with the transnationalisation of economics. {J. Rosennu, Turbulence in
World Politics, Princeton University Press, 1990.)
' See for example, I. Wallerstein, 'European Unity and its Implications for the Interstate System',
Ch. 4 in Geopolitics and Geocullure, Cambridge University Press, 1991, as well as, A.
Callinicos, 'Crisis and Class Struggle in Europe Today'. International Socialism, No. 63,
Summer 1994, pp.3-48.
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determinant of European integration; politics, ideas, cleavages other than class
cleavages, all matter greatly in all policy processes. 5° Neo-Marxists have
acknowledged this fact and rejected vulgar economism. However, they have, on the
whole, still overstated the power and instability of economic determinants and,
hence, failed to provide a suitable explanation for European integration.5'
Like neo-Marxists, neo-liberals52 underline the importance of global economic
developments and place European integration firmly within this broader framework.
However, because of the potential for efficiency gains, they approve of economic
European integration but reject unnecessary interventionism and political
For a much more balanced discussion on the relationship between economics and politics, see
for example, Edelman Spero op.cit., or, P. Resnick op.cit. These authors reject the unbalanced
Realist and "Economist" views of exchanges. Edelman Spero argued in particular for an end to
the intellectual and academic liberal tradition of separating the two spheres so as to adjust
theory more to practice: "Thus, in order for theory and analysis to maintain touch with reality,
it has become necessary to bridge the gap between economics and politics, to explore the
interface between economics and politics in the international system." ibid. p.3. Resnick also
argued for an interactive approach and emphasised in particular the continued relevance of
political and legal concepts, e.g. sovereignty. His views certainly reflect current debates in the
EU, e.g. on EMU, be they based on mythical or genuine understandings of concepts such as
sovereignty.
51 See for example, Wallerstein op.cit. who argued, like many Realists or quasi-Realists, but from
a different philosophical point of departure (Wallerstein's philosophical premises are more akin
to neo-Marxism.), that Europe and European integration would come under great strain,
particularly if the Cold War bipolarity were to be replaced by a less clear-cut pattern. His
pessimism has so far not been justified, even though there are areas of instability around the
world.
52 The term neo-liberal is used broadly here and includes all those who believe in, and favour, a
separation of the political and economic spheres, with economic rationality ultimately taking
precedence over political rationality {See Busch op.cit., for a discussion of the differences
between economic and political rationality. } For further discussions and explanations on the
concept of nec-liberalism and related concepts, e.g. rational choice, see for example, S. Hall,
'Variants of Liberalism', in Donald, J. & Hall, S. (eds.) Politics and Ideology, Open University
Press, 1986, Ch. 2; Dunleavy & O'Leary op.cit.; and, in particular, P. Dunleavy, Democracy,
Bureaucracy and Public Choice, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991, which is an extensive and lucid
discussion on the concept of public (or rational) choice and its relationship to the classical
liberal tradition of thought.
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integration. 53 Although neo-liberalism is currently a strong ideological force both
world-wide and inside the European Union, it is also unsuitable as an explanatory
tool for European integration since it overemphasises the powers of economic self-
interest and underestimates the mediating influences of ideas and politics. 54 Many
theoretical manifestations of neo-liberalism, such as some endorsements of the
rational choice model, also grossly oversimplify the concept of economic self-
interest. 55 They particularly ignore the difficult relationship between individual and
collective self-interest, assuming that the latter will automatically be an aggregation
of the former. This flawed assumption is probably based on the neo-liberal view that
collective social entities are essentially nothing more than clusters of individuals. In
addition, they fail to recognise that the latter can be mellowed by empathy and
altruism.
For references to early signs of 'efficiency gains', see Aldcroft, op.cit. For study forecasts on
efficiency gains with regard to the SEA, see notably, T. Padoa-Schioppa (ed.), Efficiency,
Stability and Equity: a Strategy for the Evolution of the Economic System of the European
Community, Oxford University Press, 1987, and, M. Emerson et al., The Economics of 1992,
Oxford University Press, 1988, and, Cecchini et a!. op.cit. Undoubtedly, these forecasts
exaggerated the efficiency gains of the SEA but, there is equally little doubt that some efficiency
gains have been achieved through the creation of a nearly complete internal market. The belief
in such efficiency gains helps to explain why 'neo-liberal Eurosceptics', such as Lady Thatcher
approved of the single market project {See S. George, 'The Policy of the British State', in
Britain and European Integration since 1945, Blackwell, 1991, Ch. 2, or, Grant op.cit., 1993,
for confirmation on this point. } For (equally dubious) forecasts on efficiency gains, following
full Economic and Monetary Union, see. e.g. Emerson & Huhne op.cit., or, M. Artis, 'The
Maastricht Road to Monetary Union', Journal of Common Market Studies, 3 0(2), 1992, pp.299-
309.
See for example, the discussions on this topic in Chapter two, including appropriate references
as well as e.g. Anderson op.cit., 1996.
G. Tullock, The Vote Motive: an Essay on the Economics of Politics, with Applications to the
British Economy, London: Institute of Economic Affairs Publications, 1976, p.5. "Voters and
customers are essentially the same people" and act similarly "...in the supermarket and in the
voting booth." This remark exemplifies crude rational choice endorsements, albeit in a
somewhat different context to the one discussed here.
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3.6.	 International Regimes and Neo-Institutionalism56
A number of well known scholars of international relations with Realist leanings
and/or origins have attempted to explain the relative stability of international
exchanges, using the concept of international regimes. International "regimes" were
first conceptualised by Ruggie and thereafter amended and developed mainly, but
not exclusively, by Krasner, Keohane and Young. 57 According to Krasner regimes
are "sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making
procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given issue area".58
Thus, regimes are very much concerned with the emergence of cultural scripts that
prescribe and proscribe actors' behaviour in the international sphere. In that sense,
"regimes provide a substitute for a world government." 59 Regimes have also been
called "issue specific institutions", since institutions are "...that which is established,
or constituted in society". 6° Thus, institutionalism in general refers to a belief in the
56 Attinà was one of the first analysts to use the term "neo-institutiona!ism" with regard to certain
recent attempts to conceptualise European integration within the broad framework of the Realist
school of thought. (F. Attinà, II Sistema Politico della Communità Europea, Giufilé, 1992. }
Neo-institutionalism refers to recent re-evaluations of the institutionalist debate, especially in
the context of European integration.
J.G. Ruggie, 'International Responses to Technology: Concepts and rends', International
Organization, 29(1), 1973, pp.557-83; S.D. Krasner (ed.), International Regimes, Cornell
University Press, 1983; Keohane op.cit., 1984; 0. Young, 'International Regimes: Toward a
New Theory of Institutions', World Politics, 39, October 1986, pp.104-22. Further discussions
on international regimes can be found in a special issue of International Organization, also:
36(2), spring 1982.
58 Krasnerop.cit., 1983, p.1.
J. Vogler, 'Regimes and the Global Commons', in McGrew, A.G. & Lewis, PG. et al. op.cit.,
Ch. 6, p.131.
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lasting and mediating power of historically evolved rules, norms and values into
which successive generations are socialised by the communities in which they live.
These 'cultural scripts' restrict free wheeling bargaining, thus providing a framework
within which stable exchanges can arise, despite the chaotic elements of human
nature, including the prevalence of political self-interest and rivalry:
"Historical developments are path dependent; once certain options are made, they
constrain future possibilities. The range of options available to policy makers at any
given point in time is a function of institutional capabilities that were put in place at
some earlier period, possibly in response to very different pressures."61
"International regimes shape interstate politics by providing a common framework
that reduces the uncertainty and transaction costs of interstate interactions. In the
post-war system, Keohane argues, regimes have preserved established patterns of
cooperation after the relative decline of the United States."62
See for example, Krasner op.cit., 1983; Keohane op.cit., 1984; L. Cornett & J. Caporaso, "'And
still it movesi" State Interests and Social Forces in the European Community', in Rosenau, J. &
Cziempel, E-O. (eds.) Governance Without Government: Order and Change in World Politics,
Cambridge University Press, 1992.
61 S.D. Krasner, 'Sovereignty: An Institutional Perspective', Comparative Political Studies, 21(1),
April 1988, pp.66-94. This view evidently attributes great power to social conditioning and the
institutionalisation of social processes. Social change becomes thus limited and difficult to
achieve. This interpretation owes much to the thought of one of the best know socio-
anthropologists, i.e. Clifford Geeitz.{(See for example, Keohane op.cit., 1984, and D. Strang,
op.cit. for confirmation of this point. }This interpretation of social change has since justifiably,
if sometimes excessively, been challenged, e.g. by structuration theory or post-modernism (see
below).
62 A. Moravcsik, 'Negotiating the Single European Act', in Keohane & Hoffmann, op.cit., 1991,
Ch. 2, p.48. (reprint of Moravcsik op.cit., 1991). Moravcsik is referring to Keohane's reasoning
on international regimes, especially as espoused in Keohane op.cit., 1984, pp.61-4, and RO.
Keohane (ed.), Neo-Realis,n and its Critics, Columbia University Press, 1986, pp.192-5.
Keohane referred to his deliberations as "modified structural realism". Moravcsik basically
approves of the approach and its underlying assumptions and does not challenge the strong
belief in institutionalisation. So he, too, underestimates the potential for actor-centred change.
He argues however correctly, that institutionalism is in any case insufficient for the study of the
EU because it does not take domestic politics into account, thus treating states like "black
boxes". A combination of institutionalism and 'domestic politics', with a light dose of neo-
liberalism is, in his view, the best conceptual framework for analysing the nature of the EU. (As
stated earlier, he flirted more than other institutionalists with neo-liberalism.)
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Regrettably, writers such as Keohane emphasise the power of cultural conditioning
to such an extent that it is hard to see how social and political change can come
about, whatever the extent of international bargaining. In respect of European
integration, such conservative institutionalist analyses differ ultimately hardly from
intergovernmentalist explanations, even though the assumptions on which analysis is
based are distinct, because institutionalists regard the nation state as the dominant
modern European institution.
Recently, 'neo-institutionalists' have developed some more useful and less
conservative institutionalist explanations for European integration. In particular,
Moravcsik's work made a significant contribution to the search for a suitable
conceptual framework for the analysis of European integration. 63 Moravcsik took
account of the role of 'domestic politics' and, to a lesser extent, linkage politics.
Furthermore, he accepted that non political and non cultural forces could mediate
international exchanges. In this respect he had been influenced particularly by the
assumptions of neo-liberal international political economists. Thus, Moravcsik
abandoned some of the marked weaknesses of one dimensional conceptual
approaches such as classical neofunctionalism or intergovernmentalism.
63 Moravcsik op.cit., as well as, A. Moravcsik, 'Preferences and Power in the European
Community: a Liberal Intergovernmental Approach', Journal of Common Market Studies,
31(4), 1993, pp.473-524.
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Moravcsik also rejected excessive cultural determinism and accepted the possibility
of slow cultural and rule change. 64 Hence, his analyses provided at least partial
explanations for the constitutive changes that have taken place in respect of
European integration. 65 Nevertheless, progress was limited in this respect and
Moravscik continued to underestimate the extent to which actor-driven change
could mediate cultural institutionalism and, hence, overstated the predominance of
national self-interest at the expense of those integrating forces that have led to some,
albeit limited, constitutive rule changes in the EU.66
The criticism directed towards institutionalists implies that the emphasis on "the
sticky nature of change" cannot explain constitutive rule changes satisfactorily since
the latter are brought about "...by human decisions and actions". 67 On the other
hand, bargaining theories tend to underline actor autonomy excessively.
Consequently, it is necessary to apply a more sophisticated notion of change that is
neither too ". . .strong on action, but weak on structure..." nor too "...strong on
structure, but weak on action... "68 This view was elaborated by Giddens who
developed structuration theory which is an attempt to overcome the duality between
64 This interpretation is indirectly confirmed by Gabriel op.cit. and Navari who both emphasise the
influence of neo-liberal and rational choice thinking on Krasner and Keohane and other
proponents of regime theoiy and institutionalism, e.g. Moravcsik. (C. Navari, 'On the
Withering of the State, in Navari, C. (ed.), The Condition of States, Open University Press,
1991, Ch. 8.
65 See Chapter two and later parts of Chapter three.
66 Support for this view can be found, for example, in lix op.cit., 1994, and D. Strang, 'Anomaly
and Commonplace in European Political Expansion: Realist and Institutionalist Accounts',
International Organization, 45(2), spring 1991, pp.143-62.
67 Maull op.cit., p.153. This argument is supported widely elsewhere, e.g. ibid; Wallace op.cit.,
1990; Axford op.cit., or, B.G. Peters, 'Bureaucratic Politics and the Institutions of the European
Community', in Sbragia op.cit., Ch. 3.
68 A. Giddens, New Rules of Sociological Method, Polity, 1993, 2nd edition, p.4.
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action and structure.69 Unlike institutionalists, Giddens refutes the marked
distinction between subjects (actors) and objects (structures) that is at the heart of
the institutionalist debate. However, equally he rejects the post-modem claim that
cultural scripts are simply subjective projections of self-identity by individual human
actors. 7° He argues that these scripts have an objectivity as far as actors are
concerned but, at the same time, this objectivity is rooted in the diversity of a
differentiated and reproductive social environment. Hence, "activity is structured
while it at the same time reproduces or transforms the configurations of social
life". 7 ' Subjects and objects remain thus distinct entities but reconstruct one another
partially. Consequently, rules of the game are neither static, nor necessarily
interpreted in the same way by everybody, nor always adhered to.
69 See A. Giddens, The Constitution of Society. Outline of the Theory of Structurafion, Polity,
1984; A. Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity, Polity, 1990; Giddens op.cit. Evidently,
Giddens did not develop his theory in a conceptual vacuum. He drew on existing sociological
and philosophical traditions but his special contribution lies in his acute understanding of these
traditions and in his ability to select and eventually synthesise many of the most valuable
aspects of these traditions. In the mean time, other scholars have added to the structurationist
debate. See for example, P. Cerny, The Changing Architecture of Politics. Structure, Agency
and the Future of the State, Sage, 1990, or, J.A. Scholte, International Relations of Social
Change, Open University Press, 1993.
70 There have recently been some attempts to conceptualise European integration in post-modern
terms. See for example Axford op.cit.; A. Heller & F. Feher, 'Europe: An Epilogue?', in The
Post,nodern Political Condition, Polity Press, 1991, 2nd edition, pp.146-60; C. Mouffe, The
Return of the Political, Verso, 1993; C. Bayard, 'A Postmodern Reading of European Identities
and Polities: a Provisional Cartography of Europe and Postmodernity', Paper presented at the
IVth Conference of the International Society for the Study of European Ideas, Karl-Franzens
Universität, 22-27 August 1994. Post-modernism usefully challenges philosophical essentialism
and underlines the importance of change, fluidity and the projection of subjective sell-
interpretation onto 'autonomous objects'. However, its outright rejection of 'metanarratives' and
structures seems inappropriate with regard to the European Union, given the evidence produced
in Chapter two. Post-modernism goes too far in its attempts to rectif' the complacency of
excessive philosophical determinism. For these reasons, it is not discussed at length in this
thesis. Instead, some space is allocated to Giddens' more relevant deliberations on the
phenomenon of social change. For a path-breaking debate and critique of post-modem thought,
see for example, D. Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity, Basil Blackwell, 1990.
Scholte op.cit., p.128.
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Giddens theory is important because it promotes the notion of mutual mediation and
goes a long way towards explaining both change and continuity in social life. It also
explains that there are a variety of interpretations regarding each social phenomenon
and, consequently a number of preferences about how it should be shaped. The
diversity is a result of varied social conditioning which, according to Giddens, leads
to a plurality of 'aggregated collective objectivities'. This particular interpretation of
the plurality of social phenomena captures the differentiated nature of the EU, as
outlined in the previous chapter and explains why, to some extent, "European union
is in the eye of the beholders". 72 Consequently, the main facets of structuration
theory are a useful basis for the analysis of European integration but they are general
conceptualisations, which are neither detailed nor Euro-specific enough to form the
basis of a satisfactory conceptual framework for the analysis of European integration
in themselves. Yet, it is imperative to take account of Giddens deliberations on the
relationship between structures and agents when developing a specific analytical
framework for European integration.
3.7.	 Federation or Confederation?
Integration theories derived from International Relations discourse fail to analyse
adequately the nature of European integration and the EU, even though they make
useful contributions. Consequently, some analysts have drawn on material from the
field of comparative politics and notably on federalist discourse, given the immediate
post-war history of European integration and the ambitions of men like Jean
Monnet. In this context, two distinctions are necessary. First, it is possible to assess
the extent to which the European Union presently displays the characteristics that
are usually associated with federal states or, alternatively, with confederations.
72 H. Young, 'European union is in the Eye of the Beholders', The Guardian, 2 November 1993,
p.18.
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Second, it is useful to examine if European integration is a federalising process.73
Neither of these extensive debates are fuliy explored in the thesis since there is no
scope to do so. Furthermore, federalism and confederalism can at best partially
explain the nature of European integration and the EU. However, they carry
sufficient weight to merit some attention.
Walter Bagehot argued that "federal government was rare because its prerequisites
were many." 74 What are these prerequisites? Commentators on federations fail to
agree but there are certain facets that are frequently mentioned in writings on
federalism. In particular, federations are made up of several vertical levels of
government whose relationship is clarified in a constitution or treaty.75 Usually,
these treaties do not contain opt-out clauses such as Article 240 in the EEC Treaty
of Rome. In cases of dispute, constitutional courts rule on the constitutionality of a
particular matter and have thus tended to be important actors in federal systems,
particularly shortly after their establishment and in periods of political conflict or
vacuum. Sovereignty in federations may legally still rest in a single location - for
example with the people - but it has been delegated to representative government in
Federalism is a many-sided concept. It can describe a particular form of government in a federal
state. Federalism can also refer to a set of normative values that promotes the establishment of
federal states and federalism as a form of government. For example, the European Movement
that was founded in 1948 argues in favour of a federal states of Europe. Finally federalism can
encapsulate a process of integration that contains dynamic forces pushing for the establishment
of a federal state. In this context federalism becomes an analytical tool and that is how it will be
used here when examining European integration as a federalising process. General and Euro-
specific literature confirms the multiple uses of the concept. For general discussions, see for
example, K.C. Wheare, Federal Government, Oxford University Press, 1953, 3rd edition; P.
King, Federalism and Federation, Croom Helm, 1982; J.N. Rakove, The First Phase of
American Federalism, in Tushnet, M. (ed.) Comparative Constitutional Federalism: Europe
and America, Greenwood Press, 1990, Ch. 1; M. Burgess (ed.), Federalism and Federation in
Western Europe, Croom Helm, 1986. For Euro-specific discussions, see for example, Forsyth
op.cit.; Pinder, J., European Community: the Building of a Union, Oxford University Press,
1991; Archer & Butler op.cit.; Sbragia op.cit., 1992 (both references); Nugent op.cit., 1994.
W. Bagehot, English Constitution, quoted in Wheare op. cit., p.35.
Federalism and federation derive from the Latin word 'foedus', i.e. 'treaty'.
101
a divided form. Each level of government needs to have sufficient independent
economic resources to be able to execute its tasks. The majority of writers on
federalism are adamant that a federation needs to have an assembly, democratic
institutions and a common citizenship. 76 Individual commentators also mention other
prerequisites which would promote a definite sense of 'commonness'. For example,
an article in the Economist included a single foreign policy, a single military
establishment and a single intelligence service. 77 Lord Mackenzie-Stuart claimed that
a single currency was also a prerequisite to a true federation.78
It is evident from these considerations that the European Union falls well short of
being a federation, even though it shows some federal characteristics. "If the EC is
not yet federalist, more than intergovernmentalist and only partially responding to
neo-functionalist theories, is there another label that fits it? One answer could be that
of 'confederal',...".79 Archer and Butler approved of this interpretation, because of
the mix of federal and non-federal traits in the EU but regarded the label as rather
unrefined.80
76 See for example, Forsyth op.cit., or, M. Tushnet, 'Conclusion', in Tushnet, M. (ed.) op.cit.,
pp.139-51, or, B. Laffan, integration and Co-operation in Europe, Routledge, 1992.
The Economist, Playing as One?', 320 (9913),29 June 1991, pp.9-10.
78 Lord Mackenzie-Stuart, 'Foreword', in Tushnet op.cit.
Archer & Butler op.cit., p.191
80 ibid. Archer & Butler were by no means the only ones that considered the notion of
'confederation' broadly compatible with the ECIEU. See for example, J. Lodge, Preface: The
Challenge of the Future', in Lodge op.cit., 1993; P. Hirst op.cit.
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Their conclusion is not unreasonable, given that
"the distinction between a confederation and a federation lies in the degree of
sovereignty surrendered. In a confederation the participating states accept the
collective discharge of limited functions while maintaining a high degree of
autonomy and sovereignty, whereas in a federation there is one sovereign state, and
the locus of external sovereignty is at the higher level."81
However, in view of the curious situation with regard to sovereignty in the EU on
the one hand, and strong legal integration on the other hand, coupled with qualified
majority voting in some policy areas, the classical definition of confederations as
"Staatenbundnisse" (as opposed to Bundesstaaten) is still a poor fit with regard to
the EU. 82 The situation would remain unsatisfactory, even if the EU was labelled a
hybrid, not least because both concepts are strongly tied up with territorial notions
of political exchanges, dominated by formal political and legal actors. As seen
earlier, the EU possesses non-territorial and non-formal characteristics.
Furthermore, the current distribution of policy responsibilities in the EU is without
historical precedent in another confederation or federation, mainly because of
gradual sectoral integration as advocated in functionalist theory. The application of
subsidiarity may however reverse this trend to some extent. Furthermore, the
decentralising thrust of subsidiarity may eventually foster a European, as opposed to
a Madisonian conceptualisation of federalism. A number of commentators
highlighted the conceptual and political distinction between dominant American and
European federalism. The former bears the legacy of James Madison's fear of
factionalism, and has therefore had strong centralising tendencies, whereas the latter
81 Laffan op.cit., pp. 7-8.
82 For a definition of a 'Staatenbund' or 'Union of States' see for example Forsyth op.cit., p.2: A
Staatenbund is a "...process by which a number of separate states raise themselves by contract to
the threshold of being a state...". See also Scruton op.cit. on the difference between a
Staatenbund (plural: Staatenbundnisse) and a Bundesstaat. These two German terms usefully
exempli1' the difference between a confederation and a federation.
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emphasises decentralisation and is fully compatible with the catholic interpretation of
subsidiarity.83
Like most of the IR approaches discussed earlier, federalism as an analytical tool,
explaining integration, suffers from excessive determinism, even though it
emphasises the political nature of integration. As with functionalism and
instItutionalism, too much faith is put in a set of structures. It is undeniable that there
are certain structural pressures within the Community that assist those who wish to
create a federal United States of Europe. For example, it is frequently argued that in
cases such as the United States of America or Switzerland, federalism offered a
workable solution for the accommodation of diversity within unity. Consequently, a
similar development is thought to strengthen the EU's global position, without
undermining social heterogeneity, particularly in view of Article 3b of the TEU on
subsidiarity. Creating a federal structure resembling those of existing federations is
also frequently advocated as a solution to the democratic deficit of the EU. The
federal thrust of the EU's emerging jurisprudence is often seen as a solution to
disputes. 84 These are correctly identified as pressures for a federal solution but, in
order to come to fruition, they need to be coupled with the political will of actors.85
So far they have not proven strong enough, hence, the final omission of the term
Tederal' in the TEU, despite its inclusion in some of the draft Treaties. Even if one
Burgess op.cit.; Peters op.cit. and R. D'Amico & P. Piccone, 'The Future of Federalism', Telos,
91(1), 1992, pp.3-15 all highlighted this important distinction; for references to subsidiarity,
see Chapter two.
See for example, J. Pinder, The Federal Case, Publications of the European Movement, 1991,
or, P. Luff The Simple Guide to Maastricht, European Movement Publications, 1992, p.58. (P.
Luff is the director of the pro-federal European Movement.}, or, A. Duff, 'Building a
Parliamentary Europe', Government & Opposition, 29(2), 1994, pp.147-65.
85 This point of view is widely confirmed elsewhere, e.g. Wheare op.cit.; Forsyth op.cit.; F.H.
Hinsley, 'The European Community: a Body-Politic or an Association of States?', The World
Today, Januaiy 1989, pp.1-3.
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allows for federalisation by steps - which is a relatively recent conceptual
'innovation', sometimes referred to as neo_federalism 86 - there is no guarantee that
the structural pressures in the EU will ever facilitate a full federation. 87 Indeed, this
scenario is extremely unlikely, given that there are equally structures that hinder
federalisation, notably the Council of Ministers, the bureaucratic aspects of
European integration, the elitist elements of integration.88
86 See for example, Laffan op.cir, Sbragia op.cit., 1992, Ch. 8.
87 Sbragia, ibid., argued that this conclusion could be challenged because there was no blueprint
for an EU federation. Using Daniel Elazafs view that "the essence of federalism is not to be
found in a particular set of institutions but in the institutionalisation of particular relationships
among the participants of political life", she pleaded for an innovative and flexible
interpretation of federalism in respect of the EU. Given the EU's innovative structural
arrangements, this plea is not unreasonable but it is carried too far in her deliberations. Elazar's
dcfinition equates nearly any form of political institutionalisation with federalism which is not
very constructive since it undermines any specificity associated with federalism. {D. Elazar,
Exploring Federalism, University of Alabama Press, 1987, pp.1 1-2.)
88 Some commentators have argued that, given the endemic elitism in the EU, it would be most
appropriate to regard the EU as a consociation, after Lijphart. (See for example, P. Taylor,
'Consociationalism and Federalism as Approaches to International Integration', in P. Taylor &
A.J.R. Groom (eds.) Frameworks for International Co-operation, pp. 172-84, or, D.N.
Chiyssochoou., Democracy and Symbiosis in the European Union: Towards a Confederal
Consociation7, West European Politics, 17(4), October 1994, pp.1-!4.). Undoubtedly, elite
bargaining is an integral aspect of European integration, but the notion of Consociationalism
makes assumptions of concordant bargaining that are not met with regard to the EU, despite a
broad commitment to seek consensus, if possible. Consociationalism also underestimates
structural constraints as well as the role of private interests, bureaucratic, etc. Furthermore,
there are too many normative and prescriptive undercurrents in this concept! The last point is
implicit in the following Review Article: J. Steiner, 'Consociational Democracy as a Policy
Recommendation: the Case of South Africa', Comparative Politics, 19(3), April 1987, pp.36!-
78. For the conceptualisation of Consociationalism, see notably A. Lijphart, 'Consociational
Democracy', World Politics, 21(2), January 1969, pp.2O'7-25; A Lijphart, 'Consociational
Theory: Problems and Prospects', Comparative Politics, April 1981, pp.255-60. For an
elaborate critique of Lijphart's works on Consociationalism, see for example S.M. Halpern, 'The
Disorderly Universe of Consociational Democracy', West European Politics, 9(2), April 1986,
pp.18 1-97, or, P. du Tort, 'Consociational Democracy and Bargaining Powers', Comparative
Politics, 19(4), July 1987, pp.419-30 who sought to produce a more sophisticated explanation
for bargaining outcomes, based on the idea of convergence of baraining tactics. Thus, his article
is both a critique and a refinement of consociational ideas.
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3.8.	 Conclusion
None of the classic integration 'theories', based on IR or comparative politics, is an
adequate analytical tool to conceptualise the nature of the EU and of European
integration in its own right. Yet, these 'theories' have provided important
foundations for more constructive conceptual syntheses such as those developed by
Putnam or Moravcsik. Arguably, efforts of that kind can be refined further by relying
on intellectual input from other social sciences. In particular, structuration theory
has provided a valuable basis for more balanced discourse on the relationship
between structures and agents and the ways in which this relationship mediates
domestic as well as international bargaining situations. Such conceptualisations go a
long way in explaining the nature of post-war Europe, especially if they are
concerned particularly with the EU and based on empirical evidence, such as is the
case with Moravcsik's work. However, such contributions tend to concentrate on
certain key stages of development, like the negotiations for the SEA and the TEU.
Undeniably, this focus is justified but it does not 'tell the whole story' because it is
concerned too much with high profile interactions and, consequently, too little with
the day to day management of EU politics. Yet, the latter also shapes the nature of
the EU and of European integration. Neither IR nor comparative politics approaches
are suitable to analyse the day to day management of the EU, since they revolve too
much around formal political institutions and intermittent, key bargaining situations.
Consequently, it is necessary to take recourse to the analytical tools developed
within the field of political science, since these provide more opportunities to
incorporate low profile and informal political processes than JR or comparative
politics approaches. For reasons which have been elaborated in Chapter one, policy
analysis, which is one of the major political science based analytic approaches, is
particularly suited to provide insights into the nature of the EU. Hence, much of the
remainder of the thesis focuses on the analytical potential of policy approaches
which are applied to the empirical data that has been collected for this thesis.
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Moreover, Chapters six and eight contain reflections on the ways in which the
potential of these analytical tools could be expanded by synthesising them with
aspects of JR and comparative political approaches. There is no scope to discuss the
full range of policy analytic approaches within the boundaries of the thesis but
particular attention has been paid to examining the validity of bureaucratic and
pluralist interpretations of the policy process, given that the EU has been influenced
heavily by bureaucrats but has become also a paradise for lobbyists. In addition, the
potential of policy networks analysis is explored because empirical evidence
suggests that policy processes in individual policy areas differ to some extent from
one another.
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ChAPTER FOUR:
POLICY MAKING IN THE EU:
BUREAUCRATIC GOVERNMENT?
4.1.	 Introduction
Jean Monnet's original plans positioned the Commission at the very heart of the
European Communities but the redesign of the original plans and subsequent
developments led to institutional interdependence, particularly in the area of policy
making. There is also a bewildering range of policy procedures which guarantees in
its own right that "...policy making [in the EU] is a staggeringly complex set of multi
level games.Ml Charges that the Commission, as a non-elected, hardly accountable
Wassenberg concluded thus in 1990, even before complexity was further enhanced by the TEU
provisions. See, A.F.P. Wassenberg, 'Games within Games: On the Politics of Association and
Dissociation in European Industrial Policy-Making', in Mann, B. (ed.) Governance and
Generalized Exchange: SeIf-organising Policy Networks in Action, Westview Press, p.288.
The TEU contains the most up to date outline of the formal policy making procedures. There
are four different procedures for 'non administrative' legislation: consultation, co-operation, co-
decision, assent. The EP has a right to exercise its veto power when co-decision or assent
procedures apply. Assent is required from the EP for certain decisions, e.g. accessions to the
EU, association agreements with third countries, Commission appointments, etc.; a provision
which first figured in the SEA, but which was widened in the TEU. There is also a separate
procedure for the budget; the EP has a genuine say in this process, especially over non-
compulsoiy expenditure. However, in the past there has been veiy little room for non-
compulsory expenditure because the CAP has eaten up an enormous amount of the budget, in
the form of compulsory expenditure. The problem still exists today, but to a lesser extent. There
is also a separate procedure under Article 113 of the EEC Treaty for external trade agreements.
The provisions for decision-making under the two new pillars in the TEU are mostly, but not
exclusively intergovernmental, so that some decisions do not require formal policy instruments.
Where policy is made, the EP is consulted only, and there are usually unanimity decisions,
although qualified majority voting is the norm for procedural decisions and, as seen, the Treaty
recommends its use elsewhere where possible. Nugent op.cit., 1994, produced an amazingly
clear outline of the various procedures, given their complexity and the inaccessible manner in
which they figure in the Treaties.
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body, possesses excessive powers nevertheless persist. 2 Commission officials (as
opposed to the Commissioners) are also accused of enjoying too much freedom in
respect of policy drafting so that they "can exercise a lot of influence." 3 Coupled
with continued allegations of dirigisme, such claims lead to the view that the EU is
exceedingly bureaucratic or - in popular Eurospeak - Eurocratic 4. Material contained
in the two previous chapters touched upon this issue and cast doubt on the validity
of one-sided allegations. However, none of the theories examined the role of
bureaucrats in sufficient detail to come up with a satisfactory evaluation of their
contribution. In view of the pivotal Treaty functions allocated to the Commission,
Monnet's influence on the EC and the participation of large numbers of national
public administrators, it is necessary to explore the extent to which claims about
bureaucratic government are sustainable. Initially, a brief clarification of the concept
of bureaucracy is required.
4.2.	 Bureaucratic Models of Policy -Making
According to Mitchell the expression 'Burokratie' was coined by Vincent de
Gourmany (1712-1759) but it was J.S. Mill who established the term's basic
meaning, that is government by non-elected professionals, as opposed to elected
2 See for example Gardner's comment that the Commission is "in the driver seat". J.N. Gardner,
Effective Lobbying in the European Co,nrnunity, Kiuwer, 1991, p.30.; see also many of the
comments quoted in the remainder of this chapter.
For example, a recent article in The European accused Commissioners of "under-managing and
under-controlling officials and of being too indulgent with them." { The European, 'The High
Pay, Low Tax World of the Eurocrat', 6-12 January 1995, p.17. } Accusations of excessive
powers at any level in the Commission's hierarchy relate primarily, but not exclusively, to its
right to initiate policy. It will be demonstrated later in this chapter that the context within
which this right is executed is far more restrictive than is often assumed.
The quote in the main text is taken of a questionnaire, completed by an MIEP.
' See for example, Crampton op.cit., 1990.
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representatives of the people. 5 Weber subsequently created an ideal-type model of
bureaucracy in Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. 6 This comprehensive treatise portrays
bureaucracies and bureaucrats in a favourable light, arguing that the latter are
neutral, rational and effective servants of the state. Mosca came to similar
conclusions in his Elimenti di Scienza Politica. 7 This view of bureaucracy shares
certain assumptions with the functional theory of integration: both concepts
emphasise rational behaviour, organisational harmony, efficiency and the strategy to
make policy when necessary, and not as a result of political considerations. 8 This
positive interpretation of bureaucracy is also cherished by many public
administrators themselves, including Jean Monnet. 9 Therefore, Monnet may have
been influenced more by bureaucratic than functional traditions; a point which was
recently emphasised in relation to the Community's democratic deficit.'°
See for example, M. Aibrow, Bureaucracy, Macmillan, 1970.
6 M. Weber, Wirtschafi und Gesellschajt, Mohr Verlag, 1948, 3. Auflage. Weber was aware that,
in reality, it was difficult to distinguish between the administrative and political spheres and
that bureaucrats could act politically, although he maintained that they should not do so. Also,
he upheld the convenient distinction between non-elected and elected professionals. The same
distinction is thus adopted here.
0. Mosca, Elimenri di Scienza Politica, translated by A. Livingstone as 'The Ruling Class',
McGraw-Hill, 1939.
8 Navari op.cit.
A claim supported by evidence from, e.g. E.N. Suleiman, 'From Right to Left: Bureaucracy and
Politics in France', in Suleiman, E.N. (ed.) Bureaucrats and Policy Making, Holmes & Meier,
1984, Ch. 5, or, S. Hazareesingh, Political Traditions in Modern France, Oxford University
Press, 1994, pp. 155-6.
10 This point is implicitly supported by S. George, Politics and Policy in the European
Community, Oxford University Press, 1985 edition, pp.19-20. who pointed out that Monnet had
never acknowledged any intellectual debt to functional theoiy, nor proclaimed to have read
Mitrany's works. The claim also gets implicit support from Featherstone's op.cit., 1994, recent
discussion of Monnet's role in creating preconditions for a democratic deficit in the EC. (See
also Chapter two on this point.)
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At first sight it may not be necessary to ponder upon the roots of Monnet's dirigiste
tendencies, since either set of beliefs would have influenced him to allocate the
Commission a pivotal position among EC institutions. However, the distinction is
necessary because, in some respects, the two sets of ideas differ markedly. Notably,
the concept of bureaucracy is hardly concerned with the role of informal policy-
actors such as functional interests. Bureaucratic government emphasises the
"structures of government whose primary function is to perform.. .the process of
rule-application; that is to say, the process through which general social rules are
converted into specific decisions for individual cases." There is no necessary
connection between functionalism and excessive interventionism, whereas such a
connection is now usually taken as part of bureaucratic government.
Earlier this century, the belief in bureaucratic neutrality and efficiency was
abandoned, probably because bureaucrats have been involved increasingly in policy
design, owing to the steady growth of government.' 2 Consequently, some critical
models of bureaucratic government have been developed. Bureaucrats are accused
of being self-interested, conservative, inefficient, and prone to beget steadily more
bureaucracy.' 3 Consequently, they apparently shy away from change and policy
1 B.G. Peters, The Politics of Bureaucracy, Longman, 1984, 2nd edition, p.2. (emphasis added
here}. The notion of bureaucracy has developed considerably in recent decades and the term is
often used broadly to refer to any administrative organisation (ibid.). However, scholars such as
Peters, Albrow op. cit. or, D. Warwick, Bureaucracy, Longman, 1974, all favour the narrower
interpretation of bureaucracy on the grounds of earlier conceptualisations, namely by Weber. In
the thesis, this narrower interpretation is adopted, but the notion of 'government officials' is
adapted to take into account the specific EU structures and, hence, includes non elected
Commission Officials, the Commissioners and their cabinets stafi civil servants of national
governments, civil servants and/or EU officials working on behalf of the other EU institutions.
12 For useful discussions of the enormous growth of government and policy output in Western
European political systems during the 20th Century see for example T.W. Rice, 'The
Determinants of Western European Government Growth 1950-1980', Comparative Political
Studies, 19(2), pp.233-57, or, Hirst op.cit.
' See for example, G. Bannock et al., Dictionary of Economics, Penguin, 1984, 3rd edition, p.S8,
or, A.P. Pross, Group Politics and Public Policy, Oxford University Press, 1992.
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innovation. 14 Furthermore, bureaucrats are no longer considered to be purely
rational actors; it is acknowledged that they are affected by the cultural climate of
each individual bureaucracy as well as by individual socialisation.'5 Bureaucracies
can also be riddled with internal divisions, and they are likely to be inflexible because
they are rigidly hierarchic.16
Neither Weber's ideal-type nor the critical model of bureaucratic government are
very convincing. The latter is somewhat inconsistent, too. On the one hand,
bureaucrats have apparently tremendous powers and influence, without proper
authority, on the other hand, they are introverted and lacking in motivation,
innovation and communications skills. However, both extreme approaches to
bureaucratic government raise important questions with regard to the formal and
informal functions of bureaucracies, their place in political structures and the
behaviour of bureaucrats. Such questions need to be explored in the context of the
European Union. However, it must be clarified first if the Commission can be
considered a bureaucracy, given its dual function as an executive and administration
and its overtly political character.'7
14 See for example, W. Grant, Business and Politics in Britain, Macmillan, 1987, or, C. Miller,
Lobbying Government, Basil Blackwell, 1987.
15 See for example, . Sell; Political Theories ofModern Government, its Role and Reform, Allen
& Unwin, 1985. This point is also made briefly by Majone in G. Majone, Preservation of
Cultural Diversity in a Federal System: the Role of the Regions in Comparative Constitutional
Federalism: Europe and America, in Tushnet op.cit., pp.67-76.
16 See for example, Warwick op.cit., or, T.J. Lowi, Public Policy and Bureaucracy in the United
States and France', in Ashford, D.E., Comparing Public Policies: New Concepts and Methods,
Sage, 1978, pp.177-96.
17 See Chapter two.
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4.3.	 The Commission of the European Union: a Bureaucracy witg
Difference
Since bureaucracy is taken to mean rule by non elected officials, it is appropriate to
conceive of the European Commission as a bureaucracy. It is however a bureaucracy
with a difference. It consists of two distinct layers, namely political and
administrative appointments. Commissioners are appointed by their respective
member governments, usually either in recognition of their outstanding political
careers or their strong visions on EU politics (integrationist or Euro-sceptic), or for
both these reasons. Once established, Commissioners appoint their immediate staff;
the 'cabinets'. These appointments are normally also based on political, ideological or
national affinities, rather than on merit only.' 8 Officially, the remaining Commission
staff are administrative appointments, recruited through open competition.
Nonetheless, there is some evidence of preferentialism on various grounds.' 9 Yet,
there are also attempts to curtail all forms of nepotism. For example, in March 1993
the European Court of Justice overruled the appointment of Spanish and Italian
bureaucrats to the Directorate-General for Fisheries, on the grounds that they were
appointed because of their nationality.
18 This point was confirmed during the interviews conducted for the research by the following
participants: both Kraftfood interviewees, Dr. 0. Gray, of the American Chamber of Commerce
in Brussels, Mr. Pedler and various representatives of Euro-trade associations; for confinnation
elsewhere, see for example George Ross', 1990, comments on Jacques Delors' appointment of
like-minded Cabinet staff, discussed in A.S. Milward, The European Rescue of the Nation
State, Routledge, 1992; another 'exquisite' neo-Realist work.
19 For confirmation of this point, see for example, S.T. Thomas, 'Assessing MEP influence on
British EC Policy', Government and Opposition, 27(1), pp.3-18.; The European op.cit., 6-12
January 1995.
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Since the Commissioners, and by delegation their staff; have the sole formal right to
initiate policy in the EU, executive and administrative functions have become
exceedingly intertwined. 20 Most liberal democrats find this situation uncomfortable,
particularly given the genuine lack of accountability on behalf of the Commission.
Sometimes, this point is however exaggerated, since there are some constraints on
the Commission, especially following the TEU which has enhanced the scrutiny
powers of the European Parliament. 2' For Commissioners, there is also indirect
accountability, but to their national governments. If they fail to perform to their
government's liking, the latter is unlikely to renew their appointment after their first
four year term in office. Lady Thatcher's replacement of Lord Cockfield by Sir Leon
Brittan exemplifies this point.
20 The Commission is the only government branch that can formally initiate policy; however, the
Council of Ministers were given the right by the EEC Treaty (Article 152) "to request the
Commission to undertake studies and to submit to it the appropriate proposals. The same right
has now been bestowed upon the European Parliament by the TEU. Essentially this clause
"...confirms Parliament's right to call on the Commission to submit a legislative proposal." {EP
News, 17-21 January 1994, p.2}.
21 There is much evidence that the EP is making use of its new powers. See for example, EP News
op.cit., 17-21 January 1994; K. Hänsch, 'A Future without Vetoes where the Majority Wins',
The European, 29 July-4 August 1994, p.9.; R. Watson, 'Hänsch leads sweeping reform of
Parliament', The European, 23-29 September 1994, p.1.; CEC, EC Press Release: European
Parliament to Grill the Santer Commission: New Chapter in Parliament-Commission relations,
ISEC/23/94, 15 December 1994. The EP's assertiveness appears to cause already some concern,
especially among some member governments; a fact which Smart discovered from a
'confidential' draft report for the IGC in 1996. In that report some member govermnents
apparently warned that the Commission's greater dependence on Parliament could call into
question the delicate "institutional balance" between the CoM, the Commission on the EP. This
reaction by self-interested governments is understandable but makes a mockery of calls for
greater accountability and democracy and ongoing concerns about the excessive powers of the
Commission. {V. Smart, Parliament Power comes under Fire', The European, 31 March-6
April 1995, p.l.}
Parliamentary assertiveness is not a new phenomenon, stimulated by the ratification of the
ThU. Van Hamme found that the Parliamentarians also made good use of the new powers
bestowed upon them by the SEA. {A. Van Hamme, 'The European Parliament and the
Cooperation Procedure: Impact on Lobbying', Gestion 2000, 4, 1988, pp.129-55.
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The national governments are however more likely to take into account national
self-interest than questions of accountability when they appoint or re-appoint a
Commissioner. 22 Hence, this practice promotes nationalism through the backdoor
rather than accountability, although it undeniably circumscribes the powers of the
Commissioners. However, their influence remains extensive and creates pressures
for a more conventional division between the executive and administration. 23 If this
were to be the case, many qualms about the Commission might disappear, even if
the practical effects of a more formal division between the executive and
administration may be less marked than theory suggests. Practical changes may be
limited because of the current culture in the Commission. Christoph's extensive
interview based survey produced evidence that European bureaucrats are very much
more assertive and innovative actors than most of their counterparts in national
public administrations. 24 They are trained to develop large parts of policy
independently and come to expect to have considerable freedom. It would surely
take more than a group of elected Commissioners to transform this cultural
ambience, at least in the short mn.
22 This point was confirmed by, for example, A.B. Philip, Pressure Groups and Policy Formation
in the European Communities', Policy and Politics, 10(4), 1982, pp.459-75.
23 In UK circles, V. Bogdanor, Reader in Government, Oxford University and Fellow of Brasenose
College, has been one of the most outspoken advocates of such a traditional division. He
advocates an indirectly elected executive, voted in by the EP and headed by a European
President, either voted in by the EP or directly by the people. See for example, V. Bogdanor,
'Give Europe a President', The Tunes, 11 May 1989; Bogdanor & Woodcock op.cit.; V.
Bogdanor, 'New Face Picked by the Same Old Ones', The Independent, 20 July 1994.
24 J.B. Christoph, 'The Effects of Britons in Brussels: The European Community and the Culture
of Whitehall Paper presented at the Ilird Conference of the International Society for the Study
of European Ideas, University of Aalborg, DK, 24-29 August 1992. This view was also
expressed by several interviewees (Brussels based consultant; Euro-trade associations) and by
Ludlow op. cit.
Christoph op. cit.
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4.4.	 A Dominant Eurocracy?
4.4.1.	 Beyond Selfishness
The right to initiate policy is the Commission's most formidable political weapon,
especially since the term 'policy' must be loosely interpreted:
"The Commission was designed from the beginning to produce ideas, studies, policy
papers, and progranis. It has continued to do so. The output is impossibly large to
categorise, as it includes anything from a 'think piece' on the more efficient
administration of agricultural surpluses to a draft directive to a MI-blown policy
program such as Cockfield's White Paper of 1985.M26
Besides think pieces, studies and recommendations, the Commission has initiated a
great many legislative drafts since its inauguration and the volume of actual
Community legislation is formidable, given the EU's tender age. Many interviewees
pointed out that this body of legislation has been significantly shaped by the
Commission because draft proposals, once completed, are rarely amended
drastically. 27 Black ink on white paper apparently focuses reflection and discussion
to the extent that radical re-conceptualisation of a problem is rare. According to a
Euro-lobbyist, officials may also be tempted to resist pressures for change, because,
26 Ludlow, op.cit., p.97.
27 For example, it was stated variously, that Commission officials consult and listen to various
reconunendation but that they had the power to put into words what had been said. In so doing,
they could mediate or even ignore infonnation. Moreover, they could choose particular
language to add their own personal imprint to a policy draft. It was also mentioned that higher
level Commission officials often had scant knowledge of detailed projects only and that, if they
did not see a political incompatibility between the draft policy and the broader political agenda,
they left their junior colleagues much freedom with regard to phrasing and structuring detailed
provisions. This point was confirmed by an interview comment listed in Burson-Marsteller,
Lobbying the EC, Burson-Marsteller Publications, June 1991, p.22: "While regulations get
modified, in essence they are drafted at a fairly low level by people with a lot of autonomy. In
fact the director general himself may not know what is going on." These views also fit in with
earlier statements regarding the autonomy of low level Commission officials. (See footnotes 24
and 25.)
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"normally officials are very proud of their babies and have little interest in changing
them."28
The prevailing attitudes found among officials lend support to institutionalist
readings of social change, although, theoretically, they do not exclude opportunities
for radical draft designs by Commission officials. However, there is little evidence of
such radicalism. Apparently officials consult widely and take account of existing
policies, even within individual member states, before drafting new laws or
amendments. This claim was substantiated by a Commission official who said that
"...first we take notice of what exists". 29 Moreover, policy innovation is severely
restricted by the tendency to produce amendments, rather than new laws, wherever
possible. An MEP confirmed that in areas which have only recently been covered by
EU policies there is more scope for policy innovation, since these are of a "tabula
rasa" nature. However, other interviewees insisted that such opportunities were not
fully exploited. For example, another MEP pointed out that, in the area of
environmental policy-making, Brussels followed broadly international trends.
Consequently, policy drafting does not take place within a vacuum and, hence,
innovation and creativity are limited by the existing policy environment, a fact which
is common to most policy-making cultures. 3° Thus, EC policy-making shows some
28 Interview comment by a Brussels based consultant and lobbyist; September 1991.
Interview comment by a Commission official who worked at DG \'I, at the time the interview
took place, that is in September 1991.
30 On the general point, see for example Krasner op.cit. (both references); on the limiting effects
of existing EC legislation on policy innovation, see for example Nugent op.cit., 1994.
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marked incrementalist characteristics. 3 ' Incrementalism certainly reduces the
manoeuvrability of current Commission policy drafters but it does not provide a
direct indication as to whether their predecessors were more innovative. Given the
Commission's custom of looking at existing national policies, even early drafters may
have been engaged predominantly in synthesising and adjusting national policies to
EC conditions, and not in policy innovation. This argument does not belittle their
contribution; it simply puts claims of excessive Commission influence into
perspective.
It has been argued that policy change is limited also because the drafters are
primarily concerned with the preservation of the status quo that tends to favour their
interests. 32 The following comments confirm that Commission officials are
sometimes considered to be too lazy, complacent and inefficient to engage in
proactive and innovative policy-making.33
Lindblom devised a model of incrementalist policy-making which highlighted the power of
institutionalisation, but also asserted that policy-making was a rather a-rational, contingent
process. {C.E. Lindblom, 'The Science of Muddling Through', Public Administration Review,
19, spring 1959, pp. 79-88.) Chapter five deals in greater detail with the issue of rational
policy-making, but the discussion here confirms that EC policy-making is culturally and
historically conditioned and, hence, not purely rational. Discussions in Chapter five indicate
that policy-making is generally directed by a mixture of rational and other behaviour.
32 This generalisation is undoubtedly exaggerated and inappropriate but there is one area where
sell-interest is likely to play a significant role: as a result of the persistent budgetary pressures,
the CoM asked the Commissioners in 1993 to review their remuneration and to find ways of
cutting their salaries and associated privileges, e.g. two paid first-class tickets per annum for all
immediate family members of a Commission official to their home country. {On this issue, see
for example, Der Spiegel, 'Vernunitige Relation', 47(32), 9. August 1993, S.47-50.)
Accusations of complacency and inefficiency are particularly ripe with regard to the fraud and
corruption problem that the Community has to grapple with. See for example, M. Mendrinou,
'European Community Fraud and the Politics of Institutional Development', European Journal
of Political Research, 26 (1), 1994, pp.81-101, or, F. D'Aubert, 'The Silence of the Subsidies',
The European, 6-12 January 1995, p.17, or, CEC, 'The Week in Europe: CAP fraud blacklist',
WE/17/94, 5 May 1994 and CEC, Background Report: Combating Fraud, B/05/95, May 1995.
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"Rightly or wrongly, there is a perception among many Europeans that the Eurocrats
are more interested in their own careers and perks than in building a united
Europe."34
"So often the European Commission is portrayed as a vast sanctuary where droves of
Euro-civil servants, polyglots in designer suits, are paid vast salaries to indulge their
Europhile tendencies."35
Thierzy Naudin refers to Eurocrats as "Kalka's little Kaisers", warns businessmen of
Europe to be aware of them and ends his 'inside view' with the recommendation that
"it is time for a definitive White Paper from Brussels - one to tear down the paper
curtain between businesses and governments."36
Interviewees have not been as unkind to the Commission officials but some concern
with regard to inefficiency and complacency has been voiced, notably by two MEPs
who argued that "the productivity of EC officials was very low" and that they had a
tendency to "sit in well paid ivory towers".
Do European officials really epitomise all the worst characteristics of bureaucrats? It
is possible to find instances of corruption, complacency, inefficiency, selfishness,
pettiness among European officials. For example, there appears to have been some
cover up over a former Euro-official's involvement in fraud related to tobacco
subsidies. 37 Occasionally, Eurocrats produce extremely questionable policy
initiatives, for example attempts to harmonise the amount of water used to flush a
With this report the Commission demonstrates - at least on paper - that it is not inefficient and
complacent but seeks to solve the problem of fraud. Various measures are suggested, namely:
specialised task forces on the ground, more enquiries and exploiting them better, concentrate on
high risk sectors, e.g. CAP, increase awareness of fraud, exploitation of intelligence, training
national officials, new policy instruments, e.g. a Regulation on the Protection of the
Community's financial interests.
R. Evans, 'Eurocrats-Public Servants or Usurpers?', Geographical Magazine, March 1990, p.41.
R. Watson & L. Walker, 'Inside the Mind of the Eurocrat', The European, 15-2 1 April 1994,
p.6.
36 T. Naudin, 'Why it is Time to Tear Down the Eurocrats' Paper Curtain', The European, 10-16
March 1995, p.21.
D'Aubert op. cit.
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toilet or the prohibition of pork chops with an attached kidney. 38 Sometimes, the
Commission seems equally silly in its refusal to take action. For example, when the
executive director of a Spanish animal rights association complained about the
public slaughter of pigs in Pampaneira (E) every December, the Commission stated
that it could not take any action on such matters because these animals were not
tortured and killed for consumption purposes. 39 However, the majority of scare
stories about foolish initiatives from Eurocrats turn out to be myths.4°
The Commission is thus not a safe heaven for any 'little Kafkaesque Kaiser' and most
interviewees and questionnaire respondents showed a great deal of respect for
Eurocrats and felt that the vast majority of them were hardworking sincere people.
Consequently, derision and allegations of bad behaviour are often unfair and should
not be generalised. Nonetheless, there is no room for complacency, since the
Commission evidently suffers from a serious image problem which is partially self.
inflicted, partially the consequence of media 'hounding', in the UK and elsewhere.
The image problem is a serious matter because it enhances the widespread disquiet
over the undemocratic nature of the Commission which, in turn, reduces its
manoeuvrability and freedom to act. These restraints are likely to limit its overall
policy impact. 4 ' Commissioners are well aware of this problem, but they and their
staff have not mastered the art of effective communication as yet.42
38 Aitken, 'Lords flush out the Brussels Meddlers', The Guardian, 7 Februaiy 1992, p.6; BBC 1,
6 O'clock News, spring 1993.
9 J. Carvel, 'European Commission moves to protect Frogs but Pampaneira Pigs stay beyond
Reach', The Guardian, 8 October 1993, P.1.
40 Examples of myths are: A directive prohibiting the use of wooden barrels for the fermentation
of beer {EP News, 'No Need to Get in a Froth', 14-18 December 1992, p.3.); the EU is insisting
on round Gin bottles. (V. Macdonald & R. Temple, Do LQM believe all you Read in the
Newspapers?, Publications of the European Commission, February 1994.
This point has been confirmed several times, e.g. The Economist, All Aboard, 316(7653), 5
May 1990, p.15. Data in Chapter seven substantiate this point.
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4.4.2.	 Interventionism
It has been argued widely that, for historical, ideological and egotistical reasons, the
Commission is a highly interventionist organisation which sometimes creates
legislation for the sake of legislation so as to safeguard its own position, privileges
and power. 43 Work programmes vary in size from year to year, but are generally
substantial, sometimes even unwieldy. Hence, it is not inappropriate to regard the
EU as a formidable policy initiator. Yet, the Commission is by no means the only
institution that pushes for policy initiation (see Table 1, p. 12044) but, being the
formal policy initiator, the Commission carries the burden of criticism from those
who publicise incessantly the 'unacceptable' nature of that body. Ironically,
governments often blame one another for pushing the Commission to legislate, while
merrily engaging in that practice themselves. For example, Belgium forced
amendments and legislation on packaging and vehicle emission standards; the UK
ensured the protection of cheated time-share holiday owners and insisted on the
protection of animals during transport; France demanded legislation on the
reintroduction of minimum prices for fish; several other member states insisted on
EU-wide standards for hall marking. 45 The CoM always promotes policy initiatives
42 The Commission is aware of its problem and frequently attempts to improve the situation, alas to
little avail! See for example, CEC, ISECIB32/91; WE/23/92; ISECIB11/93, ISEC/B17/93;
WE/40/93; WE/19/94.
This accusation is implicit in many of the negative assessments of the Eurocracy contained in
this chapter and is compatible with the now widespread assumption that bureaucrats promote
policies out of seLf-interest (see footnote 13).
Table I has been made up from the following sources: The Economist, Eurobuzz: Subsidiarity,
325(7779), 3 October 1992, p.49 and CEC, WE/39/91; ISECIB4/93; ISECI.B4/94;
ISEC/Bi 1/94.
The Economist, '1992: Second Thoughts: A Survey of Business in Europe, 3 19(7710), 8 June
1991, inset after p.72.; CEC, ISECIB28/93; WE/3/94; WE/4/94; C. Ripa di Meana, 'Cruelty is
no longer a Fringe Issue', The European, 10-16 March 1995, p.1
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and studies, notably on technological co-operation with East European and CIS
countries or on case studies on the varied impact of the Channel Tunne1.
Moreover, significant political guidelines are established by the European Council,
both at Intergovernmental Conferences (IGCs) and through the medium of the
Presidency. 47 Recently, the European Parliamentarians have increased their requests
to the Commission for new legislation. For example, they persuaded the Commission
to introduce legislation for a Hepatitis B vaccination programme. 48 Sometimes
interest groups convince Commission officials to initiate policy drafts. For example,
environmental and consumer groups have stimulated legislation on nitrate levels in
lettuces and on distance selling. 49 Therefore, the Commission does not carry hull
responsibility for the size of the annual work programme and the vast quantity of Eli
legislation. Nonetheless, the Commission does have interventionist tendencies, even
if these are hidden in Table 1 on page 123.
The Commission's interventionist tendencies have manifested themselves in a variety
of ways. For example, Chapter two revealed that the Commission has sometimes
used its role as Guardian of the Treaty to expand into new policy areas such as
environmental regulation. Moreover, it has been the driving force for many
European-wide programmes, particularly in the cultural and technical areas.5°
See CEC, Background Reports, ISECIB32J91; ISEC/B30/92; ISEC/B6/93.
For confirmation, see for example, Wessels op.cit., or, CEC, 'Background Report: the Role and
Influence of the Presidency of the Community, ISEC/B17/92, 2 July 1992.
48 EP News, 'Hepatitis Danger', 8-12 February 1993, p.4.
CEC, ISEC/B23/92; WE/13/95; BBC 1, 6.30 pm Local News Update, East Anglia, spring 1994.
50 For example, SOCRATES, ALTENER, JET. ALTENER = Community Action Programme for
greater use of renewable energy sources { See CEC, 'Background Report on ALTENER',
ISECIB28/92). JET = The Joint European Torus = The largest and most powerful experiment
yet attempted towards the development of nuclear fusion as a new energy source. (See, CEC,
'Background Report on JET, ISECIB19/92} SOCRATES is the updated and expanded version
of the ERASMUS and LfNGUA Higher Education exchange and co-operation programmes,
now due to come on stream 1996/97.
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Table I
Breakdown of the Commission's work programme 1991:
Reasons for initiation of EC proposals (535):
Percentage	 Reason
	
28%	 Concerning the negotiation and application of
multilateral and bilateral international
agreements, e.g. fishing rights, GATT, aid
programmes
	
15%
	
modified current laws, e.g. directive on food
colouring
	
14%
	
responded to requests from individual
governments (see examples above)
	
13%	 followed programmes already approved by the
CoM or Treaty obligations, e.g. SEM
programme, action plan for consumer policy,
review of the telecommunications sector
8% carried out obligations of the EC treaties, e.g.
farm prices, cancer action programme (under
public health provisions in TEU)
	
8%
	
imposed anti-dumping measures, in response to
complaints from the CoM
	
8%
	
requests from CoM (see examples above)
	
6%
	
based on the Commission's own ideas, e.g.
special animal centre
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Sometimes it has also dedicated itself to carrying out treaty obligation to a depth
and at a speed that worries many national and European politicians. For example,
following the ratification of the TEU, the Commission has immediately begun to
work on a programme for immigration which includes proposals to give legal
immigrants in the EU eventually full citizenship. 5 ' Together with other policy-
makers, the Commission has pushed for interventionist policies such as structural
and regional fund programmes, social policy environmental policy. 52 Furthermore,
certain Directorate-Generals (notably DG VI which is in charge of Agriculture)
continue to be influenced heavily by French legal and administrative culture which,
in turn, remains quite dirigiste. 53 Within limits, senior Commission personnel can
also influence the amount of policy output and the speed with which policies are
processed. For example, Leon Brittan is known to have fostered the deregulatory
tendencies in the Commission. Conversely, Jacques Delors carried with him a
dirigiste heritage. 54 Finally, the Commission has exceptional powers in a very small
range of policy areas which enhance its overall impact on policy-making. Notably, it
has been given some delegated legislative powers in the area of agricultural policy-
making so as to ensure sufficient freedom to manage the CAP." This situations has
provoked it occasionally to interfere with ministerial decisions, including rejecting a
German and British veto, on the grounds that these were interfering with the smooth
51 v Smart & R. Watson, 'Big Two Plan Even Stronger Maastricht', The European, 25-31 March
1994, p.1.
32 In these policy areas, the Commission has worked as part of multi-institutional coalitions and
has not always been the driving force: "The Social Charter caine into being when the
Commission, spurred on by the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee,
recognised that the citizens of Europe and not business alone should benefit from the
opportunities offered by the Single Market." (CEC, 'Background Report', ISEC/B1/92: 1).
3 See for example, P. Sandevoir, Introduction au droit, Dunod, 1991; R. Watson, 'EvolutioflalY
Theory of the Eurocrat', The European, 15-2 1 April 1994, p.1.
See for example, Milward op.cit.; J. Palmer, 'Leaders Vow to Strip Veil of Secrecy from
Europe', The Guardian, 17 October 1992, p.8.
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management of agricultural markets, in accordance with the principles of CAP.
During the lead up to '1992', the Commission could invoke also some additional
powers in order to speed up the passage of single market legislation. 56 Article 10 of
the SEA stipulates that SEM legislation that involved minor amendments only,
would not need to await for formal CoM approval, but could be dealt with under a
specially devised committee procedure. 57 In some respects these provisions resemble
those in respect of agricultural policy-making and they have provoked concern,
including a statement by the CECG claiming that they "...changed the emphasis of
decision-making from the Council to the Commission."55 To some extent, this is a
valid assessment but it overstates the importance of Article 10 of the SEA, because
Heads of State and Government would never have signed away significant decision-
making powers to the Commission.
In the final analysis, it is difficult to judge how widespread interventionist beliefs and
activities are within the Commission. 'Interventionism' is an arbitrary notion,
depending on cultural and ideological perceptions and, hence, "...one country's
Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, Title II: AgrIculture, 1957. For more
detailed comments on these provisions, see for example G. 1-lendriks, 'Germany and the CAP:
National Interests and the European Community', International Affairs, 65(1), 1989, pp.75-87,
as well as, Spicer op.cit. Regrettably, this situation has led to a widespread myth that the
Commission is the (central) decision-making institution in the Community. {On this point, see
for example, Luff op.cit.) More recently, the Commission has also been given direct
intervention powers in respect of non-compliance with the EU's competition policy. According
to Lord Clinton-Davis, these new executive powers have given raise wrongly to concern over
the Commission's legislative powers, too, at least on occasions. Lord Clinton-Davis, 'The
Commission', Presentation at the Hawksmere Seminar on Lobbying and Decision-Making in
Europe, London, 30 Januaiy 1992.
56 This right is based on article 145, paragraph 3, of the EEC Treaty which was added with the
ratification of the SEA (Article 10, SEA).
Outlined under Council Decision 87/373/EEC of 13 July 1987.
58 CECG, Information Paper on Decision-Making under the Single European Act, Pamphlet
89/12, 1989, p.3.
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bureaucratic interference is another's urgently needed EC action." Moreover, the
institutional interdependence in the EU provides barriers for imprudent legislating.
For example, an interviewee stated that Commission officials will not introduce
legislation that they judge to be unacceptable to the European Council or the CoM.
For example, Jacques Delors was very keen on introducing a comprehensive training
programme; alas, pen was never put to paper since he knew that he lacked adequate
political support. 6° Most interviewees also maintained that Commission officials
gathered information from a broad range of sources before they wrote a policy draft,
as well as at all later stages. 6 ' Furthermore, the CoM can always throw out
unsuitable legislation at the decision-making stage, although there is a marked
divergence among ministers as to what constitutes the right amount of legislation,
due to political and ideological diversity. Qualified majority voting makes life
however a little easier for interventionists. Nowadays, the EP is also more effective
in monitoring policy initiatives. Indeed, Commissioners and MEPs recently agreed
on a 'code of conduct'. The Commission will in future only proceed in exceptional
circumstances with proposals rejected by the EP. In return, M1EPs have promised
not to delay proposals that they do not like. 62 As demonstrated previously, the
principle of subsidiarity has already been applied to scrap some existing EU laws and
to prevent excessive zeal among policy initiators. 63 The Commission is well aware of
the possible implications of Article 3b and other provisions in the TEU: "Account is
The Economist op.cit., 3rd October 1992, p.49.
60 Interview comment by CBI member of staff; Brussels office; September 1991.
61 These views were expressed by Officials from Trade Associations (general and sectoral),
Business people, Consultants, Politicians and Civil Servants (home and Brussels based).
62 See, EP News, 'Full Steam Ahead: Commission and MEPs Mend Fences', 13-17 March 1995,
p.1, and, CEC, 'The Week in Europe: Commission-Parliament Relations', WE/1O/95, 16 March
1995.
63 See Chapter two.
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taken of the new co-decision procedure and all the proposals listed will have to be
examined in strict compliance with the subsidiarity principle."64
Intervention can manifest itself in different ways. During the early years of the EU,
the Commission undoubtedly pursued its task to further European integration by
way of creating enabling legislation. It was also very much concerned with
harmonisation of member states' legislation and with planning the route towards
greater integration. The CAP is the symbol of that phase which must be labelled as
dirigiste. Dirigiste tendencies have not disappeared entirely in the Commission but
the main form of intervention is now regulation. 65 As noted earlier,66 this sea change
took place within a changing ideological framework in the Western world during the
1970s and was epitomised in the implications of the Cassis de Dijon ruling which has
also affected the culture of the Commission.
4.4.3.	 Omnipresence
The Commission enhances its influence because it has much control over the policy
time-table and because it is more or less omnipresent. 67 Unlike other policy actors,
the Commission is involved in all stages of policy-making. For example, Commission
officials chair a host of ad hoc or semi-institutionalised consultation and
CEC, 'Background Report: The Commission's Legislative Programme for 1994', ISECJB1/94, 4
Januaiy 1994, p.1.
65 See for example Majone op.cit.
66 ibid.; see also Chapter two.
67 This point was made by numerous interviewees and figured on several responses to the
questionnaire on interest representation and policy-making. For example, it was stated that
"...the Commission is involved at all stages..."; it was also explained that the policy draft is
often referred to as "Ia navette" (shuttle) because it went through so many complex interactions
and that the Commission was the one institution through whose hands it went most often.
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management committees; they regularly send officials to the EP and the ESC and
they frequently liaise with the civil servants working for the Permanent
Representations of the member states. The higher echelons of the Commission are
also in constant contact with senior national, and sometimes sub-national,
politicians. Besides formal contacts, Commission officials profit from the incestuous
nature of Brussels where "everybody soon gets to know everybody else in the
business" 68
4.4.4.	 Implementation
The Commission oversees policy implementation which, more often than not, is
carried out by national or sub-national agents who work on behalf of the
Commission. In theory, this responsibility enhances Commission power, but Rhodes
found that, apart from the CAP, implementation was dominated by national concerns
which often interfered with the Commission's task. 69 Wallace discovered that non-
compliance and obstruction were particularly marked during periods of recession
which usually intensifies national rivalry. 70 Obstruction varies from policy sector to
policy sector, but seems widespread, covering areas such as equal opportunities,
industrial policy or health and hygiene.7'
68 Interview comment made by a Commission official in DG VI; September 1991.
69 RA.W. Rhodes, European Policy-Making, hnplementation and Subcentral Governments, EIPA
Press, 1986.
70 Wallace Ct al. op.cit., 1983, Ch. 2.
71 ibid.; see also S. Cunningham, 'The Development of Equal Opportunities Theoxy and Practice
in the European Community', Policy and Politics, 20(3), 1992, pp.177-89. Numerous
interviewees also expressed this view.
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Is the Commission partially to blame for its inefficiency with regard to policy
implementation? At least an official in the UK Permanent Representation thought so,
stating that Commission officials were not particularly interested in "the unsexy side
of the whole policy business". 72 The official conceded however that the Commission
had recently "got its act together". 73 However, problems with implementation persist
and are largely of a structural nature. Nonetheless, implementation continues to
open up loopholes and cause difficulties. National parliaments interpret directives
variously; they can also delay the transformation of a directive into national law.
Implementation often involves new policy actors, particularly at the regional and
local levels. Communication difficulties can arise, or the implementation process can
be hampered by non co-operation. 74 Hence, the Commission's responsibility for
implementation is a mixed blessing and does not improve its image problems, nor
necessarily enhance its impact on policy outcome.
4.4.5	 Jnternal Divisions: Horizontal and Vertical
There is little evidence of a Commission-wide sense of identity; among staff loyalties
seem to lie predominantly with DGs or sub-sections of DGs, if they exist at a1l.
Internal friction of all kind seems rife:
Social scientists have unearthed tales of jealousy, intrigue and sexual fantasy more
typical of a blockbuster movie than nine-to-five office life."76
72 Interview with a British official at the UK Permanent Representation, Brussels, September
1991.
7 ibid.
74 These issues are explored in greater detail in Chapter seven because policy implementation is
an integral part of the policy process and can modify policy output significantly.
Implementation patterns also reflect certain characteristics of a political system.
76 The European op.cif., 15-21 April 1994, p.1.
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"Any impression of homogeneity is illusory. Nationality, language, political
allegiance and departmental loyalties cut a swathe across everything else."77
"The Commission's decision-making has been more diffuse, poorly co-ordinated and
erratic than Council's intergovernmental approach."78
These may be prejudiced comments, but there is evidence of lack of co-ordination
and communication, as well as rivalry. For example, Sharrock reported that a road
building project between France and Spain was supported by EC structural finds,
but now found to be violating EC environmental laws. 79 A similar situation has
arisen in Greece with the AcheloOs dam project. Such divisions may well weaken the
Commission's potential to influence policy outcomes. They also make Commission
officials vulnerable to manipulation, for example, by lobbyists. 80 However, some
interviewees dismissed divisions as "old hat" 8 ' and unimportant. They stressed the
growing need for cross-departmental action, for example with regard to consumer
policy and the positive impact of the many cross-DG work groups, committees.
ibid; p.6.
78 Moravcsik op.cit., 1991, pp.70-i. References to rivalry and divisions are widespread and can
also be found in Milward op.cit, S.P. Mazey & J.J. Richardson, 'British Pressure Groups in the
European Community: The Challenge of Brussels', Parliamentary Affairs, 45(1), 1992, pp.92-
107, or, R Watson, 'Bigger Club Creates Linguistic Nightmare', The European, 11-17 March
1994, p.4. Mazey & Richardson noted particularly the notorious rivalry between DG VI
(Agriculture) and DG III (Internal Market and Industrial Affairs); the latter has deregulatory
tendencies and clashes sometimes also with DG V (Employment, Social Affairs and Education)
and DG X (Information, Communication and Culture) who tend to want to created more, and
more harmonised, policies. A. Jones & B. Mead, 'Eurocrats face the Challenge', Geographical
Magazine, March 1990, pp.42-3, found that divisions and rivalry were also rife among the
Commissioners. A nunther of interviewees, including a Conunission official, also confinned
this point.
D. Sharrock, 'Battle of Bear Valley', The Guardian, 4 December 1992, Supplement on Europe,
pp.16-7.
0 This statement represents the view of a number of the interviewed lobbyists and consultants.
81 Interview comment; member of a Euro-trade association; September 1991.
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In line with stereotypical views of bureaucracies, 82 the Commission is rigidly
hierarchic. According to some interviewees, this structure can lead to
communication problems as well as sudden changes to policy drafts. 83 In the light of
this finding, it is necessary to qualify an earlier point, regarding the freedom of low
level officials to draft policies. They enjoy this freedom as long as the draft broadly
fits the political priorities of the higher echelons of the Commission.
4.4.6.	 Working Together
All the evidence indicates that the Commission's position in the policy process is one
of interdependence. The Commission and the Council have to engage in a symbiotic
relationship since the former initiates and the latter decides. They both work within
the broad framework set by the European Council and are, in addition, restricted by
the Treaty provisions and the 'acqziis communautaire'. The voice of the Parliament
is getting louder and the Commission has to comply with the rulings of the Court of
Justice. Moreover, the intricate web of informal influences modifies formal policy
patterns to the extent that it is hard to generalise. For example, cross-institutional
alliance building takes place quite often, since internal divisions also exist in the
Council of Ministers, the Permanent Representations of national governments and
the EP. In addition, organised interests play a significant, if informal, role in the EU's
policy process. Furthermore, the Commission's fortunes depend on the general
82 See for example Bannock et al. op.cit.
83 Various interview comments. For example, a middle-ranking Commission official admitted that
"...you got to arrange things with the top; things can change here..." (Interview September
1991) and the interviewee at the BLL commented (see appendix Ill) that he had first hand
experience of this practice. Apparently, a middle-ranking official had accepted one of his
recommendations and included it in a policy draft. However, following feed-back from a more
senior Commission official, the recommendation was deleted, because it was deemed
unacceptable or undesirable by the higher echelons of the Commission (Interview with Herr
Welsch, BLL, July 1991).
84 See Chapter five.
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mood of the wider public and the political constellations in member states. For
example, much opposition against the TEU is directed at the Commission. As a
result, "it is reluctant to make any proposals that could upset entrenched national
interests, lest EC governments seek to trim its powers." Accordingly, it is wrong to
argue that the Commission is the dominant partner in the EU's policy process. It is a
powerful, but dependent policy actor that needs to build alliances in order to achieve
its goals. 85 The same goes for the other major institutions of the EU, that is the
CoM, the ECJ and the EP. At a higher level, these institutions furthermore interact
with the changing and complex agendas of the European Council. Furthermore, at a
lower level, their exchanges are also mediated by informal pressures.
4.5.	 National Bureaucracies
The above complexities are not captured by any of the bureaucratic models of policy
making and the EU policy process should not be mistaken for bureaucratic
government. However, overall, bureaucratic influence is considerable, because,
besides the Commission, many national civil servants are involved in that process;
either by working for one of the Permanent Representations, by being seconded to
the Commission or through their respective home bases. The Permanent
Representations are particularly well placed to influence policy output, especially
through the two Permanent Representation Committees (COREPER I and
COREPER II) and the Special Committee on Agriculture (SCA) because they
85 All interviewees that were asked, confirmed that all initial policy drafts are amended in some
form; often many times.
COREPER is an acronym of the French term: Commitd des Representations Permanentes. Most
of the time, commentators simply refer to a single COREPER, meaning COREPER II which is
made up of the Ambassadors of the member states. However, there is a second COREPER,
made up of the Deputy Permanent Representatives who are situated just below the Ambassadors
in the bureaucratic hierarchy. { See for example, The EC Committee of the American Chamber
of Commerce, EC Information Handbook 1991, Publications of the American Chamber of
Commerce, 1991.)
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carry out a lot of work on behalf of the CoM. 87 Items that have been agreed on at
COREPER level and are thought to get Council approval without discussion are put
on a separate list, entitled 'A points'; other items figure on the 'B point' list. In cases
of 'A points' items, the national bureaucrats' input is crucial, and, with regard to B
points' it is considerable. COREPER II's influence is enhanced, too, by their
responsibility to prepare for the summits of the European Council. The civil servants
who represent the country that holds the presidency are particularly advantaged in
this process as they have some input on agenda setting. 88 Moreover, the fifteen
national ambassadors to the EU that make up COREPER II are generally highly
regarded by other policy actors. 89 However, it must be borne in mind that proposals
do not reach COREPER until they have been extensively discussed with all the other
policy actors involved. Further discussions and consultations take place at
COREPER level. Moreover, their influence, as part of the CoM, is circumscribed by
the constitutional provisions for policy processes. Consequently, it is a vast
exaggeration to argue that COREPER H constitutes TM the 15 men who run Europe
on our behalf'90.
4.6.	 Conclusion
The EU is not governed by bureaucrats, but they do play a significant role in the
policy process. Some are in better positions than others to influence outcome. The
87 Any standard text on EU institutions will confirm this poinl
88 The EC Committee of the American Chamber of Commerce op.cit..
89 Interview and Questionnaire comments; EC official and officials from the UK and French
Permanent Representations.
S. Helm, 'The 15 men who run Europe on our behalf, The Independent on Sunday, 18 June
1995.
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level of influence depends on many factors, namely their structural position, the
policy in question, their ability to build alliances and gain support for their ideas.
Since bureaucratic government has been defined here as government by non elected
officials, the Commissioners must be labelled bureaucrats, too. They do of course
occupy a pivotal position within the EU, especially the President, who is also a
member of the European Council, and consequently they considerably enhance the
bureaucratic traits of the EU. However, as in the case of integration theories, the
notion of bureaucracy cannot fully capture the contribution made by the higher
echelons of the Commission. Commissioners are overtly political appointments and
are responsible for policy initiation. While sophisticated notions of bureaucracy take
into account that officials are often drafting policies on behalf of ministers and
influence these through informal political behaviour, they do not adequately address
the function of the Commissioners.
Notwithstanding this conclusion, it is a valuable exercise to try and conceptualise the
EU through the notion of bureaucracy. This approach tackles the myth of Eurocratic
dominance and confirms the institutional interdependence in the EU. Consequently,
it also verifies the earlier conclusions on the limitations to neofunctionalist and
intergovernmentalist explanations of European integration. Since bureaucracy is
concerned with rule-application 91 , it has also been possible to crystallise some rules
within the EU, namely the requirement to interact with all other policy actors and to
build alliances constantly so as to gain sufficient support to proceed with policy
initiatives. Moreover, unwritten rules proscribe the introduction of initiatives that are
considered politically untenable. 92 Like other administrations, the European and
91 See definition of bureaucracy by B.G. Peters op.cit., 1984; footnote 11.
92 As in any other political system there is of course a need to produce workable policies - a point
discussed in greater detail in Chapter five with regard to the role of technocrats in the policy
process.
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national civil services are strictly hierarchic, although Commission officials appear to
have more room for manoeuvre than most national civil servants, provided they
move within the broad parameters set by their superiors. This relative freedom may
well be a consequence of the comparative youth of the EU, the influence of various
administrative traditions as a result of multi-national recruitment and the proactive
position allocated to the entire Commission by the original EC Treaties.
This chapter confirms two important rule changes in the EU which have seriously
affected the behaviour of Commission officials, provoked institutional changes and
redesigned the policy process: the move from dirigisme to regulation and the
growing preoccupation with the democratic deficit of the EU. Both rule changes
have redressed the institutional balance to the detriment of the European
Commission and, hence it is no longer (if it ever was!) "quite the motor force that
some of the founding fathers had hoped for..."93
The focus on rules, rule changes and the behaviour of Eurocrats provides some extra
indications on the issue of social change. Basic rules appear to have been
institutionalised quite heavily, but drastic change does obviously sometimes occur.
Such change seems to result from the confluence of different factors, notably a 'spill-
over' of the changing ideas on the functions of government and state; powerful
decisions by individual EU institutions; a requirement to make EU policy-making
more efficient and to manage its limited finances or pressures for a more democratic
EU. Such change is then mediated by institutionalised counter-pressures. For
example, the move towards horizontal framework legislation, following the Cassis
de Dijon ruling, was met with counter-pressures from those who favoured the
Nugent op.cit., 1994, p.122.
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institutionalised version of law-making, that is harmonised recipe type legislation.94
Furthermore, many 'news policy drafts are in fact amendments to existing legislation,
so adding an incrementalist 95 flavour to EU policy-making. Individual interpretations
have also mediated change. The point at which such pressures for and against
change finally meet also depends on the attitudes of individual policy actors because
"people matter, everywhere and issues can change if people change, for example in
the Commission."96
These findings indicate that change is not evenly mediated within the EU and that it
will ultimately be necessary to find a conceptual framework that incorporates
diversity. They also suggest that the institutionalist claim about the 'stickiness' of
social change is by no means unfounded, but that, ultimately, structuration theory,
with its emphasis on interaction, is better able to capture the essence of rule change
in the EU. Finally, they signal that European bureaucrats are not rational actors who
operate in a vacuum. Instead they are affected by socialisation as well as their own
experiences and intellectual capabilities.
The follow up questionnaire to the survey on lobbying and policy making, which
was only completed by eleven respondents (see Appendix 11), confirms the last
point. Only two respondents maintained that the EC policy process was overall
rational (a). Some six of them thought that it was a game of political trades off (c)
and two concluded that it was a combination of (a+c), whereas one thought that it
was a combination of (a), (c) and the influence of ideological considerations. The
conviction that behaviour is dominantly guided by various influences, without
9 See for example Chapter seven.
Seefootnote3l.
96 Quote by an interviewee from the CBI office, Brussels, September 1991.
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however being excessively a-rational, was confirmed by interview and questionnaire
comments. For example, one interviewee said that "rationality is often nothing more
than a mantle of respectability; underneath political bargaining and trades off appear
ripe".97
However, such comments must be treated cautiously, and not only because they are
not necessarily representative. Difficulties arise partly over terminology. For
example, it seems that the expression 'ideological' is neither frequently used nor liked
in EU circles. Issues, such as deregulation, which have ideological undercurrents are
simply treated in terms of 'political preferences'. 98 There is also a deep-rooted
problem with the composite notion of rationality. The majority of people, including
questionnaire respondents and interviewees, assume that they know what is meant
by 'rational behaviours . Yet, economic and political rationale can clash, especially
when policy actors have mixed commitments. For example, the Kangaroo Group,
which leapt into life in 1979, has advised the Commission and other policy actors -
apparently on the basis of economic reasoning - on the need for a highly deregulated
internal market. However, the Kangaroo group is made up of a mixture of
prominent politicians and business people, many of whom favour free trade for
ideological reasons, as well as for its possible economic rationaleY Those few
parliamentary (EP) support staff who have interests elsewhere, mainly in industry,
may also have to grapple with the frequent dissonance between political and
Interview comment from an advisor on Europe, working for a major multi-national food and
drinks processor that has a subsidiary in Brussels; September 1991.
98 This observation is based on interview evidence, questionnaire comments as well as on many
informal conversations.
This argument was substantiated by appropriate comments from Ms Denise Owen, consultant
and lobbyist who was interviewed in January 1992 and who has previously worked closely with
members of the Kangaroo Group, including Lord Plum. The point is also confirmed elsewhere,
notably by Harrop op.cit and Gardner op.cif., 1991.
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economic interests!'°°. There are further complications as far as the concept of
rationality is concerned. Besides certain neo-liberals and advocates of public choice
modules, few commentators have agreed that individual rationality coincides neatly
with collective rationality. Moreover, it has been argued very eloquently elsewhere
that so called rational policy choices can, on occasions, be mediated by sensations of
empathy and altruism.'°' Finally, the uneasy distinction between incrementalism and
rationalism has to be borne in mind. To Weber, rational policy making certainly
implied that policy makers were able to decide on policy options without being
trapped by cultural conditioning. By contrast, incrementalism rightly emphasises the
virtual impossibility of such freedom. However, the concept of 'muddling through'
significantly underestimates the influence of strategy, methodology, reasoned
argument and detachment on policy-making, at least in the EU, and especially with
regard to technically complex policies. The next chapter addresses this issue in
greater detail and looks, more generally, at the compatibility between theoretical
conceptualisations of pluralism and empirical manifestations of EU policy-making.
100 Watson op. cit. recently (10-16/2/95, p.'.) reported that a small number of EP support staff have
indeed dual commitments and interests. The majority are however dedicating themselves
exclusively to their work within the EP.
101 See notably, J. Mansbridge, 'Self-Interest in Political Life', Political Theory, 18(1), 1990,
pp.132-53.
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ChAPTER FIVE:
TIlE EU: A PLURALIST hEAVEN?
5.1.	 Introduction
Since the publication of Arthur Bentley's The Process of Government in 1908, the
study of group politics has been central to policy analysis. With regard to the EC,
there are some additional incentives to study the role of private interests.' The
A clarification of terms is necessary. Most early literature on group politics, interest
representation or lobbying, assumes that private interests are represented in an aggregated form,
through groups. (This is particularly true for early accounts such as Bentley op.cit., or D.
Truman's The Govern,nental Process: Political Process and Public Opinion, Knopf, 1951.)
However, in the case of the EU, the terms 'private interests' can also include individual
interests, e.g. of an organisation or a single person. It is therefore more suitable than the
frequently used "interest group". It is also broad enough to include any form of private, i.e. non-
state, actor, including traditional functional interests such as trade associations, pressure and
single issue groups (e.g. the pro breast feeding lobby), professional lobbyists and consultants
acting on somebody else's behalf. The situation is so complex that it is sometimes even difficult
to distinguish hcther or not 'interests' are private. For example, many regional authorities
regularly lobby EU Commission officials and politicians, both as 'private interests' but also,
nowadays, through the official channel of the Committee of Regions; a fact confirmed by many
interviewees. As seen in the previous chapter, sometimes advisors and politicians are actively
involved in policy making through public and private channels.
The term 'private interests' includes a variety of slightly differing phenomena and is thus rather
vague. However, the thesis is not the appropriate place to explore the finer distinctions between
these phenomena. This task has been carried out elsewhere at length; indeed "learned tomes
have been written concerning the distinction between interests, lobbies and pressure groups, and
political theorists have delighted in feats of verbal dexterity aimed at arriving at precise
definitions of, and pointing to precise differences between, each of them." {G. Wootton,
Interest-Groups, Prentice-Hall, 1970, quoted in Alderman op.cit., p.1). For such discussions
and the semantic disagreements between discussants, see for example, Ball op.cit.; Pross
op.cit.; S.E. Finer, Anonymous Empire, Pall Mall, 1966, revised edition; R. Kimber & J.J.
Richardson (eds.), Pressure Groups in Britain: a Reader, J.M. Dent & Sons, 1974; M.
Duverger, Party Politics and Pressure Groups, Thomas Nelson, 1972; G. Jordan & J.J.
Richardson Governing under Pressure, Martin Robertson, 1979; Cawson op.cit., 1985; AR.
Ball & F. Millard, Pressure Politics in Industrial Societies, Macmillan, 1986.
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Commission has always encouraged their participation and has been "eminently
approachable" 2 . Their growth has been exponential since the mid-1980s and Euro-
lobbying has apparently become a growth industry. 3 This chapter thus contains an
overview of interest representation in the EU which is centred around these issues.
Where appropriate, reference is made to earlier theoretical deliberations, but the
theoretical framework for the following discussion is borrowed from the field of
policy studies.
Those 'ho are included in the umbrella term of private interests have one thing in common:
they all seek to influence policy outcome in their area(s) of interest The questionnaire on the
Single European Market and the Food Industry (Appendix I), defines 'lobbying' as an activity
that seeks to influence the official political policy-making process. In accordance with that
definition, private interests therefore all lobby and, hence, are sometimes referred to as
lobbyists. This is a simple definition of lobbying, but one which was understood by
questionnaire respondents and interviewees and which is not inappropriate within the remit of
the thesis. For lengthier discussion on the definition for lobbying, see for example most the
literature referred to earlier in this paragraph or J. Nonon & M. Clanien, L'Europe et ses
couloirs: Lobbying et lobbyists, Dunod, 1991, ho adopted a simple definition of lobbying
similar to the one used in the questionnaire on the Effects of the SEM (Appendix 1).
2 0. Bickerstaffe, 'Lobbying the EEC', International Management, June 1982, pp.12-6.
References on the emergence of a growth industiy can for example be found in the Rhein-
Neckar Zeitung, Die geheime Macht', 17. Oktober 1990, S.25 or in K. Woolfson 'Lobbyists take
on Brussels', The European, 28-30 June 1991, p.22. The growth has caused widespread concern
about the legitimacy and quality of Euro-lobbying; see for example D. Buchan, 'EC Army of
Lobbyists has to Lobby for its Future', and D. Buchan, 'Strasbourg Lobbyists fight to stay on the
Outside'; both articles are found in The Financial Times, 24 January 1992, pp. 1-2. The EP was
so concerned about the growth in lobbying activities that it held a special debate, attempting to
improve the quality of lobbying and to better structure the activities of lobbyists. The idea of
registering was introduced, following the US and, much more recent, Canadian precedents.
(On this point, see M. Rush, 'Registering the Lobbyists: Lessons from Canada', Political
Studies, 42(4), Decenther 1994, pp.630-45. The debate in the EP did not get very far though,
partially because the MEPs could not approve a definition of lobbying, nor a method for
registration. (See European Parliament, 'The Galle Report on the Representation of Special
Interest Groups', Document EN/CM. 118767, PE 154.303, January 1992.) The Commission's
1992 Work Programme also expresses concern over the proliferation of Euro-lobbying. (See,
CEC, 1992 Work Programme, 1992)
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5.2.	 The Proliferation of Interest Representation in the EU
Virtually no European interest activity took place before the second World War, and
the two oldest Euro-groups, COPA and UNICE, were founded in 1958. Other
groups followed suit, for example BEUC (1963) and trade unions, although ETUC
was not founded until 1973. Recently, it has been estimated that there are well over
800 Euro-groups and up to 10,000 lobbyists involved in Euro-lobbying.5
Consequently, the growth of Euro-groups and Euro-lobbying is a consequence of
European integration and there is some evidence of spill-over pressures with regard
to their emergence 16 The role of the Commission in this process is ambiguous.
Meynaud and Sidjanski concluded that these groups emerged on their own initiative,
with very little encouragement from the Commission. 7 However, the Commission
influenced this development at least indirectly because, until the mid-70s, it reftised
to consult with any private interests that had not formed into a Euro-group. This
narrow-minded attitude reflected its early interpretation of European integration as a
On these issues, see for example Haas op.cit., 1958, 1964; Philip op.cit., 1982 and, particularly,
J. Mcynaud & D. Sidjanski, Les groupes de pression dans Ia Communauté Européenne 1958-
1968: structures et actions des organisations professionnelles, Editions de 1'Institut de
Sociologie de l'Université Libre, 1971. This is the major study on early developments in group
politics and lobbying in the EC.
For confirmation, see for example, 0. Gray, Talking to Governments: a Study Prepared for The
Coca-Cola Retailing Research Group Europe, July 1992; B. Kohier-Koch, 'Changing Patterns
of Interest Intermediation in the European Union', Government and Opposition, 29(2), 1994,
pp.166-80; RH. Pedler, 'Some Lessons from EU Lobby Cases', in Pedler, RH. & Van
Schendelen, M.P.C.M. (eds.) Lobbying the European Union: Companies, Trade Associations
and Issue Groups, Dartmouth, 1994, Ch. 15, p.309.
6 Euro-groups are transnational groups, organised at the European level, concerned with putting
their views across in an aggregated form and in respect of European policies. Euro-lobbying is
lobbying that aims to influence European policies, Treaties, institutions, etc. - even if some of
the lobbyists' activities are carried out at sub-European level.
' Meynaud & Sidjanski op.cit.
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process of homogenisation. Eventually, the Commission's attitude became untenable
because of pressures from lobbyists, and it now listens to a much wider range of
interests from all corners of the Community and beyond. 5 Nevertheless, it still
favours aggregation at the European level and continues to facilitate semi-
institutionalised positions for key Euro-groups. This point was confirmed by
numerous interviewees who mentioned that, when talking to MEPs or Commission
officials, non-Europe wide groups had to be extremely careful not to produce a
view that took only their particular national, regional, sectoral, individual or
ideological views into account. Apparently, they were more likely to be taken
seriously, if they showed that they had a European wide understanding of an issue.9
Most private interests have not ignored Commission and EP preferences on this
matter and, hence, there has been a steady growth of Euro-groups. However,
evidence suggests that the creation of such groups is almost exclusively based on
tactical considerations and that there is little evidence of a neoftinctionalist
realignment in terms of values.' 0 According to Cawson, some private interests
8 This phenomenon suggests that pressure groups can sometimes "force themselves" upon
institutional policy-makers; probably in response to new salient policy issues, public opinion,
new technical issues, internal reorganisation of previously ineffective pressure groups, etc. As
noted by Christianscn and Doding, this finding contradicts earlier comments by policy
analysts who imply that governments are in charge of selecting the pressure groups with which
they wish to consult. {L. Christiansen & K. Dowding, Pluralism or State Autonomy? The Case
of Amnesty International (British Section) the Insider/Outsider Group', Political Studies, 42(1),
March 1994, pp.15-24.) The authors refer in particular to Dalil's and Richardson and Jordan's
past comments on this issue. {RA. Dahi, 'Rethinking 'Who Governs?': New Haven Revisited',
in It Waste (ed), Community Power: Directions for Future Research, Sage, 1986, p.180 and
A.G. Jordan & LI. Richardson, Government and Pressure Groups in Britain, Oxford University
Press, 1987, p.29.)
See for example the appropriate quotes by some of the survey participants for this study in
Section 5.4 (details in footnote 37). This point is also confinned in secondaiy literature, e.g.
Gray op.cit.; 1992; Kohler-Koch op.cit.; Science & VIe Economie, 'Les dix cominandements du
lobbyiste bruxellois', no 74, juillellaoü[ 1991, pp.63-4.
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attempt to cover the purely tactical nature of their revised Euro-level structures. For
example, some firms, such as Philips, have created appropriately named letterhead
organisations so as to fake a 'genuine Euro-interest'." However, in most cases,
private interests have neither accepted, nor pretended to accept, unreserved'y the
EP's and Commission's preferred patterns of interaction. On the whole, their
organisation and strategies continue to mirror the complicated and multi-level
patterns of EU policy-making. This point is substantiated by the changes in lobbying
patterns, following the SEA. For example, henceforth, MEPs have been lobbied
much more and many more consultants and professional lobbyists have been
employed by individuals or groups who aim to influence EU policy-making.
Furthermore, many interest groups have carried out internal re-organisations and
reassessed their strategies so as to meet the changed conditions.'2
10 Even Haas was aware of the tactical nature of interest group formation but, during his early
years of research into European integration, he overestimated the potential of Euro-groups to
change values gradually, in response to the structural innovations that these groups constituted.
However, Section 5.10 of this chapter shows that, among private interests, there are certain,
very limited value changes occurring within the EU that may be provoked by structural
adjustments in response to European integration. {See Haas op.cit.; all references}. Strong
objections against any neofunctionalist interpretation with regard to Euro-lobbying can also be
found elsewhere, e.g. in W. Streeck & P. Schrnitter, From National Corporatisnt to
Transnalional Pluralism: Organized Interests in the Single European Market', Politics and
Society, 19(2), 1991, pp.133-64.
See A. Cawson, 'Interest Groups and Public Policy Making: the Case of the European
Consumer Electronics Industry' in Greenwood, J., Grote, J. & Ronit, K. (eds.) Organised
Interests and the European Conmunity, Sage, 1992, pp.99-118.
2 This point was variously confirmed during interviews, notably with the CIAA, the CEFS,
ASILEC and DTF interviewees. In a small number of cases, interviewees stated that they did
not need to have a major reorganisation, following the signature of the SEA, since they were
prepared for the changes. For example, the interviewee at CAOBISCO made this point.
References to the considerable extent of reorganisation among many groups following the
signature of the SEA can also be found in secondaiy literature such as C. Van der Straten
Waillet, 'Lobbying in the European Community', International Public Relations Review, 12(3),
1989, pp.10-6. or, J. Greenwood & K. Ronit, 'Interest Groups in the EC: Newly Emerging
Dynamics and Forms', West European Politics, 17(1), January 1994, pp.31-52.
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5.3.	 Symbiotic Policy-Making: Trading Off the Need for Expertise and
Information for Ease of Access and Widepread Consultation
In part, lobbying in Europe has become an accepted - if not universally desirable -
phenomenon because the "EC is a rather open institution" where "access is quite
straightforward" and "consultation the norm".' 3 This view was confirmed by most
interviewees and over 80% of the respondents to the survey on interest
representation in the EC. However, there were a number of qualifications. Notably,
it is easy to get access to Commission officials, MIEPs, members of ECOSOC, but
less easy to get access of permanent representatives. Moreover, it is virtually
impossible to deal with the CoM and individual ministers at the European level. The
ECJ is not open to lobbying. Apparently, it is quite easy to be listened to once, but
there will not be a repeat unless lobbyists can show that they know what they are
talking about and have something to offer to the policy drafters. The ease of access
3 These quotes are all questionnaire comments (questionnaire on 1obbying, see Appendix II); the
first one s made by Mr. Paul Gray, formally Head of the Food Division in DG ifi and now a
senior advisor to the Commission; the other comments were made by members from Brussels
based Euro-trade associations. There are many more similar questionnaire and interview
comments and sccondaiy literature confirmed beyond doubt that (initial) access to policy
drafters and MEPs 'was much easier than in most other political systems. On this point, see for
example M. Petite, 'Les lobbies européens', Pouvoirs, 48, 1989, pp.95-103 or, V. Hoffmann,
'interessenvertretungen und "Euro-Lobbying TM, unpublished synopsis of a forthcoming book on
Euro-Lobbying, 1991. (Not to be quoted else here) or Burson-Marsteller op.cit.; Lord Clinton-
Davis op.cir, Greenviod & Ronit op.cit. Although officials and MEPs are easy about receiving
lobbyists, it must be reiterated that finding the right person and presenting one's case effectively
is a difficult task! if lobbyists are not able to complete this task successfully, they are unlikely to
be received on several occasions. Furthermore, Eliassen's & Andersen's op. cit. research
demonstrated clearly that it is vezy difficult to access senior level Conunission officials and
Commissioners and survey evidence indicated that verbal interactions with officials was much
more easily achieved than insight into as yet unpublished documents. See for example, the
following questionnaire comment by a Head of Unit from DG ill in response to Question 6 of
the Questionnaire on Lobbying and the Single European Market (Appendix 11):
Q: How easy is it for lobbyists to gain access to relevant EC documentation which has not yet
been made official or which is not made official at all?
A: In general not easy. "If the subject is particularly sensitive, then impossible."
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also depends on the policy in question and the policy priorities of the formal policy-
makers.
In theory, the European Community is committed to the values of liberal
democracy,' 4 and one senior Commission official claimed that "lobbying was
intrinsically connected to citizens' right and freedom of access to information" and
that "anybody, including individuals, could get access to Commission officials and
Parliamentarians". In principle, his statement is correct but, in practice, access is not
always that easy, because of the complex nature of EU policy-making, the aloofness
of Brussels officials, the diverse resources of private interests:
"Policy-ning in the EC, with its myriad committees and incessant meetings
conducted in arcane language, remains remote from the mass public."'5
"Participation in Community decision-making is open to all, but only in the same
sense that the Brussels Hilton is also open to rich and poor alike."16
"The lobbying environment in Brussels is in some respects complex and a trifle
forbidding to ncscomcrs."'7
Nonetheless, the commitment to liberal democratic values and - in recent years - the
need to improve their image, have probably encouraged EU policy-makers to give
easier access to lobbyists. More important, the continuous systemic changes have
opened up opportunities for lobbying. According to Tyszkiewicz, the EC has
become more and more like "modelling clay" in recent years, as a result of policy
14 Judging from how little has been achieved to date to reduce the Eu's democratic deficit, this
commitment has only been upheld in practice in relation to the political systems of the
individual member states.
15 Laffanop.cit.,p.141.
16 Comment by Stephen Crampton in CECG, 'The Participation of Consumers in National and
European Community Policy-Making in the Run Up to 1992 and Thereafter', Pamphlet 89/8,
1989, p.3.
Gardner op.cit., p.39.
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expansion, greater institutional interdependence and ideological influences.'8
Apparently, private interests have been able to exploit this situation. This is not an
implausible assumption, although the subsequent discussion illustrates that the need
for information and expertise is the main reason why policy drafters grant easy
access to private interests. As Beer's ground-breaking study on British interest
groups demonstrated, expertise and information have long been the main attractions
for close relations with interest groups.' 9 However, the dependency on contributions
from experts is particularly intense in a quasi-supranational political system.
The European officials have to produce workable policies, all the more, since their
legitimacy has been based on efficiency, and not democratic considerations.2°
However, they are generalists who have little knowledge of technical detail.
Sometimes they also lack inspiration and time: "...les hommes au pouvoir manquent
d'idées nouvelles. Le temps et l'information leur font défaut." 2 ' They also need to be
accustomed to existing legislation in member states in order to be able to anticipate
the impact of new European legislation. Consequently, they require technical
expertise from people 'in the field', a fact confirmed by all interviewees and by 74
(8 8%) of the 84 questionnaire respondents. Many of these thought that "technical
18 Z.J.A. Tyszkicwicz, 'UNICE: The Voice of European Business and Industry in Brussels',
Speech given by Tyszkiewicz (Secretary General of the UNICE) to the IREC Conference, 28-30
September 1990.
19 S.H. Beer, Modern British Politics, Faber, 1965.
20 Rose noted that, in respect of any government, "effectiveness is the first concern of governors."
{R. Rose, The Nature of the Challenge', in Rose, It (ed.) Challenge to Governance: Studies in
Overloaded Politics, Sage, 1980, Ch. 1, p.7.) As Dc Somogy and Boyce noted, with regard to
the EU, the need for efficient and effective policy-making is all the more important, given its
lack of democratic legitimacy. {J. Dc Somogyi, 'Economics, Politics and Management of
Business Representation', Business Economist, winter 1983, pp.39-41; Boyce op.cit., 1993.)
21 "People in power lack new ideas, time and information". The conunent was once made by Jean
Monnet and was quoted by Tyszkicwicz. {Z.J.A. Tyszkiewicz, 'Les delis aux entreprises',
speech made at the UNICE HQ, November 1990.)
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expertise was absolutely vital" and that anybody who "doubted his/her knowledge
should take an expert along". 22 The need for technical expertise is also reflected in
the numerous working groups and committees organised by the Commission, and to
a lesser extent by the EP, where technical experts are always represented. Nugent
found that these were usually chaired and managed by Commission officials, but that
all participants were given opportunities to influence policy.23
These findings have given rise to the view that the Commission has been colonised
by technocrats and that EU policy-making amounts virtually to technocratic
government. 25 In view of the above data, the influence of technocrats on EU policy-
making cannot be denied. However, their influence alone does not determine policy
outcome, because "technical facts must still be dealt with within the political
parameters. The latter can only be overridden completely by technical expertise if
they would otherwise lead to completely unrealistic and unworkable policies". This
interpretation is substantiated by the earlier finding that Commissioners have
sometimes had technically sound policy drafts re-written by their superiors on the
grounds that they did not fit into the political agenda of the Commission.27
22 These views seem representative; see for example, Gardner op.cit.;'Mazey & Richardson
op.cit.; S.S. Andersen, 'Towards a Common EC Energy Policy', in Andersen, S.S. & Eliassen,
K.A. (eds.) Making Policy in Europe, Sage, 1993, Ch. 8.
23 Nugent op.cit., 1994.
24 See Section 5.4. for an explanation of the term 'colonisation'.
The notion that technical, non elected expertise dominates certain areas of policy-making was
for example explored within the French polity by Thoenig op.cit.
This is a short extract from an interview with a Commission official which was carried out
during the research trip to Brussels in September 1991. The official emphasised this important
point veiy much, but wanted to remain anonymous.
27 See Chapter four on the 'relative' freedom of low to middle level Conunission officials in charge
of policy drafting.
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Consequently, the claim that EU policy-making is technocratic government is an
exaggeration, although there is one noticeable exception: European standardisation.
Policy-making in this area virtually amounts to "private interest government".
Private interest government arises for two reasons: Governments can delegate
policy-making powers to private interest groups, but, if weak, they can also be
'colonised' by the latter. The case of European standardisation clearly falls into the
first category, that is to say the Commission has delegated policy-making
responsibilities to CEN/CENELEC.
European standardisation is controlled by two small, but virtually autonomous,
bodies: the European Committee for Standardisation (CEN) and the European
Committee for Electrotechnical Standardisation (CENELEC). 29 The Commission
can still request quality standards for a product, but has to formally work through
CEN/CENELEC. 3° For obvious reasons, these two bodies are lobbied but,
apparently, access is very difficult because they are private organisations, governed
by different laws and rules. 3 ' The role of CEN/CENELEC has not so far caused
The term was for example used by Grant op.cit., 1987, and, W. Streeck & P.C. Schmitter (eds.),
Private Interest Government, London: Sage, 1985.
29 Gardner op.cit., and confirmed by Dr. 0. Gray, a member of the EC Committee of the US
Chamber of Commerce, Brussels, during an interview in September 1991. For information on
CEN/CENELEC and standardisation, see for example L'ENGREF, la normalisation et
l'Europe: secleurs de l'agro-alimentaire, du bois, Ct de I'eau, Editions Romillat, 1992, or, DTI,
rIhe Single Market: Testing, Certification and Inspection', March 1991, 3rd edition, and, DTI,
'BS 5750/ ISO 9000/ EN 29000: 1987, a Positive Contribution to Better Business', November
1993. This literature points to the importance and desirability of a common standard, even if
the principle of mutual recognition has already been enshrined legally.
30 See for example the Commission's request to CEN to come up with a European safety standard
for condoms. {Foreign & Commonwealth Office, The European Commuily: Facts and
Fairyta/es Revisited, FCO Publications, June 1995.)
Gardner op. cit. Some interviewees, namely trade association officials, complained about this
point. R Monbiot OBE also mentioned that the delegated responsibilities strongly favoured
German traditions of standardisation, because the Germans had been proactive and were now
chairing 26 Out of 33 committees on standardisation! (Mr. Monbiot, who is a well established
consultant on European matters to UK businesses and MNCs, was interviewed for this policy
study in spring 1992.)
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waves among scholars of European politics, but these developments are extremely
exciting to analysts of public policy-making and probably exceedingly alarming to all
those who believe in public accountability. After all, it may be possible that the
delegation of public responsibilities to a private body is not fully reversible.32
Furthermore, the issue of standardisation is not entirely apolitical. Within nation
states it has frequently been used as a form of hidden protectionism, whereas the
elaboration of a European standard will reinforce the free market logic behind the
SEM.33
5.4.	 Capture Theory. Statism and the Breakdown of Institutional Barriers
It could be inferred from the above findings that European policy-making has been
colonised or captured by private interests. 34 Indeed, certain observers have adopted
32 Ronge produced some evidence that such a situation is feasible under certain conditions.
However, it would be unwise to make inferences, since his evidence caine from an entirely
different context. Nonetheless, his findings indicate that 'private interest government' could
alter the relationship between government and private interests beyond scenarios originally
envisaged by the government agencies. (V. Ronge, Bankpolilik im Spat kapitalismus,
Suhrkamp, 1979.) HI. Jacek, 'Business Interest Associations as Private Interest Governments',
in Grant, W. (ed.) The Dairy Industry: an International Comparison, Dartmouth Publishers,
1991, Ch. 3 supplied evidence of private interest government in some sectors of the food
industries of some European countries.
For confirmation, see for example, D. Grose, 'Food Standards as a Policy Instrument', in Burns,
I. et al. (eds.) The Food Industry: Economics and Politics, Heineman, 1983, Ch. 13, and, H.
Adam, 'normes et normalisation - de quoi s'agit-il?', in L'ENGREF op.cit., pp.11-28.
There are a number of approaches to group representation which claim that groups can come to
dominate government agencies, be it because the latter are inefficient, overloaded or politically
amenable to this phenomenon. These approaches have variously been referred to as colonisation
or capture of groups, or clientelism or pantoufiage. The latter imply more amenability on behalf
of government agents, but all concepts are cognate. (For more details, see for example M.
Atkinson & W.D. Coleman, 'Strong States and Weak States', British Journal of Political
Science, 19(1), 1989, pp.47-67.) Capture theories have been questioned by authors who believe
that government agents are in a strong position to remain autonomous. (See for example, P.
Birnbaum, 'States, Ideologies and Collective Action in Western Europe', in Kazancigil, A. (ed.)
The State in Global Perspective, Gower, 1986, pp.232-49, or, particularly, E. Nordlinger, The
Autonomy of the Democratic State, Harvard University Press, 1981, for an extensive and classic
defence of state autonomy.)
149
this view. For example, Louyot and Geoffroy reported that there were
"...innombrables lobbies qui font le siege des institutions communautaires" in
Brussels. 35 However, this would be a misleading interpretation, because official
policy-makers have developed a series of measures to prevent colonisation. Some of
these have been mentioned in the previous chapter; others include the manipulation
of timing. For example, several lobbyists, who participated in the surveys for this
study, complained that Commission officials rarely left them sufficient time to
respond adequately to drafts. The point was raised also by an astute Personal
Assistant of a German MEP, but in relation to the Commission's manipulation of the
political time-table vis-à-vis the EP. This comment underlines several other points,
too, namely the informal ways in which the Commission attempts to assert its
influence, the pressures that individual member governments and the CoM exert
upon time-tabling and the EP's almost pathetic endeavours to prove its validity as a
mature policy participant!
"Man kann natUrlich auch mit der Zeit Politik machen; zum Beispiel erleben wir es,
daB die Kommission manche Vorschlage, obwohl sic sehr wichtig sind, sehr, sehr
kurzfristig vorlegt, die dann so richtig durchs Parlament gepeitscht werden mUssen,
well bestimmte Under drangen, well der Ministerrat eine Entscheidung treffen will,
und well man sich als Parlament nicht den Vorwurf zustehen will, daB das Parlament
nun dies oder das verhindert hat, weil es nicht rechtzeitig Stellung nahm. Da gibt es
schon oft Zcitdruck und Zugzwang, dass man eigntlich sagen muB es ist schlinun,
dal3 man nicht sorgfliltiger beraten kann."36
The belief in state autonomy is usually referred to as 'statist' or 'institutionalist' and is
conceptually linked to institutionalist views of inter-state relations and of social change in
general in that it is based on assumptions of the 'power and stickiness' of established institutions
(see also Chapter three). Like classical pluralists, capture theorists emphasise the power of
private interest groups, but do not necessarily assume that many groups get to be in powerful
situations. On the contrary, there is often an assumption that a small elite of groups dominates
specific policy sectors. Such relationships have also been referred to as 'pantouflage' or
'clientelism'; for an appropriate statement on pantouflage and clientelism, see for example S.N.
Eisenstadt & L. Rongier, Patrons, Clients and Friends, Cambridge University Press, 1984.
N•• .numerous lobbies that besiege the community institutions..." A quote from A. Louyot & F.
Geoffroy, 'Le vrai pouvoir des Eurocrates', L'Express, (2150), 25 septembre 1992, pp.20-4.
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Intense pressures to produce legislation have also renewed the Commission's
preference to work with aggregated interests: "direct intervention, even by large
organisations is not always successful, particularly because the Commission prefers
aggregated opinions" or "too many cooks spoil the broth; you need aggregated
opinions."37 Yet, aggregated opinions are often not all that influential, because they
are too general; a lesson which both UNICE and CIAA have learnt. 38 The trend
towards Euro-groups also provides Commission officials with extra opportunities to
exploit inevitable divisions among private interests. 39 There is also no evidence that
lobbyist's influence the Commission in its choice of policy instruments, even though
the repercussions of a regulation are markedly different from that of a directive.40
36 Part of an interview with the Personal Assistant to a German MEP, Bonn, July 1991. "Of
course, it is possible to engage in political games by manipulating the policy time-table. For
example, the Commission sometimes produces policy drafts at veiy, very short notice, even
though they are very importani These policy drafls must then be whipped through Parliament,
because some menther states are pushing for a decision, or the CoM wants to take a decision as
soon as possible, or because Parliament does not want to be accused of delaying this or that
because it has not adopted an official opinion within the time limits set by the policy
procedures. As a result, there are significant time constraints and pressures to come to decisions
and, hence, it is lamentable that there is not more time for careful discussion."
Quotes from two different respondents to the questionnaire on Lobbying and the Single
European Mark (Appendix II). The point was also reiterated by many of the people
interviewed for this study, namely from sectoral associations, i.e. CAOBISCO, ASILEC, DTF,
but also by both interviewees from CIAA. This finding confinns the appropriate deliberations in
Section 5.2.
38 See Section 5.7 and Chapter seven for more details on the performances of UNTCE and CIAA,
as well as, more generally, W. Grant, 'Pressure Groups and the European Community: an
Overview', in Mazey, S. & Richardson, J.J. (eds.) Lobbying in the European Community,
Oxford University Press, 1993, pp.27-46.
This point was conceded by most of the interviewees referred to in footnote 37.
40 Lodge reported that, officially, the type of policy decision is made between the Commission and
its legal service but that it is influenced overtly by the wishes of the member states. She did not
mention lobbies, and neither did any other commentators referred to in the thesis; hence, the
assumption expressed in the main text that they may not influence this choice{J. Lodge, 'EC
Policy-making: Institutional Dynamics', in Lodge, J. op.cit., 1993, Ch. 1.)
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Some eight of eleven respondents to the follow-up questionnaire and several
interviewees stated that policy drafts reflected the amalgamated input of
Commission officials, MIEPs, national civil servants and private interests. 4 ' Many
survey participants also agreed that lobbyists and Commission officials needed each
other. Consequently, their relationship is symbiotic and private interests can hardly
be decried as dangerous parasites. 42 Nevertheless, the boundaries at the interface
between private and public spheres may become blurred. Nine of the eleven
respondents to the follow-up questionnaire on interest representation agreed with
this view and confirmed that small policy groups, which included a variety of actors,
tended to emerge around specific policy areas, at least during the drafting stage.43
Thus there is little evidence to support any notions of systematic colonisation by
private interests, but some evidence of the blurring of boundaries between the
private and public spheres. It must however be emphasised that this situation usually
takes place away from the CoM and its immediate staff who tend to be aloof and
very difficult to access. 44 All 84 questionnaire respondents substantiated this
allegation. Hence, there is no blurring of boundaries at the decision-making stages
where the representatives of national interests continue to play a distinct role. This
41 For details on the follow-up questionnaire to the questionnaire on lobbying and interest
representation, designed for this study, see Appendix IL Interviewees from various walks of life
held this view, e.g. several of the representatives from national trade associations emphasised
the point, as well as Brussels based lobbyists and bureaucrats.
42 Elsewhere, the interaction has been labelled aptly TM une subtile dialectique", i.e. a subtle
dialectic process. {LeMonde, 'Vive le lobbying', l8juin 1991, p.27.}
Chapter six contains a discussion on the search for an appropriate conceptual framework for
this finding and Chapter seven and the remainder of tius chapter contain more empirical
evidence of the phenomenon.
This point was for example confirmed by a UK civil servant in the Pennanent Representation.
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finding lends some weight to intergovernmentalist interpretations of the EU.
However, it must be borne in mind, that national autonomy is increasingly
compromised by the EP and QMV, at least in some areas. Moreover, national policy
actors have been exposed to a mixture of pressures at member state level and their
policy stance may have been mediated by these. 45 Finally and despite the secrecy of
the CoM, it is evident that ministers frequently trade off national interests in
complex series of 'package deal voting'. 46 Indeed, a source close to ministers let slip
that, in the CoM, "there was a lot of horse trading at five past midnight". Whatever
concerns that remark might conjure up, it seems that such deals are accepted, for, as
one MEP put it (in 1992): "With twelve starting points a trade off is essential."47
5.5.	 The EU: a Pluralist Heaven?
The answer to this question depends on what is meant by 'pluralism'! The EU can be
described as 'pluralist', if the term describes a commitment to a variety of
institutional and non-institutional actors, freedom of speech and association, access
to information and policy-makers. However, it would be indefensible to associate
the EU with fully blown pluralist state theory, as developed early in the 20th Century
by English thinkers such as Figgis or Laski. They did not analyse political systems,
but produced normative state models, based "on a complex vision which tries to
' This view is substantiated elsewhere, e.g. by Bulmer op.cit., 1982, George op.cit., 1991, Laifan
op.cit., 1992 and Lodge op.cit., 1993, Ch. 1.
46 See subsequent sections and chapters, as well as, e.g. the famous "Sheepmeat Trade oil",
referred to in Mazey & Richardson op.cit., 1993, or the final "complex package of measures"
that brought the Community's banana drama to an end. See, e.g. RH. Pedler, 'The Fruit
Companies and the Banana Trade Regime (BTR)', in Pedler, R.FL & Van Schendelen,
M.P.C.M. (eds.) Lobbying the European Union, Dartmouth, 1994, Ch.3, p.81.)
The first quote comes from a person who volunteered to be interviewed at length for this study
but who insisted that, with regard to this comment, anonymity must be maintained. This person
has worked closely with European and national politicians and civil servants for several
decades. The second quote is from a questionnaire respondent.
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incorporate maximal diversity of group life within an over-arching authority."48
These were neither well known, nor clearly developed, partially because of the
thinkers' approval of pragmatism, and fear of any form of authority that could
undermine the freedom of groups. However, the rejection of centralism,
interventionism, bureaucracy as well as, at the other end of the spectrum,
individualism, indicates that they are inadequate even as an analytical tool with
regard to the EU.
Path-breaking works such as The Process of Government. The Group Basis of
Politics or Who Governs? ensured that the notion of pluralism became increasingly
associated with the role of interest groups in the policy process. 49 This development
seems most relevant to the current discussions, even though early conceptualisations
of pluralism have since been widely criticised, either because they have not been
differentiated or because they have been based on normative assumptions. 50 For
example, early pluralists thought that the conflict between groups ensured equal
opportunities, with regard to access and influence potential. They also paid little
attention to the internal constellations of groups, to relationships between groups
and, worst of all, they treated government agencies as if they had no identity of their
own.
48 Vincent op.cit. p. 215.
A.F. Bentley op.cit.; E. Latham, 'The Group Basis of Politics: Notes for a Theoiy', American
Political Science Review, 46(2), June 1952, pp.376-97; DahI op.cit., 1961.
50 For appropriate critiques, see for example, M. Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public
Goods and the Theory of Groups, Haivard University Press, 1965; G.D. Garson, Group
Theories of Politics, Sage, 1979; C. Ham & M. Hill, The Policy Process in the Modem
Capitalist State, Harvester Wheatsheaf 1984; S.M. McLaughlin & P.A. Sabatier, 'Belief
Congruence Between Interest Group Leaders and Members: an Empirical Analysis of Three
Theories and a Suggested Synthesis', Journal of Politics, 52(3), August 1990, pp.914-35.
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The critiques also brought forth a number of reconceptualisations and refinements.
Virtually all observers came to accept that competition among groups was
incomplete, even though they did not agree on the exact nature of preferences. For
example, neo-Marxist conceptualisations emerged, arguing that "incomplete
competition" was based on class cleavages. 5 ' Others discovered elitist oligopolies,
based on different societal cleavages, e.g. technocratic expertise, legal expertise, a
plurality of elites that vary from system to system, and intent on preserving their
privileged position. 52 In 1977 Lindblom rekindled the argument that economic and
industrial interests were innately advantaged in a capitalist society, but from a non-
Marxist point of view.53 Basically, he argued that "business and businessmen are
accorded a place of peculiar privilege within society" because "government cannot,
for ideological reasons, systematically transgress market logic." 54 Lindblom's
arguments have sometimes been termed neo-pluralist and this is the expression used
here. 55 It has already been established that the EU cannot be understood from a one-
dimensional economic point of view. However, Lindblom's argument needs to be
The term was coined by R. Miliband, The State in Capitalist Society: an Analysis of the
Western Syste,n of Power, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1969.
52 See for example, Garson op.cit. or, B.. Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict in Industrial
Society, Roulledge and Kegan Paul, 1959, or, T.J. Lowi, The End of Liberalism, Norton
Publishers, 1979, 2nd edition. Lowi argued that elites tried to create a superficial picture of
pluralism so as to safeguard their oligopolies beneath a surface of imagined equality.
McFarland agreed with this view and also pointed out that oligopolies endeavoured to adhere to
consensual policy-making so as to prevent challenges to their oligopolies. Pross made the same
point. {A.S. McFarland, 'Interest Groups and Theories of Power in America', British Journal of
Political Science, 17(2), 1987, pp. I29-47; Pross op. cit. }
C.E. Lindblom, Politics and Markets, Basic Books, 1977.
S. Wilks & M. Wright (eds.) C'omparative Government-Indust,y Relations: Western Europe,
the United States and Japan, Clarendon, 1987, p.292 writing about Lindblom and broadly
approving of his view.
See particularly M.J. Smith, 'Pluralism, Reformed Pluralism and Nec-pluralism: the Role of
Pressure Groups in Policy-Making', Political Studies, 38, 1990, pp.302-22.
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considered because some commentators maintain that "the European Community is
made for big business".56
Some pluralists accepted the concept of "incomplete competition", but rejected the
idea of durable oligopolies, and emphasised the diversity and extent of interest group
politics57 Regrettably, these "reformed pluralists" also failed to discuss adequately
the relationship between informal and formal policy-makers. 58 Hence, the notion of
"incomplete competition" is not suited for in-depth analysis, but it may explain
partially EU policy-making, given the comparative ease with which lobbyists can
access EU officials and politicians.
In the context of the EU, it is also necessary to examine the concept of neo-
corporatism. 59 This particular interpretation of group relations has evolved from the
56 This comment was made by a Brussels based consu1tant/layer, but has been voiced elsewhere,
too, e.g. by the British Labour MPs Tony Benn and Peter Shore and in S. Bowler, 'Government-
Business Bargaining and the Impact of EC Institutions: the Lindblom Problem', Political
Studies, 36, 1986, pp.524-32.
This view was particularly widespread in the USA because lobbying has always been extensive
there. Despite his famous essay entitled Pluralism Revisited, Dali! must for example be counted
among the 'reformist pluralists' {R.A. Dali, Pluralism Revisited', in Ehrlich & Wootton op.cit.,
Ch. 2}.The pre-eminence of this concept in US literature on group politics is also noticeable in
more recent works, e.g. T.F. Eagleton, Issues in Business and Government, Prentice Hall, 1991,
especially Ch. 1.
58 Re-interpretations of pluralism have been given many labels. Reformed Pluralism is a term used
by M. Smith in his discussion on the evolution of pluralism; Smith op.cit., see also footnote 55;
Smith's term is adopted in the thesis.
This is also the view of Greenwood & Ronit op.cit. The term neo-corporatism is used here so as
to avoid any confusion with the state corporatisni that formed part of Italian Fascism. Neo-
corporatism is sometimes referred to also as societal corporatism and sometimes simply as
corporatism, or even as corporate pluralism. See for example, K. Von Beyine, 'Neo-
Corporatism: a New Nut in an Old Shell?, International Political Science Review, 4(2), 1983,
pp. 173-95
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pluralist debate but maintains that, in Societies where social cleavages are low, high
levels of aggregation lead to policy being made by small clusters of relevant groups
and state agencies who co-operate so as to produce widely acceptable policies. On
the whole, policy actors are thought to adopt a consensual policy style which makes
for efficient policy-making. Many scholars of neo-corporatism do not just describe
this phenomenon but appear to approve of it, too. Hence, in their view "the best
policy was one that gained agreement." 6° Usually, interest groups that are part of the
policy cluster are semi-institutionalised, enjoying an automatic right to consultation,
although state-group relationships ultimately remain optional and groups cannot rely
entirely on their privileged positions. 61 It is assumed that such developed structures
of interaction will yield greater political power than more contingent arrangements.62
Classical neo-corporatism has been applied at the macro-level and, mainly, to the
tripartite policy clusters between agents of the state, employers' representatives and
trade unions. Yet, in the meantime, a wide variety of meso- and micro-level studies
It is conceptually closely related, but slightly different from Rokkan and Heisler's notion of
'corporate pluralism' which is more closely related to reformed pluralism, at least where the
latter refers to constellations that are heavily institutionalised and characterised by a relatively
small number of policy actors. The expression 'corporate pluralism' is not used in this thesis,
since it is not possible to satisfactorily differentiate between reformed and corporate pluralism
on the one hand and corporate pluralism and neo-pluralism, when applied in general tenns, on
the other hand. This brief excursion into the semantics of group politics demonstrates the
confusion over expressions and the tendency to invent and re-invent new terms for old concepts.
Regrettably, this tendency weakens the debate. For a statement on 'corporate pluralism', see for
example MO. Heisler, 'Corporate Pluralism Revisited: Where is the Theoiy?, Scandinavian
Political Studies, 2(3), 1979, pp.277-87.
60 Jordan & Richardson op.cit. 1979, p.22.
61 A point confirmed for example by B. Keller, 'Interessenorganisation und Interessenvermittlung',
Kolner ZeitschrjJI far Soziologie und Soziale Psychologie, 42(3), 1990, pp.502-24, or, by Bull
op. cit.
62 Streeck & Schmitter op.cit., 1985. Coleman found this assumption to be true in respect of
Banking Interests in Germany. {W.D. Coleman, 'Banking Interest Intermediation and Political
Power', European Journal of Political Research, 26(1), 1994, pp.3 1-58. J
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have emerged, all centred around the notion of neo-corporatism. Consequently, neo-
corporatism may have some bearing on EU policy-making, even though the latter
can hardly be described as a system with few societal cleavages.
Whatever the shortcomings of the various aspects of pluralist debate, they promise
to cast some light on the data on EU policy-making presented so far. However, it is
necessary to answer three more questions, before a thorough evaluation can be
made. How uneven is access in reality? Do economic and industrial interests occupy
a very special position? How much can interest groups influence policy outcome?
5.6.	 Access. Insiders and Outsiders
Some means of getting privileged access have already been discussed: technical
expertise, good knowledge of the system and presentation of aggregated Euro-
opinions. However, according to the survey data collected for this study, the matter
is far more complex. For example, Table 2, which is based on data gathered from the
first stage of field research for this study, demonstrates that newcomers, lacking
personal contacts, may be disadvantaged, at least if they cannot offer high levels of
expertise.
Interviews and other surveys confirmed that lobbying was "also about who you
know" and that it "depends much on personal relations. Sometimes, these relations
decried the idea of preferentialism based on personal contacts; instead they tended to
stress the importance of expertise and lobbying skills.
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Table 2
Questionnaire: Lobbying and the Single European Marketi
Question 8: How important are personal contacts with EC officials
as far as lobbying is concerned?
Very important	 43
Quite important	 16
Important for access, but not with regard to influencing policy 	 2
Important, but less important than technical know how/information 13
Not important
	
2
I Don't know
	
3
I No answer
	
5
I Total valid answers
	
84
(51.5%)
(19%)
(2.5%)
(15.5 %)
(2%)
(3.5 %0
(6%)
(100%)
Table 3, which is also based on data from the second mall survey carried out for this
study (Appendix II), suggests that, beneath the surface, national preferences may
also influence access patterns and lobbying outcome. Interview comments and
secondary literature substantiate this view: "Dear me, what an ignoble thought.
[YES!!] Numerous cases can be cited."63
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According to an MEP's comment, access is also extremely difficult in some sensitive
policy areas: "Food, environmental legislation - fairly open; thermonuclear fusion
research programme - very arcane - very expensive - completely closed." Another
MEP complained that it was extremely difficult to have a say in foreign policy
issues, even for MEPs, let alone for private interests. In some policy areas, access is
heavily distorted by political priorities and established routines. Agricultural policy is
the classical example and deserves special attention. These findings are confirmed by
the research carried out for this study, especially as far as the comments on food and
agricultural policy-making are confirmed.M
63 Questionnaire comment from an EC official; unfortunately he/she did not cite any of these
cases! A number of respondents and interviewees made similar comments and a couple said
that the division was more noticeable between the Northern and Southern parts of the EU than
between individual countries. Interestingly, one participant claimed that overzealous officials
occasionally discriminated against nationals, in an effort to ensure that the "European"
principle was not undermined. It seems however, that this is a rare exception. The figures in
Table 3 and the comments relate to European officials only, and not to civil servants in the
Permanent Representations; these blatantly favour national lobbies, since this is part of their
script. Views on MEPs are varied, but there is a sense that some of them favour national lobbies
andlor particular interests. Although these allegations are largely subjective and should not be
overrated, the data is substantiated by secondary literature; see e.g. M. Burrell, 'Key to Unlock a
Lobby Door', Kangaroo News, April 1991, p.6 (with reference to Commission officials); The
Economist, 'Uncivil War in the European Conununity', 326(7796), 30 January 1993, p.43 (with
reference to 'nationalism' and related preferences among Commissioner); R. Watson, 'MEPs
Army of Helpers maintain their Secrecy', The European, 10-16 February 1995, p.1. (with
reference to national/specific preferences among a small number of MEPs and their staff).
However, there is also evidence that the EU's supranational institutions are increasingly able to
lessen the cultural impact of national socialisation. For example, the Burson-Marsteller study
found considerable evidence of 'Europeanist idealism' among Commission officials. (Burson-
Marsteller op.cit.). Progress to overcome national divisions among MEPs has been particularly
marked, although not entirely successful. This progress is symbolised by the EP's structure
which is now based on grouping along party, and not national, lines. On this issue, see for
example, S. Hi; 'The Emerging EC Party System? The European Party Federations in the
Intergovernmental Conference', Politics, 13(2), 1993, pp.38-46, or, Boyce op.cif., 1995.
64 Agricultural policy-making is discussed briefly in the remainder of this Section (5.6) and food
policy-making is examined in Chapter seven.
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Table 3
Questionnaire: Lobbying and the Single European Market
Question 9: Does nationaitv play a role in the outcome of lobbying activities
with EC institutions?
I Nationality matters quite a lot
Nationality matters only marginally
Nationality matters only as far as language is concerned
I Nationality does nt matter
IDon't know
INo answer
I Total valid answers
	
20
	
(24 %)
	
26
	
(31%)
	
17
	
(20.5 %)
	
14
	
(16.5%)
	
4
	
(4.5%)
	
3
	
(3.5%)
	
84
	
(100%)
For decades a small cluster of officials, politicians and private interests have worked
together to set up and manage the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). This
situation arose because of the central position of the CAP in the early stages of
integration, and the convergence of key interests among the most influential policy-
makers which are the national farming lobbies, national governments, Euro-level
farming lobbies (especially COPA/COGEGA) and staff in DG VI which is
responsible for the CAP. 65 Before direct elections broadened the political spectrum
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in the EP, the latter generally supported these interests, too. Driven by political
considerations, these policy-makers have produced one of the most absurd policies
in modern times. 67 The consequences have been dire: overproduction and market
distortion, excessive cost, fraud, inequality regarding subsidies, ridicule and outrage,
both inside and outside the EU.68
Many of the studies on the CAP infer that the close interaction among these policy-
makers leads to a break-down of the boundaries between the private and public
65 For detailed discussions on the nature of the CAP and its consequences on EU policy-making
and integration, see for example, J. Pearce, The Common Agricultural Policy, Routledge and
Kegan, 1981; G. Schmitt, 'Agricultural Policy Decisions in the EC: Consequences of
Institutional Imbalance', Food Policy, November 1986, pp.334-44; J. Burtin, The Common
Agricultural Policy and its Reform, Periodical 1/1987, Publications of the European
Communities, 1987, 4th edition; C. Maier, Agrarpolitik, Publikation der Bundeszentrale flit
politische Bildung, 1989. Most standard textbooks on the EU and policy-making also contain a
summary of the CAP; Nugent's (op.cit., 1994) chapter is particularly valuable.
See for example J. Pinder, European Community: the Building of a Union, Oxford University
Press, 1991, p.89.
67 See for example, J. Tarrant, 'A Review of International Food Trade', Progress in Human
Geography, 9(2), 1985, pp.235-54; C. Hendriks, 'The Politics of Food', Food Policy, Februaiy
1987, pp.35-45; Hendriks op.cit.; The Economist, 'Grotesque: a Survey of Agriculture',
325(7789), 12 December 1992, special survey inset, following p.74; F. Butler, 'The EC's
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP)', in Lodge, I. (ed.) op.cit., 1993, Ch. 6.
68 See earlier comments in Chapter four on cost and fraud. For the other issues, see for example,
The Economist, 'Europe's Farm Subsidies: Milking the Sacred Cod, 3 11(7627), 2 December
1989, pp.109-10; The Economist, 'Europe's latest Farming Muddle', 318(7695), 23 February
1991, pp.14-5; J. Moal, 'The Food Markets of the Future', Paper delivered to CEPS business
policy seminar no. 41, Brussels, 18 February 1992. Another commentator, G. Stevenson, is
particularly outraged about the inequality that the CAP has actually caused among farmers,
despite its ambitions to be fair to all farmers. He claimed that about three quarters of the CAP
budget went to the largest 20% of the farmers, exporters and agribusiness interests. He also
rightly deplored that the CAP had done very little to protect farm workers. (G. Stevenson, The
Food Magazine, January-March 1991, pp.20-i. }
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sphere. 69 In some instances, a 'quasi private interest government' by delegation has
evolved. For example, Article 7(1)(e) of Regulation (EEC) No 1696/7 1 enables
producer groups to manage the production aid scheme for hops. Article 15 of
Regulation (EEC) No 103 5/72 allows fruit and vegetable producer groups to
withdraw produce from the marketing channels and make reimbursements, if they
perceive there to be a crisis on the market. 7° However, interaction varies across the
CAP and, in some areas, producers play a lesser role. For example, Dc Koening
noted that DG VI had not even consulted producers when it formulated a directive
for pesticide. 7 ' Recently, the Agricultural Commissioner boldly rejected COPA's
conclusion that proposed GAIT provisions were incompatible with the CAP reform.
He argued that COPA's forecasts were erroneous and unacceptable. 72 In view of
such evidence, most close observers of the CAP concluded that, when it counted,
"DG VI remained autonomous [in relation to private interests]". 73 Hence,
69 See for example, CECG, 'Information Paper on Decision-Making under the Single European
Act', Pamphlet 89/12, 1989; 0. Gray, Pressure Groups and their Influence on the Common
Agricultural Policy and its Reform in the European Community, unpublished PhD thesis,
University of Bath, June 1990; T.T. Nielsen, 'Aspects of the EEC Influence of European Groups
in the Decision-making Processes: the Common Agricultural Policy', Government and
Opposition, 6, 1971, pp.539-58; Mazey and Richardson op.cit., 1992; D. Watts, Lobbying
Europe', Talking Politics, 5(2), 1993, pp.1 15-20.
70 CEC, SEC (90)562 final, Brussels 26 October 1990.
71 M. De Koning, 'Taking Care of Business', European Affairs, 1991, pp.29-31.
72 CEC, The Week in Europe: GAU and CAP, WE/14/93.
Gray op.cit., 1990, p.540; see also, De Koning op.cit.; Hendriks op.cit. (both references),
Harrop op. cit.; A few of the German professionals interviewed for this study in Bonn during
summer 1991 stated that the "German Bauernverband" had more influence sith the Gennan
Ministry for Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry than the producer lobbies at European level
with DG VI. In the case of France, farmer lobbies are very influential, partially because of their
high profile and continued public support. {See e.g. J-Y. Capul & D. Meurs, Les grandes
questions de l'écono,nie française, Nathan, 1988, Ch. 1: Agriculture; G.P. Malpel, 'Les
agriculteurs francais face an marché unique', in L'ENGREF Le marché unique européen,
Editions Romillat, 1991, pp.268-71; Le Quotidien de Paris, 'Agriculture: l'Europe victime du
GATF...et de Ia Commission', 19 mars 1992, p.11.)
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Commission officials are not captured by the producers, nor have the boundaries
between the private and public spheres been permanently blurred. This finding
supports earlier comments on the Commission's ability to safeguard its autonomy.
The EEC Treaty states that the management of the CAP shall "...exclude any
discrimination between producers or consumers within the Community." 74 Yet,
producers have held traditionally 50% or more of the seats, available to private
interests, on the many agricultural committees and working groups. 75 Processors,
retailers and consumers have found it very difficult to make their voices heard and
many other private interests, such environmental groups, animal welfare groups,
have found access difficult, especially initially. It is feasible to describe this situation
as loosely neo-corporatist, however the newer concept of'policy community' may be
more appropriate, since it has none of the macro-connotations attributed to neo-
corporatism, but describes closely knit policy clusters.76
According to Smith, British farmers have also had very privileged relationships with MAFF, at
least until relatively recently. {M. Smith, 'From Policy Community to Issue Network:
Salmonella in Eggs and the New Politics of Food', Public Administration, 69(2), 1991, pp.302-
22.) A similar view was expressed by A. Charlesworth, N. Collins & I. Bradbury, 'Agricultural
Partner Under Pressure', Politics, 10(1), 1990, pp.3-S. Harrop op.cit., p.95, noted that the
situation was no different in "...the smaller countries with fewer fanners...".
The findings referred to in this footnote (73) indirectly support the claim that DG VI is not
captured entirely by the European farming interests.
EEC Treaty op.cit., Art. 40(3).
See for example, J. Pearce, 'The Common Agricultural Policy: The Accumulation of Special
Interests', in Wallace, H. et al. op.cit., Ch. 5; CECG, 'The Participation of Consumers in
National and European Community Policy-Making in the Run up to 1992, and Thereafter',
Pamphlet 89/8, 1989; CECG, 'EC Agriculture and the Environment', Pamphlet 90/20 Draft,
1990. The point was also made by interviewees and questionnaire respondents participating in
this study, including Stephen Crompton from CECG and all interviewees connected with the
potato processing industry.
There is a hierarchy among producer groups too, with COPA/COGEGA being by far the most
influential producer Euro-groups. Compared to these two organisations, many small producer
groups have been disadvantaged. {See e.g. Stevenson op.cit.; also interviews carried out for this
thesis.) This point is however often overlooked because COPA/COGEGA has, at least until
recently, represented the bulk of farmers' interests. { See Nugent op. cit., 1994).
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The close agricultural policy community has recently come under strain because the
policy context for European agricultural policy-making has changed. Budgetary
restrains have become ever more urgent and "...quotas and monetary compensatory
amounts are obstacles to the 1992 programme." 77 Consequently, the "CAP
protection for farmers has gradually cracked open; like other repressive regimes, in
the end, they are toppled." 78 Notably, the food processors have organised
themselves much better and demanded more say in agricultural policy, since they are
the producers' largest customers (7O%). 9 Food retailers too are actively seeking a
voice in agricultural policy-making, 80 and the consumers and environmentalists have
been able to gain insider status. 8 ' Challenges have also come from within the
76 See e.g. Smith op.cit. 1990; Mazey and Richardson op.cit, Parliamentary Affairs..., 1992; The
concept of policy communities is discussed in Chapter six and, in relation to EU food policy-
making, in Chapter seven.
M. Evanson, 'Milk and Milk Products: Implications of 1992 for the UK Daiiy Sector', Food
Policy, April 1990, p. 132.
78 This comment was made by Mr. Evanson of DTF, UK, (see footnote 77) during an interview
that he granted to the author of this policy study and which was carried out in London at the
DTF HQ during autumn 1992.
'9 This point has been made several times during interviews for this study but has also been
confirmed widely elsewhere, e.g. in Eurofood, 'CAP Reform According to Mac Shariy',
Februaiy 1991, p.2; by the UK Food and Drink Federation in FDF, 'The Development and
Future of the CAP', Commission Proposals, Com(91) 258 Final), Briefing Paper 694.hw., 1991
and by its French equivalent, Association Nationale des Industries Agro-Alimentaires (ANTA)
during an interview with one of ANIA's senior staff in Paris at ANTA's HQ during winter 1992.
Finally, Burtin op.cit., p.7!, noted that "...it is clear that the future of Community agriculture is
now largely in the hands of its main customer, the processing industiy."
80 A view expressed by various interviewees who participated in this study, namely from DV
Zuckerverein, REWE, private businesses, including the export director of Ritter Schokolade.
Similar views have been expressed elsewhere, e.g. in B. De Vroom, 'The Food Industiy and
Quality Regulation', in Grant, W. (ed.) The Dairy Industry: an International Comparison,
Dartmouth Publishers, 1991, Ch. 10, or, G. Stahr Ct al., CMA-Betroffenheitsanalyse EG-
Binnen,narkt 1992, Publikation der Centralen Marketinggesellschaft der Deutschen
AgrarwirtschalI MBH, 1991, Kpt. 10.
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Commission itself notably from DG III which objects to the dirigiste undertones in
DG VI, from DG XI (Environmental Directorate) and the Conimission's Consumer
Service. 82 These transformations mirror primarily a changing political climate, but,
with regard to some interest organisations, they are also the result of improved
structures, strategies and lobbying tactics. 83 However, as noticed earlier, these are
themselves largely manifestations of the changing policy context. Most of all, they
are symptomatic of the politicians' recognition that the CAP must be reformed so as
to ensure the survival of the EU. Yet, compared to the traditional interests these
lobbies still play a relatively minor role when it counts, as for example during the
negotiations that led to the CAP Reform of 1992.M Consequently, there is still a
81 For confirmation of this point, see for example, W.R. Sheate & RB. Macrory, 'Agriculture and
the EC Environmental Assessment Directive: Lessons for Community Policy-Making', Journal
of Common Market Studies, 28(1), 1989, pp.68-81; B. Delpeuch, Pratiques agricoles et
Environment', in L'ENGREF op.cit., pp. 160-7. Also, CECG op.cit., 1989 and 1990; CECG,
'Consumers in the European Community: Annual Report, 1990. For two succinct accounts of
the development of environmental policy in the EC, see for example P.M. Hildebrand, 'The
European Conununity's Environmental Policy, 1957 to 1992: From Incidental Measures to an
International Regime?, Environmental Politics, 1(4), winter 1992, pp.13-43; J. van der
Straaten, 'A Sound European Enviromnental Policy: Challenges, Possibilities, Barriers',
Environmental Politics, 1(4), winter 1992, pp.66-83. The material by CECG used in this study
contains, among other issues, useful basic synopses on the EU's consumer policy.
82 This point too was raised by many participants in this study. With regard to secondaiy
literature, the point has been confirmed for example by D. Vogel, 'The Making of EC
Environmental Policy', in Andersen & Eliassen op.cit., 1993, Ch. 7, p.121.
83 For example, some environmental lobbies have re-organised themselves and/or refined their
lobbying techniques; see notably some of the references made to the EEB in S. Mazey & J.
Richardson, 'Environmental Groups and the EC: Challenges and Opportunities', Environmental
Politics, 1(4), winter 1992, pp.109-28.
84 In its historical context, the CAP Reform of 1992 is radical, but it has not been able to break
entirely with the tradition of using artificial pricing to control markets and subsidise fanners.
The failure to break radically with the past reflects the continued dominance of a small
producer dominated policy communities, both at the national and European levels. This view is
supported by CECG op. cit., 1990; CECG, 'The Future of the Common Agricultural Policy',
Pamphlet, September 1991; CECG, 'CAP: Farm Price Proposals 1993/94', CECG Pamphlet
93/13/AD, 1993; J. Palmer & J. Wolf, 'Farm Pact Makes a Slow Start to a New-Look EC', The
Guardian, 22 May 1992, p.8; Food and Drink Federation, 'CAP Reform: Where Now?',
Briefing Paper 1338E.HW, 1993.
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clear hierarchy in this policy area, even if access is becoming easier for all private
interests. This claim is confirmed by Nugent who found that ".some of the more
respectable of these 'oppositional' agricultural groups have their foot in the
Community door, but none has quite entered the room." 85 Nonetheless, at least
superficially, agricultural policy-making in the EU is now a little more 'pluralistic',
but farmers are bound to remain in a special position, because "UEurope veut Ct doit
bouffer. Donc, s'il y avait un écroulement des agriculteurs ça serait terrible."
Several lessons can be learnt from the above deliberations with regard to the access
issue. Firstly, a number of factors mediate access and, consequently, exchange
patterns are varied, depending on the policy in question. The CAP is an example of
institutionalised policy-making that favours a small group of interests who aim to
preserve the status quo. On the other hand, there are areas of policy making which
are reminiscent of ". . . an American-style pattern of 'disjointed pluralism", such as
lobbying for regional fUnds (in recent years) or environmental policy-making.8l
Not surprisingly, the Commission has emphasised the benefits that have so far arisen from the
CAP Reform, e.g. a less costly agrimonetary regime and a fall in cereal stock. {See CEC, 'The
Week in Europe: New Agrimonetaiy Regime', WEJ4/95; CEC, 'The Week in Europe: CAP
Reform Cuts Stocks', WE/26/94.} For a factual overview of the CAP Reform, see for example,
Dossiers de La Politique Agricole, La Rdforme de Ia P.A.C., décembre 1990.
85 Nugent op.cit., 1994, p.367.
86 Interview comment from a middle-ranking civil servant in the French Department of
Agriculture who participated in the French interview round for the present study, carried out
during winter 1992. The continued preoccupation with adequate food supply and, subsequently,
the special position attributed to food stuffs by politicians is discussed more extensively and
convincingly in I.M. Sturgess, 'Sell-Sufficiency and Food Security in the UK and EC
Presidential Address', Journal ofAgricultural Economics, 43(3), September 1992, pp.311-26.
87 Originally, lobbying in the area of regional policy had not been veiy widespread, since there
was little scope, given that the emerging 'regional policy' was little more than a regional fund,
dominated by intergovernmental bargaining. On this point, see A.B. Philip, Pressure Groups
and Policy Formation in the European Communities', Policy and Politics, 10(4), 1982, pp.459-
75.) Following the structural reform of Community funds introduced by the SEA and the
virtual doubling of regional funds during the past decade, this situation has changed radically
and there is now intense lobbying over regional policy, both in Brussels and, later, within the
regions that were given funds, in the form of bids for parts of these funds.
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Andersen and Eliassen see a correlation between newly developing policy areas and
more 'pluralistic' patterns of policy-making and between institutionalised policy
sectors and more corporate-type policy-making. 88 There is some truth in this
argument, but it oversimplifies the situation. For example, food colouring is an
established area, but is increasingly 'pluralistic' (see Chapter seven) and, to a much
lesser extent, the same is true for the CAP. There are also policy areas that have
been developed relatively recently, but are not subject to lobbying by numerous
private interests. 89 Policy patterns thus tend to become institutionalised, but
hierarchies and monopolies are clearly not cast in stone, and there is scope for policy
change, albeit at a leisurely pace. Therefore, the status of private interests is not
static and outsiders can become insiders and vice versa. As a result, there is no
scope for complacency on the part of private interests. Furthermore, these findings
indicate that policy patterns and outcome can never be predicted with absolute
certainty and that simplistic assumptions about cause-effect relationships between
Both phenomena were described by several of the interviewees who participated in this study
and are also discussed in secondary literature, such as A. Buzelay & A. Hannequart,
Problemalique regionale et cohesion dans Ia Communauté européenne, Editions Economica,
1994; A. Devailly, 'Les rdgions développent une stratdgie communautaire', Espace Social
Européen, 31 janvier 1992; G. Marks, 'Structural Policy in the European Community', in
Sbragia op.cit., Ch. 6, p.214. For an easily accessible synopsis on regional policy development,
see for example, I. Kellas, 'European Integration and the Regions', Parliamentary Affairs,
44(2), April 1991, pp.226-39. For a detailed account of the Structural Reform and its
implications, see for example, D. Ethier, 'The Reform of the European Community's Structural
Funds: from the Single Act to Maastricht and Aller', International Review of Administrative
Sciences, 59, 1993, pp.195-211. With regard to environmental policy, see for example Streeck
& Schmitter op.cit., 1991; Mazey & Richardson op.cit. Environmental Politics...; Vogel op.cit.
88 S.S. Andersen & K.A. Eliassen, 'European Community Lobbying', European Journal of
Political Research, 20(2), 1991, pp. I73-87; S.S Andersen & K.A. Eliassen, 'Complex Policy-
Making: Lobbying the EC', in Andersen & Eliassen op.cit., 1993, Ch. 3; Hildebrand op.cit.
makes a similar point but is, appropriately, more cautious about expressing a possible cause-
effect relationship between institutionalisation and the structure of policy-making.
89 Andersen & Eliassen op.cit., 1993, make that point themselves, albeit indirectly. They mention
financial services as a sector that has not yet been institutionalised, but that is nonetheless
difficult to lobby, mainly because of the high level of technical expertise required to become an
insider. Research and Technology is another example that fits here. According to a
questionnaire respondent (MEP), it is characterised by a small 'policy community' that works
closely together.
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systemic features, such as institutionalisation, and policy-making structures are
misleading. This insight confirms reservations on such simplistic assumptions
expressed earlier in the thesis.
5.7.	 Neo-Plurplism
With regard to the CAP, industry has not so far been dominant. However, in many
respects, this intensely dirigiste policy sector remains one of the most difficult to
penetrate for business interests and is not representative of their overall input in EU
policy-making. With the exception of the CAP, business interests are thought to be
influential in most policy areas as well as with regard to the overall design of the EU.
For example, a journalist commented that European "integration was business
driven, not politically driven, though politicians will rarely admit that. "° The former
Belgian foreign minister, Martin Eyskens, believes that the "European Union will be
built by our industrialists." 9 ' Burson-Marstelle?s survey on lobbying behaviour
concluded that "private industry is really the best at lobbying." 92 Following
Lindblom's logic, Streeck and Schmitter described the single European market as an
alliance between large business and state elites.93
More qualified views usually point out that only the "big boys" 94 are very influential
in Brussels, as well as at national level. In particular, the influence of the 'Round
9° D. Morgan, 'European Integration and National Elites: British Media and the Triumph of
Federalism?', Telematics and Inform atics, 8(3), 1992, p.198.
91 Martin Eyskens, quoted in B. Tigner, Whe Politics of Business', International Management,
November 1990, p.34
92 Burson-Marsteller op.cit., p.14.
3 Streeck & Schrnitter op. cit, 1991.
4 Expression used by a Brussels based consultant who was interviewed for this study in
September 1991.
169
Table of European Industrialists' is frequently mentioned: "In 19S5 it was not
UNICE but the European Round Table.. .that transformed the notorious
'Euroscierosis' into a 'Europhoria' that Lord Cockfield was to take and present in his
famous White Paper." 95 Besides the Round Table of European Industrialists, the
Kangaroo Group and multinationals, like Mars, Philip Morris or Nestlé, large
American and even Japanese corporations are thought to be particularly influential,
especially since these organisations are apparently getting better at presenting their
interests embellished by an air of Europeanism.96
Direct lobbying is much less common among European firms, especially if they are
not involved in transnational activities. 97 Among small firms, direct lobbying is
almost unheard of. Both points are substantiated by the data presented in Table 4,
although these refer to Food and Drinks Processing firms in the UK, France and
Germany only.98
Elsevier, 'An Unwieldy Lobby', 15 June 1991, p.1. This claim has been supported elsewhere,
e.g. Gardner op. cit.; D. Morgan op. cit., Burson-Marsteller op. cit.; N. Dudley, 'Lobbyists Home
in on EC Lawmakers', The European, 17-23 January 1992; interview comments (see for
example above, footnote 95).
The Round Table of European Industrialists came into being in 1983. It is a super-elitist group,
made up of over 40 top European industrialists who have together more than 3 million
employees and over $400 billion sales per annum. The chief executives/chainnen of Philips,
Volvo, Siemens, etc. are members. The Round Table overtly lobbies against excessive
regulation, especially in the social and environmental spheres. In many instances, its members
prefer flexibility in these areas at the level of individual firms.
96 This view was for example expressed by Tyszkiewicz, op.cit. (all references); Hoffmann op.cit.
B. Tigner, 'Influence Peddling, European Style', International Management, June 1988, pp. 32-
40; Prospects, 'Hany Elhardt: EC Lobbyist', October 1990, pp.4-5; J.N. Gardner, 'How
American Companies Lobby the EC', Wall Street Journal, 5 June 1991, p.10. Some
interviewees, especially consultants, agreed with this view; others had no opinion or knowledge
on this particular subject. For comments on the considerable lobbying power of the Round Table
and the Kangaroo Group, see for example Gardner op. cit., 1991 Effective Lobbying...; Harrop
op.cit., 1992.
References as for footnote 96.
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Table 4
Questionnaire: The Single European Market and the Food Industry
Question 23: Concerning matters related to the SEM,
has your organisation ever engaged directly in lobbying activities?
No
	
43	 (49 %)
Confidential
	
5	 (6%)
Don't know
	
12	 (14%)
At national level only
	
13	 (15%)
Via Trade Associations only
	
6	 (7%)
At European level
	
8	 (9%)
I Total valid answers
	
87	 (100%)
98 These figures are taken from the mail survey on the SEM and the Food Industr y carried out
especially for this study (see Appendix 1). Some 87% of respondents were sinail businesses.
None of the respondents who had less than 10 employees had ever directly lobbied, as would be
expected. The larger firms treated the matter almost exclusively as 'confidential'. Perhaps the
most surprising finding in Table 4 is the 14% of 'don't know' answers, given that 75% of the
respondents were in senior management positions.
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However, the failure to lobby directly at the European level does not mean that
these firms are inadequately represented. Many of them make their voices heard
through sectoral andlor general trade associations and, in some cases, via the
national governments. Their lobbying strategies are nonetheless less diverse and they
remain largely dependent on effective representation which is unfortunate, since such
representation is not always forthcoming. 99 Furthermore, any intervention on their
behalf is inevitably based on a prior process of opinion aggregation.
Industry, and especially large businesses, have a privileged position in Brussels, but
the above data tell only one side of the story. Business has taken a lead in crucial
areas, such as the SEM or EMU, but the flagging out of such issues is the result of
mixed influences and not business pressures alone. At least, this is the view of many
interviewees and questionnaire respondents.'°° For example, all survey respondents
of the follow-up questionnaire on lobbying disagreed with the following statement:
"with regard to EC lobbying, there is only one set of insiders, and that is big
business." 0 ' Several respondents pointed to the occasional weakness of UNICE, the
employers' Euro-organisation, which could be exploited by other lobbies and
See subsequent discussions and chapters.
100 example, the (former) Director-General, Directorate-General for Research, European
Parliament, was asked if he thought that big business lobbies had a disproportionate advantage
over other groups. He replied that "all groups who are organised on an EC-wide basis, whether
large or small, have the advantage." A senior official from DG Ill dismissed the same question
with a brief "...they just have more resources". Other interviewees and questionnaire
respondents argued that they sometimes have an advantage, but that they are not necessarily
always effective, nor the only successful lobbyists. For example, a questionnaire respondent
(MEP) stated that "some other groups - some local/regional and others are much more effective
than others. Certainly not all successful lobbyists are 'big business' - environmental and animal
welfare groups prove this." Crompton from CECG was less certain about the balance between
'big business' and other groups in respect of influence and felt that on the whole they were more
likely to have insider status and greater influence but that this statement had to be qualified,
since there were exceptions.
101 Question 3.3 of the follow-up questionnaire; survey on Lobbying and the SEM (Appendix 11).
Regrettably, only 11 respondents were prepared to complete this questionnaire; they had varied
backgrounds, i.e. MEPs, Eurocrats, Members of Trade Associations, private lobbyists.
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political institutions, namely the Commission, especially because of persistent
difficulties to overcome national self-interest within the UNICE.'°2 Others stipulated
that resources alone did not determine lobbying success. Apparently, public and
political support and determination are important, too. There is some evidence to
support these claims. For example, Harlow noted that the Euro-group for Animal
Welfare had been able... "to exert an influence on European policy-making out of all
proportion to its size", probably because it is well organised and has attracted strong
public support.'°3 In the light of the success of some of these groups, industry has
apparently begun to take seriously some of them, as well as their 'sponsor' DG.'°4
Yet, the lobbies themselves are not as yet content and some have argued that "...the
102 0n occasions, IJNICE has been accused of producing over-generalised, lowest common
denominator statements. It has also been argued that it should be more proactive. (See for
example Cope op.cit.; Gardner op.cit. Effective Lobbying...; Dc Koning op.cit.; Elsevier
op.cit. }. These accusations are not unfounded, but the blame does not lie with TJNICE only, as
noted by Rhodes: "Europe's employers have really refused to delegate sufficient authority
upwards to their European union; this has given UNICE weakness..." {M. Rhodes, 'The Future
of the 'Social Dimension: Labour-Market Regulation in Post-1992 Europe', Journal of Common
Market Studies, 30(1), 1992, p.40.)
As Doogan noted, the unwillingness to delegate significant responsibilities upwards to IJNICE
reflects the diversity of interests and the persistent national preferences among Europe's
employers. National preferences are sometimes voiced directly in Brussels by national trade
associations, but they are more often made known through national civil servants and
politicians. Sectoral interests, on the other hand, are reflected increasingly by appropriate Euro-
groups, some of which are very effective, e.g. CEFIC or CAOBISCO. (K. Doogan, 'The Social
Charter and the Europeanisations of Employment and Social Policy', Policy and Politics, 20(3),
1991, pp.167-76.
lO3}T jjIow op.cit., p.340. There is indeed evidence for disproportional successes for animal welfare
lobbyists; they are reported variously, e.g. by A. Hill, 'EC Tightens Cosmetic Test Rules', The
Financial Times, 4 November 1992, p.3; C. Fisher, 'The Lobby to Stop Testing Cosmetics on
Animals', in Pedler & Van Schendelen op.cit., Ch. 11. There is further evidence that the Euro-
Animal Welfare lobby is quite effective: One of the MEPs who answered a questionnaire for
this study mentioned for example that they had been instrumental in helping to save baby seals
by putting EC institutions under pressure to protect the seals. The Commission itself refers to
the influence on cosmetics, animals in zoos or animal transport, etc., legislation which has been
exercised by Animal Welfare groups. (CEC, 'Background Report on Animal Welfare',
ISECIB29/9 1.) All these issues have provoked intense public interest and support for many of
the proposals made by the Animal Welfare support groups. (See for example, EP News, Farm
Animals - Campaign Stepped Up', 25-29 October 1993, p.4.). This support and the visually
very emotive propaganda of these groups has helped their cause without doubt.
'°4 Mey & Richardson op.cit. Environmental Politics.
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EU puts business ahead of animal rights". 1o5 However, since lobbying is "about
relative gains as much as about absolutes", the new legislation on the use of animals
in cosmetic testing has to be regarded as a lobby success.'° 6 There is evidence that
even less well resourced groups have been relatively successful at making their
voices heard in Europe. For example, the baby food manufacturers and Europe's pro
breast feeding group were engaged in a lobbying struggle with DG ifi. The pressure
group felt that their requests were not sufficiently considered, but one of the senior
Commission officials, who had been involved directly in this case, claimed that the
final directive concerning labelling and advertising of baby produce was a
compromise "...which went a long way towards the pro breast feeding group's
107
'Oppositional' 108 lobbies have thus not always been ignored and have sometimes
been received more favourably at the European level than at national levels,
especially in those states that have pushed for greater deregulation.'° 9 Greater
105 M. Born, 'Free Trade a Higher Priority than Welfare', The European, 10-16 March 1995, p.13.
106 Comment by Mr. Paul Riedermann, DTF Brussels, interviewed for this study in September
1991.
107 Confidential information by a Senior Commission Official. The pro breast feeding lobby was
disappointed because they could not secure legislation that prohibits medical professionals from
giving infant formula to mothers (see also Tigner op.cit.). The Conurnssion official reported
that their views had been taken into account with regard to sale, packaging, marketing and
advertising of infant formula, since these were food law concerns. However, the matter over
non-administration was, in the Commission's view, a question of medical ethics and beyond
their scope. This example demonstrates that perceptions on lobbying impact are veiy subjective,
depending to a large extent on perceptions and expectations.
1O8 Jn this context, 'oppositional' denotes groups that oppose to varying degrees the main views and
policy suggestions of the industrial and business lobbies.
109 See for example, D.C.E. Roberts, '1992 and All That', British Food Journal, 93(1), 1991,
pp.25-6, or, B. Rosarnond, 'National Labour Organizations and European Integration: British
Trade Unions and '1992', Political Studies, 4 1(3), September 1993, pp.420-34.
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awareness of many environmental and social issues and a growing assertiveness
among Europe's consumers have helped their cases, too. Indirect support for
promoting environmental policy has also come from the ECJ. The Court's June 1991
ruling in the titanium dioxide case (300/89) demonstrated that if favoured the use of
Article lOOa of the amended Treaty of Rome with regard to environmental policy-
making, thus supporting qualified majority voting." 0 In addition, these groups have
been supported by the respective committees in the EP which has itself strengthened
its position in recent years." Indeed, one interviewee said that many MEPs and
Commission officials regarded it as their duty to ensure that the voices of non-
business interests were heard in Brussels and Strasbourg. Yet, it must not be
forgotten that there are also significant pro-business, pro-farming, pro-deregulation
and pro-subsidiarity forces in the EP who challenge the championship of "pinkish
"0 0n this point, see for example Hildebrand op.cit. who explained that a constitutional problem
had arisen after the signature of the SEA in that it was not entirely clear to what extent
environmental policy-making was to be governed by Article lOOa and to what extent it was still
being based on Articles 100 and 235 which did not allow automatically for the use of QMV.
111 For example, Judge and Earnshaw and Judge documented the proactive and pro-environmental
work of the EP's Environment Committee. {D. Judge, Predestined to Save the Earth: the
Environment Committee of the European Parliament', Environmental Politics, 1(4), winter
1992, pp.186-211; D. Judge & D. Earnshaw, 'Weak European Parliament Influence? A Study of
the Environment Committee of the European Parliament', Government and Opposition, 29(2),
1994, pp.262-76.) A number of interviewees also mentioned the important role that the EP's
Environment Committee was playing in EU environmental policy-makings. Not surprisingly,
many of these interviewees were German, e.g. a researcher for a German MEP, an official in
the German Ministry for Agriculture, Food, Forestry and Fisheries and several of the
representatives of German trade associations who were interviewed for this study during
summer 1991.
The active support of the EP's Environment Committee and many MEPs who are not members
of this Committee has also been documented elsewhere, e.g. by the EP's own EP News, {see for
example EP News, 'Campaign to Help Zoo Animals', 2 1-25 June 1993, p.4 and EP News, 'Save
it' Drive Attracting Intense Lobbying', 21-25 June 1993, p.4.), by the Commission (see for
example CEC, 'The Week in Europe: Ecolabel Launched', WE/26/93, 1 July 1993.) or by A.
Liberatore, 'Problems of Transnational Policy-Making: Environmental Policy in the European
Community', European Journal of Political Research, 19(2-3), 1991, pp.281-305. For a useful
and up to date discussion of the EP's Committee system, see for example S. Bowler & D.M.
Farrell, 'The Organizing of the European Parliament: Committees, Specialization and Co-
ordination', British Journal of Political Science, 25(2), April 1995, pp.219-44.
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and greenish" issues. 112 Furthermore, support for "pinkish and greenish" trends are
countered by a growing unemployment problem in Europe, deregulatory pressures
and financial limitations." 3 Furthermore, they must be compatible with the EC's
foremost objective, that is the safeguarding of "...benefits of economies moving
closely together." 4 Hence, business and industry are in a very favourable position,
given that economic wealth creation has remained the major justification for the
EU's existence. Evidently, institutional policy-makers are not immune to the
pressures from 'oppositional' forces and these can have marked influence on policy
outcomes, depending on the policy in hand. However, compared to the influence of
business and industrial lobbies, they tend to play second fiddle and their major
concerns have not been fully integrated into economic policymaking.l5
Although case studies cannot be generalised, social policy exemplifies the neo-
pluralist bias in many policy areas. Provisions for common social policies were
enshrined in the EEC Treaty and have since developed considerably, both
112 An expression used by a professional lobbyist (Brussels). Andersen and Eliassen op.cit., 1991,
p.185, confirmed this point, in more general terms, noting that "The [European] Parliament
thrives on political issues that cannot be reduced to technical decisions."
113 See for example The Economist, Pull me Up, Weigh me Down', 328(782 1), 24 July 1993,
pp.29-30. This article argued that unemployment, competition, economic recession, etc., all
reduced active support among many European interests for common regulatory policies,
especially in the social sphere. The subsequent discussion in this study shows that this claim is
quite valid, if perhaps somewhat exaggerated.
114 B. Corby, 'Creating the Right Europe', CBI News, December 1991/ Januaiy 1992, p.4. See also
discussions on the primary objectives of European integration in Chapters one and two.
115 This view is supported elsewhere, e.g. in A. Weale & A. Williams, 'Between Economy and
Ecology? The Single Market and the Integration of Environmental Policy', Environmental
Politics, 1(4), winter 1992, pp.46-64. In addition, see also A. Stern, 'Alarm at Secret Plan to
Scrap EU's Green Laws', Tue European, 9-15 June 1995, pp.1-2. This story reports a possible
intensification of the deregulatory aspect of EU policy-making, supported by such key figures as
John Major and German Chancellor Helmut Kohil Furthermore, see Ripa de Meana's
comments on the failure to fully integrate environmental concerns in economic policy
considerations at the EU level. Ripa de Meana is a former Environment Commissioner. {CEC,
'The Week in Europe: Environment Impasse', WE/2 1/92. }
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constitutionally and in practice. Hence, there is a constitutional and, it seems, a
political commitment to European social policies. 116 There are three elements that
underline the commitment: the expansion of EU social legislation, the semi-
institutionalised consultation procedures that characterise much of social policy-
making and, to a lesser extent, the European Social Fund (ESF)." 7 The
institutionalisation of consultation procedures is particularly noteworthy. In 1970, an
116 UK is the obvious exception because it has not adopted the Social Protocol in the TEU,
objecting to the latter's regulatory and supranational thrust. The EEC Treaty contained basic
provisions for social policy, but these expanded considerably with the ratification of the SEA
and TEU and now include the Social Protocol as well as a specific commitment towards
economic and social cohesion. As noted by Teague & Grahi, these constitute a definite move in
the direction of positive integration which includes open intervention and 'social engineering'.
{P. Teague & J. Grahl, 'The EC's Social Charter', Journal of Public Policy, 11(2), 1991,
pp.207-32.)
The Commission has also reiterated this point; see for example CEC, 'Background Report on
the Application of the Social Charter - Second Report', ISECIB25/93. However, this
commitment is set against even stronger commitments towards wealth creation, full
employment and, in some instances, respect for existing national idiosyncrasies. This fact is
recognised even by Commissioners responsible for social policy. For example, P. Flynn recently
noted that Europe must respect the needs of business, but also offer a vision of economic and
social progress for all its citizens." {CEC, 'The Week in Europe: Building a Europe for
Business and Progress for All', WE/38/94, p.!.)
Elsewhere, the primacy of economic concerns and the desirability for national and sub-national
diversity in the area of social policy is emphasised much more vigorously. See for example the
appropriate statements in a number of UNICE documents, namely (INICE, 'The Social
Dimension of the Internal Market: UNICE Position, 30 November 1988; UNICE, 'UNICE
Views on the Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights', Pamphlet, 19 October 1989;
UNICE, 'UNICE position paper on the Action Programme of the Conunission', 22 March 1990.
For an extreme neo-liberal view, see for example a document by a Gennan think-tank, i.e. the
European Group at the Frankfurt Institute: W. Engels, E. Helmstaedter, H.O. Lenel, R. Vaubel
& H. Willgerodt, 'The European Social Charter: a Programme of Social Regulation for the
Internal Market?', Study Paper 3, Publications of the European Group at the Frankfurt Institute,
December 1989. For a more balanced discussion on the relationship between economic and
social pressures, see for example P. Teague, 'Human Resource Management, Labour Market
Institutions and European Integration', Human Resource Management Journal, 2(1), autumn
1991, pp.1-21.
111 For detailed discussions on social policy and the use of the ESF, see for example CEC, 'Social
Europe: the Social Dimension of the Internal Market', Official Publications of the European
Communities, 1988, special edition, or, E. Moxon-Browne, 'Social Europe', or, P. Teague,
'Coordination or Decentralization? EC Social Policy and Industrial Relations', Chs 8 and 9 in
Lodge, J. (ed.) op.cit., 1993.
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advisory Standing Committee of Employment (UNICE, ETUC, Commission,
Council) was inaugurated. Thereafter, many similar, smaller committees and
working groups emerged and, during the 1970s some tripartite conferences took
place and the concept of concertation was worked out." Concertation has since
been replaced with the concept of social dialogue which opens up possibilities for
close agreements between the social partners." 9 For example, Article 4(1) of the
Protocol on Social Policy stipulates that ". . .the dialogue between them [ETUC and
UNICE] at Community level may lead to contractual relations, including
agreements", should they so desire.
These structures are quasi neo-corporatist, but there are a number of factors that
distort them so considerably that, in the final analysis, it would be wrong to label
European social policy as neo-corporatist. Views on social policy are basically
divided between social regulators and deregulators. In addition, there are those who
support social regulation, but not at the European level. The deregulators are
broadly represented by UNTCE; the social regulators by ETUC. All points of view
are represented in the Commission, the EP and the Council. Since these attitudes are
18 See for example, Lodge op.cit., 1983. Streeck and Schmitter op.cit., 1991; CEC op.cit. (Social
Europe, 1988); P. Flynn, European Social Policy: Options for the Union, Green Paper, Official
Publications of the European Communities, 1993.
'I9 It is hoped that social dialogue will lead to a more productive form of Euro-bargaining than the
ineffective tripartite conferences of earlier decades. There is indeed now an agreement between
UNICE and ETUC on collective bargaining, however, it has not progressed far, since Europe's
employers remain reluctant to move beyond words. This reluctance is evident in many of
UNICE's statements on social policy, namely those mentioned in footnote 112 as well as in a
letter to the Secretazy General of the CoM by UNICE's secretaly general, concerning (COM
(90) 581 final of 25 Januaiy 1991 which isa Council Directive concerning the constitution of a
Committee of European enterprises who will be concerned with providing infonnation and
consulting workers; see also K. Schmidt, 'European Social Policy afler Maastricht: the Politics
of the Social Protocol', Journal of European Social Policy, 2(2), 1992, pp.123-4; M. Rhodes
op.cit.; The Economist, 'End of Chapter', 325(7780), 10 October 1992, p.52.
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diametrically opposed, it has been difficult to find common ground, especially in
sensitive areas, like minimum wage or work councils. Consequently, social dialogue
to date has been mostly rhetorical and some sensitive legislation has only been
acceptable to both sides in a diluted form.' 2° The majority of the successful
legislation has concerned health and safety and equal opportunities, two areas where
divisions are somewhat less marked.' 2 ' According to Lange, there are very few
European social policies that have serious financial implications, either for the
Community or business organisations. 122 For example, comprehensive training
legislation was rejected by the employers' on these grounds.' 23 So far, European
legislation has also not facilitated genuine industrial democracy, even though a
works council directive has long been on the agenda, at least in theory.' Although
ETUC is a respected organisation, an increasing number of specific social interests
have begun to lobby directly in Brussels, because they feel that the employer-
employee dichotomy no longer presents an adequate framework for social dialogue.
For all these reasons, it has been acknowledged repeatedly that social policy has
120 This point was confinned by several of the persons interviewed for this survey, notably by the
UNILCE, CBI (Brussels office), BDA (KOIn office) and Kraflfood (Brussels) interviewees. The
point was also made in writing, e.g. in, UNICE op.cit., 1988; J. Ryan, 'The Effects of European
Integration on the Social Policy of the European Communities', European Research, 2(4), 1991,
pp.16-21.
121 ibid
122p Lange, 'The Politics of the Social Dimension', in Sbragia op.cit., 1992, Cli. 7, and, P. Lange,
'Maastricht and the Social Protocol: Why Did They Do It?, Politics and Society, 2 1(1), 1993,
pp.5-36. There is evidence to support this view. See for example footnote 119. Obstacles also
arise with so called 'caring policies' that involve benefit and pension payments; these could
simply not be afforded by the EU, unless its budget structure was entirely different and included
direct taxation. {See, EP News, 'Caring Policies could put Strain on Europe', 18-22 April/2-6
May 1994, p.3.} Consequently, social legislation is mainly regulatoiy in nature.
123 The UNICE and CBI (Brussels) interviewees confirmed this poinL See also, e.g. M. Rhodes,
'The Social Dimension of the Single European Market: National versus Transnational
Regulation', European Journal of Political Research, 19(2-3), 1991, pp. 245-80.
124 See footnote 119 as well as The Observer, 'Workers Vetoed', 6 May 1990; The Financial Times,
'Business Opposes EC Employee Involvement Plan', 8 May 1990 and CBI News op.cit.
179
always been "the stepsister of market integration" • 125 This view does not ignore
widespread support for social policy provisions within the EU, but underlines that
"the competitiveness of business must be preserved", if the EU's major objective is
to be achieved.' 26 In recent years, economic recession, growing unemployment,
shifts to the right in some member states and the application of subsidiarity' 27 to
social policy have made it even more difficult to produce far reaching results in this
sector, especially if they involve costs. Furthermore, excessive enthusiasm among
the pro-regulation forces has often been stopped in Council where unanimity voting
is still the order of the day for sensitive social policy issues.'
With regard to social policy, business interests have been undeniably in a rather
privileged position and have been able to prevent too much progress towards a
'Lange op.cit., 1993, P.28. This view has been acknowledged elsewhere. See for example, P.
Teague, The European Community: the Social Dimension, Kegan Paul, 1989; Rhodes op.cit,
1991; Archer & Butler op.cit.; Laffan op.cit.; S. Mime, 'Time stands still for Workers
exceeding 48-hour Limit', The Guardian, 1 June 1993, p.2. This point is also confirmed by
Commission Documentation, e.g. CEC, 'EC Background Reports', ISEC B1/92.; ISECIB8/93.
'CEC, 'Background Report on Social Policy', ISECIBI/92, p.2-3; see also, A. Crisp, 'UNICE
Offers Direction in Search for a Working Europe', The European, 2-8 December 1994, p.26.
127 Cormnission Documentation confirms that the subsidiarity principle is applied in some social
policy areas, e.g. social exclusion through poverty, are being dealt with on a national basis, in
line with the subsidiarity principle, even though 50 million EC citizens live at or below the
poverty line, as defined by the Commission. {CEC, 'Background Report on Social Exclusion -
Poverty and other Social Problems in the European Community', ISECIB1J/93, and, CEC, The
Week in Europe, WE/23/93.) Prior to the introduction of QMV, such issues were of course also
not dealt with at the Community level, because national governments could oppose harmonised
policy on such sensitive and, potentially costly, issues. In sensitive and/or costly areas, the
subsidiarity principle is likely to be used whenever there is sufficient political support which
will not be that infrequently, since UNICE and the national employer organisations tend to
support the subsidiarity principle (UNICE interviewee; de Koening op.cit.)
128 See TEU provisions; but this point has also been confirmed by the UNICE and CBI (Brussels)
interviewees, as well as by Ryan op.cit.; Philip op.cit., 1992 and J. Kirkbride, 'The Social
Chapter: What it's All About', The Daily Telegraph, 23 July 1993, p.2.
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genuine social Europe.129 Thus, there is a definite neo-pluralist undercurrent to
social policy-making. Yet, the achievements of the EU in this field must not be
underestimated and the social dimension should never be dismissed as "...some kind
of sweet to be offered at the end of the meal. It is an integral part and parcel of the
Internal Market and of the building up of the Community."l30
5.8.	 Influencing European Legislation
It is difficult to unravel the amount and direction of influence in an intricate policy
process. Accurate quantification is virtually impossible; 131 hence, the figures
presented in this section are only one aspect of a general qualitative assessment on
Euro-lobbying.
Any evaluation of Euro-lobbying must first take account of the continued need to
lobby nationally too, so as to influence the individual ministers who make up the
CoM (see Table 5, page 178). This dual strategy is necessary, even in areas where
qualified majority voting and/or the co-operation procedures apply and is epitomised
in Mazey and Richardson's comment that "being able to monitor different national
developments may yet prove to be the most effective skill for groups attempting to
influence European policy-making." 32 Ironically, perceptiveness of national issues
may however undermine the lobbies' ability to form strong European opinions, so
129	 Commission and the social interests are certainly not satisfied with the progress of
harmonising and advancing social policy in Europe. See for example, CEC, 'Background
Report' and 'The Week in Europe', ISEC/B8/93; ECIUK./WE/18/93. EP News, 'Social Concern',
14-18 December 1992, p.3.
130 Former Greek Commissioner in charge of DG V (social policy), Ms Vasso Papandreou, quoted
in Doogan op.cit., p.l70
131 See Chapter one.
132 Mazey & Richardson, op.cit. Parliamentary Affairs..., p.103.
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decreasing their potential for influence, especially in respect of the Commission and
theEP.
Table 5
Questionnaire: Lobbying and the Single European Market:
Question 13: Has the lobbying of EC institutions taken on more importance than the
lobbying of national governmental institutions in individual EC member states?
I Yes
Depends on policy area
INo
I No, because the Council takes the decisions
Euro-lobbying and national lobbying are complementary
Not yet, but Euro-lobbying is becoming more important
Don't know
	
8	 (10%)
	
16	 (19.5%)
	
9	 (11%)
	
3	 (3.5%)
	28 	 (34%)
	
8	 (10%)
	
10	 (12%)
I Total valid responses
	
82	 (100%)
This peculiarity also adds some uncertainty to lobbying in the EU because, whatever
the relationship between lobbyists and ministers, national lobbies cannot be certain
of support, because of the importance of ministerial trades off and package deals
within the CoM. Sometimes, ministers take the interests of the lobbies into account,
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including the French film industry and the French farmers with regard to a GATT
agreement in the Uruguay round.' 33 On other occasions, particular interests are
sacrificed in package deals, despite promises to the contrary. For example, the UK
government seems to have retracted on promises to the British food and drinks
industry and the British consumers, regarding a regulation on geographical
designations of foodstuffs during negotiations for the CAP reform.' 34 Lobbyists may
feel despondent about the resulting uncertainty, but they cannot side-step the
national governments. At the same time, the unpredictable nature of decision-making
in the CoM reinforces the need for simultaneous Euro-lobbying, directly or indirectly
through Euro-organisations. Effective lobbying in the EC must therefore be a multi-
level game and "the master-lobbyist like the chess-master must be able to play
several games at once at different tables, as far afield as Strasbourg, Luxembourg,
Brussels as well as his national capital.".135
An assessment of the Euro-lobbying aspect of this multi-level game remains an
important task, since "5,000 plus lobbyists must make a difference."'36 Tables six
and seven confirm that Euro-lobbying influences policy outcomes, although
respondents disagree markedly on the extent to which lobbies can influence policy.
However, the data in these Tables must be treated with caution, since they are
judgements by informed participants and since some assessments, especially from the
food and drinks processors, are in fact little more than guesses. With respect to the
survey on lobbying, responses are mostly founded on direct Euro-lobbying
' 33 EP News, TV concerns, 13-17 September 1993, p.4.; J. Nundy & T. Jackson, 'France Whips Up
Hostility to GAiT, The Independent, 19 November 1992, p.1.; J. Nundy & A. Marshall,
'France Gains Allies Against GATT Deal', The Independent, 26 November 1992, p.1.; L. Elliott
& J. Wolf, 'French Find Allies Against GATF Deal', The Guardian, 27 November 1992, p.14.
134 Several interview sources, all wishing to treat this issue confidentially.
135 Philip op.cit, 1982, p.471.
136 One of many such comments made by questionnaire respondents and interviewees.
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experience; but they are nonetheless subjective interpretations of a varied and
intricate phenomenon. Yet, similar conclusions have been drawn elsewhere.'37
It is not surprising that only approximately 50% of the food and drinks processors
responded positively to Question 24 in Table 7, since they were asked a very specific
question about the potential influence of individual business organisations. The
answers may well have been different, had the question been phrased more generally.
Furthermore, virtually all the respondents from the other survey are in one way or
another directly involved in lobbying. Lobbyists in particular, would hardly engage in
this costly and time consuming venture if they did not believe that it could be
beneficial to them or to those on whose behalf they act.'38
The data in Table 7 suggest that respondents have little faith in direct lobbying, with
the possible exception of 'some business organisations'. A few respondents
confirmed that, in their view, this expression related to large business organisations.
"Yes, through a major multinational or through an interest group."
"yes through an interest group, or big finns have a branch in Brussels or are
represented in working committees."
"Yes, but only veiy, very big ones Ibusinessesl."
137 This point is confirmed in virtually all the secondary literature referred to in this chapter, but
has also been confirmed by documentation examined for the thesis, e.g. The Gin Rect/Iers and
Distillers Association and the Vodka Trade Association, Report and Accounts, 1991; C.
Senevat, La CEE et le lobbying; extraits des actes de colloque, Centre Français du Commerce
Exterieur, 1991.
' 38 A point confirmed by many lobbyists, see e.g. Tigner op.cit., 1988; Cope op.cit, Burson-
Marsteller op. cit.; Prospects op. cit.; Burrell op. cit.
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7
9
8
9
21
15
6
4
1
1
1
1
3
Table 6
Questionnaire: Lobbying and the Single European Market:
Question 12: On balance, do lobbying activities of EC institutions influence
EC policy-making?
Yes
Yes, considerably
Yes, to some extent
Yes, minimally
Yes, but it depends on the policy in question
Yes, but mainly with technical expertise
Yes, but at pre-draft and/or early drafting stages only
Yes, but in the form of amendments only
Yes, because lobbyists challenge preconceived opinions
Yes, but large business organisations only
Yes, but large trade associations only
Yes, substantial impact, but on details only
Don't know
(8%)
(10.5 %)
(9%)
(10.5 %)
(25.5 %)
(17.5 %)
(7%)
(4.5%)
(1%)
(1%)
(1%)
(1%)
(3.5%)
Total valid responses
	
86
	
(100%)I
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Table 7
Questionnaire: The Single European Market and the Food Industry:
Ouestion 24: In your opinion, can an individual business organisation. such as yours,
effectively influence EC policy-making?
2
16
4
10
1
2
27
5
2
1
70
I Yes
Yes, but only through an intermediary
Yes, but with minimal effect only
Yes, but only some business organisations
Yes, but only with regard to certain policies
Yes, but only with certain EC institutions
No
No generalisations possible
Not possible to determine
Confidential
I Total valid responses
(3%)
(23 %)
(6%)
(14%)
(1%)
(3%)
(39%)
(7%)
(3%)
(1%)
(100%)
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Interviewees from all walks of life confirmed that the most effective lobbying was
carried out by specific interest organisations and MNCs. 139 Interestingly, the data in
Table 6 do not support this claim, although they do not invalidate it either, since
respondents gave their individual answers and were not specifically asked to
comment on who was most influential. Where additional comments were made at all
about the influence of business on lobbying, views differed.' 4° The accumulated
evidence in the thesis indicates nonetheless that there is a certain neo-pluralist bias in
the system. In particular, business seems to have disproportionately influenced the
broad development of the EC; a 'claim to fame' which few, if any of the other private
interests can 'pride' themselves with.
Table 6 reinforces certain points made during earlier discussions in many respects,
namely it is best to lobby early, while drafts are being worked out; it is much easier
to aim for amendments than to attempt to stop a legislative draft; technical advice is
absorbed into policy drafts more easily than overtly political demands; lobbying
success depends heavily on individual sectors, and even issues. Table 5 established
that successful lobbying is still at least a two-tier game, even though European level
lobbying is proliferating and becoming more important. Consequently, Andersen's
and Eliassen's claim that "we can talk about the Europeification and lobbyfication of
EC decision-making" is only partly correct.' 4 ' As one interviewee put it,
"...intensified lobbying at the European level may well enhance multi-culturalism and
139 The data in Figure I in Chapter seven, which refer to the benefits and losses that businesses are
likely to encounter as a result of the completion of the internal market, also lend weight to this
point.
140 See section 5.7 on Neo-pluralism.
141 Andersen & Eliassen op.cit., 1993, Ch. 3, p.35.
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mutual understanding, but it is not leading to genuine transfer of loyalties...", nor to
a fully blown European style of lobbying. 142
The data in Table 8 also reveal little evidence of the emergence of a genuine
European tradition of lobbying. Those respondents who answered in the affirmative
largely repeated the obvious, but many also stressed one important aspect of EU
policy-making and that is its commitment to policy solutions based on consensus
whenever possible. This commitment does not preclude extensive and tough
bargaining, nor intense conflict; it illustrates merely that the vast majority of
European policy-makers do not believe that development is possible without at least
seeking broad consensus among the elite of Europeans. This salient point was
confirmed variously by interviewees, questionnaire respondents and secondary
142 comprehensive discussions on the concept of national lobby styles, see for example, J.J.
Richardson (ed.), Policy Styles in Western Europe, George Allen & Unwin, 1982. Although
there is no scope to examine the concept in greater detail, it must be emphasised that certain
cultural differences with regard to lobbying styles are noticeable among EU member states. For
example, in the UK and Germany, lobbying is accepted and widespread, although Beer found
recently some evidence of antagonism towards lobbyists in the UK. In France, lobbying has
traditionally been frowned upon and in Spain is has not as yet developed veiy far. In Italy, it has
been closely associated with bribery and corruption. Appropriate references on national
lobbying styles of EU member states and their repercussions on Euro-lobbying can be found in
Petite op.cit. (France); Nonon & Clamen op.cit. (Italy); Jassogne op.cit. (France); Woolfson
op.cit. (UK, US, Germany); Dudley op.cit. (Germany, France); Canel op.cit. (Spain); S. Beer,
'Lobbyists and their Techniques', Parliamentary Affairs, 45(2), 1992, pp.220-32, (UK); M.F
Braun, 'L'achèvement du grand marché communautaire', in Dominati, J. (ed.) Quel avenir
industriel pour Ia France?, Editions Economica, 1987, pp.73-89; J.J. Gurviez, 'les réseaux
secrets d'influence', Expansion, 25(316), septembre 1987, pp.150-7, 159; F. Londez, 'Le
lobbying des entreprises francaises et Ia construction du marchd unique', Annales des Mines,
février 1989, pp.120-2; T. Lefdbure, Lobby or Not to Be, Editions Plume, 1991; J. van den
Bulck, Pillars and Politics: Neo-Corporatism and Policy Networks in Belgium', West European
Politics, 15(2), April 1992, pp.35-55. F. Morata, 'Regions and the European Community: a
Comparative Analysis of Four Spanish Regions', Regional Politics and Policy, 2(1-2),
spring/summer 1992, pp.187-216; D. Sidjanski, 'Les groupes d'intdrêt de l'Europe du sud et leur
insertion dans Ia CE', Revue du Marché Com,nun, 325, mars 1989, pp.164-75 (Portugal, Spain,
Italy, Greece).
Most commentators agreed that lobbies in member states are gearing themselves up to Euro-
lobbying, but that they are keeping their individuality. Armingeon found that the same goes for
European trade unions, even though their co-operation is increasing all the time. {K.
Armingeon, 'Towards a European System of Labour Relations?', Journal of Public Policy,
11(4), 1991, pp.399-413.} The absence of a genuine European culture or ideology (see for
example Chapter two) undoubtedly hinders the emergence of an intrinsic European style of
lobbying.
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literature For example, a French interviewee stated that "la recherche du consensus
est absolument ndcessaire" and an experienced lobbyist believed that "compromises
are sought by the 'actors' from CEC, EP and Council."43
As anticipated, none of the material produces Conclusive evidence about the exact
influence of the lobbyists, although most data point to the important role which they
play. However, in view of the earlier findings on the relative autonomy of the formal
policy-makers, it is worth bearing in mind that "le poids des groupes européens et
nationaux dans le processus de decision et de gestion de Ia Communauté demeure
relativement modeste par rapport a celui des gouvernements et de leurs
représentants."144 This is particularly true for broad political directions.
143The representative from the Union Nationale des Producteurs et Distributeurs de Jus de Fruits Ct
Legumes, de Nectars et de Boissons aux Fruits de Ia Métropole de I'Outre-Mer, who was
interviewed for this study in Paris during winter 1992, stated that "the search for consensus was
absolutely necessary" in the Brussels' way of policy-making. The other quote was made by a
member of CEFIC. With regard to supportive evidence from secondaiy literature, see for
example Stafford and Wallace. Stafford reported that the EP promoted consensus and
conciliation politics and Wallace made the same point about the process as a whole. {W.
Wallace op.cit., 1990; Stafford op.cit.)
' 44 Sidjanski op.cit., 1989, p. 175.
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Table 8
Questionnaire: Lobbying and the SingkEuropean Market:
Ouestion 15: Is there already. or is there going to be a typical EC lobbying tradition,
which is recognisably different from the lobbying traditions of the individual EC
member states?
5
	
(7%)
7
	
(9%)
6
	
(8%)
6
	
(8%)
4
	
(5%)
4
	
(5%)
2
	
(2.5%)
1
	
(1.3%)
1
	
(1.3%)
1
	
(1.3%)
I
	
(1.3%)
1
	
(1.3%)
(20 %)
22
	
(29 %)
Yes
Yes, more consensus and compromise oriented
Yes, because access is easier
Yes, more costly and complicated and more knowledge required
Yes, because EC lobbying is more technocratic
Yes, nearer US and/or Anglo-Saxon tradition of lobbying
Yes, the Commission wants to register lobbyists
Yes, because there are more policy communities at EC level
Yes, much more widespread in the EC
Yes, more direct lobbying by multinational companies
Yes, the EC institutions are more closed and arrogant
Yes, lobbying is not a pejorative word or disdained profession
No
Don't know
Total valid
	
76	 (100%
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5.9.	 Conclusion
The proliferation of Euro-lobbying is reinforcing the bewilderingly complex nature
of the EU. Generalisations are increasingly inappropriate, because political
exchanges are too varied. Nonetheless, there remain some discernible trends. This
chapter demonstrates that the EU is izt, in the strict sense of the expression, a
pluralist heaven, even though private interest representation has become an integral
part of European politics. There is no doubt that, in the vast majority of cases, the
formal policy-makers have preserved autonomy vis-à-vis the private interests. To
date, farmers and certain business interests have been the most influential private
interests, but, on the whole, they have not captured the formal policy-makers. They
have worked in tandem with those formal policy-makers whose views coincided
with theirs, exploiting specific political and economic climates. Sometimes, policy-
making patterns have consequently become quite institutionalised, but there are no
unassailable or permanent hierarchies and monopolies. Indeed, 'oppositional' groups
have often successfully introduced new issues for debate, thereby mediating existing
patterns. Nonetheless, the acms of European integration have given business interests
a certain innate advantage over other interests. The strong political support for
agriculture in the immediate post-war era and, subsequently, the original design of
the CAP, have favoured producers' interests, at least until it became evident that the
CAP was threatening the very existence of the EU. Recent changes in agricultural
policy-making demonstrate that cultural scripts can slowly be rewritten within the
EU. However, the limitations to the CAP reform and the structural transformations
in agricultural policy-making support moderate institutionalist interpretations of
social change.
All kinds of private interests have been able to influence aspects of policy drafts.
Consequently, the final versions of legislative drafts that reach the CoM are
compromises that have been mediated by the input of a variety of formal and
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informal policy-makers. They can look quite different from the early versions.
Generally speaking, private interests are more successful in influencing drafts that
require technical expertise than highly political legislative projects. However,
influence can be of a political nature too, especially since the 'technical v political'
dichotomy oversimplifies reality. Yet, with the noticeable exception of business and,
during the early years agricultural interests, lobbies seem to have had little influence
on the broad economic and political priorities that have shaped European
integration. This situation has not necessarily arisen because of a lack of political
support for the concern of non-business interests. However, the legislation that they
seek to create is often associated with costs, either to business or the EU itself. The
former obviously vehemently oppose such projects and the latter has only very
limited financial resources to live up to costly commitments. For this reason, social,
environmental and consumer legislation has often been more successful in areas
where inexpensive regulation is appropriate. The cost aspect also explains why
social dialogue has hardly progressed beyond rhetoric and that economic and social
cohesion in the EU remains a distant aspiration. Finally, the limited budget of the EU
explains why the distributiv policies of the EU (structural funds) are some of the
most fiercely lobbied areas: a large number of private interests seek to secure a share
of the limited EU funding.
The proliferation of Euro-lobbying has affected lobbying activities in many member
states. The constant interaction between different private interests is also promoting
multi-culturalism. Furthermore, lobbying activities reinforce the need among all
policy-makers to bargain, to seek alliances and to make compromises. There are also
some basic unwritten rules of conduct for Euro-lobbyists, namely discretion,
integrity and expertise. However, there is no sign of a genuine homogenisation of
national lobbying styles. The biggest obstacle to the emergence of a Euro-lobbying
tradition is undoubtedly the continued requirement to lobby national political
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institutions so as to influence, if possible, CoM decisions. Consequently, any
neofunctionalist explanations of Euro-lobbying are inappropriate.
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CHAPTER SIX:
POLICY NETWORKS:
A SUITABLE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR
THE ANALYSIS OF POLICY-MAKING
IN THE EUROPEAN UNION?
6.1.	 Introduction
Chapters four and five illustrate that interpersonal and inter-group exchanges,
structures, functions and patterns of influence vary so much that sweeping
generalisations about polic-making in the EU are inappropriate. Macro-level
theories fail to take account of these variations. Therefore, an extra level of analysis,
which can take account of sub-systemic variations, is necessary in order to examine
how and to what extent such variations help to shape the overall nature of a political
system. Policy networks analysis (PNA) provides such an additional layer of analysis
and, hence, PNA is examined in some detail in this chapter.
The discussions on the CAP and on social policy confirm that macro-level
terminology has been adapted and used to explain the nature of sub-systemic
structures. However, these discussions suggest that such adaptations are not entirely
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satisfactory, and this point has been confirmed elsewhere, too.' Unnecessary
conceptual confusion will be caused, if the same language is applied to explanations
of either the nature of a political entity (studies at the systemic level) or the nature
of parts of that political entity (studies at the sub-systemic level). Hence, scholars
have intensified their search for an analytical model that captures the relationship
between sub-systems and the systemic level, that is meso-level analysis, and that is
not tainted with conceptually loaded language. Such models emerged first in the
USA and more recently in Britain and Continental Europe. Lately, the policy
networks model has attracted much attention and PNA has become the most widely
used approach to the study of policy sub-systems and their relationships with the
systemic level, especially, but not exclusively in the Anglo-Saxon tradition of policy
analysis. 2 However, there is a lively debate as to the contribution made by PNA.
Certain political scientists have hailed it as a considerable and innovative conceptual
advancement whereas others have denigrated it as just another shorthand description
1 See for example, R.A.W. Rhodes, '"Power-Dependence" Theories of Central-Local Relations: a
Critical Assessment', in Goldsmith, M.J. (ed.) New Research in Central-Local Relations,
Gower, 1986, pp. 1-33; R.A.W. Rhodes, 'Policy Networks: a British Perspective', Journal of
Theoretical Politics, 2(3), 1990, pp.293-3 17. In both works Rhodes claimed that terms like
'corporatism' provided rigid metaphors that could not be 'teleported' to sub-central analysis.
2 This point was confirmed recently by D. Marsh, 'State Theory and the Policy Network Model',
1995. (This paper is as yet unpublished and must not be quoted elsewhere.) who argued that Nm
Britain there has been a significant growth in research using the policy networks concept in the
last few years. This, in itself, suggests that the concept is a useful one.N For examples of policy
networks analysis, see the many references to policy networks studies in the thesis, as well as
for example, (in agricultural policy-making, at the national level) A. Greer, Policy Networks
and State-Farmer Relations in Northern Ireland, 192 1-72', Political Studies, 42(3), September
1994, pp.396-412. (generally, at the European level) E. Bomberg, 'Policy Networks on the
Peripheiy: EU Environmental Policy and Scotland', Regional Politics and Policy, 4(1), spring
1994, pp.45-61; J. Peterson, 'EU Research and Development Policy: the Politics of Expertise', in
Rhodes, C. & Mazey, S. (eds.) The State of the European Union: Integration in Perspective,
Vol. 3, 1995, Longman.
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for the study of sub-systems. 3 These claims are explored and evaluated in the initial
sections of this chapter.
PNA has been applied increasingly to the EU, too, and Peterson argued that "the
policy networks model requires further testing and refinement at the EU level, but it
remains the most analytically powerful approach on offer."4 In view of the growing
popularity of this model, it is necessary to inspect Peterson's claim in some detail and
in two stages. First, the intrinsic merits and limitations of policy networks analysis
have to be examined and, second, attention has to focus on ways in which policy
networks analysis can be refined so as to become more specifically applicable to the
EU. The following paragraph explains why such refinement and adjustment is
essential.
The findings presented and discussed in Chapters three to five confirm that the EU
cannot be treated like a conventional international organisation and that,
consequently, 'integration theories' are not adequate analytical tools in their own
right to capture the nature ofthe EU. However, the empirical data indicate, too, that
nation statism and national self-interest continue to be so central to all activities
related to the EU that analysis cannot rely solely on conventional political science
frameworks. Although interactions vary, depending on the respective constitutional
arrangements of the different policy-making processes in the EU, all of them involve
See many of the references used in this chapter, but especially K. Dowding, 'Model or
Metaphor? a Critical Review of the Policy Network Approach', Political Studies, 43(1), March
1995, pp.136-58.
J. Peterson, 'Policy Networks and European Union Policy Making: a Reply to Kassim', West
European Politics, 18(2), April 1995, pp.389-407. There are however also sceptics with regard
to its general utility and/or its applicability to EU policy-making. See for example, M.M.
Atkinson & W.D. Coleman, 'Policy Networks and the Problems of Governance', Governance,
5(2), April 1992, pp.154-80; H. Kassim, 'Policy Networks, Networks and European Union
Policy Making: a Sceptical View', West European Politics, 17(4), October 1994, pp.15-27.
196
a dual approach with negotiations at the national and European levels. This has been
demonstrated beyond doubt in Chapters four and, especially, five. This duality needs
to be reflected in an analytical framework and hence, a means has to be found to
combine aspects of integration theory with political science in a coherent manner.
Since PNA is concerned with sub-systems and IR with national systems and their
exchanges, such a synthesis is not impossible and is therefore explored in the latter
part of this chapter. Chapter seven, which contains an empirically based discussion
on European food policy-making, provides a first testing ground for a synthesised,
inter-disciplinary framework.
6.2.	 Policy Networks Analysis: an Appraisal
6.2.1	 Origins and Scope of Applicability
Political scientists borrowed 'networks analysis' from sociologists who had
developed the concept in order to study small group dynamics. Hence, they were
very much concerned with the kind of exchange relationships that arise between
individuals who find themselves in an interdependent situation. 5 This shift in
emphasis to the micro-level of systemic analysis challenged the very foundations of
the structural-ftinctionalist tradition of sociology and kindled a deep concern for the
dynamics of interaction. As seen in Chapter three, it led to new sociological insights,
including the development of structuration theory. Certain IR specialists and
See for example, G.A. Banck, 'Network Analysis and Social Theoiy - Some Remarks', in
Boissevain, J. & Mitchell, J.C. (eds.) Network Analysis - Studies in Human Interaction,
Mouton, 1973, pp.37-43; D. Katz & RL. Kahn, The Social Psychology of Organizations,
Wiley, 1978, 2nd edition; C.B. Handy, Understanding Organizations, Penguin Books, 1985,
3rd edition. See also appropriate references in Chapter three. The Katz & Kahn and Handy
references also indicate that the networks analysis of group dynamics has become an important
aspect of the study of business organisations, an issue which is addressed briefly in Chapter
seven during the discussion of the impact of EU policies.
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political scientists have adopted networks analysis. However, within the IR context,
these endeavours have remained limited and manifest themselves mainly in discourse
on interdependence and transnationalism. 6 In the field of political science conceptual
adaptation has been far greater and, consequently, PNA has been developed as a
meso-level type of analysis. In other words, the focus is no longer on interaction
between individuals but on interaction between groups, organisations or sub-
systems. This adaptation is captured well in Benson's classic definition of networks
as complexes "...of organisations connected to each other by resource dependencies
and distinguished from other... complexes by breaks in the structure of resource
dependencies".7
Richardson and Jordan first introduced the terms 'policy networks' and policy
community' into UK literature on policy studies, but as metaphors only. 8 Rhodes
was responsible primarily for further developments. He cultivated policy networks
analysis to make sense of central-local government relations, especially with regard
to the relative distribution of power between the two levels. Later, he argued that
policy networks analysis could be applied more widely, so as to elaborate a "...meso-
level of analysis [which] focuses on the variety of linkages between the centre and
the range of sub-central political and governmental organizations." 9 Since the
examination of EU policy-making in this thesis starts with an examination of the
6 See Chapter three, Section four.
I. K. Benson, 'A Framework for Policy Analysis', in Rogers, D., Whitten, D. and Associates,
Interorganizational Coordination, Iowa State University Press, 1982, P.148.
8 Richardson & Jordan op.cit., 1979. They used these terms as metaphors in order to highlight
the fragmented nature of British policy-making. See below for explanations of the term 'policy
community'.
Rhodes op.cit., 1990, p.304.
Subsequently, the model was used to investigate exchanges between groups and organisations of
any kind {see for example, Atkinson & Coleman op.cit., all references, on this point}.
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interactions between non-governmental and governmental policy actors, the ways in
which Rhodes has adjusted networks analysis to the field of politics is crucial.
Indeed, PNA looks like an ideal starting point for the analysis of the data presented
here, especially since PNA is bound to accommodate sub-systemic variations, given
the reference to the .. ."variety of linkages...". t0 However, before testing its usability
by introducing further empirical data collected for this thesis, it is necessary to look
at PNA in more detail so as to address some of the ambiguities of Rhodes'
contributions and to establish the limits of viability of this analytical tool, especially
in relations to EU policy-making.
Rhodes developed a set of criteria in order to differentiate between types of
networks which became known as the 'Rhodes model of PNA'. The Rhodes model
classified policy networks along a spectrum, with policy communities representing
the most integrated and issue networks the least integrated types of policy
networks." Rhodes also distinguished between types of policy networks, based on
the identity of the major policy actors such as professional, producer or sub-
government networks. Originally, Rhodes treated the two sets of typologies as if
they were mutually exclusive, but he has since rectified this mistake.' 2 Over the
years, Rhodes, together with Marsh, improved the original Rhodes model and
introduced a far more differentiated set of criteria, thus making classification within
the model more sophisticated. 3 This improved version, which is referred to widely
10ibid.
For a detailed analysis of these two concepts, see Rhodes op.cit., various, and D. Marsh &
R.A.W. Rhodes, Policy Communities and Issue Networks: Beyond Typology', Marsh & Rhodes
op.cit., Policy Networks..., 1992; D. Marsh & RAW. Rhodes, 'New Directions in the Study of
Policy Networks', European Journal of Political Research, 21(1-2), 1992, pp.181-205 or Jordan
& Schubert, op.cit.
12 A point which is for example substantiated by G. Jordan, Policy Community Realism versus
'New' Institutionalist Ambiguity', Political Studies, 38(4), 1990, pp.470-84.
See Marsh & Rhodes op. cit Policy Nercvorks..., 1992.
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as 'the Rhodes-Marsh model of PNA', dominates current debate on policy networks
analysis, at least in the British and European context.
6.2.2.	 Policy Networks Analysis: Some Strengths and Weaknesses
Given that PNA does not focus primarily on the systemic level, this type of analysis
endorses the view that political systems are not homogenous entities but
complicated constructs that are made up of a variety of differing sub-systemic parts.
In other words, PNA is capable of capturing the variety of policy processes that
exist within political systems. Thus, it can provide insights into individual studies.
Yet, PNA can also produce a more comprehensive 'political landscape' of a
political system by juxtaposing the images provided by individual case studies.' 4 For
reasons of manageability, this thesis draws on material from a very limited range of
policy areas. However, even the data in Chapter five can illustrate how a 'political
landscape' picture can be constructed. The variations and similarities between areas
such as social, agricultural and environmental policies can be translated into
metaphorical language too. Thus, they become 'regional mini landscapes' that begin
to merge into parts of an overall 'political landscape', when juxtaposed. Political
landscapes do not explain policy outcomes, they describe them. Hence, they have
not got sufficient explanatory potential to be suitable for theorising, in their own
right. However, they provide the analyst with ordered structures and clues on which
14 This metaphor is preferable to the more common term 'policy maps', because landscapes are
dynamic and, hence, the metaphor is capable of symbolising the evolutionary nature of policy
processes. {For the policy map metaphor, see for example Jordan & Richardson op.cit., 1979.
Or, V. Schneider & R. Werle, 'Policy Networks in the German Telecommunications Domain',
in Mann & Mayntz op. cit., or, Schneider op. cit., 1992.) Dowding's comments substantiate the
argument that terms like 'policy network', 'policy map', policy landscape' are metaphors, not
explanatoiy tools, but he, too, appreciated the value of the metaphorical discourse: "The
imageiy is simply metaphorical heuristics, though no less serviceable for that." And, "Again,
therefore, the network analysis is more of a map of the policy process, than a filly fledged
explanation of it." {Dowding op.cit., p.139 and p.157.).
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further theorising can be built. Moreover, efforts to construct policy landscapes
challenge one common critique of PNA, namely the view that policy networks
analysts sometimes oversimplify macro-level pictures by treating them merely as "...a
collection of policy arenas..."
The Rhodes-Marsh model of PNA is valuable because it provides the analyst with a
sophisticated taxonomy that enables him or her to organise data in a constructive
manner. For example, the material presented on agricultural policy in Chapter five
could be classified usefully, using the Rhodes-Marsh taxonomy. The closeness of
exchanges between the core members are reminiscent of what Rhodes and Marsh
understand by 'policy communities' and the central role of the agricultural lobby
indicates that the CAP is a 'producer network'. Of course, the Rhodes-Marsh model
produces an ideal-type system of classification and no network is purely a 'policy
community' or a 'producer network', but the ideal-types provide crucial signposts
which help to order and, therefore, understand empirical data.
Some of the benefits of PNA have been offset by a persistent confusion over
semantics. Notably, the newly developed PNA terminology has been mixed
occasionally with existing traditional policy analytic terminology, so undermining
some of the arguments in favour of PNA referred to in the introduction of this
chapter.' 5 Also, this semantic inconsistency has led to a situation where "...different
labels have been used for similar phenomena...", with the result that "...differences of
opinion may merely reflect differences in definition.' 6 At the same time, "different
authors have used similar labels to describe different phenomena..." which has
Van Waarden's (op.cit.) matrix of the "characteristics of policy networks analysis between state
agencies and organised interests" illustrates this problem.
16 ibid, p.49.
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caused further coflfuSion. 17 The crisis over terminology became even more acute
when Wilks' and Wright introduced their own, distinct policy networks model,
which used similar terminology to the Rhodes-Marsh model, but to describe
different phenomena.' 8 The semantic confusion seems to be even worse with regard
to policy networks studies related to the EU. According to Raab and Peterson, EU
scholars have been particularly inept at handling semantics and Peterson argued that
"...the most compelling reason for scepticism about the policy networks model is
that EU scholars often apply it loosely without conceptualising or even defining their
terms.°19
Although PNA is capable of capturing systemic diversity, so far it is not easy to see
why it should be more sophisticated than meso-level studies, especially given the
semantic confusion surrounding PNA. 2° However, there are a number of reasons
why, in the finaly analysis, PNA is far more refined than conventional meso-level
analysis. The advantages of PNA over conventional meso-level analysis are related
to the concept of resource dependency that is at the centre of PNA. 2 ' Traditional
meso-level analysis has assumed that policy processes within sectors are more or
less homogenous. However, there is evidence in this thesis and elsewhere that
variety exists within sectors, too. Such variety can be captured if resource
' ibid. p.,49
18 Wilks & Wright op.cit. They introduced the idea that networks theoty can be applied at sub-
sectoral and policy issue level. Furthermore, they concentrated increasingly on interpersonal
exchanges, thereby following the footsteps of many socio-anthropological networks analysts.
This development is not without its merits, but it is so markedly different from the direction in
which Rhodes and Marsh developed that the overlap in terminology is deplorable. {see also
footnote 38)
19 Raab op.cit.; Peterson op.cit., 1995, p.390.
20 find appropriate footnotes in Chapter five - Cawson's meso-level analysis, esp. in relation to
corporatism.
21 See Benson's classic definition of networks (footnote 7 of this chapter).
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dependencies, and not policy sectors, are used to demarcate the area of study.
Similarly, the focus on resource dependencies provides suitable parameters within
which transsectoral policy-making can be investigated. This strength has sometimes
been underestimated, probably largely due to a certain ambiguity concerning the
expressions 'meso-level' and 'micro-level' in Rhodes' and Marsh's writings on
PNA. 22 Recently, Marsh cleared up any confusion in relation to these two terms and
confirmed that they are associated with different types (government-group relations
and relations between individuals respectively) of policy analysis and not with the
number of policy issues covered by an individual policy study: "Rhodes and I see the
policy network model as a model of interest group intermediation; that is of relations
between interest groups and government." 23 This quote confirms that the scope of
applicability is quite wide, as far as PNA is concerned. Notably, this quote indicates
that PNA can be used to analyse transnational policy-making, if 'the government' is
a transnational body such as in the case of the EU. This realisation should put to rest
any qualms about using PNA in systems other than nation states. Furthermore, the
reference to the general concept of 'interest groups' suggests that PNA is also
applicable where 'interest groups' consist of individual companies or persons
provided that the latter act as if they were groups, that is they represent an
aggregated, and not a personal, interest. Thus, the flexibility of a framework which
is demarcated by resource dependencies ensures that it is applicable to policy-
analysis within the EU, despite the preponderance of individual lobbyists and
consultants and the transnational nature of the EU.
There are a number of other advantages which arise because PNA demarcates
networks by reference to resource dependencies. Notably, resource dependencies
22 Kassim was confused and concluded wrongly that the Rhodes-Marsh level could not be applied
to sub-sectoral or transsectoral studies. Kassim op.cit.
23 Marsh op.cit., p.2.
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may indicate that, with regard to some policy studies, it is inappropriate to make
artificial distinctions between the policy formulation and implementation stages.
Alternatively, breaks in resource dependencies may indicate that a distinction is
necessary. 24 Moreover, the emphasis on interdependence with regard to resources
helps to explain why some kind of consensus can usually be reached over policy
issues, even when policy preferences among actors differ markedly. 25 For example,
there is a far greater need to achieve a consensus among policy actors if their
resources are highly interdependent. Hence, likely policy outcomes may be inferred
by examining the extent and nature of resource dependencies. Policy networks are
well equipped to capture the informal aspects of policy-making, too, since they
concentrate on all actors who are involved in the network. More importantly, the
focus on resource dependencies eliminates the a priori distinction between state
agencies and private interests which is so dominant in traditional policy analysis.
24 The importance of policy implementation, policy impact and evaluation in the policy circle is
for example discussed in B.W. Uogwood & L.A. Gunn, Policy Analysis for the Real World,
Oxford University Prees, 1984. Chapters seven and eight of the thesis demonstrate that these
aspects are highly relevant to EU policy-making.
25 For example, Hogwood & Gunn op. cit. noted, resource dependence forces participants to
compromise notion alludes to the common interest of participants, i.e. the search for a solution
to a policy problem.
Proponents of statist views such as Atkinson and Coleman have however been disquieted by this
trend, as is evident from this quote: "Progress toward a multi-level model of the policy process,
in which networks and communities play a critical role, will be hampered by a slavish devotion
to pluralist images of the state. Although the modern state may be a highly fragmented and
divided entity, it is not reducible to its parts nor can it be dissolved into a collection of policy
networks. In constitutional democracies, no policy-making institution is an entirely independent
entity. The state consists of a set of executive, administrative, deliberative and adjudicative
institutions whose peculiar character and relationship to one another will influence the
integration of policy communities, the structure of policy networks and the values nurtured in
both." {Atkinson & Coleman op.cit., p.165). Kassim argues along these lines, though less
bluntly, in respect of the "institutional density" of the EU which means "...that there is greater
scope for the institutions involved to devise strategies that reflect or distil specifically
institutional interests, or political sensitivities." {Kassim op.cit., p.22.) In view of the findings
in the previous two chapters, these authors' reservations are justified, at least as far as the EU is
concerned. Although there are numerous divisions between the various formal policy-makers,
there is evidence that they have, overall, retained a certain autonomy which may not be
adequately captured by individual policy networks studies, nor by an aggregation of these.
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Consequently, PNA is not based on preconceived assumptions about the nature of
the boundaries between the private and public spheres. This aspect of networks
analysis is particularly beneficial, since the findings in Chapter five revealed that the
relationship between the private and public spheres is varied, dynamic and often very
diffuse. The nature of resource dependencies tends to be reflected in the structural
organisation within policy networks and in the intensity of exchanges between
actors. Therefore, monitoring structural or interactive change will give an analyst
indications that the nature of resource dependencies is changing. Alternatively, if it
can be established that resource dependencies have changed, it will be possible to
anticipate structural and interactive change. While these linkages cannot explain
cause and effect relationships with regard to policy change, they are at least a
starting point for such investigations.
There is another, far more important advantage, which arises from the centrality of
the concept of resource dependency as espoused in PNA. The preoccupation with
research dependencies reflects a more basic preoccupation with the distribution of
power in policy processes. Re'source dependency forces policy actors to come
together and trade their resources. Those who possess a large number of resources
and/or highly sought after resources have more power to influence policy outcome
than those with minimal resources, because the former are in advantageous trading
positions. 27 An examination of the nature and extent of resources that actors possess
will thus provide some indication as to who influences policy outcome, and to what
extent. Since this is the central question with which policy analysts are concerned,
PNA has far more analytical potential than may be assumed at first sight. However,
However, the state agent versus non-state agent dichotomy can be tested within policy networks,
provided explicit attention is paid to the issue, because policy networks analysis neither assumes
that there is, nor that there is not, a distinction between these types of agents.
27 Confirmed in different language and context by Putnam's two-level game "theory".
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there are a number of factors which limit this potential to varying degrees. The most
important obstacles are outlined below and so are possible means of overcoming
them.
Despite the focus on resources, existing literature fails to clarify exactly what
counts, or does not count, as a resource. The easiest way to solve this problem is to
count 'anything tradable' as a resource, including such intangible resources as
legitimacy, public support. Yet, it is hard to measure some of these resources and to
evaluate their relative value in relation to other resources. This task is made all the
more difficult since the relative value of each resource is a function of the demand
for that resource within a particular policy network. For example, 'public support'
may be a more sought after resource in respect of environmental policy-making than
in respect of policy on technical standardisation. Similarly, technical expertise may
be a more valuable resource for health and safety issues rather than for policy-
making on industrial relations. A detailed examination of the kind of resources
required to produce a specific policy will provide signposts, but will not eliminate all
grey areas of analysis. Furtherntore, it is also necessary to carry out an audit of
resources in respect of each actor so that the existing resources can be contrasted
with the required resources. Within limits, this exercise then allows inferences as to
the relative value of each type of resource.
It is often very difficult to delineate individual policy networks because it is not
always immediately clear what constitutes resource dependencies and what amounts
to breaks in these resource dependencies. 28 For example, certain actors may have
resources that are relevant only at certain stages of the policy process, like the
28 These problems discussed for example in Atkinson & Coleman op.cit.; Kassim op.cit.;
Dowding op.cit., 1995. Peterson op.cit.
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implementation stage. Consequently, structural variations within networks may
arise. Others may consider that they have resources which are needed to produce
policy outcome, while key policy actors consider their resources as irrelevant. Given
these diffuse areas, analysts may find it difficult to decide objectively if certain policy
actors should be counted as part of the cluster of policy actors that makes up a
policy network. It may be misleading, too, to analyse individual policy networks in
isolation, since they influence one another and can even overlap to the extent that it
becomes difficult to judge if they are still individual policy networks or have become
two-tiered, but merged entities. These difficulties, which are unfortunate, but
limited, are explored in greater detail in Chapter seven in relation to food policy-
making in the EU.
6.2.3.	 Model or Theory?
Is PNA a fully developed theoretical tool with explanatory potential or is it first and
foremost a model whose merits arise largely from describing and ordering data?
Since PNA provides some indications of the locations and levels of power among
policy actors it would be unfair to dismiss it as a purely descriptive device.
However, its theoretical potential is in so far very limited as power distributions at
the meso-level cannot be treated independently. They are mediated directly by
power constellations at the macro-level as well as by the ways in which policy actors
use, or misuse, their resources, that is by policy behaviour. Therefore, meso-level
analysis must be embedded in both macro- and micro-level theories in order to
achieve its full explanatory potential. This point has been accepted by most
proponents of policy networks analysis, including Rhodes and Marsh. 29 For
example, Raab noted that
29 Dowding's (op.cit.) recent review of the appropriate literature substantiates this point, but see
also Marsh op.cit., both 1995 papers.
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"...we are confronted with the problem of how to understand what goes on within
policy networks - construed as pluralist, corporatist, or in any other way - and
between these sites of interaction and their encompassing structures.30
Similarly, Marsh stressed that
"...in order to explain the membership of networks, and the outcomes of them, the
policy network model needs to be integrated with both micro-level and macro-level
analysis."3'
If PNA cannot provide a theory of power in its own right because it is only one of
several levels of interlinked analysis, it could be concluded that its theoretical
potential is very limited after all. This may be true particularly for EU policy-making
because of the well documented tendency by ministers in the CoM to engage in
extensive policy trades-off. Since such deals introduce new variables, so expanding
the 'policy game' beyond individual networks, they can alter entirely expected policy
outcome within a particular network. Consequently, analysis of individual networks
may raise more questions than it can answer, unless it is adapted in such a way that
it can take account of exogenous forces that mediate the internal workings of the
network.32
PNA has thus limited explanatory potential in its own right and it would be incorrect
to label it a 'theory of policy-making'. However, for the following reasons it would
be equally inappropriate to argue that PNA has no intrinsic explanatory potential at
all. First, PNA supplies a number of clues in respect of power distribution within
specifically defined parts of a political system. These clues can be used to construct
30 Raab op.cit., p.78.
31 Marsh op.cit., p.3.
32 See Section 6.4.
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an approximate picture of power distribution within a political system, especially if
several policy networks are investigated. Macro- and micro-level analyses can build
on these markers. Second, within each policy network some predictions can be made
about the location of power if the resources of the policy actors are matched against
the resources needed to create a workable policy. If the policy resources of an actor
overlap significantly with those required to produce a policy outcome, then this
actor has more potential power than others to influence the policy process. If an
empirical investigation indicates that this is not the case, then explanations for the
discrepancy between the potential and actual power have to be found. It will be
imperative to draw upon macro- and micro-level theories in order to account
adequately for the differences, since the internal dynamics of the meso-level of
analysis should produce an outcome which is at odds with the actual empirical
findings. However, the extent and nature to which anticipated and actual findings
vary provides important signposts as to what type of macro- and micro-level
explanations may cast light on findings that are, at first sight, obftiscatory.
Policy analysts usually acknowledge the potential of PNA, but also emphasise the
theoretical limits of meso-level analysis. Subsequently, some of them have linked
PNA to broader theoretical considerations at either the macro-level and/or the
micro-level of analysis. Theorising has taken a number of different formats and has
drawn on material from many disciplines within the social sciences. The most
pertinent contributions are evaluated briefly in Section 6.3.
6.3.	 Introducing Theory Into Policy Networks Analysis
Benson, Rhodes and Marsh have been at the forefront of linking PNA with macro-
level theories of the state. All three have argued that policy options and processes
within policy networks were severely restricted by the power structures that exist at
the systemic level. Consequently, these power structures helped to shape networks.
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All three theorists have probably overstated the restraints of the systemic power
structures (political or economic), thereby producing final analyses which differ only
marginally from more conventional theories of the state. For example, Benson
constructed an 'interorganizational theory of the state' which is essentially neo-
pluralist since he argued that the "...complex of interoganizational resource
dependencies [i.e. networks] constitutes a structure of class domination."33
Rhodes locates policy networks analysis within a quasi-statist framework since he
underlines the extent to which national governments shape individual policy
networks. Although he pays some attention to broader economic, informal political
and ideological pressures, he credits these with very limited mediating powers.34
Rhodes' contribution should lay to rest concerns that PNA is "...hampered by a
slavish devotion to pluralist images of the state." 35 However, his statist leanings
seem somewhat incompatible with his claim that policy networks analysis should be
"...located within very different macro-theoretical approaches". 36 Furthermore,
Rhodes emphasis on government structures have led him to neglect increasingly the
actual exchange dynamics at the neso-level and hence, some of his discussion are
now firmly re-located within the far more static realm of structural-functionalist
discourse. This development has been criticised, since it undermines some of the
potential of PNA. Thus, Rhodes prematurely assumed that his contextualisation
would silence criticisms that "...the concept of networks is used descriptively and
that the [intrinsic] theoretical scope is narrow."37
33 Benson op.cit., 1982, p.176.
' See for example, Rhodes op.cit. "Power Dependence"..., 1986, pp.35-43 and 408-10 as well as
Rhodes op.cit., 1992, pp.48-77 where Rhodes emphasises that changes in the national
government environment affected outcomes in respect of local government policy networks.
35 Atkinson and Coleman op.cit., p.167.
36 Rhodes op.cit., 1990, p.309
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Some of Marsh's contextualisations are reminiscent of Rhodes' work. However,
very recent work by Marsh appears to extend the search for suitable macro-level
theories considerably. 38 Furthermore, he acknowledges increasingly the need to look
at micro-level theories. 39 In this respect, Wilks and Wright wholeheartedly agree
with him:
"To understand how and why a policy network operates, it is necessary to understand
the 'unwritten constitution' which guides the behaviour of the actors towards each
other and influences the strategic deployment of their resources."40
However, they both rejected
"...the notion of grand theories of the state arguing that in the sectors they analysed
across Europe there was little correlation between the degree of government
intervention in different nations and the categorization of the state in those nations as
interventionist or non-interventionist. 41
With regard to micro-level theorising, Wilks and Wright have drawn heavily on
rational choice theory, although, contrary to scholars such as Dowding or Salisbury,
they conceded that social and cultural conditioning can mediate rational, self-
interested choices considerably. 42 Other scholars, such as Raab, have followed in the
" ibid., pp.308-9.
38 Marsh op.cii., 1995, both unpublished references
ibid.
40 M. Wright op.cit., p.609.
41 Dowding op.cit., pp.140.
42 See for example the discussion on British farming interests in, K. Dowding, Rational Choice
and Political Power, Edward Elgar, 1991 or R. Salisbury's article on exchange theory, a rather
naive version of rational choice theory that maintains that policy actors are more concerned
with self-interested gains within their immediate environment than with policy outcomes. {R.
Salisbury, 'An Exchange Theory of Interest Groups', Midwest Journal of Political Science, 13,
1969, pp.27-S.
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footsteps of Wilks and Wright. 43 As explained in Chapter three, this synthesis
actually enhances behavioural analysis since it links it with the broader question of
the structure-agent relationship and avoids thus excessive essentialism. Raab seems
particularly aware of this issue:
We are also brought face to face with a classic dilenuna in social science, the
relationship between action and structure., which underlies some of the difficulties
inherent in attempts to find an adequate conceptualisation of policy networks....The
problem of action and structure is possibly resolved through the analysis of
structuring, or structuration, in which the focus is upon process in time, seen in terms
of events...
Few scholars have developed the structure-agent debate in great detail, but Sabatier
is a notable exception. This American policy analyst developed explanations based
on an interpretation of the policy process as a belief system. In Sabatier's world,
participants in the policy process are strongly influenced by values and beliefs, but
they are not just manipulative pawns because, over time, they discover
".deficiencies in the existing program and then develop a series of strategies to deal
with them." 45 Thus, they undergo a "...process of policy learning..." which affects
their individual behaviour in such a way that they become more attuned to the needs
and values of other policy actors. In turn, these changed attitudes lead to different
interactions at the group level and at the level of group and government exchanges,
with the result that policy demands converge increasingly and that policy-making
becomes gradually more consensual. 46 Although competing 'belief groups' continue
to exist, this process leads to a reduced potential for policy change. Sabatier referred
Raab op.cit.
Raab, op.cif., p.78.
PA. Sabatier, 'Top-Down and Bottom-Up Approaches to Implementation Research: a Critical
Analysis and Suggested Synthesis', Journal of Public Policy, 6(1), January-March 1986, p.38.
46 ibid., p.38.
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to this phenomenon as an advocacy coalition framework.47 There is a strong
'technocratic undercurrent' to Sabatier's framework, since he emphasised that
learning and subsequent policy convergence was often stimulated and directed by
(sometimes competing) expert advise. 48 For example, the current preference given to
sustainable development as a form of managing underdeveloped areas of the world
illustrates belief congruence, based on expert advise, as identified by Sabatier and
other proponents of the advocacy coalition framework. However, not all change is
initiated by expert advice. Exogenous change, such as an economic crisis or political
transformations elsewhere in the system, can provoke a learning response, too.
Proponents of the advocacy coalition framework could be accused of logical
inconsistency, because they use social conditioning as a point of departure, but
subsequently underline the importance of learning as a means to policy solution and,
often, associated policy change. However, they have in fact conceptually linked
these two elements, albeit rather vaguely. Apparently, policy participants have
certain basic core beliefs that are not affected by learning. The 'stickiness' of core
beliefs also explains why, in some nstances, competing advocacy coalitions are
unable to compromise and, hence, policy problems remain unresolved.49
ibid.
48 The advocacy coalition framework is conceptually closely related to the notion of 'epistemic
communities' which emphasises learning processes in foreign policy, based on appropriate
expert advise, that lead to policy convergence, thereby facilitating the emergence of
international agreements, e.g. GATT, environmental resolutions, such as agreed upon at the
Rio de Janeiro and Berlin Conferences, food aid. {See for example, a special issue of
International Organization, 46(1), 1992, dedicated to the 'epistemic conununities' debate.)
See for example, P.A. Sabatier, 'From Vague Consensus to Clearly Differentiated Coalitions:
Environmental Policy at Lake Tahoe, 1964-1985', in P.A. Sabatier & H.C. Jenkins-Smith (eds.)
Policy Change and Learning: an Advocacy Coalition Approach, Westview, 1993. This account
describes the unbridgeable gap between environmentalist and capitalist advocacy coalitions over
the fate of Lake Tahoe, USA.
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The focus on learning probably underestimates certain behavioural aspects, such as
political shrewdness. 5° Furthermore, proponents of the advocacy coalition
framework tend to downplay the possibility of coalition-building between interests
whose beliefs do not converge. 5 ' Yet, coalition building without convergence exists,
as can be seen from the following comment an interviewee from a European
consumers group:
"Consumer organisations form temporary lobbies with others on specific issues - for
example with footwear manufacturers over the VAT zero rate or tape manufacturers
on copyright. These can be effective."
The interviewee confirmed that these alliances were political and had little or
nothing to do with belief congruence. Such alliances exploit coinciding interests,
and not converging beliefs.
Despite these shortcomings, the advocacy coalition framework is a useful antidote to
the excessive determinism that characterises so many behavioural theories.
Furthermore, Sabatier refines the usially general structure-agent debate in that,
unlike most other scholars, he develops a means by which social conditioning and
free will can be linked conceptually. Therefore, his work contributes significantly to
the general debate on actors' behaviour, although it must be applied o empirical
situations alongside theories of behaviour that emphasise the economic (rational
choice) or political (bargaining theories) self-interest which actors can, and do,
display during policy games.
50 A point which was for example made by Moe who attempted to synthesise exchange theoiy and
belief congruence theory at the intra-organisational level. {T. Moe, The Organization of
Interests, University of Chicago Press, 1980.)
A criticism which was also raised in Hann's recent discussion of Sabatier's theory. (See A.
Hann, 'Sharpening up Sabatier: Belief Systems and Public Policy', Politics, 15(1), 1995, pp.19-
26.)
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This short discussion on the interaction between various levels of analysis confirms
earlier empirical and theoretical findings as follows: no individual macro- or micro-
level framework seems to explain policy outcomes adequately, even when
examination is refined by concentrating on meso-level analysis, too. Therefore, none
of the frameworks presented can be labelled strictly a theory, because it is not
generalisable. Hence, should theorising be abandoned on the grounds that it is not
leading anywhere? As is evident from Vincent's deliberations, such a conclusion
would signal a profound misunderstanding of the function of theories within the field
of social sciences:
"Social and political theories tend to differ from scientific theories. It is much harder
to say that social and political theories are true or false, partly because the falsity of
one theoiy will be premised on the assumption of another theory, assumptions which
again may be judged as false by others. Social and political theories tend actually to
constitute the reality of politics; there is no independent reality to which they apply or
which will adjudicate between the competing claims to truth. We explain and
understand ourselves in politics in theoretical terms. Theory thus has a constitutive
role. Scientific theories, on the contraiy,...Social and political theories, unlike those
in science, are not really empirically testable. The test of social and political theory is
its fruitfulness in explaining the social world... "52
Surely, the last statement authenticates that political analysts need to (a) draw a
picture of the social world - or whatever aspect of it that is being researched - and
(b) explain the dynamics of this picture as well as possible, by using as many
promising explanatory tools as possible. 'Promising' in this context limits the choice
of explanatory tools to those whose content bears at least superficially some
52 Vincent op.cit., p.40.
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resemblance to empirical phenomena. As demonstrated in this chapter, the
introduction of meso-level analysis in the form of PNA, helps to determine what are,
and are not, promising explanatory tools because it provides the analyst with crucial
additional information, including hints on how policies should be shaped, if they
were not mediated by macro- and micro-level influences.
6.4.	 Policy Networks Anal ysis and Policy-Making in the European Union:
Locating Meso-level Analysis within Macro- and Micro-level
Approaches
This chapter has introduced PNA as a comparatively sophisticated meso-level
framework that provides a suitable point of departure for analysis of data on interest
representation and policy-making, including the material collected for this research
project. 54 Yet, it has also become evident that PNA will need to be integrated in a
multi-level analytical framework in order to make the most of the data. For this
reason, PNA must be regarded as a complement, and not an alternative, to the
various other models, theories and approaches that have been explored in this thesis.
However, any discussions on the complementarity of the various levels of analysis
must be postponed until an incontestable case for the applicability of PNA with
regard to EU policy-making has been made. Earlier in this chapter, it has been
argued that PNA is a suitable analytical tool for the study of EU policy-making,
because it is concerned with the interactions between all kinds of political
For example, it makes sense to look at neofunctionalism in the context of European integration.
However, it is pointless to seek to explain European integration in terms of absolutist
interpretations of the state.
For reasons of convenience and to avoid any semantic confusion, any further discussions of
PNA in the thesis are based on the Rhodes-Marsh model and the ways in which these two
scholars have linked terminology and concepts.
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organisations and government. Yet, this argument creates some complications,
because the EU is a unique political system which does not have an ordinary
government. Hence, the case for PNA is not as self-evident as it might seem at first
sight.
Given that nation states have become the dominant political entities over which
'governments' have authority, the notion of government is now associated closely
with the concept of 'nation state', at least in everyday language. Moreover, in liberal
democracies, the notion of government is associated with electoral accountability.
The 'government' of the European Union does not befit these perceptions. Indeed,
there is no 'proper government' in the EU, given the peculiar institutional and
functional make-up of this political entity. However, upon closer inspection of the
notion of 'government', it becomes clear that the absence of a unitary body of
governors does not preclude the use of PNA in the context of the EU. Whatever
connotations the term 'government' has in everyday language, its meaning is in fact
neither limited to the description of a unitary body, nor is it necessarily associated
with authority to rule over a specific territory or to rule in a particular way. 55 One of
the meanings of "government" is synonymous to the concept of "governance" and
the latter is defined either as "a method of management, a system of regulations" or
as "the office, function or power of ruling with authority". Although the EU does
not possess a body that corresponds to conventional notions of government, its
institutional and constitutional arrangements are fully compatible with the two
definitions for the term "governance".
Although PNA is applicable in the context of the EU, any analysis that fails to take
account of the idiosyncratic make-up of the European body politic is unsatisfactory
See the various definitions of 'government' in, for example, The Concise Oxford English
Dictionaiy, op. cit.
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because governance of any kind within the EU is taking place within a national
versus supranational dichotomy. 56 This dichotomy shapes policy processes and
outcomes and cannot be ignored. Hence, it is necessary to adjust the Marsh-Rhodes
model of PNA to this Euro-specific environment. Initially, the model can be
expanded usefully by adding a category of classification for the level of interest that
policy actors represent, that is subnational, national, supranational. Evidently, it is
necessary to classify informal as well as formal policy actors in this manner. This
extra variable provides information that can then be assessed in the light of
'integration theories', so illuminating certain aspects of the perennial debate on the
distribution of power between subnational, national and supranational forces in the
EU.
Since PNA is concerned with the interaction of aggregated interests and government
within specified resource dependent clusters, it is a single level analytical tool. Yet,
as a result of the dichotomous nature of EU policy-making, the interaction between
aggregated interests and 'government' in the EU does not take place only at a single
level. Occasionally, single level exchanges are involved but, more often than not,
two, or even three-level exchanges take place. This point can be illustrated as
follows. Many national companies present their policy interests to representatives of
national governments only, even if the policy in question is made at the European
level. They expect the national governments to take account of their interests and
speak on their behalf at European level negotiations. Therefore, the companies in
question are involved in single level exchanges only, whereas the government
representatives are engaged in two-level exchanges. If individual companies
represent their interests both at the level of national and European levels, they are,
correspondingly, also involved in two-level exchanges. Similarly some Euro-
56 This claim is substantiated by the data presented in the thesis and has been confirmed also by
many of the studies on the EU which have been referred to in earlier chapters of the thesis.
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organisations do not have national equivalents with whom they have to engage in
exchanges. Their only interactions are at the European level and, hence, these are
single-level actions, too.
There are three ways in which the multi-level nature of interaction can be tackled,
but only one of them is fully satisfactory. In theory, PNA could be broken down so
that each network would be concerned with single-level exchanges only. Thus,
PNAs, concerned with European policy, would incorporate only those policy actors
that aim to influence policy outcome directly. The contributions of those policy
actors who solely engage in interaction at the national level would be analysed in the
context of different, exclusively national policy networks. This approach is not
entirely unacceptable but it introduces artificial fragmentation of an interdependent
policy process, thereby disregarding existing resource dependencies and patterns of
interaction that are directed by resource interdependence.
It is possible to argue that the multi-level nature of European policy-making makes
it, after all impossible to use PNA and that other analytical tools, such as a multi-
game approach, should be used instead. 57 This is a feasible option, but has certain
draw-backs associated with conventional multi-game approaches, namely the focus
on specific key bargaining situations, rather than day to day policy-making, and on
formal policy actors; the limited level to which multi-level game approaches have
developed means of classification. Moreover, multi-level game approaches are based
on the assumption that exchanges take place in an international, and not a
supranational milieu. Yet, each of these environments creates different conditions
under which policy-making takes place.
See Chapter three, especially the discussions on linkage politics and multi-level games, as
espoused for example by Putnam, op. cit.
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Instead of rejecting either PNA or multi-game approaches, it is possible to use the
two analytical tools simultaneously. Although Putnam and other IR specialists have
used multi-level game approaches in order to illuminate international interactions,
the basic logic of multi-level games is not tied to any specific bargaining context and
is, thus, applicable to almost any situation where political interactions and bargains
take place. Hence, the logic of multi-level games can be applied successfully within
policy networks so as to cast light on the ways in which the multi-level games, that
some policy actors play inside the network, shape their behaviour, their positions,
their functions, and, thus, indirectly, the overall nature of the network itself.
The juxtaposition of multi-level game approaches and PNA creates synergies which
facilitate a more sophisticated analysis than each individual tool can provide. Yet, it
will still be necessary to link the extended PNA to macro- and micro-level theories.
With regard to micro-level theories, it is best to bear in mind that policy behaviour is
not shaped by single forces. 58 In view of the dichotomous nature of the EU, macro-
level theorising must be linked directly to the various integration theories outlined in
chapter three, whatever their limitations. As seen in Chapter three, this exercise will
involve multi-level games approaches, too, but in a different context, that is in the
process of analysing the ways in which international style bargaining in the Council
of Ministers and the European Council mediate the potential policy outcomes of
individual networks and are, themselves, affected by the particular shapes of
individual policy networks. Given the tendency for trades-off and policy package
deals in the EU, this stage of analysis is crucial!
In addition, 'theories of the state', such as pluralism, neo-pluralism, elitism, need to
be considered too, since they are concerned with elucidating aspects of the nature of
See the various conceptual discussions on policy behaviour as well as the empirical material
presented in the thesis. Both set of data confirm this point.
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the EU which are entirely different from those illuminated by integration theories.
Integration theories are concerned with the level of vertical integration or
fragmentation; 'theories of the state' are concerned with the overall distribution of
power within a political entity. As is evident from the terminology, 'theories of the
state' are traditionally concerned with analysis at the level of nation states, but only
because the latter are currently the predominant political entities across the world
and not, because they can be applied to the 'state' only.59
There is no doubt that the analytical framework, which has been elaborated here, is
extremely complicated. However, since policy-making in the EU is complex, a
differentiated analytical framework is necessary, whatever the practical drawbacks.
Yet, it is impossible to examine sufficient empirical data to test this analytical
framework fully within a single piece of research, especially one that is limited in
scope and length. However, the subsequent chapter provides an opportunity to test
some aspects of the analytical framework, especially the extended policy networks
approach, albeit not exhaustively.
a more detailed justification for this stance, see Chapters four and five.
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over a century. 2 The main objective of food regulation throughout history has been
the safeguarding of public health. More recently, regulation also aims to inform
customers of the composition and quality of products.3
Despite immense amounts of research, the extent of regulation needed to achieve
these aims cannot be determined easily, particularly since many areas of food policy-
making are characterised by intense scientific controversies and disagreements.
Consequently, attitudes towards food regulation have evolved idiosyncratically
within individual member states, mediated by different ideological, historical, legal
and scientific traditions.4 Subsequent differences in policy-making have been
reinforced by a marked divergence in national and sub-national consumption
For brief histories of food regulation, see for example, D. Coates, 'Food Law: Brussels,
Whitehall and Townhall', in Lewis, D. & Wallace, H. (eds.) Policies into Practice, Heinemann,
1984, pp.144-60; J. Horton, 'EEC Food Laws - will Barriers be Removed After 1992?',
Presentation at a Symposium organised by Leatherhead Food RA, November 1989; D. Denton,
Tood Policies Go Local', The Food Magazine, April/June 1990, pp.10-i, or, J. Hawthorn, 'The
Food Industry: a Backward Glance', Nutrition Bulletin, 16(2), May 1991, pp.55-9. The earliest
food legislation (Act) in a member state is thought to date back to 1266 when, in England, the
sale of underweight bread and "unsound meat" was prohibited. However the beginnings of
modern food law legislation in the UK can be traced back to the Food and Drugs Act of 1875.
Other EU member states begin to legislate around more or less at the same time or later.
For more detailed discussions of these aims, see for example J. Horton, 'UK Food Laws - the
1991 Situation Examined', presentation at a Symposium organised by Leatherhead Food RA,
April 1991; P. Lips & F. Marr, Wegweiser durch dos Lebensmittelrecht, Deutscher
Taschenbuch Verlag, 1990, 3. Auflage, or, C. Cockbill, 'Harmonisation of Food Law',
Presentation at the Conference of the National Association of Master Bakers and the Scottish
Association of Master Bakers, Februaiy 1990.
In some areas, such as labelling, there has been a marked convergence of attitudes (although
not to the extent that there is no longer conflict; see footnote 50), but in other areas differences
remain as entrenched as ever. Moreover, differences arise in respect of novel areas of food
policy-making such as genetic engineering of foodstuffs or food irradiation, too. For more
extensive discussions on the implications of national differences and attempts to overcome
them, see notably International Marketing and Economic Services (UK) Limited, 1992 and the
Master Baker: Export Potential Arising from the Single European Market, Report prepared for
the National Association of Master Bakers, 1990; C.P. Pappas, 'A Competitive Study of Laws
and Regulations on Compositional Requirements for Cheese in the EC Member States', British
Food Journal, 90(4), 1988, pp.163-5; E. Morris, 'Labelling and Foods for Particular
Nutritional Uses', Paper presented at a Symposium organised by Leatherhead Food RA,
November 1989.
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patterns. 5 In turn, these differences continue to justifj particular processing methods
which, often, require specially adapted legal provisions.6
Thus, food policy-making evolved within strong national traditions but, following
the signature of the EEC Treaty, there was a broad consensus that food policy-
making should in future be regulated at the European level, given the economic
importance of the food and drinks industry. The policy-makers must have been
aware of the ambitious nature of this decision, since, in theory, they decided to apply
the principle of subsidiarity in order to avoid excessive conflict and imposed
In recent decades, consumption patterns have developed in two, contradictory, ways. On the one
hand, increased travel and global marketing has led to greater variety in consumption habits.
On the other hand, a few global products have emerged, namely coca cola, philadelphia cheese
and fast food products, so signalling a limited homogenisation of tastes. Yet, despite these two
trends, cultural (often local, regional or national) culinary preferences continue to thrive. Both
interviewees from Kraftfood and Mr. Monbiot emphasised that global products remained very
much the exception and that even these are often slightly adjusted to cater for local tastes. For
example Nestlé Instant Coffee comes in more than 14 varieties in Western countries alone
(Europe, USA, Canada). For more detailed studies on recent trends in consumption patterns,
see for example C.P. Gebhard, 'Strategic Outlook for the 1990s: the Food and Drink Industry',
London, 9 February 1988; ByE, Jahresbericht 1989, Bonn, 1990; Sir P. Carey, 'Changing Food
Patterns in the 1990s: New Consu,ner Habits and the Implications for Retail and Processing
Firms', Presentation at the World Economic Forum Annual Conference, February 1990; B.
Saunders, 'The Future Role of the European Consumer', British Food Journal, 93(2), 1991,
pp.21-4, or, J. O'Connor, H. Wilkins & B. Boyce, 'Food Consumption Patterns Towards the
Millenniwn', in Brace & Patten (eds.) op.cit., pp.58-60 (photocopy in Appendix V).
The varied nature of eating habits is apparently replicated in other areas of consumer behaviour
too, e.g. with regard to clothing, preferences of toys, etc., thus confirming the continued
existence of cultural heterogeneity among Europeans. On this point, see for example, H. Daems,
'The Strategic Implications of Europe 1992', Long Range Planning, 23(3), June 1990, pp.41-8.
Food colours and food additives are two areas that reflect idiosyncratic developments in
processing, but also in consumer preferences. (Consequently, they have become areas of
conflict at the European level (see footnotes 48 and 50 ).} Often, specific additives have helped
processors to produce food stuffs that are attractive to certain consumer groups, but not to
others. Mushy peas are a classic example and so is the "British banger". For further information
on such idiosyncrasies, see for example, EP News, 'Food for Thought in Colourants Row', 8-12
March 1993, p.4, which provides a synopsis of the battle to keep peas green. EP News, 'We're
not swallowing grey frozen chips!', 14-18 November 1994, p.2. tells a similar story, but in
respect of phosphate based additives that preserve the appetising colour of frozen potato
products. R. Watson, 'Brought to the Market', The European, 23-27 December 1992, p.39
recounted the - eventually successful battle - to safeguard the British 'banger'.
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homogenisation. 7 However, at that stage, this principle was not anchored in the
constitution, nor was it really taken into account in practice. Despite the problems of
overcoming national differences, the Commission increasingly insisted on recipe-
type legislation, regardless of opposition from food processors and inspite of the
Commission's rhetorical commitment to remove all technical barriers that hindered
EU intra-trade of foodstuffs. 8 Inevitably, disagreements were rife and progress was
limited and less than 50 directives and regulations relating to foodstuffs had been
passed by the late 1 970s, although the first EEC piece of legislation had been on
food colouring. 9 This lack of progress was particularly frustrating, given that the
Commission had set up numerous working groups and a Standing Committee on
Foodstuffs shortly after the inauguration of the EEC. However, the limited process
can easily be understood, given the rigidity of recipe-type legislation, the
idiosyncratic nature of food policy-making in the member states and the continued
national self-interest that permeates every area of EU policy-making.
The major disagreements had related to basics, such as the extent of regulation,'° as
well as to specific issues such as the types or composition of fat, used in the
See for example, A. Swinbank, 'Subsidiarily and Food: The Political Economy of Mutual
Recognition', Paper presented at the ESRC Conference on the Evolution of Rules for a Single
Market, University of Exeter, 8-11 September 1994.
8 Recipe legislation prescribes all ingredients for a food or drinks product in great detail.
See Chapter one, Section 1.3 as well as D.J. Jukes, 'The Structure of Food Law Enforcement in
the United Kingdom', British Food Journal, 90(6), 1988, pp.239-49.
Food processors fear extensive regulation because it tends to add extra cost to processing and
reduces freedom, in respect of product range, innovation, processing methods, etc. (See for
example, K. Anderson & R. Tyers, 'Effects of Gradual Food Policy Reforms in the 1 990s',
European Review ofAgricultural Economics, 19(1), 1992, pp.1-24. } Yet, as mentioned above,
they are also worried about too much deregulation because they associate it with extra
competition. See for example the comments by two small UK processors who completed the
questionnaire on The Sin gle European Market and the Food Industry. "UK Food Industry has
already lost a great deal due to European imports."; "flooded by cheap products from other
countries".
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production of certain goods. Broadly speaking, processors and retailers have
favoured as little regulation as possible, while consumers, environmentalists and
producers (in the form of CAP) have favoured greater levels of regulation. These
trends have been reflected also within the Commission, with DG ifi being the most
free market oriented Directorate-General that is involved directly in legislating on
foodstuffs. Ideological and political cleavages exist in the European Parliament, too,
where the Committees on Agriculture, Fisheries and Rural Development and on
Environment, Public Health and Consumer Protection have divergent political
agendas." Moreover, the latter is in itself divided between non-interventionists and
interventionists, with a tendency to be dominated by the latter. 10 Finally, divisions are
equally marked in the CoM, since some governments have been pushing for more
deregulation and/or subsidiarity than others, emphasising the need for flexible
processing in the light of ever more demanding and sophisticated consumers. On the
whole, this view is endorsed by the 'classical' non-interventionists, that is the UK,
Denmark, Ireland, but it is prevalent on occasions elsewhere, for example in the
Dutch or German governments. Therefore, it must be underlined that none of these
differences are cast in stone and, depending on individual circumstances, views on
the correct level of regulation and alliances change.' 2 In the light of such marked
Nevertheless, they appear to be concerned principally over extra regulation and cost which is
evident from a recent article in the EP News. {EP News, Food Law Concern', 19-23 April
1993, p.3.} and from comments by other questionnaire respondents: "New regulations will
influence production negatively." (small UK processor); "improvement to premises necessaiy;
extra cost" (small UK processor); "complying with legislation is costly".
Several interviewees expressed this view, including the personal assistant to the German MEP
referred to in Chapter five and the interviewee from the British Gin Rectifiers and Distillers
Association, interviewed on two occasions in autumn 1992 (Andover).
12 On this point, see also the more general discussion in Chapter four, Section 4.4.2., on
interventionism, as well as the references in Chapter five to environmental and consumer
lobbies which confirmed that these managed to push the UK government into demanding
legislation for the welfare of animals during life transport to another EU countiy. All
interviewees from the FDF confirmed that they had worked hand in hand with consumer and
environmental groups and the government on this issue,.. .at least up to a certain point!
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variety and fluidity, it has been necessary to base discussions on the nature of food
policy-making in the EU on empirical observation. The major findings of this
undertaking are presented here a holistic approach has been adopted which included
considerations on policy formulation, implementation and impact. The data were
analysed in order to cast further light on the general discussions in Chapters four and
five and to test some of the theoretical deliberations espoused in Chapter six.
Initially the entire food sector was treated as a resource interdependent single policy
network, but subsequent analysis indicated that this view is controversial and that
there may be sufficient breaks in resource dependence to have to disaggregate food
policy-making further into sub-sectoral networks. Controversy arises in part from
difficulties in defining resource dependence, an issue which was considered in the
previous chapter and will be discussed again in the latter parts of the current chapter.
Another issue, that revealed national preferences and interventionist tendencies, concerned
grape vines. The Bundesverband Deutscher Weinbauer, Bonn, was worried about the free
movement of vines across EC countries and argued that checks in Southern European countries
were not adequate to safeguard the health of Europe's vineyards. The trade association lobbied
the German government until the latter raised the issue at the European level and demanded
some form of protection for German vines. This point confirms that trade associations can put
issues onto the agendas of politicians. It may confirm, also, the slightly prejudiced attitudes of
some Northern Europeans towards their Southern counterparts. {The information on this issue
was provided by the two employees working (in 1991) at the Bundesverband Deutscher
Weinbauer, who were interviewed for this study in summer 1991. At the time of the interview,
no firm decisions had been taken as yet.)
Bananas, too, provoked the British government, together with its French and Spanish
counterparts, to adopt interventionists tendencies. The three countries formed an alliance so as
to ensure that regulation would protect their markets from being flooded by cheap "dollar"
bananas, following the onset of the SEM. Their fears were quite justified since banana prices in
the UK, France and Spain had been artificially high, due to specific arrangements with (former)
colonies and the growers in the Canaiy Islands, respectively. On the other hand, the Germans,
who consume more bananas than any other EU citizens, had enjoyed the cheaper "dollar"
bananas for years and opposed the three countries on this issue, together with the big three
multinationals in the banana trade, that is Del Monte, Chiquita and Dole. However, a
compromise deal was eventually struck which continues to favour the protectionist
arrangements with (ex-)colonies and the Canaries, albeit to a lesser degree. On the complicated
issue of the 'banana' war - which also demonstrates that multinationals do not always get their
way, especially if their demands are politically not acceptable - see for example, J. Pettifer,
'Going Bananas', The Guardian, 23 March 1993, special inset; J. Woli 'EU Calls Truce in
Banana Wars as Four Latin-American Countries Sign Deal', The Guardian, 30 March 1994,
p.14; CEC, WEI3I/94, and, Pedler op.cit., 1994, Ch. 3.
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7.2.	 From Euro-Recipes to Horizontal Framework Legislation
During the first decade of food policy-making it became evident that dirigiste,
recipe-type legislating produced virtually unworkable policies and hindered, rather
than furthered, integration. The problems with which food and drinks processors
were faced as a result of this narrow approach are symbolised by the following
complaint: "It has taken 14 years to agree a Jams Directive, so how much longer will
it take to deal with all other foodstuffs?" 3 Hence, there was soon widespread
consensus that this approach was not suited to create a genuine internal market for
foodstuffs. However, by the time the problems were recognised, the dirigiste
approach had been institutionalised to the extent that is was nearly impossible to
challenge it, particularly since it served the self-interest of some parties involved,
namely the over enthusiastic team of Commission officials who were responsible for
food policy. However, it would be erroneous and unfair to blame them alone for the
lack of change in the way in which European food policy was made. Although food
processors objected largely to prescriptive policy-making, many of them were
frightened of the impact that a genuinely open food market might have on their
business fortunes. Since lack of progress ensured that extensive, if sometimes
invisible, protectionism continued to thrive, they were not as committed to progress
as might have been expected. This underlying resistance overspilled on occasions to
the appropriate ministries in the member states, particularly since most of these were
dominated by the interests and culture of food producers, and not processors. As
explained in Chapter five, the former tended to favour dirigisme to various extents,
particularly at the level of national policy-making. Thus, the superficial agreement
Cockbill op.cit.
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that change was necessary did not, in practice, lead to any significant inroads into
the way in which food policy-making in the EU operated.
Serious assaults on recipe-type harmonisation began only following the re-definition
of harmonisation, the adoption of the principle of mutual recognition and the
introduction of horizontal framework legislation in the late 1970s.' 4 This
development mirrored the constitutive changes in the EC, referred to in Chapter
two, and gave new impetus to the task of integrating the European food and drinks
sector. Indeed, Lord Cockfield's White Paper on the completion of the internal
market included a statement of intention to give special attention to legislation
concerned with foodstuffs.' 5 Moreover, in November 1985 the Commission
produced a detailed White Paper for the establishment of an integrated market in the
food and drinks area. The size and scope of this ambitious paper symbolised the
continued significance attributed to this policy sector.' 6 In the event, the majority of
proposals were welcomed by the various interested parties, but some policies, as
well as some policy details, have caused intense debates among policy actors,
especially with regard to scientific ambiguities and levels of regulation.'7
See Chapter two of the thesis. For early evidence of this change, see e.g. D. Welch, Prom Euro-
Beer to Newcastle Brown; a Review of European Conununity Action to Dismantle Divergent
"Food" Laws', Journal of Com,non Market Studies, 22(1), 1983, pp.47-70; for more recent
evidence, see Food and Agricultural Organisation of the United Nations, 'The Single European
Market', CCP 9 1/19, April 1991; Swinbank op.cit.
S. Fallows, Towards 1992: Completing the EEC Internal Market for Food, Horton Publishing,
1988, or, Single Market News, 'Food Law: Progress in Harmonisation of Directives', winter
1990, p.'8.
16 There were over 120 proposals relating to this specific area of legislation
17 Many of the more controversial issues are referred to in the course of this chapter.
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Notably, the pressures for recipe-type legislation have not fully disappeared. There is
some concern that mutual recognition and horizontal framework legislation are not
leading to a genuine integrated market, since they perpetuate differences at the
national level, ironically often to the detriment of national producers.' 8 Given the
protectionist undercurrents that have characterised the interactions of food policy
actors at the European level, these concerns are still smoke-screens, at least in part.
"Mutual recognition does break down trade barriers, but from the perspective of
manufacturers this does not create a single market. This is because national rules
continue to regulate product characteristics of goods manufactured and marketed
within a Member State, whereas imported products are subject to different rules."19
The case against mutual recognition can be taken further, because some
uncertainties in its application remain:
"Furthermore, although a considerable body of cases has been considered by the
European Court, some confusion still remains regarding the precise requirements
that have to be met if a product is to enjoy the benefits of mutual recognition within
the EU. This centres on the question whether a product has to be both manufactured
and marketed in a Member State,..."20
These are justifiable concerns, but, it seems that the principle itself is less of a
hindrance towards a genuinely integrated market, than the continued right of
18 For a statement that pushes towards increased use of vertical legislation and integration, see for
example the CECG's position statement on Deregulation and Food Law', 28 May 1993.
The German "Reinheitsgehalt" or purity law, which determines the ingredients and production
methods of German beers, if produced inside Germany, is a classical example of national
regulation that is more stringent than its EC equivalent. German brewers and their
representatives argued that it gave them a competitive disadvantage and the concern was such
that virtually all German interviewees referred to the issue (for details, see for example, BVE
op.cit.). As mentioned elsewhere (Boyce op.cit., 1992), the political bickering over the
"Reinheitsgehalt" probably increased the sale of 'pure' German beer during the 'lead-up' to 1992
because the continued discussions became almost an informal means of advertising.
19 Swinbank op.cif., p.9 of the conference draft paper.
20 ibid., p.1.
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individual member states to impose stricter regulations on its own manufacturers
instead of permitting all methods acceptable at the European level. This right is a
further indication of persistent protectionism! Horizontal framework legislation has
given rise to similar objections, since this approach perpetuates certain national
differences, too, albeit to a lesser extent.2'
Even if such concerns merit some attention, they cannot deflect from the positive
impact that the new, more flexible approach has had on integration. 22 Under the new
provisions, significant numbers of policies and policy amendments have been passed
in a very short period, thus leading to the adoption of almost all policy proposals
outlined in the White Paper on foodstuffs by the end of 1992. To some extent,
progress was speeded up by the introduction of QMV in the CoM, but it would have
been unthinkable to pass equal amounts of food legislation in earlier decades, even
with QMV. However, progress should not be mistaken for smooth policy-making.
There is still a great deal of controversy and conflict during the drafting of individual
policies, partially because protectionist and dirigiste undercurrents have not
disappeared entirely, partially because many issues are technically or scientifically far
less clear than laypersons tend to assume. Consequently, the extent of regulation
needed to safeguard public health and consumer choice remains a point of dispute!
The following examples substantiate the above arguments. Some consumer groups
object to anything less than a recipe for Ketchup, on the grounds that ingredients
21 See for example, P. Allen, 'How will the Legislation be Enforced? What will be the Implications
for the Food Industry?', Paper presented at a Symposium organised by Leatherhead Food RA,
November 1989.
22 For a definition of the concept of 'integration' which is compatible with this point, and an
earlier, general discussion on this topic, see Chapter two, Section 2.6.
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vary too much at present, thereby misleading the consumer. 23 Processors, on the
other hand, argue that variations are necessary in order to satisfy existing
preferences among European consumers. Additives have caused particularly stormy
interactions, since it has been decided that, for reasons of public health and
consumer choice, it is necessary to draw up a positive list of permitted additives,
that is a piece of vertical legislation! 24 In some cases, this decision has led to what
seem to be ridiculous arguments to the outsider but evidently not to those whose
living may be dependent on a satisfactory solution. The case of the Irish beer
producers illustrates this point. They have insisted that seaweed must figure on this
list, because without its use, they would not be able to manufacture the dark
concoctions that are popular the world over. 25 However, seaweed is not a
conventional additive, but a food product, therefore it seems to make no sense to
put it on the additives list, yet, it is used as an additive in the beer brewing process
and hence, may no longer be acceptable, if it is not on the list.
Given the continued search for consensus among European policy-makers,
compromises have been found on most occasions. For example, horizontal
framework legislation has been circumscribed by positive lists of specifications,
indicating minimum constraints or requirements. Sometimes bands, allowing for
variation, have been permissible and, when all else failed, temporary derogation has
23 Greek tomato ketchup must have a minimum of 16% from tomato juice solids, but in the UK it
must have a minimum of 6% from fresh tomatoes.
24 For example, there is a horizontal framework directive for additives (COM 89/107/EEC), but in
addition, there are various positive lists of additives drawn up, including their field of
application.
25 EP News, op.cit., 14-18 November 1994, p.2.
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occasionally been granted. 26 However, these compromise solutions were often
preceded by long and turbulent periods of policy-making. Furthermore, the
underlying differences in opinions often refuse to disappear as a result of legislation,
or the compromise legislation turns out not to be properly workable. In both cases,
pressures for amended and improved legislation arise. 27 Consequently, it can be
argued that the SEA integration programme on foodstuffs has not as yet
satisfactorily achieved its triple aim of integration, public health and consumer
protection. Yet, compared to earlier efforts to achieve these goals, it has come a
very long way!
The benefits to European-wide food policy-making arising from the constitutive
changes in the EU which took place during the 1970s and 80s are undeniable, and
concerns over persistent variety, facilitated by these changes should not be
exaggerated. However, the case study confirms that these constitutive changes to
policy-making have brought about a new type of integration, which has a strong
deregulatory thrust. In other words, the principle of mutual recognition may not
26 One of the DTF interviewees and the representative from the German Daiiy Trade Association
explained that bands were introduced eventually with regard to non-daiiy ingredients in yellow
fats. For general references, see E. Vardakas, 'Promoting Food Policy in the EC, Presentation
at the CEPS Business Policy Seminar No 41, Preparing the Internal Market in Food, 18
Februaiy 1992.
27 This point was made by Allen op.cit.; in all the references by CECG contained in this thesis, by
the EP's Raftezy Report 1989 (European Parliament, 'The Rafleiy Report on the Food Industiy',
Parts A and B, Document A2-17/89, 22 March 1989.), as well as by some interviewees,
including a Brussels based consultant who argued that "none of the legislation is good enough;
not comprehensive; not good details; no good additives; the defining word is no." Another
interviewee made a related comment about bad legislation: "if you are prevented from selling a
product, but in two or three years times, legislation will be amended in your favour, because
there are problems, it could be quite critical." The National Association of Master Bakers'
publication of 16 May 1990 contained an example of legislation that was not adequately
achieving its aims: "By a quirk of the Food Labelling Regulations - which require ingredients to
be declared on all food - in-store baked products are exempt from declaring
ingredients...Consumers therefore lose the protection of ingredient declarations and pay a
higher price for a product which they erroneously presume to be somehow more 'natural'."
(Comment by T. Casdagli, Director, The NafionalAssociation ofMaster Bakers, 16 May 1990,
p.2.)
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have been welcomed only by pro-integrationists who have recognised the
impossibility of imposing excessive homogenisation, but also by outright free
marketeers who endeavour to apply the principle in the - partly realistic - hope that
it will lead to less regulation overall, both at the European and national levels and in
particular, if combined with the principle of subsidiarity. 28 Moreover, the principle of
mutual recognition returns some control over policy issues to the national level. As
stated in Chapter two, this redistribution of control should however not be
exaggerated. The Commission has endorsed and promoted these developments, so
signalling to the world internal cultural and political changes. However, it is evident
that pressures from national politicians and European industrialists, coupled with the
unworkable nature of the earlier policy approach, forced them to adopt both
principles, regardless of their own views. 29 This point confirms once more that the
freedom of manoeuvrability in the Commission and their political impact is limited, if
sufficient contra-pressures arise.
7.3.	 Food Policy-Making in the European Union: Conflict or Consensus?
The cultural, ideological, political and legal differences that have characterised the
emergence of food law in Europe have ensured that food policy is "far from boring
and purely technical." 3° National self-interest continues to play a pivotal role,
although, as seen earlier, traditionalist rhetoric frequently turns out to be
28 The deregulatory thrust of the two principles, especially in relation to foodstuffs, was stressed
emphatically by Swinbum op.cit., 1994. To a lesser extent, it was discussed also in P. Allen,
'Food Law and EEC Deregulation Policy', British Food Journal, 91(1), 1989, pp.10-2. For
discussions on the implications of the principle of subsidiarity, see earlier chapters, especially
Chapter 2, Section 2.5.2.
29 Swinbum op.cit. The point was raised also by both Mr. Paul Gray and Dr. 0. Gray during
interviews for this research project, taking place between 1990 and 1992.
30 Comment made by a member of the FDF, during an interview for this project.
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protectionism, rather than genuine support for existing patterns of processing and/or
law-making! Thus, the division between deregulators and regulators is marked at the
European level, too. It is most visible between industrial and non-industrial interests,
but is also quite entrenched within individual European institutions. The failure to
structure food policy-making tightly within the EU and the lack of consistency
within the Commission have added to the potential for conflict during the making of
EU food policy. For example, the absence of a Directorate-General for Foodstuffs
has enabled various DGs to meddle in this area and responsibilities are dispersed as
follows: DG VI is in charge of proposals related directly to agricultural matters, DG
Ill handles all legislation concerned with the single market initiative and industrial
matters and DG I is concerned exclusively with food issues and external trade.31 In
addition, the Commission's Scientific Committee, its Legal Service and its Consumer
Service, which are all independent of the traditional structure based on Directorates-
General, have been involved intensively in food policy-making. Finally, the absence
of a European Food and Drugs agency or a European Institute for Nutrition - which
can be explained partially in terms of persistent national self-interests - has widened
scope for debate, both in the scientific and political arenas.32
However, there are a number of determinants that have facilitated compromises
among policy-makers: (a) workabl&3 and economically sustainable policies are
required; (b) certain basic technological and scientific facts are beyond dispute and
31 This point was made repeatedly, namely in the RalIeiy Report op.cit., by Vardakas op.cit.; by
the CECG in 'A Hot Potato? Food Policy in the EEC', CECG Publications, May 1987; and by
several interviewees.
32 ibid.
In this context, 'workable' refers not only to technically sound products, but also to products that
appeal to the tastes of consumers.
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cannot be ignored; (c) many policies revolve almost entirely around such
technological and scientific considerations; 34 (d) European food policy-making is
incremental and consists increasingly of amendments; (e) policy deals are often
struck by way of trades off both at the pre-Council and CoM stages. These factors
have acted as catalysts and sustained progress, especially during the far more
receptive conditions that have dominated food policy-making during the past
decade.
In certain routinised areas, food policy-making is indeed highly technical and
consensual. For example, the issue of extraction solvents used to remove alkaloids
from tea and coffee caused comparatively little dispute. 35 Not surprisingly, the
climate at CEN is more consensual than anywhere else because policy-making takes
place within a small policy community which is drawing up European Food
Standards, as requested by the Commission. Hence, food standards, in line with
other technological standards, are being drawn up by delegated quasi-private
government. This point is fully recognised by the responsible officials in the
Commission who referred to this situation as a "...new partition of responsibilities
between state and voluntary controls. 1136
The Commission always consults its Scientific Committee which illustrates how committed the
former is to getting a scientific opinion, irrespective of how it will make use of the information
within the broader policy game.
Part of Council Directive amending for the first time Council Directive 88/344 of 13 June 1988
on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to extraction solvents used in
the production of foodstuffs and food ingredients (COM(91) 502 final - SYN 374).
36 Varças op. cit.
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However, some conflict arises with regard to food standards, too. Namely, Van
Caenegem, the Head of CIAA, voiced opposition to the delegation of powers to
CEN, demanding that CEN should be involved only in the drawing up of food
standards at the request of a European sector, and not at the request of the
Commission or as a result of its own initiative. 37 Van Caenegem is concerned with
two familiar issues, that is excessive regulation and inadequate policy input by the
processors. However, his suggestions are not acceptable to the Commission as it
would rescind its remaining control and CEN is not keen on the idea for reasons of
self-interest. 38 Nevertheless, the policy community active within CEN may still come
under strain from processors, trade associations, consumer groups and MEPs who
all wish to be involved in European food standardisation. Such a development would
be particularly marked in the unlikely event that food standards were to become
compulsory.
Political considerations creep into most discussions on food policy proposals and, as
in other policy areas, technical and scientific considerations can be overridden by
political priorities. Food policy-making is thus definitely less technocratic and more
political than is often acknowledged. As the following - rather biased - quote from
an exasperated and enraged pet food manufacturer illustrates, food policy-making is
usually a complex mixture of scientific, technological, ideological, cultural, political
and economic considerations:
"What about BSE? Prosper de Mulder, a Dutch company with factories in UK,
France, Germany as well as Holland, produce the majority of meat and bone meal
S. Van Caenegem, 'Arguments fro,n Industry - the Priorities', Presentation at the CEPS
Business Policy Seminar No 41, Preparing the Internal Market in Food, 18 Februaiy 1992.
38 BLL, In Sachen Lebensmittel, Jahresbericht 1992/93, abgeschlossen am 28. April 1993.
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from meat offal in Europe. All by the same methods using identical plant. Only UK
was hauled into the dock. The other countries in Europe conveniently found reasons
for silencing the facts about BSE in their necks of the wood. The French will
continue to bum live sheep we export They will continue with their policy of
opposition to the way we market milk in order to destroy our dairy industxy to their
advantage - not by fair competition but by EC rules and regulations which they will
side-step when it goes against their interests. P.S. We were recently approached to
export our dog foods to Iceland. It was stopped at the last minute by their Ministry of
Agriculture, saying they were perturbed about BSE in the UK, and the fact we
declared openly that we were using meat and bone meal made by Propser de Mulder,
was used against us. No other logic would prevail."39
Occasionally, the Commission has failed to produce policies at all as a result of
conflict that may seem rather petty to the outsider but, upon closer inspection,
reveals deep political cleavages. The ongoing failure to solve the 'animal versus
vegetable fat in chocolate' debate is one of a number of examples that substantiates
this point. 40 Despite an agreement in 1973 that, from 1976 onwards, the use of
vegetable fat for chocolate production would be permitted, most member states
refused to accept vegetable based chocolate and resisted any attempt by the
Commission to resolve the problem by way of appropriate legislation. Eventually,
the Commission grew weary of the lack of progress and ignored the issue and,
according to insiders, it is unlikely that it would ever have been resolved, were the
British chocolate manufacturers now not able to use the principle of mutual
The view expressed in this quote is obviously exaggerated and biased, but it is nonetheless
symbolic of many of the issues raised in the main text and demonstrates beyond belief the
political undercurrents of food policy-making in the EU. A small number of other interviewees
commented on the negative repercussions, following scares over BSE, claiming that the scares
offset any possible advantages for marketing beef in a genuinely integrated SEM.
The original six member states and many of the newcomers continue to insist that chocolate
and its by-products have to contain animal fat, or else they could not be referred to as
'chocolate...'. The UK, on the other hand, refuses to abandon its tradition of vegetable fat based
chocolate or to call its chocolate by a different name. To some extent the disagreement can be
explained by reference to cultural differences, but it is mainly economic and political since
some Continental European member states, and particularly France, have special cocoa bean
agreements with ex-colonies which they do not wish to relinquish for political reasons. They
fear that the arrival of British chocolate on French markets may affect this agreement
negatively, as well as harm the French chocolate producers. (Much of this information comes
from interviewees, but the main issues are summarised in the BCCCA, Annual Review, London,
1990.
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recognition in their defence. 4 ' Indeed, formally, the problem remains unresolved
because there is still no suitable legislation, nor an appropriate Court ruling. Hence,
the 'chocolate saga' continues to worry particular interests, especially in the UK.
Apparently, such impasses have been perpetuated sometimes by the Commission's
general tendency to concentrate on 'easy' policies whenever possible. 42 Regrettably,
not all unresolved issues will become outdated with the passage of time and the
Commission's occasional unwillingness to persist with difficult policies perpetuates
conflict, even if it may be dormant or spill over into new policy areas. Moreover, this
attitude explains why some fudged policies are not being improved as soon as
possible.43
However, conflict among policy actors is constrained by the incremental nature of
European food policy-making. Much legislating constitutes of amendments and the
need for these is often written into existing legislation. Where new legislation is
introduced, responsible Commission officials routinely undertake surveys of the
41 This point was made by Dr. 0. Gray, as well as by the interviewees from CAOBISCO, Verein
zur Forderung des SUBwarenexports and the BCCCA.
42 A number of the interviewees from various trade associations made this point, including one of
the interviewees from CIAA. The chocolate issue is a classical case, but a similar thing
happened with regard to the EU's commitment to establish a potato regime. The Commission,
under CAP regulations, was obliged to create such a regime, but ignored the issue, at least until
veiy recently, because it looked like too much of a "political hot potato". The interviewees from
DG VI, the UK Potato Marketing Board, the UK Potato Processors' Association', Van
Spaendonck and the Bundesvereinigung der kartoffelverarbeitenden Industrien all confirmed
this point. For further details, see also UK Potato Processors' Association, Position Paper,
205921/10027 WJSOO74.91T 270691:1232, 1991 and EP News, 'Commission Gets Down to a
Root Cause', 19-23 April 1993, p.4.
See also footnote 26.
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national situations, before embarking on policy drafting.44 This finding substantiates
earlier claims of a similar nature.45 Therefore, opportunities to introduce radical
proposals are therefore very limited and arise mainly in new fields of research, like
genetic engineering, biotechnological innovations. These issues provoke much
conflict, given that there is normally no consensus about the scientific, moral and
financial implications of such deveIopments. Radical suggestions are not usually
made by Commission officials, since they tend to lack expertise in highly technical
and scientific areas and, hence, feel uncomfortable with unpredictable policy
adventures. 47 However, they do not seem unwilling to consider radical proposals
from within the industry, provided that they can draw up a workable and politically
feasible draft.48
Food policy-making in the EU does not fit into public choice models of policy-
making, even though rational behaviour and self-interested preferences play a part in
it. There is also very little evidence of gradual belief congruence among policy
See for example COM(91) 523 final - SYN 379: Council Regulation laying down Community
Procedures for Contaminants in Foods. The explanatory memorandum from the Commission
for the Regulation refers to its survey into the national situations which uncovered significant
differences that the Commission considered an obstacle to single market integration (p.3). John
Horton, 'The EEC Additive Story', Paper presented at a Symposium organised by Leatherhead
Food RA, Leatherhead, 8 April 1991.
See Chapters four and five.
See particularly P. Gray, 'Foodstuffs and Biotechnology', Presentation at the CEPS Business
Policy Seminar No 41, Preparing the Internal Market in Food, 18 February 1992. Interviewees
confirmed this point with regard to areas such as food irradiation and genetic engineering of
foodstuffs. Furthermore, during the non-participatory observation at the ECOSOC, it became
clear from ongoing arguing over scientific matters, that there was no consensus at all among
the scientific community with regard to, for example, certain food colourings (see also footnote
48).
Evans, DTF, op.cit. (reference and interview); interviewee at the DG VI.
48 Comment by an interviewee from a German trade association - his own experience.
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actors, even though, some "learning" has taking place. For example, processors have
come to accept basic facts about environmental pollution. However, ideological and
cultural cleavages, coupled with economic and political self-interest, have largely
prevented belief congruence. As implied above, the pressures for consensus and
compromise are mainly tactical and structural and are, above all, related to regime
change. Thus, it must be concluded that political bargaining remains one of the
major modes of behaviour among policy actors in this field of policy-making.
However, bargaining takes place within marked limits arising from strong trends
towards institutionalisation and, hence, incrementalism with regard to policy-
making. Thus, social and cultural conditioning mediate free-wheeling bargaining to a
considerable extent, without however repressing all pressures for change.
Consequently, change was possible, following the Cassis de Dijon judgement.
Similarly, policy change can arise as a result of new technological and scientific
discoveries or significant new political, economic or social trends.49
As demonstrated, bargaining is involved in virtually all food policy-making, albeit to
varying degrees. For example, bargaining was minimal with regard to the
"Regulation on Certificates of Specific Character for Foodstuffs" or the "Directive
Concerning the Measures for the Prevention of Specified Zoonoses and of Specified
Zoonotic Agents in Animals and Products of Animal Origin in order to prevent
Genetic engineering and biotechnology are obvious examples. (See for example, Eurofood,
'Labelling Foods Using Genetic Modification', February 1991, p.15.) However, sometimes
discussions on other issues change too, due to techno-scientific considerations. For example,
increased research and laboratory testing has led to discussions on the elimination of certain
food colourings that were previously widely used, e.g. Tartrazine (E102), Amaranth (E123).
{See for example, The London Food Commission, 'Food Adulteration and How to Beat it',
Unwin Paperpacks, 1988, Ch. 3 on additives.) Sweetener legislation is another potential area
for changes, due to scientific progress; for confirmation of this point, see for example, M.
Lindley, 'Implications of Current Developments in EC Sweetener Legislation', British Food
Journal, 93(2), 1991, pp.18-20. See also footnotes 5, 45 and 50.
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Outbreaks of Foodstuffs Infections and Intoxications". 50 Yet, it is much easier to
find examples of legislative proposals that have provoked a great deal of bargaining.
Some of the most notorious ones relate to broad issues such as food labelling and
food additives (especially food colours), but some are more specific, such as the
"Amendments to the Council Directive on Foods for Particular Nutritional Uses" or
the "Council Directive concerning Irradiated Foodstuffs". 51 Since compromises are
50 SEC(90) 2414 final; Council Directive 92/1 17/EEC; See also L. Harris, CECG Update on EC
Food Legislation and Activities, July 1993. Eurofood, 'Certificates of Specific Character for
Foodstuffs', February 1991, p.5. T. Baird-Parker, 'Food-Hygiene', Presentation at the CEPS
Business Policy Seminar No 41, Preparing the Internal Market in Food, 18 Februaiy 1992.
51 COM(89)398 final; COM(89)576. See also, DTI, 'Single Market Fact Sheet 5 on Food Law,
1990. On the difficulties of designing satisfactory food labelling, see for example the following
material published by CECG, all in 1991. CECO 91/5 Final; CECG 91/9; CECG 91/10; Food
Labelling and 1992, February 1991; Food Labelling and Consumer Choice, November 1991;
CECG 93/9; as well as T.R. Kirk, 'Proposals for Nutrition Labelling in the EC - an Update',
British Food Journal, 91(9), 1989, pp.13-4; Morris op.cit.; MAFF, 'Information Paper on
Current Food Labelling Legislation Codes', DW41.CPDA.GFL.DFF.DA, Januaiy 1991. S.
Johnson, 'UK Labelling Update', Presentation at a Symposium organised by Leatherhead Food
R.A, 8 April 1991. D. Flowerdew, 'Proposed Labelling Rules from the EC', Presentation at ibid;
N. Sauze, 'Etiqueftage: Introduction du Principe de l'Indication Quantitative de Certains
Produits, QUID', Presentation at the CEPS Business Policy Seminar No 41, Preparing the
Internal Market in Food, 18 February 1992; BLL, 'In Sachen Lebensmittel: das
gemeinschaftliche Lebensmittelrecht - Eine Zwischenbilanz zum 3 1.12.1992', 30. Dezember
1990, Abschnitt B Uber Lebensmittelkennzeichnung und Werbebehauptungen.
Food labelling is a broad policy issue and is basically covered by a framework directive
(COM(91)72 of 16 January 1991) and a range of more specific directives on topics such as
geographical designations, food claims used in advertising, organically produced foods, date
marking. Processors accept that customers need to be infonned, but are worried about the cost
and practical difficulties with detailed labelling (see also earlier relevant comments in this
chapter). For example, one frustrated participant at the 1991 Leatherhead Symposium
wondered how he was going to write down all required labelling in several languages on
chewing gum wrappings! Many processors also argue that too much labelling leads to confusion
and does not help the customer. Consumer organisations, on the other hand, have generally
pushed for more, simple, clear and detailed labelling, if necessary with the help of such symbols
as the "grune Punkt" (green point) which indicates that packaging is environmentally sound
and which was introduced by the German government on a national basis only. Both sides
claim to have statistical evidence that supports their arguments, but neither side seem willing or
able (?) to produce such evidence.
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difficult to achieve with such controversial issues, the latter often become part of
extensive policy deals, cutting across several areas of policy-making. In this respect,
indirect taxation of foodstuffs and excise duties on alcoholic beverages has become
one of the most notorious battlegrounds in recent years, because it has such
tremendous economic implications. Thus, this issue exemplifies the above point very
well, since all negotiated outcomes have been extensive trades off and uneasy
compromises. This is particularly true for Council Directive 92/84 of 19 October
1992 which "...lays down minimum rates of excise duty to be applied throughout the
Community for each category of alcoholic drink."52
The following statement indicates that, initially, the British government seemed
prepared to accept an increase on excise duties for Scottish Whisky in return for
concessions on beer and wine duties and the safeguarding of zero-rate VAT on
foodstuffs, books and children's clothes. "Mr. Lamont has been ready to do a deal as
part of horsetrading on tax harmonisation which would allow Britain to keep the
zero rate of VAT on food and children's clothing... There was also a proposal that
On the conflict-ridden nature of legislating on food additives, and especially food colours, see
for example footnotes 5, 45 and 48, as well as CEC, 'Fourth Progress Report of the Conunission
to the Council and the European Parliament, COM (89) 311 final, Brussels, 20 June 1989;
CECG, Setting ADIs - A New Approach', Pamphlet, 90/21, August 1990; J. Horton, Progress
with Community Additive Controls', British Food Journal, 93(2), 1991, pp.13-7; Horton
op.cit., 1991; CIAA, 'The CL4A and Food Colours', Position Statement F1J10/91, 1991; The
Economic and Social Committee of the European Communities, 'Revised Preliminaiy Draft
Opinion : Proposal for a Council Directive on Colours for Use in Foodstuffs', (COM(9 1) 444
final SYN 368); EP News op.cit., 8-12 March 1993, p.4. As noted by an interviewee from
MAFF, to some extent conflict arises because there is no clear agreement within the scientific
community as to the safe or harmful nature of many additives, especially ii they are used in
combination.
52 Extract from Council Directive 92/84 of 19 October 1992.
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wine should be zero-rated." 53 Lamont's deal was challenged fiercely by the Scottish
Whisky industry who lobbied the government and sought allies for its cause, for
example among UK MPs, MEPs, the UK Gin Distillers and Rectifiers, Scottish
Whisky Distributors and Sellers in other EU countries, various national and the
European Trade Association for Spirits (IJEAES). 54 The lobby regarded this issue as
one of life or death for the Scottish Whisky industry and did its utmost to change
Lamont's decision, but pressures were not adequate to eliminate the spirits excise
duty issue from a package deal including, wine, beer, mineral oils, tobacco and
VAT. Nevertheless, the lobby got some concessions since excise duties for spirits
were eventually fixed at 550 ECU per hectolitre of pure alcohol which was lower
than originally anticipated. Furthermore, the Commission committed itself to a
comprehensive review of excise duties on all alcoholic beverages. (The Scottish
Whisky industry was, and still is, extremely discontent regarding this deal but
appears to have survived so far.) In the case of VAT and excise duties, bargaining
and trades off were particularly marked because these are fiscal measures which
P. Rawstorne, 'Scotch Campaign Seen as a Matter of Duty', The Financial Times, 6 August
1991, p.2. For further and related details, see also House of Commons Official Report,
Parliamentaiy Debates on the Scottish Economy, HMSO, 16 July 1991; House of Commons,
Written Answers: ECOFIN, HMSO, 25 June 1991, p.s124; The Scotch Whisky Association,
'Why the Scotch Whisky Industiy is Facing a Fight in the Single European Market', Press
Release, 1991; The Scotch Whisky Association, 'The Threat to the Intra-EC Duty Free Trade',
Press Release, 1991.
See for example, F. Kane, 'Whisky's Spirited Fight', Sunday Telegraph, 4 August 1991; A.
Young, Fears Over Discrimination Against Scotch', Glasgow Herald, Saturday 29 June 1991;
Glasgow Herald, 'Unfair Measures', 29 June 1991; The Scotch Whisky Association, 'Scotch
Whisky under Co,nmon Market Discrimination', Scotch Whisky Newsletter No. 70, July 1991;
The Financial Times, 'Scotching a Tax Anomaly', 1 October 1992; CEC, Call for Tender MB-
l5O3Iacb: Study on "Competition Between the Different Categories of Alcoholic Drinks", 1992,
p.!; The Scotch Whisky Association, 'ECOFIN: Scotch has All to Play for', 28 July 1992; The
Scotch Whisky Association, 'EC Tax Harmonisation7, August 1992; The Scotch Whisky
Association, 'EC Spirits Producers Criticise EC Tax Deal', 20 October 1992.
The interviewees at UEAES, the Association of UK Gin Distillers and Rectifiers and the CBI
Office, London (indirect taxation matters) all confirmed this point, as did a letter to the author
of the thesis written by a representative of the Scotch Whisky Association, Edinburgh.
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have to be decided in the CoM on the basis of unanimity. 55 However, similar trends
are discernible with the many less intergovernmental food policy measures that come
under QMV.56
7.4.	 Food Policy-Making in the EU: Structures
Since much food policy-making is now dealt with on the basis of QMV, a marked
shift towards Euro-lobbying has taken place in the food sector. Nonetheless,
national lobbying continues to thrive, both inside member states and with the
permanent representatives in Brussels. Hence, it is appropriate to examine these
activities on the basis of a multi-level conceptual framework such as elaborated in
the previous chapter. The introduction of QMV has modified interactions between
private interests and policy-makers, as well as within the CoM, but not to the extent
that there is no longer a need for a special multi-level conceptual framework. Yet,
the latter needs to be able to capture some changes in exchanges, arising from the
introduction of QMV, namely the fact that it has become harder to block the passage
For general references to the difficulties that have arisen from the SEM commitment to
harmonised excise duties see most references in footnotes 51 to 53, as well as, for example,
BSI, 'Europa 1992 - Die Spirituosen und der Binnenmarkt', Bonn, 1989; BSJ, 'Europa 1992 -
Die Spirituosen im AnpassungsprozeB', Bonn, 1990; BSJ, 'Europa 1992 - Die Spirituosen in
gesamtdeutscher Verantwortung', Bonn, 1991. For similar references in respect of VAT, and
equivalent taxes in other member states, see for example T. Hayes, 'A Painless Path Through
the EC Tax Minefields', The European, 2 1-23 June 1991, p.24, or, L. Walker, 'VAT Taxes the
Single Market', The European, 25-28 June 1992, European Business Section, p.!.
56 See for example M. Evanson's comment in respect of EC food legislation that "in the second
sector - legislative matters - where any necessaiy changes would take place sooner or later
anyhow, but where 1992 has perhaps focused attention, these will show quite a bit of activity
and some compromises". M. Evanson op.cit, 1990, plO.)
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of legislation and that more bargaining now takes place before policy drafts reach
the Council stage. Such bargaining takes place particularly during negotiations with
COREPER which enhances the latter's policy contributions. Complicated and
extensive trades off are now less often necessary, but happen nonetheless, because
QMV still requires partial consensus. 57 The modified version of PNA, as elaborated
in Chapter six, is capable of capturing structural and behavioural changes in the
policy process as outlined above, because it allows for the monitoring of bargaining
processes inside networks.
As in other policy sectors, the EP has tried hard to exploit its increasing powers by
way of contributing to the making of European food policy. The EP's amendments
to the additives list suggest that its efforts have not been fruitless. 58 However, the
EP's role in food policy making has been hampered by internal divisions which have
been referred to by an MEP as "an ongoing battle". 59 As noted elsewhere, divisions
in the EP are particularly serious because it can usually only intervene successfully if
it can act with a clear majority. 60 Many lobbyists are aware of this division and have
See Evanson's comment in footnote 55. Trades off are particularly notorious in respect of
decisions, concerning individual food policy issues that are marked by divergence and conflict,
such as food hygiene, food additives and colouring, food labelling. This claim is substantiated
implicitly in discussion papers such as L. Harris, 'Update on EC Food Legislation and
Activities', MAFF, July 1993, which details some of the debates surrounding the major issues
related tO the politics of European food policy-making. This point was also supported by B.
Saunders op.cit. and interview comments from Mr. Radermacher, a lawyer working for some
German food trade associations, who was interviewed for this project in summeT 1991.
Radermacher argued that "...wie lost man Meinungsverschiedenheiten? in langen Sitzungen
werden Kompromisse ausgearbeitet, bis es mat zu einem Entscheid kommt." {How do you solve
differences of opinion? during long sessions compromises are worked out, until a decision is
made at some point. }
See references in footnote 5.
Questionnaire respondent.
60 On this point, see for example Hix op.cit., 1993; Boyce op.cit., 1995.
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refused to take seriously the EP's endeavours to be at the heart of policy-making,
although many admitted that they lobbied MEPs nonetheless, "just in case... "61
The Food Division of DG III has been very dedicated to the achievement of the
internal market on foodstuffs. Consequently, they have been as assertive as possible
and used all means at their disposal. However, interviewees unanimously agreed that
the internal divisions in the Commission and the lack of a DG for Foodstuffs have
occasionally undermined their efforts.62 Yet, the Commission officials responsible
for foodstuffs have benefited in other ways. Notably, they have been able to rely
heavily upon Council Decision 87/373/EEC of 13 July 1987, because so much food
and drinks legislation consists of amendments or extensions. Notwithstanding this
advantage, their efforts have been hindered, too, in this direction, because they have
had to take account of the Standing Committee on Foodstuffs which consists of
mixed political interests. The Committee's influence is particularly marked under the
regulatory procedure and the CoM has usually insisted that this procedure be
invoked, despite Commission efforts to the contrary. 63 Thus, even under Council
Decision 87/373/EEC, the Council has refused to give the Commission as much
freedom as possible which, surely, confirms that the governments of member states
are unwilling to give up too much power in an area which is still heavily tied in with
61 A throw away comment made by an interviewee (German trade association, summer 1991).
62 On internal divisions in the Commission, see Chapters four and five; on the other point, see
footnotes 30 and 31.
63 The Standing Committee of Foodstuffs votes by QMV. The Commission is more or less tied by
the vote, depending on which one of the three possible procedures has been adopted. The
regulatory procedure requires the approval of the Committee; otherwise the proposal is referred
to the CoM. The management procedure enables the Committee to block Commission decisions
and refer them to the CoM. If the advisory procedure applies, the Commission can ignore the
Committee's vote, although constitutionally it is supposed to take "the utmost account of the
opinion delivered by the Committee". {Council Directive of 13 July 1987, 87/373/EEC, Article
2, Procedure I)
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national self-interests, thus lending weight to interpretations of the policy process
that emphasise intergovernmentalism.
The regulatory procedure, as applied by the Standing Committee on Foodstuffs, has
enhanced the role of national civil servants, too, because the CoM is represented by
one civil servant from each member state in the Standing Committee on Foodstuffs.
Since many of these are delegated from the respective Ministries of Agriculture, they
have not seen eye to eye with the officials from DG ifi on many occasions.
Apparently, they have asserted themselves quite often, mainly due to their
sophisticated negotiating skills and their tendency to strike bargains with one
another, prior to decision-making sessions in the Standing Committee." Thus, food
policy issues illustrate the extent to which nationa bureaucrats can meààe in EU
policy-making. However, it must be borne in mind that their hands are nonetheless
tied by directions from their home based civil service and the national politicians.
Those permanent representatives that were interviewed explained that they usually
negotiated several bargaining positions with their superior civil servants and
ministers. Before, as well as during, negotiations taking place within the committees
and working groups, they then began by insisting on the most advantageous position
from their governments' point of view, using the less advantageous, but approved
bargaining positions as fall backs. Yet, when none of these succeeded in securing
political agreement, they were obliged to report back to their national 'masters' and
discuss with them new bargaining strategies. 65 In view of this strategy, claims that
This is for example the view of P. Riederman, DTF, Brussels Office, who was first interviewed
for this research project during autumn 1991.
65 The interviewee at the UK Permanent Representation in Brussels underlined this point strongly,
and it was further conlinned by the few staff working at Permanent Representations who
completed the questionnaire on Lobbying and the Single European Market.
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national bureaucrats 'run' the EU, are exaggerated, despite their vital input.66
However, these findings confirm once more that it is necessary to construct a multi-
level framework for analysis that can capture the many bargaining processes that
take place during policy-making, both inside policy networks as well as between
these.
The Commission officials responsible for food and drinks matters have in many ways
successfully managed the increasing lobbying activities by private interests. As in
other areas of policy-making, officials tend to manipulate the time table for policy-
making whenever possible. 67 During the lead-up to '1992', lobbyists, national civil
servants and MEPs were given hardly enough time to prepare constructive
responses to the policy drafts that they were shown by the Commission officials. The
following quote shows that timing was particularly problematic for those national
trade associations that were mainly involved indirectly in the policy process,
represented by either Euro-groups and/or their respective governments.
The speed of developments within the EC has increased noticeably. A difficulty at
the moment is that when the Commission finds an obstruction to the proposals that it
is making, it produces fresh proposals almost immediately and requires that these be
ccjngjdered within a matter of days. This allows the government departments veiy
little time to seek the industiy's views. We have represented our concerns on this to
ministers, but they can offer no help."68
See Chapter four, footnote 90, Helm op.cit.
67 See Chapters four and, especially, five for general references.
68 This statement was made by an interviewee, working for a national sectoral trade association,
dealing mainly with daiiy produce.
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On the positive side, the Commission's management of the policy time table has
forced many private interests to become more efficient and a lot of internal re-
structuring has taken place within trade associations at the national and European
levels in response to the single market drive. Notably, the CIAA, the European trade
association for food and beverages, underwent a fundamental re-organisation In
1989. A member of its British counterpart, the Food and Drinks Federation,
commented that it had since gone "from strength to strength". 69 Many other
interviewees conceded that the CIAA was now in a much better position to
effectively manage its relationship with the Commission, but pointed out that,
however efficiently organised it may be, it still suffered from the problem of having
to represent an extremely varied industry. 70 These issues evidently preoccupy the
CIAA team, but they are also very concerned about the quality of legislation that the
Commission is producing. For example, Van Caenegem, the CIAA's secretary
general, had complained that, occasionally, the Commission had been too willing to
accept a fudge compromise over a policy in order to ensure that it would meet the
'1992' deadline. 7' Van Caenegem's worries were confirmed by a number of
interviewees. For example, one commentator warned that the post-1992 era would
be taken up by working out amendments to improve the quality of unworkable
policy comproniises.72
69 This statement was made by one of the staff at FDF who was interviewed for the thesis.
70 This view was prevalent among appropriate interviewees and questionnaire respondents and
was confirmed elsewhere, e.g. in Eurofood, 'Company Profile: CIAA: Confederation of the
Food and Drink Industries of the EEC', February 1991, pp.6-7.
71 Van Caenegem op. cit. This confirms similar views expressed by other commentators (see
footnotes 26 and 42).
72 baird-Parker op. cit.
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As can be deduced from the following quote, the relationship between the
Commission and the various interest groups tends to be reciprocal:
"II faut savoir que la Commission - a ma connaissance - n'a ja.mais eu la prdtention
de 'faire 1'Europe' tout seul. Elle fait appel a chacun qui peut apporter une pierre a la
construction. D'oü les comités consultatifs. ..".7
However, the Commission generally safeguards its autonomy. "Although
Commission officials need technical advice from the industry, they can usually
consult a variety of sources and then, if necessary, play them off against one
another." 74 In many ways, the emergence of numerous sectoral Euro trade
associations concerned with food policy has enhanced the Commission's ability to
manipulate the various lobbies. Furthermore, the Commission relies heavily on its
own Food Science Committee and, increasingly, liaises directly with individual firms
on technical and scientific questions. Finally, the Commission officials who are
responsible for food policy are apparently very skilled in exploiting any internal
divisions among private interests, as well as among politicians and national civil
"As far as I know, the Commission has never claimed that it 'makes Europe' all by itself It calls
on the help of anybody who can add a little bit to the construction of Europe. Hence, the
consultative committees...". This comment was made by a French food processors who
completed the questionnaire on The Single European Market and the Food Industry.
" Questionnaire comment by a trade official. {Lobbying and the Single European Market).
The food and drinks sector is extremely diverse and it is veiy difficult to find satisfactoiy
aggregate positions. For example, the definition of 'food and drinks processors' included MNCs
as well as family run establishments with only a handful of employees. The products are also
extremely varied and require different processing, handling, packaging, distribution procedures.
Therefore, it is particularly difficult for CIAA to produce more than "lowest common
denominator" opinions { interview comment), despite recent efficiency gains. However, some
Commission officials believe that the food and drinks processors could enhance their lobbying
potential, despite the difficult circumstances: "I think the food industiy has failed miserably in
its task; for one thing they need to build more strength amongst themselves." (Conunission
official, quoted in Burson-Marsteller, op.cit., p.17.)
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servants. 75 Apparently, all these shrewd strategies do not prevent Commission
officials from reiterating that officials prefer to deal with Euro level associations who
present representative and aggregated views!76
The Commission's tactics suggest that technocratic and political policy-making are
not necessarily mutually exclusive. There is obviously a lot of technical input at the
drafting stage, but the information provided is handled in a truly political manner.
Furthermore, the emerging evidence suggests that none of the lobbies concerned
with food policy have entered into a genuinely clientèlistic relationship with the
Commission officials in the way that, in the past, agricultural producers have with
DG VI officials. 77 Undoubtedly, the CIAA is now very close to the officials, but,
although they are regularly consulted, they are aware of the barrier that exists
between themselves and the Commission.
Van Caenegem op.cit.; J. Moal, 'The Food Markets of the Future', and T. Stocker, 'Chairman's
Conclusions', Presentations at the CEPS Business Policy Seminar No 41, Preparing the Internal
Market in Food, 18 Februaiy 1992.
76 See also Chapter five.
Certain interviewees and questionnaire respondents seemed to resent the Commission's relative
autonomy, accusing even the comparatively free market oriented DG ifi of being excessively
complicated, bureaucratic, interventionist, unrealistic. For example, a small processor who was
interviewed for the thesis said that "...the Commission wants one world in the interest of the big
beds." This implies that the Commission is intervening and - what's more - on behalf of big
business!
Accusations against the Commission's tendency to intervene in food policy issues, are not
totally unfounded, but are sometimes rather unfair and/or based on the expectation that policy
should be made virtually without the involvement of public sphere policy actors. However, the
vast majority of interview and survey participants acknowledged that the Commission consulted
adequately and did its best to implement the triple aim of creating an economically sound
integrated food market, while satisfying public health and consumer demands. {With regard to
the CAP, see Chapter five. }
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"La Commission fait toujours cc qu'elle veut en fin de compte, en definitive, nous
essayons de liii démontrer queues sont les meilleures decisions, mais cc nest pas
nous qui prenons les decisions."78
There has been some concern that multinational food and drinks processors are
advantaged, in comparison to the many small businesses in this sector. 79 Yet, some
interviewees argued that the Commission deliberately compensated in favour of less
powerful business organisations. 8° Furthermore, there is no evidence that
multinationals always get their way with the Commission. Nonetheless, they appear
to constitute an important counter pressure to national government demands,
because they often adopt transnational stances and lobby for the abolition of national
peculiarities. Given the conflicting evidence, it is difficult to assess to what extent
big businesses profit, compared to small ones. The data from the survey on the
effects of The Single European Market and the Food Industry suggest that large
companies are somewhat advantaged, both with regards to lobbying input (see
Tables 4, 6 and 7 in Chapter five) and the benefits arising from the SEM (see Figure
1). To some extent this bias is inevitable, given that the European food and drinks
sector is increasingly concentrated. In view of their economic power, it is perhaps
surprising that there is not a clear agreement with regard to their impact on policy,
nor a widespread acknowledgement that they have very close clientélistic
relationships with the policy-makers. Nevertheless, some companies are obviously
78 "In the end the Commission always does what it wants. We try to show it what the best
solutions would be, but we do not take the decisions." Comment by a member of the CIAA's
management team. Interestingly, Gray came to similar conclusions with regard to the CAP even
though this area of policy-making was thought to be most vehemently colonised by certain
interests. Gray's views are however also supported by the findings in Chapter five. (0. Gray
op.cit., 1990}.
See for example ibid; Burson-Marsteller op.cit. as well as throw away remarks by the staff
interviewed at BCCCA in respect of Mars Plc.
For example, various trade officials; this point was also implied by P. Gray when referring to
the case of the pro-breastfeeding lobby (see Chapters four and five).
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very well received and respected and, in some policy areas, such as food labelling,
big business has dominated the policy process increasingly. 8 ' However, despite these
advantages, large food and drinks processors seem to have a less privileged position
in respect of food policy than they have, together with big business involved in other
policy sectors, in respect of economic social and general industrial policies. Yet, as
in relation to these policy areas, large business has a more obvious impact on the
broad development of European food policy than on detailed food legislation. In
view of these findings, it would be misleading to label food policy-making simply as
neo-pluralist or to argue that it is a close policy community, dominated exclusively
by large food processors who enjoy a clientèlistic relationship with Commission
officials and/or politicians.
Consumer groups are involved with most proposals as a matter of routine, and
depending on the issue, there can be environmental lobbies, health lobbies or lobbies
who are trying to press a particular, often ethical issue, such as the pro-breastfeeding
lobby. 82 The result is often an extremely complex structure of policy-making which
81 Kraftlood, Mars, Nestlé (!) were mentioned repeatedly as having close relations and/or a lot of
influence on Commission officials. Moreover, the CECG claimed that a number of MNNCs had
managed to convince the Commission to cut down on full nutritional labelling, thereby
torpedoing the proposals of the consumers' lobby. {CECG op.cit., 1990, p.7.)
82 Numerous interviewees and secondary literature referred to the growing importance of
consumer and environmental groups in food policy-making, due to the public's increased
preoccupation with 'healthy food'. For example, interviewees from the Bundesvereinigung der
kartoffelverarbeitenden Industrien, from MAFF and from the FDF made this point. Mr.
Pattinson, from MAFF, also explained that MAFF got well over one hundred letters from
concerned parties, every time the food additives, and especially the colour, issue was being
discussed in detail.
Grant, too, argued that consumer groups were having more impact on food policy, because the
late 20th Century constituted increasingly a consumer, and not producer, dominated era. {W.
Grant, 'Public and Political Implications', in C.RW. Spedding (ed.) The Human Food Chain,
1989, pp.279-87.) It is not surprising that the main contestations of this view come from within
consumer groups and, especially, from BEUC.
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involves sub-national (sometimes), national and European tiers. In many cases, the
structure of food policy-making is therefore more like an issue network than a policy
community. However, neither label is ftilly adequate since the food policy network
shows signs of both a policy community and an issue network and, hence, has to be
situated somewhere in between these two ideal types. This finding reinforces the
claim, made in Chapter six, that the Rhodes-Marsh model is based on ideal types
which are not sufficiently differentiated to caputre complicated structures such as an
apparent key feature of the food policy network, namely its division into a core and
a periphery. 83 Commission officials, national politicians and civil servants are
situated permanently at the core. Selected experts, food processors and their trade
associations are, structurally, closest to these, with some, such as the CIAA, being
very close indeed, but nonetheless in a qualitatively different space within the
network. Environmental groups and small single-issue groups are more or less
permanently located within the periphery, whereas consumer groups hover at the
interface of the periphery and the core. Structurally speaking, the EP is also very
close to the centre, but not because of its expertise. The EP's strongest resource is
its increasing power to politically legitimise EU activities, including policy-making.
This multiple structure is not cast in stone and the boundaries between the core and
the periphery are not impermeable, although they are quite marked.
See for example, Toussaint who used additives as an example to illustrate the weakness of
consumer representation! ('The Consumer Point of View', Presentation at the CEPS Business
Policy Seminar No 41, Preparing the Internal Market in Food, 18 Februaiy 1992.} See also, V.
Smart, 'Firms win But Choice Suffers', The European, 16-19 July 1992, P.38. In this article,
Smart summarised an interview with BEUC on this topic. In the interview, it was argued that
SEM legislation bad failed "to introduce a specific consumer dimension", and, G. Richmond,
'The Customer is Always Last', The Bulletin, 1 August 1991, p.35.
In view of the findings in Chapter five, similar distinctions must be made if the CAP and social
policy are treated as policy networks.
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It is difficult to capture this dynamic constellation in policy analytic terms and
traditional PNA is hampered considerably by its tendency to produce ideal type
categories which are ill equipped to capture multi-level structures as well as
intensive bargaining exchanges. Smith's label of reformed plusralism seems more
appropriate - provided that analysts are prepared to take recourse to traditional,
systemic level terminology, notwithstanding the problems associated with this
strategy84 - because it takes into account that semi-peripheral and peripheral groups
can, and do, 85 have some influence on policy outcomes. However, the notion of
reformed pluralism is far too general to be able to capture the idiosyncrasies outlined
in the previous paragraphs. The more precise notion of neo-pluralism is not suitable
either, since it overestimates the influence of big business. However, in some areas,
there do seem to be neo-pluralist undercurrents. Yet, both models underestimate the
autonomy of the formal policy-makers. In view of their resourcefulness, it could be
argued that, broadly speaking, the network supports statist and institutionalist
interpretations of policy-making, particularly given its incrementalist nature and the
pivotal structural positions of Commission officials, national civil servants and, when
applicable, the Council of Ministers. However, this assessment has to be qualified
too, given the many informal influences that are an intrinsic part of food policy-
making at the European level. For the same reason, it is also unsatisfactory to refer
to food policy-making as intergovernmental, even though national self-interest,
peculiarities and consumption patterns are significant influences on policy outcomes.
84 See Chapter six.
85 See for example, T. Stocker, 'EC Food Law and the Development of the Internal Market - The
Opportunities and the DfJIculties: an Industry Viewvpoinf, Presentation at a Symposium
organised by Leatherhead Food RA, November 1989; W. Brinkman, 'Packaging Waste',
Presentation at the CEPS Business Policy Seminar No 41, Preparing the Internal Market in
Food, 18 February 1992. While consumer and environmental groups tend to downplay their
successes, such business views may well exaggerate them a little.
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Analysis in terms of multi-level bargaining games, combined with the extensive
categorisation of policy actors (as outlined in Chapter 6) seems a far better way of
capturing these intricate phenomena. The notion of intergovernmentalism also
neglects the effects of the introduction of QMV in most areas of food policy-making
and the passage of Council Decision 87/373/EEC of 13 July 1987 has affected
negatively the relative input of national politicians. On the other hand, the latter has
enhanced the independence of national bureaucrats, but not to the extent that
intergovernmentalism is a suitable label. Moreover, this Council Decision has also
enhanced the autonomy of Eurocrats. Hence, within limits, it has reinforced the
bureaucratic aspects of EU policy-making, rather than its national elements. Still, it
would be an uncalled for exaggeration, too, to conceive of food policy-making as a
form of government by unelected officials. Equally, it would be inappropriate to
claim that unelected technocrats make food-policy in the EU, given that technical
issues are very much circumscribed by political considerations. Finally, all these
labels are in so far unsatisfactory as they do not allow for evident differences
between sub-sectors and individual policy issues, such as food standards, food
hygiene, food labelling, food additives, regulations concerning ingredients and
processing procedures.
It is obviously very problematic to find the correct analytic language to capture the
nature of food policy-making in the EU, even when locating this process within an
extended conceptual framework such as elaborated in Chapter 6! For example, it is
not even immediately evident that the food sector consists of one policy network
only, given that there is evident variety between sub-sectors and, to a lesser extent,
individual policies. However, there are a number of reasons that enable analysists to
conclude that the sector can be treated as a single policy network. Notably, there is
basic interdependence across the sector. Moreover, when making food-policy, the
issues at stake are virtually the same in all sub-sectors and revolve around the main
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objectives of food regulation as outlined in the Section 7.1. Furthermore, the same
policy actors tend to be involved in the production of food policies of all kinds. They
are not all always involved, but there is nonetheless a discernible pattern. Moreover,
those policy-makers who are not involved directly in some areas of policy-making,
such as food standards, nonetheless monitor progress in these areas and are prepared
to enter the policy-making process at any time, if a slight shift in policy priorities
arises which makes it worthwhile for them to become involved. Furthermore, the
policy actors in question tend to have the same resources, whatever specific policy is
at stake. The variety arises from the ways in which these resources interact with, and
are mediated by, specific policy situations. Given these basic similarities, it is feasible
to argue that food policy-making can be conceptualised as one specific policy
network, provided that account is taken of the intricate multi-tier nature of this
network.
7.5.	 Food Policy-Making in the European Union: Implementation
7.5.1.	 Preliminary Considerations
Regrettably, many early policy studies have ignored the effects of policy
implementation on policy outcome. 86 However, implementation has been accorded
greater priority recently, since it frequently explains blatant gaps between policy
86 For confirmation on this point, see for example R. Mayntz, 'The Conditions of Effective Public
Policy: a New Challenge for Policy Analysis, Policy and Politics, 11(2), 1983, pp. I23-43; .S.
Barrett & M. Hill, 'Policy, Bargaining and Structure Implementation Theoiy: Towards an
Integrated Perspective', Policy and Politics, 12(3), 1984, pp.219-40; Burch & Wood op.cit.;
Raab op.cit.
259
intentions and policy outcomes. 87 Furthermore, it is often difficult to determine
"where policy stops and implementation starts". 88 With regard to the EU, it is
beyond doubt that implementation can seriously affect policy outcomes. The
Commission has to date not had adequate resources to supervise implementation
effectively and has had to rely heavily on national and local administrators such as
Trading Standards Officers, Environmental Health Officers, Veterinarians, Local
Government Officials. There has been a notorious shortage of Commission staff;
responsible for the implementation of food law, and hence, reliance upon local policy
actors has been marked. 89 The problem has been aggravated by the Commission's
frequent use of directives, as opposed to regulations. 9° However, Commission
Statistics (Tables 9 and 10) confirm the widespread view that the greatest
differences arise from non-compliance or long delays with regard to the
implementation of European policies by national authorities.9'
ibid., as well as for example, M. Thrasher, 'Exchange Networks and Implementation', Policy
and Politics, 11(4), 1983, pp.375-91; Sabatier op.cit, 1986.
Barret & Hill op.cit., p.219.
See for example, Coates op.cit. (general discussion on implementation); D.J. Jukes, 'The
Structure of Food Law Enforcement in the United Kingdom', British Food Journal, 90(6),
1988, pp.23949 (discussion of EC and UK food law implementation); P. Teague, The
European Community: The Social Dimension, London: Kegan Paul, 1989 (general discussion
on EU policy implementation, but especially on social policy); K. Collins & D. Earnshaw, 'The
Implementation of European Community Environment Legislation', Environmental Politics,
1(4), 1992, pp.214-49 (general discussion on EU policy implementation, but especially on
environmental policy); J. Usher, 'hnplementing the Rules', Paper presented at the ESRC
Conference on the Evolution of Rules for a Single Market, University of Exeter, 8-11 September
1994.
See for example R. Watson & V. Smart, 'In Search of Singular Success', The European, 27-30
May 1993, p.3.
91 Delays and non-compliance tend to be more marked in countries such as Italy, where
governments have much less power to rush through Parliament new legislation and where there
is a certain cultural acceptance of non-compliance to law. Denmark and the UK have on the
whole been the fastest and most conscientious enforcers of EU law. See for example, CEC,
WE/28/93; Single Market News, 'Make Your Voice Heard', autunm 1992, p.1; V. Smart & H.
Clarke, 'Gloves off in fight for the Single Market', The European, 23-27 December 1992, p.1;
L. Walker, 'Many Measures but Single Goal', The European, 22-25 April 1993, pL39; R.
Watson, 'Who Tops the Table in Europe?', The European, 8-11 July 1993, pp.1-2.
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Table 9
Com pletion of the Internal Market: Summary as at 31/12/92
Commission _____________
Total of Commission Proposals	 282
Proposals awaiting adoption by Council 	 18
of which:	 priority	 13
non-priority	 5
Council _____________
Final adoptions	 261
Current common positions 	 3
European_Pa rlia ment	 ____________
First reading awaited (non-priority)	 1
Second reading on common position awaited	 0
Implementation_by_member_states 	 _____________
Measures currently in force 	 233
Total number of Council adoptions currently requiring national 194
implementing measures
Number of Council adoptions implemented in all Member 79
States
75%
Proportion of measures implemented: measures awaiting
implementation _______________
Source: Commission of the European Communities, Background Report on the Internal Market
after 1992, ISECIB7I93, 7 March 1993, p.6.
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Table 10
Implementation of Legislation b y the Member States; Situation as at 31/12/92
Measures	 Derogations	 Measures not yet Regulations and
implemented	 implemented	 other directly
applicable
_____ _________________ __________________ __________________ measures
B	 129	 0	 59	 6
DK	 165	 0	 22	 7
D	 137	 0	 51	 6
GR	 140	 0	 49	 5
E	 143	 0	 48	 3
F	 152	 0	 37	 5
IRL	 138	 1	 49	 6
I	 131	 0	 59	 4
L	 131	 0	 54	 9
NL	 142	 0	 46	 6
P	 147	 1	 44	 2
UK	 138	 1	 49	 6
Source: Commission of the European Communities, Background Report on the Internal Market
after 1992, ISECIB7/93, 7 March 1993, p.7.
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The intensity of the single market legislative programme has underlined these
problems and has forced the Commission to review its approach to implementation,
especially since complaints about non-compliance have been numerous during the
late 1980s and early 1990s. 92 Consequently, the Commission has taken numerous
cases to the European Court of Justice. Sometimes, this action precipitated
compliance before the ECJ had to make a judgement. 93 However, in some cases
Court rulings were simply ignored; hence, the T.EU bestowed new powers upon the
ECJ so that it could, in future, demand hefty fines of non-compliers. The
Commission has also begun to place more importance on monitoring and directing
implementation at all stages, rather than waiting for complaints, and at liaising with
appropriate policy actors. 94 However, the UNICE interviewee, in line with a UNICE
submission to the Commission in March 1991, argued that these measures were not
as yet adequate and that the matter would need to be dealt with afresh at the level of
the European Council in order to design more forthright, and hence, effective
92 CEC, ISECIB4/92; ISECIB7/93; EP News, 'EC Courting Simpler Laws', 8-12 Februaiy 1993,
p.2; R. Watson, 'Euro Boss Calls for Easier Laws', The European, 24-27 June 1993, p.41; Usher
op.cit. Andersen and Eliassen found that complaints of non compliance can take the form of
lobbying: "The main reason for the Danish ship owners' association to send a lobbyist to
Brussels, for example. was to lobby the Commission, the European Court and national courts to
get EC rules implemented and obeyed by other European ship owners." (Andersen & Etiassen
op.cit., 1991, p.179.)
See for example Richardson and Mazey op.cit. Parliamentazy Affairs, 1992, on this point.
CEC, WE/15/92. There is a long histoiy of complaints that the ECJ's inability to control
judgements and, hence, implementation is undesirable, see for example Wallace op.cit., 1971;
Allen op.cit, 1989; Sheate & Macrory op.cit.. Many interviewees confirmed this point too. As
mentioned in Chapter two, the problems with implementation lessen the practical impact of
Commission and ECJ activities. This is an important finding, but it must not be exaggerated
either, since (a) sometimes non-implementation is a matter of delay only and (b) the issue is
being tackled. Yet, there remain many loopholes in the implementation process that need to be
addressed with more vigour and innovation.
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provisions for the implementation of EU law. 95 This seems a reasonable argument,
although it will be resisted by all those who fear greater integration as a result of
enhanced implementation powers given to the ECJ and the Commission.
7.5.2.	 Implementing European Food Policy
The transformation into national legislation of EC Directives on foodstuffs broadly
follows the trends outlined in Tables 9 and 10 but has, at times, lagged behind even
further:
"In Bezug auf die Umsetzung von EG-Mal3nahinen in nationales Recht steilt der
Bericht Ider EG-Kommission] fest, daB insgesamt erhebliche Fortschritte erreicht
wurden, jedoch befinde sich der Ernahrungssektor dabei mit einem
Unisetzungszustand von nur 50% im Rückstand."96
"Neben den noch unerledigten Aufgaben der Rechtsetzung wird sich die
Lebensmittelwritschaft zunehmend auch mit der Durchfilhrung bereits
verabschiedeten Germeinschafisrechtes befassen mussen."97
Despite these set-backs, implementation and enforcement of food law is heavily
promoted at all levels and has led to a fundamental overhaul of the national law in
some member states. For example, the UK Food Safety Act, 1990, and the
Amendment of the German Food Law, 1992, were primarily national responses,
UNICE, 'UNICE Submission to the Intergovernmental Conference on Political Union: General
Considerations', ZT/LL/13.A.4., 18 March 1991.
96 "With regard to the transformation of EC Directives into national law, the report states that, on
the whole, considerable progress was made, but that the food and drinks sector was lagging
behind, since less than 50% of food legislation had been adopted at national levels." BLL, 'In
Sachen Lebensrnittel: Jahresbericht 1990/91, Bonn, 1991, p.11.
"Besides the unresolved legislative issues, the food and drinks sector will have to deal
increasingly with the implementation of EC law." BLL op.cit., 1992/3, p.2.
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aimed at incorporating the new EC legislation into the existing legal framework.98
Both documents contain instructions on enforcement so as to assist the smooth
implementation of new EC law. These documents, as well as all Commission
communications on the subject of implementation and enforcement, emphasise two
points: First, the need for partnership during implementation and, second, the
necessity to inform and train both implementors and food and drinks processors as
appropriate.99
The emphasis on partnership has led to temporary and ad hoc sub-networks,
responsible for implementation of; usually, one particular piece of legislation.'°° The
Commission has participated in these sub-networks in a variety of ways such as: (a)
regular meetings with home based national civil servants to deal with complaints,
problems and the like; (c) production of guidelines for administrative co-operation;
(d) establishment of data-transmission networks; (e) programmes for exchange of
officials; (f) support for co-operation between laboratories and certification bodies;
98 ibid., Part XV: Anderung des LMBG; Food Safety Act 1990, HMSO, 1991; P. Phillips, 'EC and
UK Food Legislation - an Overview', Presentation at a Symposium organised by Leatherhead
Food RA, 8 April 1991; S. Fallows, '1991: a Watershed Year for UK Food Legislation', British
Food Journal, 93(2), 1991, pp.3-7.
This point was made by a great number of commentators, e.g. Allen op.cit., 1989; Phillips
op.cit, V. Scherrer, as reported in AGRA Alimentation, 'Unibrem: le nouveau président', no
1142, 15 décembre 1988, pp.4-5; M. Welsch, Die Entwicklung des gemeinschaftlichen
Lebensmittelrechts', Wirtschafis-, Verwaltungs- und Umweltrecht, 2, 1991, S.86-94;
interviewees from ANIA and CIAA.
100 As seen, internal fragmentation within sectors happens at the formulation stage too, but is even
more marked at the implementation stage. Nonetheless, a detailed study of implementation will
show that, within each member state, the actors in one sub-network overlap to a good degree
with those in others, i.e. Commission officials, national and local civil servants, trade
associations, etc. are likely to be involved in the implementation of virtually all food policies,
but their particular functions, powers and behaviour may vaiy, and the structures of the sub-
networks may subsequently be slightly different in each case.
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(g) publication of information and training material. 101 Immediate responsibility for
supervision and law enforcement lies with national, regional or local civil servants.
Their activities have included general monitoring of foodstuffs, sampling and testing
products, inspecting premises, training and advising food and drinks processors,
liaising with other civil servants and Commission officials, producing reports for the
latter. These civil servants usually work in tandem with national and regional trade
associations, consumer, environmental and other interested groups and the food and
drinks processors themselves. They frequently delegate activities, especially to trade
associations and research establishments. Training and information dissemination are
the favoured areas of delegation.'° 2 Hence, a sizeable part of implementation
responsibilities are 'contracted out' to the private sector!
Although the Commission and the ECJ are closely involved in the implementation of
EC policy and are promoting greater harmonisation in this area, the current
structures undoubtedly enhance the overall contribution of national as well as sub-
national policy actors. Those who are responsible for the implementation of food
law seem to be acting less politically than their counterparts at the policy
formulation stage. However, politics is never entirely absent, even at the
implementation stage. Furthermore, there is some evidence that, besides political
101 See e.g. ISECIB7/93. Given some of the findings in the thesis regarding diiculties in
communication between the Commission and industry and the constraint on resources, the
learning process may be lengthy and difficult.
102 JIen op.cit, 1989. In some quarters such delegation has caused concern, because it may cause
more confusion about food safety aspects, and who to turn to for advise, than already exists
among many food and drinks processors. Evidence for existing confusion is presented in the
following Section of this chapter as well as elsewhere, e.g. in J. Graham, 'Wither Food Safety?
Consumer Attitudes and Perceptions', Presentation at a symposium organised by Leatherhead
Food RA, 24 May 1990. Graham is for example concerned about delegation of training
responsibilities on issues related to food safety.
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priorities, traditions, cultural outlooks and economic concerns can hinder smooth
implementation.
Law enforcers cannot supervise food and drinks processors constantly and, hence,
successful implementation also depends on the co-operation of the latter. Research
data produced some interesting findings in this respect. Food and drinks processors
are resigned to changing legislation, given that the industry itself is constantly
undergoing change, both technologically and structurally, and on the whole, they
seem to be law abiding. However, the following statements reveal concern with the
pace of change and the repercussions for their businesses.
"For tiny companies like us, there is sufficient initial extra cost, because we have to
comply with new legislation, e.g. with labelling."
"Production standards will have to change in our case, this means more checks and
paper work."
"Considerable expenditure on updating current premises or re-locating to new
premises. N
"We now have to learn languages and get standards improved".
"Redesign products to meet different demands."103
However, willingness to adapt to changing legislation is not sufficient; adequate
knowledge of the new laws is also required. It is alarming that not all food and
drinks processors have sound knowledge of the changing legislation (Figure 2),
perhaps partially as a result of the communication difficulties between Eurocrats and
industrialists referred to earlier in the thesis. Lack of knowledge, coupled with a
103 These are all comments by respondents to the mail survey on the effects of The Single European
Market and the Food Industry.
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commitment to behave in a law abiding way, has led occasionally to curious
reactions. For example, a small poultry processor spent a lot of extra money and
time on excessive testing, because he was very concerned that he would otherwise
not meet the new legal requirements. Interestingly, he also seemed to be unclear as
to what was actually legally required of him and what related to voluntary quality
improvements so as to meet BS5750 standards. He felt that he had received "only
very little information" and got "very little information and help, if any from DII",
but "some from MAJF but only because, unlike other food organisations, we
register voluntarily." 104 The processor acknowledged that local officials eventually
helped him to cope more constructively with new demands concerning food hygiene
and quality control: "EHO's and Trading Standards are the only approachable,
useftil people."°
A small number of processors are concerned about the differences arising from
idiosyncratic national implementation procedures (Figure 3). For example, the
British Poultry Meat Federation was convinced that MAFF interpret guidelines to
safeguard hygiene and public health more stringently than any other countiy.'° 5 They
argued that this caused unnecessary extra cost to the processors, so reducing their
ability to compete with other EU businesses. A few other British processors
expressed similar concerns, but it is difficult to veriQj how appropriate these are,
particularly since underlying national prejudice and feelings of superiority are not
entirely absent among food processors, as can be seen from the quotes on 271.
104 Quotes from a conversation with a small British poultiy processor who was interviewed during
1991.
105 Thi became evident during an interview with one of their representatives, London, 1992. The
issue was raised with one of the MAFF interviewees who did not think that it was an issue at
all.
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"Some of our laws are more exacting and should be kept."
"Britain may have laws stricter in some cases, also EC directives could strip Britain
of its regional food characteristics."
"We have well proven laws in our country which have been respected for many years
and proved satisfactory in most courts."106
To a lesser extent, similar worries were expressed by German respondents: 107
"If national laws are better, they should have precedence."
"Useful national directives(?) must	 be overruled by EC directives."
"Reduction of standards of laws and directives must be prevented."
This short discussion on implementation confirms two widespread views. First,
implementation of food law is likely to preoccupy policy-makers and food and
drinks industrialists increasingly, given that it is neither a smooth, nor a fast process.
Second, implementation of food law offers the "opporti.rnity to influence the form of
the actual cutting edge of legislation". 108 In the case of the EC it tends to lead to a
certain fragmentation and enhances national and sub-national idiosyncrasies,
especially as far as directives are concerned. (Yet, increased use of regulations
would probably hinder progress towards integration, given that agreement on many
policies is not easy and, therefore, it does not constitute an easy remedy. 109 Even
once directives have been integrated into national law, implementation can be varied,
as a result of different administrative systems, but also as a result of the ways in
106 Questionnaire comments by British food and drinks processors.
107 Questionnaire comments by German food and drinks processors.
108 J3CCA, Annual Report, 1990, p.14; For confirmation on similar trends elsewhere, see for
example M. Thrasher op. cit.
109 This view was implicit in the following comment by a questionnaire respondent: "only in the
perfect world can every national and local precedent be overcome."
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which food and drinks processors deal with new legislation. The way in which new
legislation impacts on its environment is, in the final analysis, not only dependent on
how policy-makers implement legislation, but also on the ways in which
industrialists react to legislation and use it to their advantage or disadvantage. This is
particularly true for 'enabling' legislation which creates new opportunities.
Therefore, the final part of this chapter looks at some responses by the to new food
legislation, arising from the drive to create a single European market. However, it is
first necessary to take another brief look at policy analytic frameworks, in the light
of the additional complications added by the policy implementation phase.
At the implementation stage, new policy actors enter the process and others are no
longer involved. Furthermore, the structure of the food network changes and,
besides the Commission officials, different actors move to the core, whereas others
are relegated to the periphery. Also, policy actors behave somewhat differently in
that political considerations are less important, and certainly less overt, than at the
formulation stage. The alterations signal partial breaks and new syntheses in
resource dependence and raise the question whether implementation should be
treated, in terms of analysis, as a separate network. European level food policy-
making certainly challenges the views of those who subscribe to the notion that no
clear-cut distinctions can be made between the various stages of the policy process.
However, the breaks in resource dependence between the formulation and
implementation stages are only partial and it is possible to accommodate both phases
within one policy network, provided that the differences are sufficiently highlighted.
It has become evident that, as far as European food policy is concerned, policy-
making is far more complex than suggested by the Rhodes-Marsh model. The
extended model, as proposed in Chapter 6, is better able to capture the multi-level
bargaining processes that go on inside the policy network. Yet, even this conceptual
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framework is in many ways too static and rigid to capture the dynamic and intricate
nature of food policy-making, and probably of other policy networks. However, this
conclusion does not render the models useless, given the ftinction of analytical tools
in social sciences as outlined by Vincent.11O
7.6.	 A Miniture Case Study on Industrial Reactions to Legislative
Changes in the Business Environment: Responses by Food and
Drinks Processors to the Legislative Programme Designed to
Facilitate the Emergence of a Genuine Single European Market
Summary of General Surveys on the Responses of European
Businesses to the Creation of the Single European Market
It would have been very hard for the European industry to miss the message that the
creation of a truly integrated market brings tremendous opportunities for those who
exploit them and serious threats for those who ignore the changing environment.111
110 See quote by Vincent in Chapter six.
111 Cecchini et al. op. cit.; CEC op. cit., Research on the Cost of Non-Europe...; J. Morrow, 'UK
finns in the Euro Fast Lane', The Guardian, 13 October 1989, p.14; P. Genet, 'Nos petits
champions de l'exportation', Le Point, no 988, 24 aoüt 1991, pp.42-6, have stressed particularly
the opportunities and benefits that could be expected from the SEM.
However, most commentators emphasised potential pitfalls, as well as opportunities, and many
of them underlined the extent to which business may need to reshape itself to benefit markedly
from the SEM. For such views, see for example, J. McGee & S. Segal-Horn, 'Changes in the
European Food Processing Industry: the Consequences of 1992', Presentation at 8th Annual
Strategic Management Society Conference, Amsterdam, 17-20 October 1988; J.R. Nicholls,
'The EC: Dancing with a Gorilla?', British Food Journal, 90(6), 1988, pp.263-'7; R. Owen & M.
Dynes, The Times Guide to 1992, Times Books Ltd., 1989; R. Monbiot, 'A Business Look at
1992', Presentation at a symposium organised by Leatherhead Food RA, 14 November 1989;
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UndoubteWy, potential threats and opportunities were sometimes exaggerated in
order to reinvigorate European integration, although to argue that "the whole thing
is just one big advertising hype" is unfair and excessively cynical. 112 It would
therefore be reasonable to expect business organisations to take an interest in the
European developments and to engage in appropriate strategic preparation."3
Rapport du Groupe de Stratégie Industrielle Agro-alimentaire, Les industries alimentaires
fran caises face au défi européen', Tome I: syntheses et résumés, La Documentation Francaise,
1990; S. Macphie, 'The Threat and the Response', Presentation at a Conference on '1992',
organised by the National Association of Master Bakers and the Scottish Association of Master
Bakers, London, 27 Februaiy 1990; R. Monbiot, 'The Impact of the EEC on the UK Food
Industry', Presentation at a symposium organised by Leatherhead Food RA, 24 May 1990; P.
Deloifre, Rapport d'orientation, publication de I'Assemblée Générale de l'ANIA, 24 octobre
1991; KPMG op.cit.
Others, such as Pringuet, have stressed that for food and drinks processors, an integrated
market exists already to a large extent and that, consequently, the SEM will not have a great
deal of impact at all. (P. Pringuet, 'La revolution européenne est déjà réalisde', Annales des
Mines, numéro special, février 1989, pp.140-i.)
Many questionnaire respondents adopted similar views, e.g. "Europe is already an extremely
tought market for our product, with lots of high quality, low price opposition, and for a long
time to come we can sell all our output within the UK and the USA." "Not much effect; eating
habits will alter only insignificantly." "Most of our production has a very short shelf life, so we
are unlikely to be able to export, but we will not be affected too much by imports either." "We
are a small company; our developing priority: North Wales and we foresee over the next four
years that our growth will be restricted in this area. Over the four years behond, growth will
gradually develop from that base with short lines of communication."
The idea that the SEM does not affect some businesses, for whatever reasons, is obviously a
quite commonly, but genuinely mistaken view, given the many legislative changes referred to
earlier in this chapter. Nonetheless, it must be admitted that there are significant differences
within food and drinks sub-sectors, with some sectors, such as soft drinks, being more affected
by legislative change than others. Yet, food and drinks processors are also part of broader
changes and are affected, too, by other SEM policy measures, for example in respect of social,
environmental, transport, competition policies.
112 This is the view of a trade association representative who wishes to remain anonymous.
113 of literature exists that discusses the benefits of strategic preparation, although some
accounts take a rather naive view of the freedom of manoeuvrability that firms have and often
ignore important constraints, such as resources, cultural outlook, etc. (See for example, N.H.
Chorn, 'The "Alignment" Theory: Creating Strategic Fit', Management Decision, 29(1), 1991,
pp.20-4; E.F. Harrison, 'The Concept of Strategic Gap', Journal of General Management, pp.57-
72, as referred to in B. Axford et al., 'The Single European Market and Small Businesses:
Evaluation of and Responses to a Changing Environment', European Research, 2(4), July 1991,
pp . 1-6.)
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Surveys carried out during the late 1980s and early 1990s indicated that awareness
of changes in the European business environment was quite high, but that active
preparation was much lower. For example, by 1991, 98% of respondents
interviewed for a Single MarketNews survey were aware that an integrated
European market was being created. 114 A similar survey in 1990 had reported that
only 43% of UK firms had so far engaged in any form of preparation. In 1991 this
figure was virtually unchanged across all firms interviewed, but was 67% among
large and international firms. l ' 5 Only 9% of the firms that had not prepared
themselves in any way for the SEM had undertaken a strategic appraisal before
deciding that they did not have to respond actively to the environmental changes.
Some 28% blatantly admitted that this decision was based on personal feelings and
subjective assessments, and not on a strategic appraisal. A further 5% declared
themselves too busy to even think about the SEM." A survey carried out among
There are however some valuable discussions of strategic management, e.g. D. Binsted,
'Learning to Cope with Change', Management Decision, 24(3), 1986, pp.32-6; J.G. Covin &
D.P. Slevin, 'Strategic Management of Small Finns in Hostile and Benign Environments',
Strategic Management Journal, 10(1), January-February 1989, pp.75-87; D.J. Hickson et al.,
Decision and Organization - Processes of Strategic Decision Making and their Explanations',
Public Administration, 67, winter 1989, pp.373-90; R Whipp, 'Human Resource Management,
Strategic Change and Competition: the Role of Learning', International Journal of Human
Resources Management, 2(2), 1991, pp.165-92; D. Hahn, 'Strategic Management-Tasks and
Challenges in the 1990s', Long Range Planning, 24(1), February 1991, pp.26-39; P. O'Farrell et
al., Does Strategy Matter? an Analysis of Generic Strategies and Performance in Business
Service Firms', Business Strategy Review, 3(1), spring 1992, pp.71 -87 (this article provides
some empirical evidence that there is a correlation between strategic management and
performance); P.E. Connor, Decision-Making Participation Patterns: the Role of
Organizational Context', The Acade,ny ofManagement Journal, 35(1), March 1992, pp.218-3 1.
Some useful comments on strategic management also appeared specifically in response to the
creation of the SEM, e.g. Daems op.cit.; E.C. Friberg, 'The Challenge of 1992', The McKinsey
Quarterly, autumn 1988, pp.27-40; S. Rothwell, 'Preparing for 1992 - Where Should We
Start?', Manager Update, 1(2), winter 1989, pp. 16-26; J.D. Sharp, 'A Business Strategy for the
Single European Market', Long Range Planning, 23(2), April 1990, pp.35-42; P.J. Williamson,
'Sales and Service Strategy for the Single European Market', Business Strategy Review, 3(2),
summer 1992, pp. 17-43; Stahr et al. op.cit.
114 Single Market News, 'Campaign: How Ready is Business?', No. 13, winter 1991, p.30.
115 Single Market News, 'Campaign Report: British Business is Taking Action - Are You7, No. 9,
winter 1990, p.11.
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small businesses in Oxfordshire produced comparable results. 116 Not surprisingly, a
CBI survey found that more large firms undertook strategic appraisals and
subsequently produced action programmes, if deemed necessary."7
tt6 Axford et. al. op.cit.
" 7 CBJ News, 'UK Firms Lead Europe in Preparation for 1992', 1990. 75% of UK firms with 200+
employees apparently undertaken a strategic appraisal by 1989; of these 77% acknowledged
that sales and marketing were going to be their major areas of change. This view was confirmed
elsewhere in e.g. S. Daser & D.P. Hylton, 'The European Community Single Market of 1992:
European Executives Discuss Trends for Global Marketing', International Marketing Review,
8(5), 1991, pp. 44-8.
Most commentators reported that large enterprises were more proactive, but there is anecdotal
evidence that not all of them have exploited opportunities to the full. For example, Marketing
reported that Cadbuiy's "...presence in Europe is not as bold as it could be..." and that "Cadbuiy
seems to be taking a relaxed attitude to the Single Market." {Marketing, Cadbury Conquers the
World', 24 Januaiy 1991, pp.20-1.
By contrast, some small firms prepared innovatively and very successfully for the SEM. See for
example, H. Darrington, 'Frozen Yogurth Voted Top', Food Manufacture, May 1991, pp.60-2,
which tells the story of Loseley Dairy Products' success in producing a range of frozen creamy
yoghurt in order to enhance its competitive status in the SEM. See also, Cherry Valley's success
with low-fat duck breast fillet products' as reported in the ANUGA Exhibition Magazine,
'Hochprofil-Prasentation auf der ANUGA, Oktober 1991, S.36, or, John Pretty's experience
with his Millers Damsel Enterprises Ltd. {J. Pretty, Developing a Market from Small
Beginnings', in Brace & Patten (eds.) op.cit., pp.51-4.). More generally, see for example
Watson & Smart's account of Bill Cronin, an airline captain with Lufthansa, who set up, in
addition to his regular job, a small high quality silk garment business, based originally in
Southern England, but now with subsidiaries in half a dozen EU countries. {R. Watson & V.
Smart, 'In Search of Singular Success', The European, 27-30 May 1993, p.3.)
On the whole, reactions of small businesses have however been muted. For example, Mr.
Barton from County Natwest referred to one of County NatWest's surveys (1990), while being
interviewed for this thesis, which depicted a rather depressing picture with regard to small
business. Notably, 56% of respondents had said that the SEM would not affect them or that they
thought the SEM would not affect them; only 32% had a positive view of the SEM and only
23% had taken some action. German surveys were somewhat more promising but produced
nonetheless comparable results, with only around 50% of survey respondents expecting
opportunities for their businesses. {DIH, Wegweiser zum EG-Binnenmarkt, 5. Aullage,
Druckerei GebrUder Kopp, Juli 1991.) Perhaps surprisingly, the CEC reported recently that
small and medium-sized enterprises were now doing quite well: "Small and medium-sized
enterprises (SMEs) are exportig more and offering new services, thanks to the single market,
according to a survey for the Commission.". This comment must be treated cautiously, given its
source, but signals that some SMEs benefit from the SEM, especially in the medium- and,
perhaps, longer term. (CEC, WE/14195.}
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7.6.2.	 Anecdotal Evidence of Positive Responses to the Single European
Market by Food and Drinks Processors
In the food and beverage industry, responses to the single market drive were mixed.
Some of the large companies were involved actively in acquisition and mergers, and
there were some joint ventures. For instance, BSN acquired Lea & Perrins in 1988,
Kraftfood bid for the Norwegian chocolate factory Freia Marabou and Trebor-
Basset became part of Cadbury." 8 There was also a marked trend towards
concentration in retailing, particularly in countries with hitherto fragmented markets,
namely Spain, Italy, Greece and Portugal." 9 Furthermore, large firms were involved
in other forms of preparation. For example, Rowntree Mackintosh organised tailor
made language programmes for their staff and BSNs Chief Executive urged the
French government successfully to train the French more effectively for the arrival of
the SEM. 120 Although costly, product innovation has been another way to prepare
for the SEM. For example, Mars Plc and other confectionery producers launched a
variety of new frozen chocolate products that imitate well-known existing
118 See for example, J. Morrow, 'UK Firms in the Euro Fast Lane', The Guardian, 13 October
1989, p.l'I; N. Barton, 'Mergers and Acquisitions in the Food Indusfry', Presentation at a
symposium organised by Leatherhead Food RA., 24 May 1990; 'R. Domeniconi, Nestlé SA,
'Acquisitional Growth, the Answer to European Consolidation?', Presentation at the County
NatWest Conference on 'Food Without Frontiers', 6 June 1991; Lebensinittel-Zeitung, 'Die
Konzentration nimmt zu', Nr. 41, 10. Oktober 1991, S.46. K. Fossli, 'Hershey May Launch
Counter Bid for Frela Marabou', Financial Times, 30 September 1992, p.23. Mr. Barton,
Director, County NatWest Ltd., also confirmed during the interview (see footnote 115) thaI
mergers and acquisitions had become a major means of preparing for the SEM, at least as far as
large business was concerned.
9 See for example, J. Sasseen, 'Setting Up Shop Across Europe', International Management, June
1991, pp.29-32; M. Gibson, 'The Battle of the Brand Alliance', The European, 13-16 August
1992, pp.40-i; 1. Tapster, 'Swiss Re Agrees Allianz Deal', The European, 7-13 October 1994,
p.23.
'20 See for example Boyce op.cit., 1993.
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confectionery such as the Mars Bar. 121 Other companies concentrated on reviewing
and reinvigorating advertising strategies.'22
7.6.3.	 Selected Responses toAhe Mail Survey for this Research Project on
the Single European Market and the Food Industry'23
As can be seen from Figure 4, some 43% of the respondents had engaged in
preparatory action for the SEM and a further 10% intended to do so. Since 87% of
the respondents are small businesses, this result is comparable to the findings in the
general surveys referred to in Section 7.6.1. Far fewer respondents considered the
SEM to be a particularly high priority (Figure 5); a finding which is also comparable
to those in other surveys.
The lack of action among the majority of respondents is based to some extent on
rational decision-making. For example, many questionnaire respondents commented
that the recession was taking up all their attention. 124 For export oriented
companies, the single market was often only one part of a global strategy and issues
121 The Independent, 'The Mars Today is Moreish in Every Way', 10 September 1992, p.1.
122 J. Whitelock & E. Kalpaxoglou, 'Standardised Advertising for the Single European Market?,
European Business Review, 91(3), 1991, pp.4-8. The pilot study, on which this article was
based, confirmed that standardisation of advertising would not be a viable option in most
instances, due to cultural differences.
123 For a discussion of the content and execution of this swvey, see Chapter 1, Section 1.5., as well
as Appendix I.
124 There appears to have been a decline in intra-EU trading that was explained by the impact of
recession, but it became evident mainly during 1993, when such trading decreased by 11%.
Hence, fears of recession and anticipated recession may be nearly as stifling as well as actual
recession. {For the reference to the 1993 decrease in intra-EU trading, see notably S. Panter,
'Remember, Europe also Means Britain', The Guardian, 1 January 1994, p.33.)
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such as GATT negotiations took on greater importance. 125 Some companies
reckoned that they had exploited European market opportunities already as much as
they wished to. Sometimes there was already a market saturation of products or a
company's products were only suitable for local markets. The following comments
by questionnaire respondents confirm these points.
"We are already well established in Europe and tend to be limited by product
availability rather than by marketing opportunities."
"Europe is already an extremely tough market for our product, with lots of high
quality, low priced opposition, and for a long time to come we can sell all our output
within the UK and the USA."
"Not much effect; eating habits will alter only insignificantly."
"Most of our production has a very short shelf life, so we are unlikely to be able to
export, but we will not be affected too much by imports either."
Many questionnaire respondents and interviewees stated that they were more
concerned about strategic developments other than the SEM, notably the CAP
reform, GATT negotiations and, to a lesser extent, EMU, or about national issues.
The latter took on a particular meaning for German business people, following
reunification and virtually all German questionnaire respondents and interviewees
commented on this in the following or similar ways: "Re-unification is a severe
distraction and can interfere with preparation for the internal market." Food
enterprises are notoriously unstable and the set-up and bankruptcy rates are very
high. Consequently, many firms have very limited financial resources and are so
worried over cash flow problems and profit margins that they fail to take much
notice of broad changes in their strategic environment. The following quote by a
British food processor is symbolic for the outlook of small and harassed processors.
"We hardly know how to pay our bills, Europe is just a dream for us." According to
125 See for example, Gebhard op. cit.
281
an official from MAFF, the preoccupation with prescriptive legal change uses up the
resources (financial, time, staff etc.) of some processors to the extent that they are
unable to take advantage of 'enabling' legislation. The example, mentioned earlier, of
the small UK poultry processor, that undertook excessive levels of testing, lends
weight to this view.
There are also some less rational and less tangible reasons for inactivity which run
contrary to the assumptions of harmony on which much theory of strategic
management has been based.' 26 The following comments show that some
industrialists simply relied on their intuition, probably to their detriment.
"I think there will be veiy little effect in our market."
"I only believe half in it"
"We are not at all concerned with the SEM"
"Many bakers think that 1992 will not affect them,..."127
Uncertainty seems to stifle preparation for the SEM, too, and there is evidently a
correlation between feelings of uncertainty and lack of strategic planning in
general.' 28 This is a worrying matter, given that 22% of survey respondents did not
126 See footnote 111.
127 The first three comments were made by questionnaire respondents, the fourth was made during
the special conference on '1992', organised by the National Association of Master Bakers and
the Scottish Association of Master Bakers, 1990. {The emphasis (italics) in the quotes is added
by the author of the thesis.)
128 See for example, Friberg op.cit.; C.H. Wilson, Developing and Marketing Daiiy Product
Brands in Europe', European Business Review, 91(3), 1991, pp.34-43; The negative impact of
excessive feelings of uncertainty were also mentioned by some interviewees (e.g. MAFF, ByE,
Ministère de l'Agriculture et de Ia Forét) and can be read between the lines of some of the
comments made by questionnaire respondents, e.g. "...it is too early tojedge with confidence...";
"We have a comprehensive plan, but again, until legislation and timing of implementation is
finalised, key issues remain difficult to predict."
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know how the SEM would affect them. A further 8% said that they did not know if
the internal market had any effects at all and 14% were uncertain about the impact
on the food and beverage industries. Finally, 12% had apparently no idea about the
ways in which the 1985 White Paper legislative programme would influence the
business environment in their respective countries. It is understandable that feelings
of uncertainty stifle proactive behaviour, but there is much evidence that business
organisations cannot afford to be frightened off too much, given the volatility of
today's European business environment. 129
Partially, organisational response depends on a firm's cultural outlook and on its self:
image.' 3° For example, businesses that regard the "SEM as a Mount Everest to
climb", are less likely to respond positively than those that "don't see why we
shouldn't one day be involved." There is some evidence from. secondary litcratuxe
that Europe's food and drinks processors are, overall, reacting in a rather
For a more general discussion on the stifling nature of uncertainty, see for example, J.K. Liker
et a]., 'Changing Everything All at Once: Work Life and Technological Change', Sloan
Management Review, summer 1987, pp.29-47.
129 For confirmation of this point, see for example, A. Kakabadse, Planning for Change',
Management Decision, 25(4), 1987, pp.22-7.
130 valuable discussions on the concept of organisational culture and its effects on
organisational behaviour, see for example, A.M. Pettigrew, 'On Studying Organisational
Cultures', Administrative Science Quarterly, 1979, No.24, pp.570-8!; E.H. Burack, 'Changing
the Company Culture - the Role of Human Resource Development, Long Range Planning,
24(1), 1991, pp.85-99. Some of the mail survey responses indicate that organisational culture,
and especially sell-perception, can indeed shape outlook and subsequent activity, or inactivity,
as the case may be. See for example the following comments: "We are independent, with
longstanding modes of operating." "we are too small to see how the organisation of the SEM
could affect us." "The character of my organisation is formed makinly by internal influences
like effort, skill, will to succeed and improve."
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conservative way to the OPPOrtunities arising from the SEM, probably because many
firms have a parochial culture. 131
Since many heavily export and/or Euro-oriented firms have already treated Europe
as one market,' 32 an open outlook and/or export experience need not produce
marked extra activity. However, such a cultural outlook, particularly if coupled with
resources, can engender further export activity (see Figure 6 for cross-references
between export-orientation and active preparation) and may enhance overall
awareness of strategic dynamics and change readiness.
Self-image and change readiness may also be mediated by national business cultures.
There is a lot of controversy about the extent to which organisations are meant to be
affected by this rather amorphous concept.' 33 Quantitative analysis of the survey
data uncovers no correlation between action levels and countries (Figure 7).
However, there are some noticeable differences which call for explanation, for
example the comparatively low level of preparation by German survey respondents.
131 For such evidence, see for example, KPMG op.cit.; Clark (1990) found that the fragmented
and rather parochial European paper industiy was facing similar barriers. {D. Clark, '1992: The
Changing Structure of the European Paper Industiy', Long Range Planning, 23(1), February
1990, PP. 89-95.)
132 Institute of Personnel Management, 1992: Personnel Management and the Single European
Market, 1PM Publications, 1988.
133 0n more detailed discussions of national culture, see for example, G. Morgan, Images of
Organization, Sage, 1986; C. Randlesome et al. (eds.), Business Cultures in Europe,
Heinemann Professional Publishing, 1990; P.B. Smith, 'Organizational Behaviour and National
Cultures', British Journal ofManagement, 3(1), 1992, pp.39-51; Y. Paul Huo & W. McKinley,
'Nation as a Context for Strategy: the Effects of National Characteristics on Business-Level
Strategies', Management International Review, 32(2), 1992, pp.103-13. Most of these writers
assume that national culture mediates organisational attitudes but this view has recently been
challenged, e.g. by K.R Johnson & RT. Golembiewski, 'Nationality Culture in Organization
Development: a Conceptual and Empirical Analysis', The International Journal of Human
Resource Management, 3(1), May 1992, pp.71-84. There is neither adequate evidence, nor
sufficient scope to embark in a more conclusive discussion on this topic here, particularly since
the differences shown in Figure 7 cannot be explained satisfactorily (footnote 132).
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Unfortunately, subsequent research and analysis has not uncovered any valid cause
and effect relationships, and earlier discussions of the issue have remained at the
level of speculation.' 34 Consequently, there is little value in repeating these here.
7.6.4.	 Cncjive Remarks: Policy Implementation and Organisational
Responses to Policy Output
The discussions in this chapter have by no means been exhaustive, especially as far
as implementation and responses are concerned. Nonetheless, they have
demonstrated that policy implementation as well as responses to policies mediate
policy outcomes. Indeed, these two processes are quite crucial in explaining why
policy outcomes are not uniform and why preparation for the single European
market has been varied among food and drinks processors. For obvious reasons, the
differences tend to be most marked with directives, but they can be quite
considerable, even without taking into account the particular policy instrument
employed. Since the unfolding of the implementation phase and reactions to policies
are often not predictable, these two phases of policy-making add some uncertainty
to final outcomes. Hence, ther is a persistent need to examine the role of influences
which mediate policy behaviour and responses to policy output.
In the case of food policy-making, policy implementation and responses to policy
output somewhat undermine certain integration pressures that arise from the
creation of new European law. In the case of implementation, this may be mainly a
short to medium term problem. Over time, organisations, too, may take even more
advantages of business opportunities arising from joint European policy making.
However, it is unlikely that responses will ever live up entirely to some of the highly
'34 See Boyce op.cit., 1993, pp.228-3 1.
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optimistic, if not propagandistic claims made by a handftil of European politicians
and officials.
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CHAPTER EIGHT:
CONCLUSION
This research project has analysed multiple aspects of the policy process of the
European Union in order to cast some light on the nature of this peculiar political
system. The Introduction (Chapter one) has highlighted the unique, hybrid nature of
this rapidly evolving political system and documents the growing relevance of the
EU to European citizens, the global world order, scholars of European integration
and political scientists alike. Chapter two has revolved around central constitutional
and institutional characteristics of the EU and has provided a synopsis of its early
history and the ways in which the latter shaped its development. The policy process
of the EU takes place within the parameters set by these characteristics. Chapter
three contains a summary of the major integration theories that have been used as
conceptual frameworks to assist in the analysis of European integration and the EU's
nature.
In Chapter 3, the intellectual debt owed to 'classical' theorists of European
integration, like Haas or Hoffmann, and to general JR theorists, like Krasner or
Keohane, is acknowledged. Simultaneously, it is accepted that such traditional
discourse has its limitations as far as analysis of the EU is concerned, especially since
it tends to be based on quite narrow, essentialist world-views. Nonetheless, some
contributions seem particularly promising. For example, Moravscik's 'neo-liberal'
institutionalist approach which attempts to synthesise findings from the field of
international political economy with traditional neo-Realist perceptions of
international exchanges. Since his work is based on empirical research relating to
key stages of development in the EU, it has all the more credibility. Notwithstanding
these strengths, it is not an entirely suitable framework for the analysis of the EU in
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its own right, namely because it revolves exclusively around specific, path-breaking
events, rather than the day to day management of the EU. Furthermore, Moravscik
plunges ultimately for a relatively narrow institutionalist interpretation, so failing to
make full use of the potential opportunities that arise from his analytical framework.
Since JR theorists are concerned with the interaction between nation states, they
tend to neglect the internal workings of the individual political systems which is
inappropriate as far as the EU is concerned. For this reason, scholars like Bulmer,
argued convincingly that any analysis of the EU has to be concerned with the
domestic politics of the member states as well. Yet, while Bulmer concentrated on
the ways in which domestic politics shape the behaviour of national politicians when
acting at the European level, he did arguably not pay sufficient attention to 'linkage
-	 politics', that is the ways in which the two-level exchanges (national and European
levels) affect one another and political outcome at both levels. By contrast,
Putnam's work on two- or multi-level games provides a feasible framework for
inter-level analysis, even though it does not relate to the EU in particular.
Furthermore, this scholar emphasises usefully the centrality and intensity of
bargaining that takes place during these inter-level exchanges. Hence, his work has
been integrated into a synthesised conceptual framework that has been developed in
this thesis and which is, arguably, more suited to the analysis of European policy-
making than any of the individual approaches and models discussed in the project,
including those referred to above.
There are three main draw-backs in Putnam's work as far as the analysis of
European policy-making is concerned. First, Putnam's work, too, concentrates
exclusively on specific key events and not continued day to day management of
interactions. Second, his work is concerned with international gatherings, and not
semi-supranational entities such as the EU. Lastly, policy-making in the EU is too
varied to be captured by an overarching conceptual approach. For these reasons, it
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would not be adequate to rely entirely on his contributions. Since the EU is more
integrated than international organisations and can be regarded as a political entity
(albeit of a very special kind; see especially Chapter 6, Section 4) with common
governance, it seemed most appropriate to synthesise multi-level bargaining analysis,
as espoused by Putnam, with theoretical approaches from political science in general
and the policy analytic approach in particular (see justifications elaborated in
Chapters 1 and 6). Consequently, Chapters four to seven of the thesis are concerned
with developing and testing an integrated, cross-disciplinary conceptual framework
which is rooted in political science but takes account of the positive contributions
from IR, including particularly Putnam's work.
Although Chapters four to seven contain extensive discussions on the
conceptualisation of the European policy process, the latter are all based firmly on
empirical data that have been collected for the project. In addition, empirical
material from other sources, such as documentation, secondary literature, has been
used in order to deepen the empirical basis of the discussions further. Thus, this
project is rooted firmly within the empirical tradition of research, even though it
contains extended theoretically oriented discussion. Primary research data were
collected by way of mail surveys, interviews and non-participant observation from
sources close to the production of EU policies. These data were exceptionally
valuable because they provided considerably insight into the basic workings and
characteristics of the EU. A synopsis of these are provided below (Section 8.1).
Moreover, data demonstrated that formal EU policy procedures are mediated
considerably by various informal influences, thus making for systemic variety. The
interaction between formal and informal policy influences and the role and
significance of the latter are summarised in Section 8.2. Given the principal findings
which could be deduced from the empirical data, discussions in Chapters four to
seven centred increasingly on the elaboration of a conceptual framework which is
sufficiently differentiated to take account of systemic variety. Section 8.3
291
summarises the main points of these discussions and proposes strategies for iliture
work concerned with the elaboration of a suitable conceptual framework for the
analysis of EU policy-making.
8.1.	 The European Union: background and basic characteristics
It is important to be aware of the historical background to the formation of the EC
because it influenced its basic constitutional and institutional make-up. Indeed,
formalised European integration has been a function of the search for peace among
European nations. It was assumed that opening up markets to member states would
create economic wealth, due to increased intra-European trading. In turn, economic
interdependence and rising standards of living would make for a more peaceful co-
existence, despite marked political and cultural divergence among European nations.
Chapter two illustrated that these assumptions were not uncontested. However, the
majority of commentators on European integration accepted that the interlinking of
national economies had had positive repercussions on peace in Western Europe.
There is more debate as to whether the specific form that formal European
integration took was the most suitable way to enhance economic growth and living
standards in European countries.
Despite the primacy of economic considerations and considerable efforts on behalf
of the founding fathers of the EU to eliminate political squabbling, European
integration has always had intensely political undertones which have sometimes
manifested themselves overtly, for example while drawing up and ratifjing the TEU.
Therefore, the European constitution (the various Treaties and the SEA), and many
ensuing formal measures, are the result of fierce political bargaining. Moreover,
political considerations have prevailed increasingly which is symbolised by the
formal institutionalisation of the European Council, the slow, but gradual
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ascendancy of the European Parliament, the relative decline of the Commission and
the introduction in the TEU of two new, overtly political, aspects to European
integration, that is the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Common Home
and Justice Policy. The quintessentially political character of the EU is not all that
surprising, given that it is above all a mechanism for interstate conflict and rivalry!
The provisions in the European Treaties have not been without ambiguities, nor
detailed enough, to provide adequate guidelines within which political bargaining
could take place. Furthermore, the political dynamics that have driven the
development of the EU have sometimes been halted by internal divisions and/or
national self-interest. As a result, the ECJ has had many opportunities to shape the
direction of European integration. In some cases, its proactive stance and its
tendency to come up with supranational solutions to unresolved problems has
caused great concern and given rise to the claim that European integration is above
all legal integration. This claim is by no means unfounded, but it is exaggerated,
since many other factors have driven European integration, too.
The founding fathers of the EC attempted to create a system that would not be
exposed to the vicissitudes of intense political bargaining. Although they failed to do
so, their contribution has had a lasting, arguably detrimental, impact. They were
more concerned with the effectiveness of the new organisation than with its
democratic legitimacy, and popular consultation and participation were not high on
the agenda during the formative stages of the European Communities. This attitude
helps to explain why the EU is still democratically deficient and why there is
relatively widespread popular apathy and disaffection, despite the recent public
relations exercises to 'sell Europe to the Europeans'.
Besides the preoccupation with effectiveness, there were other factors, too, that help
to explain the lack of popular involvement. Notably, there was genuine popular
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apathy about the 'European alchemists' and people were mainly preoccupied with
reconstructing their private lives which had been disrupted by World War II.
Furthermore, Jean Monnet and his colleagues deliberately aimed for low-key
integration, following the rejection of earlier radical proposals. Consequently, most
negotiations and discussions on formal integration went on behind closed doors. The
aloof way in which the European Community was being created is also reminiscent
of the then (and now, to a lesser extent) dominant culture of dirigisme, centralism
and elitism that imbued the French civil service. Moreover, at the time, there was not
sufficient political opposition to prevent this culture from shaping certain aspects of
European integration. Its impact was originally particularly strong in determining the
dominant culture within the Commission which then set out to perpetuate dirigiste
policy-making at the European level, most notably with regard to the CAP.
This culture has been challenged quite successfully during recent decades, but only
aller dirigiste policy-making became increasingly ineffective and began to hinder,
rather than further, increased trade exchanges among member states. Furthermore, it
took a radical decision by the ECJ (Cassis de Dijon ruling, 1979) and a widespread
change in the ideological and political outlook among prominent European
(supranational, national, sub-national) politicians to counterbalance dirigisme to the
extent that it is now more a fragmented sub-culture that contiwe. to	 &t c
the Commission. As a result, the EU has transformed itself increasingly into a
regulatory political system where the major political debates revolve around the
extent of regulation and deregulation.
The founding fathers of the European Communities were convinced that, in order to
create effective policies, functional interests had to play a crucial role in EC policy-
making, because they were able to provide expertise and first hand practical
experience in their particular fields of operation. Bureaucrats also wrongly assumed
that functional interests would behave in an apolitical way. Hence, the Commission
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encouraged their involvement. Politicians and officials alike also approved of their
contribution because they were anxious to create an organisation that could be
accessed by private interests and individuals who were concerned in one way or
another with European policy-making and/or integration. This stance is at odds with
the widespread aloofness among many European politicians and officials, referred to
earlier, and signals a clash between some basic principles of European integration
and the elitist culture of the emerging EC.
Following World War II and the spread of single party Communist systems in many
parts of the world, Europeans were frightened of anti-liberal, secret and totalitarian
regimes. Hence, the preoccupation - in theory, at least - with popular access and
systemic openness. The abhorrence for any form of totalitarianism is also noticeable
in other respects, namely with regard to the plurality of European institutions and
the principle of separation of power that divides the legislature from the executive
and the judiciary. Furthermore, there are provisions for a number of complex policy
procedures all of which are designed to create consensus rather than to allow
policies being imposed on unwilling policy-makers. However, this plurality is in the
first instance a direct result of political bargaining and the ensuing compromises
that have characterised the emergence and development of the EU, and not of the
basic principles of philosophical liberalism on which post-war European thinking is
based.
The prevalence of political bargaining and compromising largely explains why the
number of formal institutions and policy actors has increased constantly during the
past forty-four years, but especially following the ratification of the SEA and, more
recently, the TEU. For the same reason, constitutional provisions, that have
dispersed power between the four major institutions (Commission, Council, Court
and Parliament) further and further, have been enshrined in the SEA and the TEU.
However, politics is not the only reason for the steady increase in policy
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participants. The latter is also a function of the growth of policy output and the
complex nature of many policy issues.
Thus, the EU is a pluralistic political system, but it is not a pluralist quasi-state that
conforms to pluralist theories of the state as espoused by thinkers such as Figgis or
Laski, nor a pluralist system in the Bentley-ite sense (see below). It is pluralistic
because it is multi-institutional, because power is dispersed between interdependent
government institutions and other policy actors and because it is rooted in the major
principles of philosophical liberalism and pluralism.
Even in the post-Maastricht era the European Union is not a state, nor even a fully
developed political or cultural union. Indeed, it could be argued that economic does
not amount to a ftilly blown economic union either, at least until the emerging
central banking system has been fully institutionalised and all member states have
adopted a single currency. It is therefore unwise to treat the EU just like any other
political system and look only at its internal workings. Any comprehensive study of
the nature of the EU must take into account the ways in which the individual
member states relate to each other, both formally and informally and the extent to
which persistent nationalism and pressures for greater supranationalism mediate
interact.
The discussions in the thesis demonstrate clearly that national self-interest has
remained the single most dominant characteristic of European integration! This
claim does not negate the role of supranational interests, nor belittle the genuine
supranational constitutional and institutional provisions that characterise some
aspects of European integration, nor ignore the expansion of some of these in recent
years. These have all counterbalanced and mediated national self-interest, as have
some global trends towards greater interdependence. However, none has
undermined the predominance of national bargaining among the major European
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decision-makers, nor the continued culture of nationalism that prevails in many parts
of the EU, including the supranational institutions. The latter is reinforced by the
schizophrenic structures of the EU which are part intergovernmental, part
supranational, by the continued bargaining based on national self-interest, by the
deep-seated institutionalisation of nationalism and by the absence of a genuine and
developed European ideology. In turn, the persistence of cultural nationalism
reinforces the mixed nature of the structures of the EU.
These are the major basic characteristics that have shaped the development of
European integration and provided a context within which EU policy-making has
evolved. They are varied and in constant flux and, hence, the European Union is a
highly dynamic political system which is characterised by numerous tensions. At the
same time, there has been sufficient consensus among its participants to overcome
cleavages, at least to the extent that they have not so far fatally wounded this
innovative but troublesome political system. Hence, formal European integration has
been marked by both intense conflict and a genuine commitment to seek consensus
and produce workable policies.
8.2.	 Policy making in the EU: the significance of informal influences
European integration has been shaped also by many informal influences, albeit within
the broad contextual parameters outlined above. Informal influences are particularly
crucial because they create considerable variety within the same political system and,
hence, a need to (a) study individual policy clusters or issues and (b) to disaggregate
macro-level theories of policy-making (see below aim 3 as outlined in the
Introduction and discussed Section 8.3). This study uncovered a number of reasons
that explain the intensity of informal influences on EU policy-making and that are
outlined briefly below.
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The established structures, namely EU institutions, constitutional outlines of various
policy procedures - which create themselves some variety with regard to policy-
making -, other constitutional provisions, are essentially cultural scripts, that is
norms, rules, established values, that are being interpreted in different ways by the
many policy actors. With regard to the EU, there is a lot of scope for varied
interpretations, because the ideological and cultural foundations of European
integration are underdeveloped and the Treaties, on which formal integration is
based, contain many ambiguities and have constantly evolved (see Chapter 2 and
Section 8.1). Moreover, the EU is exposed to a myriad of political, economic and
cultural pressures, many of which are contradictory and create added scope for
varied interpretations of rules and norms. Furthermore, the EU is still in its infancy,
especially when compared to the longer established member states, and is
continuously shaping and reshaping itself.
Consequently, cultural scripts are still relatively open to interpretation and are thus
manipulated variously by policy actors whose agendas are equally varied, depending
on their own priorities and beliefs, their structural position vis-à-vis other policy-
makers and their functions in the policy process. The following example, which is
based on the findings of the study, illustrates that distinct subcultures have emerged
within the EU but that, even where subcultures coincide, policy outcomes may vary
greatly, because of the idiosyncratic structural make-ups of individual policy areas.
The example substantiates all the arguments laid out in the previous paragraph.
The political interests of many of the policy-makers who are involved in agricultural
and social policy areas have led them to argue that, according to the spirit of the
Treaties of Paris and Rome, the Commission must take a permanently proactive and
interventionist stance in order to direct European integration and shape it in a
particular way. By contrast, the political interests of many of the policy actors who
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have been involved in the creation of the customs union and, more recently, the
single European market, have been based on a monetarist outlook to life. Therefore,
they have interpreted the role of the Commission differently, namely as an institution
that facilities free trade and, in so doing, gradually adopts a more and more
backstage position vis-à-vis other policy-makers and in the light of economic and
trade logic. Either cluster of political interests has been able to find support for its
particular stance in the history and treaties of the EU. Consequently, competing
subcultures have emerged. They have often manifested themselves most markedly
among the attitudes and values of the personnel that work in the different
Directorates-General in the Commission because these have direct responsibility for
the drafting of policies. However, the influence on policy outcomes of the
comparable subcultures that dominate some Directorates-General has been very
disparate, because they have been exposed to different sets of competing cultural
influences. Moreover, the policy-making structures in individual policy areas varied
markedly and have distorted the influence of the subcultures. For example, with
regard to social policy-making, the dominant policy interests, who have been at the
heart of the decision-making centre, have challenged the subculture that is prevalent
in DG V, and among some of its less influential 'clients', on numerous occasions.
Consequently, social policy-making has had a distinct neo-pluralist flavour. In the
area of agricultural policy-making, the interests who have been closest to the
decision-making centre have, at least until recently, had similar cultural outlooks to
the personnel in DG VI. This convergence of political influence and cultural values
has led to policy output that differs qualitatively markedly from the output in the
area of social policy in that it is far more dirigiste in nature.
The peculiarities of cultural scripts and the convergence or divergence of political
interests are not the only reasons why policy-making in the EU is a varied process.
As noted in Section 8.1., the major formal policy actors have very little democratic
legitimacy and, hence, they have legitimised their work mostly on the basis of
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effective policy-making. Therefore, they have been dependent on the constant advice
and input from experts of all kinds. In addition, the growing importance of the EU in
terms of policy output has provoked a range of informal political pressures that
manifests itself mainly in the form of lobbying. Many of these lobbyists approach
institutionalised policy actors, even if they have no technical expertise to offer and
even if they are not specially invited to participate in the policy process. If necessary,
they use a range of resources to enter the policy-process such as public opinion
formation or temporary alliance building with more established policy-makers.
Discussions in Chapter five confirmed that economic might is one of the most
powerful resources in the EU, and in capitalist polities in general. Consequently,
those who possess economic power have been able to get particularly close to the
formal policy actors in the EU, with the effect that they have wielded considerable
influence on policy outcomes, especially with regard to broad policy decisions. On
some occasions, their influence has however been reduced by particular policy
constellations and convergence of other interests, such as agricultural lobbies.
Sometimes, the influence of economic interests has been lessened also because they
have failed to use their potential to the full.
A variety of economic, technological, social and political developments inside and
outside the EU can lead to unforeseen pressures and reinterpretations of existing
cultural scripts which may filter through to the policy-making process. For example,
the impact of US foreign policy, free trade negotiations within the GATT
framework, the arrival of environmental pressure groups and the rejection of 'state
growth' among some politicians from the late 1970s onwards have all indirectly
impacted upon EU policy-making. The type and quantity of resources can also
influence policy-making. For example, social policy in the EU has been largely
regulatory and few laws passed have made serious inroads into the EU's own
budget, largely because there is very little money available for costly policies. EU
policy-makers have on the whole also been careful not to pass laws that are too
300
costly for national and sub-national governments or for individual business
organisations. Bureaucrats and politicians alike knew that such laws would not be
acceptable.
Evidently, there are a number of reasons why policy-making is not just characterised
by formal procedures and interactions. Informal influences are largely responsible for
the divergent policy patterns, both at sectoral and sub-sectoral levels. The findings in
the thesis illustrate that differences can be quite marked, even where similar formal
policy procedures apply. For example, social policy-making has never been (not
even during the early years of social policy-making) as open to a large range of
participating private interests as has environmental policy-making. The difference
can largely be explained by the predominance of European employers who are the
single most powerful private interest in the EU. Although they are very concerned
about the repercussions of European environmental policy-making, too, control over
social policy has been traditionally at the heart of their interests. Furthermore,
private interests who are involved in social policy-making have been organised in a
different way from those engrossed in environmental policy-making. During the
early decades of this century it was assumed that the interests of employers and the
interests of employees could be aggregated respectively without too many problems
since the interests and concerns inside each group would be more or less the same.
As a result, national as well as supra-national social policy-making has tended to
structure itself in a quasi-neo-corporatist way, at least superficially. This form of
institutionalisation has been marked within the EU and has made it quite difficult, at
least until recently, for smaller groups representing particular interests to be at the
heart of the social policy process. Nevertheless, the persistent and dedicated efforts
of many smaller groups have begun to bear fruit, especially in recent years.
The findings in Chapter five indicate that the impact of informal influences has also
created divergence between the ways in which policy structures manifest themselves
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superficially and the true nature of these structures. Social policy-making exemplifies
this point, too. The quasi-neo-corporatist mode of policy-making that evolved
informally, due to social class divisions in European societies began to
institutionalise and formalise itself to some extent during the past few decades, first
in the form of concertation and tripartite conferences, more recently in the form of
social dialogue. However, beneath the surface the aggregated interests of European
employers continued to dominate those of the employees, with the result that social
policy has been more marginalised than it should have been, had quasi-neo-
corporatist structures been embedded more deeply.
This example also illustrates another phenomenon associated with policy-making. It
is often extremely difficult to demarcate the boundaries between what constitutes
formal and informal policy-influence. This problem arises partly from the tendency
for informal influences to become institutionalised, particularly if they are not
challenged. Sometimes this institutionalisation is eventually formalised, for example
by referring to it in formal documents, including constitutional amendments and/or
by setting up formal structures, such as those that characterise social dialogue in the
EU.
Variety can be detected within the same policy sector, too, because resources can be
distributed in a variety of ways. For example, with regard to some highly technical
policy issues, the contribution made by a small number of private interests, who are
regarded as experts, is not challenged by competitive interests. Therefore, the
resources of the former are less diluted vis-à-vis those of the formal policy-makers.
Consequently, the impact of the participating private interests on policy outcomes is
likely to be higher than in cases where their resources are undermined by those of
competing interests. Some of the findings in Chapter seven illustrate this point,
namely the case of the coffee extract solvent directive which did not stimulate the
interest of a large number of groups. By contrast, policies related to food colouring
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are politically sensitive and attract widespread interest, with the result that more
participants enter the policy process, so diluting individual resources. This case also
indicates that the nature of individual policies directs the level of interest in
particular policies among private policy actors, thereby shaping their behaviour and
strategies and, subsequently, the structure and nature of particular policy clusters.
The findings in this study illustrate that technical policy issues are less likely to cause
widespread interest than politically, socially or ethically sensitive topics.
CECG's tendency to form temporary coalitions with other private interests,
exemplifies that alliance building can also affect resource distribution and, hence,
policy outcomes. Similarly, the manner in which private interests utilise, organise
and manage their resources can modify their role in policy processes and,
subsequently, policy outcomes. ClANs successful reorganisation illustrates this
point.
Certain secondary literature alleges that, in some political systems, informal policy
actors make such marked contributions that they may wield more influence on policy
outcomes than the formal policy-makers. A very small number of commentators
have also expressed this view with regard to the EU, but the evidence presented and
analysed here suggests otherwise. In other words, there is a clear distinction
between the input by, and influence of, formal and informal policy participants in the
European Union, with the former generally being in a much stronger position. Levels
of relative influence vary however quite considerably, depending on the policy
issue(s) in hand. Sometimes, informal influences are very powerful, as has been the
case with European industrialists and the drive towards a single market; sometimes
they have very little influence, indeed. For example, an MEP, who was questioned
for this project, alleged that private interests had almost no influence over
thermonuclear policy-making. Occasionally, the priorities of private and public
policy actors converge to the extent that they form small like-minded coalitions,
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thereby reciprocally enhancing one another's influence on policy outcomes. The CAP
illustrates this point well. On rare occasions, policy-makers who hold a
constitutional mandate, have delegated it willingly to private interests, thereby
deliberately reinforcing their contribution in the policy process.. The case of product
and service standardisation is the classical example of such delegated private interest
government in respect of the EU.
Policy processes are also mediated by the informal behavioural aspects of formal
policy-makers. In the case of the EU, internal divisions may affect the resource
distribution and the ways in which it is exploited within policy networks. For
example, occasionally, other policy-makers have been able to exploit the cultural,
political and personal divisions between DG VI (Agriculture) and DG III (Internal
Market and Industrial Affairs, especially the Directorate that is responsible for food
policy) or the lack of communication and co-ordination between DG XI
(Environment, Nuclear Safety and Civil Protection) and DG XVI (Regional Policy).
Policy outcomes may also be affected by the nature of cross-institutional relations,
such as in the case of environmental policy-making which has profited from good
co-operation between DG XI and the EP's Environment, Public Health and
Consumer Protection Standing Committee.
Although such informal influences can affect policy outcomes significantly, they pale
away compared to the impact of the widespread trades off that take place in the
Council of Ministers' decision-making rounds! This phenomenon probably distorts
the formal policy processes more than anything else. This point is substantiated by
evidence produced here, based on primary data gathered for this research project as
well as by the findings discussed in many other studies on EU policy-making.
The last few paragraphs have underlined the extent to which informality influences
policy outcomes and creates variety in EU policy-making. However, the research
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project uncovered some common themes and trends, too. The tension between
conflict and consensus is particularly noteworthy. Many policy issues in the EU are
characterised by internal cleavages and conflicts of interest, even if; at first sight,
there seems little to argue about. Conflict is often intensified because policies have
to be acceptable to a large number of peoples and to the member states'
governments whose interests are often egotistical. Moreover, a comparatively large
number of policy actors tend to be involved in policy-making, because the European
Union is more open than most other political systems, despite its elitist culture and
the many practical and political obstacles that make access more difficult. In view of
these aspects of EU policy-making, it is all the more surprising that there is a
genuine and widespread commitment to reach consensus and to produce workable
policies. In many instances, agreement can be reached and policies are often
acceptable, if not necessarily perfect. Indeed, sometimes they show all the stereo-
typical weaknesses of watered-down compromises. In the case of the CAP, this has
produced grotesque and unworkable policies. Moreover, the example of the
chocolate directive shows that consensus, and hence, policy output cannot always be
achieved. However, on the whole, consensus of some kind can be reached.
There are two major reasons that explain the endeavours to create consensus
whenever possible. First, the vast majority of politicians and officials are committed
to the survival of the EU, in whatever form, and they realise that constant lack of
consensus is detrimental to that commitment. Second, and most importantly,
consensus can be achieved because of the opportunity to strike package bargain
deals during the various consultation stages, but especially in the Council of
Ministers. Without this resource, successfbl policy-making in the Community would
become virtually impossible, because the parameters within which consensus is
negotiated would be too narrow. This point neatly illustrates how actors and
structures interact in policy processes in order to produce specific outcomes. The
structural arrangements in the Council of Ministers safeguard the opportunity to
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strike secret package deals which could never be achieved, if they had to be
negotiated in an open legislature. Yet, these structures have been put into place
deliberately by policy actors who knew, instinctively or consciously, that such
bargaining 'outlets' would have to exist, if the Community was to survive.
Furthermore, subsequent generations of policy-makers have exploited the potential
of these structures to the full and have to date successfully evaded all pressures to
change them, despite much rhetoric about more openness in the CoM.
Commentators often highlight the bureaucratic and/or technocratic nature of the EU,
thereby implying, or overtly stressing, its apolitical nature and the predominance of
European officials, national civil servants and unelected technocrats in the policy
process. Chapters four, five and seven have indicated that, up to a certain point,
their analysis is sustainable. However, in-depth analysis reveals that European
policy-making remains an intensely political activity. There is no doubt that technical
considerations cannot, and are not, simply ignored, particularly if disregard would
lead to unworkable policies. However, a surprising number of EU policies are
characterised by uncertainty with regard to their technical or scientific merits, thus
lending themselves to political squabbling. Moreover, the evidence produced here,
suggests that even unambiguous technical and scientific issues are routinely
mediated by political priorities.
These conclusions rightly portray the European Union as an intensely political
organisation where bargaining is widespread, complex and varied. Therefore, it
could be argued that the reservations about neo-realist interpretations of the nature
of the EU raised in Chapter three are inappropriate, since neo-realists emphasise
bargaining as the major form of political exchange. Given that many key politicians
and officials in the EU continue to act primarily in accordance with national self-
interest, the EU could be depicted furthermore as intergovernmentalist, since
intergovernmentalism is a subcategory of neo-realism which emphasises the extent
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to which bargaining is driven by political and cultural nationalism. There are indeed
strong neo-realist and intergovernmental undercurrents in the EU, but claims that
the EU L neo-realist and/or intergovernmentalist underestimate its complexity and
variety and have two related weaknesses: they oversimplily the concept of
bargaining and they ignore the relevance of the many influences which mediate
political bargaining, so attenuating its impact.
Politicians may well have political priorities and electoral considerations in mind,
when engaging in bargaining, but they are also guided by other factors, such as
economic rationality, technical information, pressures from officials and private
interests, cultural affinities and, occasionally, by empathy and altruism or by
ideological visions. Furthermore, they are constrained by structural elements, like
the constitutional role of the EP or the institutionalisation of certain procedures,
including the comparative autonomy of the higher echelons of the permanent
representatives based in Brussels. Contextual pressures and developments, like the
growing global interdependence of economics and markets, are also likely to harness
their freedom to bargain. Finally, the preferences of politicians need not always be
based on national self-interest, although it is tempting for them to speak on behalf of
the particular nation state that they represent, given that the electorate of this nation
state will ultimately determine their fate. Yet, whatever their attitudes, they are
locked into an interdependent system of policy-making which is characterised by a
certain cultural and, especially, structural supranationalism (for example in the form
of the supremacy of EU law). Hence, national interest cannot reign supremely.
It is evident that the nature of the EU is dynamic and multifarious, with many
tensions, even contradictions. The combined study of the constitutional and
institutional framework and the policy process go a long way in uncovering many
aspects of this nature, particularly if examination takes place at the general level as
well as by way of a detailed case study. However, these studies mainly describe the
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various characteristics; they do not explain why the EU and its policy process
functions in particular ways, and not in others. It is therefore necessary to place
them within some kind of conceptual framework that facilitates analysis. As
indicated variously, it was one of the major aims of the thesis to search for such a
framework (see Section 1.4, aim 3).
8.3.	 From Analysis to Synthesis: Constructing a Workable Analytical
Framework for the Study of Policy-Making in the European Union
It has been established in the thesis that multi-level analysis is necessary in order to
examine political systems as constructively as possible. In the first instance, it is
necessary to look at the micro-level, that is exchanges between individuals and the
ways in which these affect sub-systemic and systemic structures. Next, the nature of
sub-systems and the interactive relationship between these and systemic structures
should be explored because, as demonstrated here (especially in Chapters four and
five) and elsewhere, there is so much systemic variety that it would be inappropriate
to ignore the make-up of sub-systems. Finally, some thought must be given to the
overall nature of a political system, including the role of overarching structures and
established cultural scripts. Policy analysts usually refer to this multi-layer approach
as micro- meso- and macro-level analysis respectively.
In the thesis, all three levels have been taken into account but, for reasons of
manageability, the main focus has been on the meso-level and a specific meso-level
framework, which makes it feasible to study EU sub-systems, has been developed,
based on policy networks analysis. The well-known Rhodes-Marsh model of PNA
has been adjusted in order to accommodate the special structures and 'rules of the
game' of the European Union. As elaborated variously, the European Union displays
aspects of intergovernmentalism as well as supranationalism and is therefore neither
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an international organisation nor a fully integrated polity. This hybrid nature is the
EU's most marked characteristic and needs to be taken into account at all levels of
analysis. Therefore, this characteristic has had to be incorporated into PNA which
has traditionally served as a conceptual framework for the analysis of frilly integrated
state systems. A brief synopsis of the ways in which this adaptation has developed is
provided below.
The discussions in Chapter 6 confirmed that it is possible to draw upon the work of
JR scholars in order to adjust conventional PNA to suit the needs of EU structures.
IX scholars usually emphasise the significance of political bargaining and it has been
illustrated that intense bargaining - between individuals as well as organisations and
government agencies, and across policy sectors - is the very essence of EU policy-
making. However, the work of scholars who are concerned with actor-structure
relationships confirms that free-wheeling bargaining is mediated significantly by
established structures and institutions such as the curious mix of
intergovernmentalism and supranationalism in the EU. Consequently, theories of
bargaining must be embedded in an appropriate context concerned with the actor-
structure relationship. In the case of the EU, several approaches from both IR and
political science, have proved particularly valuable, namely institutionalism, statism,
pluralism, domestic politics and linkage politics. Although some students of EU
politics have overestimated the role of institutions in general and government
agencies in particular, it is nonetheless possible to make sense of such phenomena as
the relative autonomy of formal policy-makers vis-ã-vis private interests (despite
their salience), incrementalist policy-making, bureaucratic and technocratic elements
of policy-making, culturally based 'rule of the game' by reference to institutionalist,
statist and (broadly speaking) pluralist conceptualisations of the policy process.
However, these are too general to suffice in their own right in relation to the analysis
of the EU. Thus, more specific frameworks need to be superimposed, namely the
notions of domestic and linkage politics. The former emphasises that any sense-
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*******************************************
QUESTIONNAIRE
THE SINGLE EUROPEAN MARKET AND THE FOOD INDUSTRY
*******************************************
GUIDANCE;
1. WHEN COMPLETING THE QUESTIONNAIRE, PLEASE A 1TEMPT ALL QUESTIONS
AND CIRCLE AS MANY OPTIONS AS APPROPRIATE.
2. A SMALL NUMBER OF QUESTIONS REQUIRE A VERY SHORT WRITTEN
STA TEMENT AND THE MAJORITY OF QUESTIONS INVITE YOU TO PROVIDE
FURTHER DETAILS! EXPLANATIONS AS APPROPRIA TE.
3. ALL GUIDING COMMENTS ARE IN ITALiCS AND iN CAPiTAL LETTERS; THE
QUESTIONS THEMSEL VES ARE KEPT IN NORMAL SCRIPT.
4. IN THIS DOCUMENT 'SEM' MEANS 'SINGLE EUROPEAN MARKET'; THE TERM
'FOOD'!S USED BROADLYAND COVERS ALL FOODS, DRINKS AND FOOD
ADDITIVES, INCLUDING ANIMAL FEEDS. THE QUESTIONNAIRE
CONCENTRATES ON FOOD MANUFACTURE, FOOD DISTRIBUTION AND FOOD
WHOLESALE, RATHER THAN ON THE FOOD RETAIL TRADE. NEVERTHELESS, IF
YOUAREA FOOD RETAiLER, PLEASE STILL COMPLETE THE QUESTIONNAIRE
AS YOUR INFORMATION WILL BE OF EQUAL VALUE TO THIS PROJECT.
5. IF YOU ARE NOT AN INDEPENDENT ORGANISA TION...
PLEASE ANSWER QUESTIONS WITH RESPECT TO YOUR IMMEDIATE
ORGANISATION ONLY, BUT STA TEAT THE END OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE
WHETHER OR NOT YOUR DEPENDENT STATUS HAS AFFECTED YOUR
ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE SINGLE EUROPEAN MARKET.
*******************************************
YOUR EFFORTS ARE GREA TLYAPPREC!A TED.
*******************************************
1. In your view, what effect has the creation of the SEM on EC business organisations?
2. With regard to the creation of the SEM, will the United Kingdom in your view
a gainhloose* to the same extent as other EC countries?	 1
b gainhloose* to a greater extent than other EC countries?	 2
c) gain/loose' to a lesser extent than other EC countries? 	 3
d it is not possible to make such general comparisons 	 4
e undecided	 5
I) other (PLEASE SPECIFYBELOW)	 6
'PLEASE DELETE AS APPROPRIATE
3. With regard to the creation of the SEM, will the food industry in your view
a) gain/loose' to the same extent as other EC countries?	 1
b) gain/loose' to a greater extent than other EC countries? 	 2
C) gain/loose' to a lesser extent than other EC countries?	 3
d) it is not possible to make such general comparisons	 4
e) undecided	 5
f) other (PLEASE SPECIFYBELOW) 	 6
* PLEASE DELETE AS APPROPRIATE
2
4.	 With regard to the creation of the SEM, will your .n organisation...
a gainhloose* to the same extent as other EC countries?
b gainhloose* to a greater extent than other EC countries?
c) gain/loose to a lesser extent than other EC countries?
d it is not possible to make such general comparisons
e undecided
f) other (PLEASE SPECIFY BELOW)
* PLEASE DELETE AS APPROPRIATE
5.	 In your organisation, which of the following areas are/will be particularly affected by the
creation of the SEM?
IF RELEVANT, PLEASE GIVE SOME DETAILS BELOW.
a product development and research
b production
c) distribution and transport
d advertising
e marketing
f purchasing
g sales
h) personnel: recruitment, staffing, conditions, etc.
i personnel: internal training policy
finance
k) orgariisational culture
I) decision-making process
m) central policy-making and strategic planning
n organisational culture
o other areas (PLEASE SPECIFY BELOW)
1
2
3
4
5
6
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
3
	
6.	 In your opinion, will the creation of the SEM change the overall character of your
organisation?
PLEASE USE THE SPACE PROVIDED BELOW TO EXPLAIN YOUR CHOICE.
a yes, fundamentally
	
1
b yes, but only superficially
	
2
c) no
	
3
d) other (PLEASE SPECIFY BELOW)
	
4
	
7.	 From which of the following sources of information has your organisation to date
received information (written, verbal, audio-visual, etc.) relating to the SEM ?
WHERE APPROPRIATE, PLEASE ALSO CIRCLE
H = HELPFUL OR U = UNHELPFUL OR N= NOT READ/STUDIED
a EC institutions (Commission, Council, Parliament)
	
1
	
N
b Central and! or local government
	
2
	
N
C) Food and Drink Federation
	
3
	
N
d CBI
	
4
	
N
e Other trade association(s)
	
5
	
N
1) Chamber of Commerce
	
6
	
N
g) Trade Union(s)
	
7
	
N
h) Polical Party/Parties
	
8
	
N
i British broadcast media
	
9
	
N
EC (exci. UK) broadcast media
	
10
	
N
k) British print media
	
11
	
N
I) EC (excl. UK) print media
	
12
	
N
m)journal(s), etc. related to the Food Industry
	
13
	
N
n) other (PLEASE SPECIFYBELOVV)
	
14
	
N
4
8.	 In your opinion, is there much informal exchange of informaon and/or informal talk about
the SEM within your organisation?
a yes
	
I
b no
	
2
d) other (PLEASE SPECIFY BELOW)
C) impossible to tell
4
3
9.	 In your opinion, which of the following countries has been preparing particularly well for
theSEM?
IF POSSIBLE, PLEASE EXPLAIN YOUR CHOICE BRIEFLY BELOW.
a Belgium
	
1
b Denmark
	
2
c) Federal Republic of Germany
	
3
d France
	
4
e Greece
	
5
f) Ireland
	
6
g Italy
	
7
h Luxembourg
	
8
i Netherlands
	
9
Portugal
	
10
k Spain
	
11
I United Kingdom
	
12
m) all EC countries
	
13
n none
	
14
o impossible to tell
	
15
p ofher (PLEASE SPECIFY BELOW)
	
16
5
10. PLEASE LISTj, SECTORS OF INDUSTRY WHICH HAVE IN YOUR OPINION BEEN
PREPARING PARTICULARLY EFFECTIVELY FOR THE SEM. IF POSSIBLE, GIVE A
BRIEF EXPLANATION FOR YOUR CHOICE.
11. Would you say that on the whole the preparaon for the SEM has become one of the
priority areas within your organisation?
a yes
	
1
b no
	
2
C) undecided
	
3
d) other (PLEASE SPECIFY BELOW)
	
4
12.	 In your organisaon, who (position in organisation) is form ally/mt ormatly* responsible
for matters related to the SEM?
* DELETE AS APPROPRIATE.
6
13.	 Approximately what proportion of time does/do the responsible (formally or informally)
individual(s) spend on matters related directly to the SEM?
a) ito 10%
	
1
b 11 to 25%
	
2
c 26to 50%
	
3
d 51 to 75%
	
4
e 76 to 100%
	
5
f) impossible to tell
	
6
g not applicable
	
7
h other (PLEASE SPECIFY BELOW)
	
8
14. With regard to the SEM, does your company
a have an official, comprehensive action plan?	 1
b have an official, but limited action plan? 	 2
C) have official, general guidelines?	 3
d) have unofficial, general guidelines? 	 4
e) intend to create an official action plan?
f) have neither unofficial nor official guidelines or acon plans 	 6
g this information is confidential	 7
h other (PLEASE SPECIFY BELOW)	 9
IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED Y' OR 'g GO DIRECTLY TO QUESTION 16.
7
15.	 Which of the following areas are! will be addressed in your action plan/ guide-lines?
a product development and research
b production
c distribution and transport
d advertising
e marketing
f purchasing
g sales
h personnel: recruitment, staffing, conditions, etc.
I personnel: internal training policy
finance
k) organisational culture
I) decision-making process
m) central policy-making and strategic planning
n organisational culture
o other areas (PLEASE SPECIFY BELOVv)
PLEASE GIVE FURTHER DETAILS WHERE APPROPRIATE; ESPECIALLY IF YOUR
ORGANISATION IS INVOLVED INA LANGUAGE TRAINING PROGRAMME.
SPACE IS PROVIDED BELOW
16.	 Has your organisation joined any association, c'ub etc. (E.g. a '1992' club) which is
exc'usively concerned with the SEM?
a) yes (PLEASE SPECIFY ORGANISATIONIS BELOW)
b) no
c) no, but it intends to do so in the near future
d this is confidential information
g other (PLEASE SPECIFY BELOW)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
1
2
3
4
5
8
17.	 (I)
With regard to the SEM, has your company to date asked any of the following for advice?
WHERE APPROPRIATE, PLEASE CIRCLE ONE OF THESE iWO OPTIONS.
H=
	
THE INFORMATION IS/WAS HELPFUL
N=
	
THE INFORMATION IS/WAS NOT HELPFUL
a) EC institution(s)
	
1
	
H
	
N
b) Central and/or local government
	
2
	
H
	
N
c) Food and Drink Federation
	
3
	
H
	
N
d CBI
	
4
	
H
	
N
e Other trade association(s)
	
5
	
H
	
N
Chamber(s) of Commerce and Industry
	
6
	
H
	
N
g Financial consultant(s)
	
7
	
H
	
N
h Legal consultant(s)
	
8
	
H
	
N
i other consultancy firms (SPECIFY BELOW PLEASE) 9
	
H
	
N
j this is confidential information
	
10
	
H
	
N
k) don't know
	
11
	
H
	
N
I) other (SPECIFY BELOW PLEASE)
	
12
	
H
	
N
17.	 (ii)
Which of the above sources have you regularly asked for business advice_before the
Single European Act came into force in 1987?
17.	 (iii)
Have you tended to ask the sources listed under 17 (ii) for general business advice or for
advice related particularly to EC matters?
9
18.	 Do you or your colleagues visit conferences, seminars, exhibitions, etc. on the SEM?
a yes, regularly
	
1
b yes, occasionally
	
2
C) yes, but only very rarely
	
3
d not so far, but perhaps in the future
	
4
e no
	
5
f) other (SPECIFY BELOW PLEASE)
	
6
	
19.	 In your opinion, should food industrialists undertake any specific, sector-related actions
concerned with the SEM?
a yes (SPECIFYBELO W PLEASE)
	
1
b no
	
2
c) other (SPECIFY BELOW PLEASE)
	
3
	
20.	 In your opinion, how well prepared is your organisation at present for the SEM?
IF POSSIBLE, BRIEFLY EXPLAIN/JUSTIFY YOUR CHOICE.
a) very well
	
1
b) fairly well
	
2
c) not very well
	
3
d not at all prepared
	
4
e there is no need for preparation
	
5
f) not sure
	
6
g confidential information
	
7
h other (SPECIFY BELOWPL EASE)
	
8
10
21. Is somebody in your organisation familiar with the majority of EC direcves on food and
drink?
ayes	 1
b yes, but only very vaguely! superficially	 2
C) only with a few specific directives that concern our organisathn specifically	 3
dno	 4
e other (SPECIFY BELOW PLEASE) 	 5
22. "The SEM can only function effectively and successfully if EC direcves and laws take clear
precedence over national directives and laws.'
With regard to the above statement, do you
a agree entirely
	
1
b agree partially
	
2
c) disagree
	
3
d not sure
	
4
e other (SPECIFY BELOW PLEASE)
	
5
IF RELEVANT, EXPLAIN YOUR CHOICE BRIEFLY BELOW.
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23.	 Concerning matters related to the SEM, has your organisation ever directly lobbied any of
the foUowing institutions?
LOBBY!NG:A1TEMPTING TO INFLUENCE THE POLICY-MAKING PROCESS.
IF POSSIBLE, BRIEFLY OUTLINE RELEVANT LOBBYING ACTIVITiES IN
THE SPACE PROVIDED.
a EC Commission
	
1
b EC Council of Ministers
	
2
c) EC Parliament
	
3
d UK Central Government
	
4
e UK Local Government
	
5
f) UK Parliament
	
6
g UK Political Party! Parties
	
7
h EC Government(s) other than UK
	
8
I not sure
	
9
j this information is confidential
	
10
k) other (SPECIFY BELOWPL EASE)
	
11
24.	 In your opinion, can an individual organisation, such as yours, effectively influence
EC policy-making?
WHERE APPROPRIATE, PLEASE BRIEFLY EXPLAIN YOUR CHOICE(S).
a) yes
b) yes, but only through an organised interest group
c) yes, but only to a very limited extent
d) only some business organisations are able to influence
e) only certain EQ policies can be influenced
f) only certain EQ institutions can be influenced
g) no
h) it is not possible to generalise
i) it is impossible to tell for an outsider
k) other (SPECIFY BELOW PLEASE)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
12
THE FOLLOWING FOUR QUESTIONS CONCERN EXPORTAND IMPORT ORIENTATIONS.
PLEASE ANSWER THESE QUESTIONS WITH RESPECT TO FOOD, DRINKAND FOOD
ADDITIVES ONLY, EVEN IF YOUR ORGANISATION TRADES ALSO IN NON--FOOD
PRODUCTS.
**********************************************************
25. Is business in your organisation conducted
a exciusiveTy within the UK? * (SEE BELOW)	 1
b within the UK and among other EC countries? 1	 2
c) within the UK and among non-EC countries? 1	 3
d within the UK, among EC and among non-EC countries	 4
e other (SPECIFY BELOW PLEASE) 	 5
1 PLEASE SPECIFY RELEVANT COUNTRIES.
* (25a):	 *
IF YOU HAVE CIRCLED , PLEASE STATE WHETHER OR NOT YOUR ORGAN/SAT/ON
HAS ANY INTENT/ON OF ENTERING BUS/NESS WITH EC COUNTRIES OTHER THAN THE
UK.
IF SO, PLEASE OUTLINE YOUR PLANS BRIEFLY BELOW.
SUBSEQUENTLY PROCEED DIRECTLY TO QUESTION 29.
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26. What percentage of your turnover stems from business conducted within EC countries
other than the UK?
a ltolO%
	
1
b 11 to 25%
	
2
c) 26 to 50%
	
3
d 51 to 75%
	
4
e 76to100%
	
5
f) this information is confidential
	
6
g) other (SPECIFY BELOW PLEASE)
	
7
27. On balance, does business conducted with EC countries (other than the UK) concentrate
on
a exports*	 1
b imports*	 2
C) exports and imports (PLEASE STATE PROPORTIONS)*	 3
d subsidiaries situated in EC countries (not UK)*	 4
e headquarters situated in EC countries (not UK)*	 5
f) joint venture(s) with an organisation/ with organisathns elsewhere in the EC	 6
g) this information is confidential 	 7
h) other (SPECIFY BELOW PLEASE) 	 9
* PLEASE SPECIFY COUNTRIES.
14
28.	 Has your organisation increased activities with EC countries (not UK) since the
ratification of the Single European Act (1987)?
a yes, exports*	 1
b yes, imports*	 2
c) yes, jointventures*	
*	 3
d yes, (additional) subsidiaries have been established 	 4
eno	 5
f) not so far, but further activities are planned*	 6
g) this information is confidential 	 7
h)notsure	 8
I) other (SPECIFY BELOW PLEASE) 	 9
*PLE4SE SPECIFY COUNTRIES
29. PLEASE STATE YOUR FULL COMPANY NAME:
30. PLEASE STATE YOUR EXACT JOB TITLE(S):
15
31. PLEASE INDICATE THE EXACT LEGAL FORM (Plc., Ltd., ETC.) AND THE EXACTNATURE
OF YOUR ORGAN/SAT/ON (INDEPENDENT, FRANCHISE, HEADQUARTERS,
SUBSIDIARY, MULTINATIONAL, ETC.)
32. (i)
Are you a
a) food manufacturer and/or producer	 1
b) food distributor and/or wholesaler 	 2
C) food retailer	 3
d) food manufacturer/producer & food distributor/wholesaler 	 4
e) food manufacturer/producer & food retailer 	 5
f) food distributor/wholesaler & food retailer 	 6
g) food manufacturer/producer, food distributor/wholesaler & food retailer 	 7
h) other (SPECIFY BELOW PLEASE) 	 8
32. (ii)
PLEASE BRIEFLY LIST THE MA/N PRODUCT CATEGORIES (E.G. MEAT, FROZEN
FOODS, ETC.) WITH WHICH YOU ARE DEALING AND, IF POSSIBLE, PLEASE STATE
THE PERCENTAGE OF THE TOTAL TURNOVER FOR EACH CATEGORY.
16
33. Does your organisation also produce and/or trade in non-food product lines?
a yes (PLEASE SPECIFY PRODUCTLINES AND PROPORTIONS BELOW) 1
bno	 2
C) other (SPECIFYBELOW PLEASE) 	 3
34. Approximately how many staff does your organisation at present employ?
35. What is your approximate annual turnover?
36. When was your organisation founded?
17
37.	 Are you interested in receiving more information about the report introduced in the
attached letter as soon as this is feasible?
a yes
	
1
b no
	
2
38. Would you be prepared to give me the opportunity to carry out approximately 2-3 weeks
of organisational research in your organisation in return for more information on the food
industry and the SEM and in return for free language tuition in French and/or German for
the staff during the period of my presence in the organisation?
a) yes
	
1
b) no
	
2
18
39. PLEASE USE THE SPACE PRO VIDEO BELOW TO MAKEANYADDITIONAL
COMMENTS ABOUT THE EFFECTS OF THE SINGLE EUROPEAN MARKET ON
YOUR ORGANISATION AND/OR ON THE FOOD INDUSTRY AND/OR ON THE UK,
THE EC, EUROPE IN GENERAL, ETC.
ALL INFORMATION IN THIS QUESTIONNAIRE WILL BE TREATED
IN STRICTEST CONFIDENCE.
*******************************************
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR EFFORTS!
YOU HAVE BEEN EXTREMELY HELPFUL.
*******************************************
19

Oxford, 4 March 1991
Dear
I would like to thank you very much for completing my questionnaire,
entitled 'The Single European Market and the ?ood 'sciy'. 'o'ci tc-
operation and your comments have been extremely useful and very
interesting. I am also very grateful for your offer to possibly carry out
further research in your organisation. At present I am working out a
suitable framework for such a study. Once this has been established, I will
permit myself to approach you again regarding the on site research. Due to
various reasons, including my own teaching commitments, I would hope
to carry out the research somewhere between June/July and September
1991.
Yours sincerely,
Brigitte Boyce
APPENDIX I
CRITICAL DISCUSSiON OF THE MAIL SURVEY ON
THE PERCEPTION OF AND RESPONSE TO THE
SINGLE EUROPEAN MARKET
1.	 Introduction
The design and delivery of this mail survey has to be evaluated in the context of the
changing focus of the original research project. The survey aimed to produce data
that would form the basis of an analysis of strategic responses to an intense
environmental upheaval for business organisations - the early focal point of this
study (MiPhil stage). This explains the considerable input of time and finance into a
mail survey that may, in retrospect, and in view of the final design and aims of the
thesis, seem excessive. Nonetheless, the basic aim of the survey has been achieved in
that it forms the foundation on which the important discussion on the effects of
policy-making on the policy environment is based (Chapter 7). In addition, some
survey material is used elsewhere during discussions policy-making and interest
representation. Several published articles have centred around the analysis and
discussion of the survey material, too (see Appendix V). These applications and the
learning process with regards to methodology, which formed an intrinsic part of the
execution of the survey, justify beyond dispute the heavy input of resources into this
particular survey. A brief, but critical discussion of the learning process associated
with this mail survey follows.
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2.	 Onestionnaire Desi2n and Res ponse Rate
Although some relevant data have been collected successfully, the low response rate
is at least in part a result of certain weaknesses with the design and dispatch of the
survey. Mail surveys tend to produce low response rates anyway, but the length of
the questionnaire is likely to have put off potential respondents. Yet, it is generally
acknowledged that a short questionnaire, designed solely to please the target group,
and subsequently inadequate with regard to collecting sufficient relevant data is
equally undesirable. Therefore, short questionnaires are not necessarily the answer
to problems with response rate but, "...dreaming up interesting questions..." appears
to be a temptation for many questionnaire designers and has, to a small extent,
lengthened the questionnaire on the SEM unnecessarily. In particular, Questions 19
and 20 come under this auspices and could have been left out. There were some
unnecessary questions, too, notably Question 29 which was irrelevant because all
questionnaires had been given an identifier anyway. Question 38 should have been
pursued later, either by letter, telephone or, preferably, during an initial visit.
However, a more radical redesign of the mail survey and the questionnaire might
have enhanced response rate more than the simple omission of some non-essential
questions.
The questionnaire was designed to provide information on perceptions, knowledge,
actions and factors that mediate perceptions and actions. Perhaps it was too
ambitious to attempt to collect all this information by way of a single questionnaire.
Certainly, this objective explains the length of the questionnaire. Since first time
respondents to the questionnaires were on the whole quite willing to answer further
1 Youngman op.cit., p.4.
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questions or to be interviewed, it may have been better to send an initial short
questionnaire on perceptions only. Such a questionnaire could have been designed to
start with the 'easy-to answer' questions 4, 6, 8, 11, followed by the harder questions
21, 22, 2, 3, 1. A follow up questionnaire on action questions (12, 14, 15, 17(i), 18,
21, 23, 28,) and mediating agents (7, 9, 10, 13, 16, 17(u), 17(iii), 22, 25, 26, 27, 30,
31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36) could have been mailed to first time respondents only. This
approach would probably have increased the manageability of the survey, reduced
costs and time investment and may will have enhanced the final response rate.
The second questionnaire on action could have been shortened further by eliminating
a series of questions, namely 7, 9, 10, 13, 16, 17(u), 17(iii), 30, because they all
proved to be unnecessary, too, albeit for varying reasons. Question 7 does not differ
sufficiently from Question 17(i) to warrant having two such long questions.
Questions 17(u) and 17(iii) were ignored frequently and failed to establish whether
the arrival of the SEM had stimulated more extensive research on European matters
in general, and SEM issues in particular, among respondents. Question 30 was also
superfluous in view of Question 12 which provided essential information on the
position of those people in organisations who were responsible for SEM and other
European matters. The answers to Question 9 were largely unusable and, it seems,
that many respondents simply voiced some semi-mythical, stereotypical views about
the efficiency or inefficiency of business organisations in other member states,
without giving the matter serious thought and/or basing their answer on factual
experience. At best, limited personal experience directed their choice of answer. In
view of these problems, Question 9 did not help to clarify the intricate matter of the
mediating effects of national business cultures, discussed briefly in Chapter 7. Most
respondents stated that they were not qualified to answer Questions 10 or 13 and
answers were often guess work. Alternatively, these questions were not answered at
all.
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It may seem strange, indeed unsatisfactory, to redesign a questionnaire in retrospect.
However, in most instances, the above improvements could be made only with the
benefit of hindsight. Regrettably, the literature on questionnaire design is of limited
use to the inexperienced researcher, because it is often controversial, indeed,
sometimes blatantly contradictory. For example, Youngman maintained that length
inevitably reduces response rates but that, sometimes, long questionnaires are
necessary. 2 Yet, he failed to state what he meant by 'long' questionnaire, to what
extent length would reduce response rate and on what occasions 'long'
questionnaires were necessary. Similarly, he advocated that questionnaires should
generally begin by asking for biographical material but that, sometimes, this
approach was too intrusive. He did not elaborate on this advice either. Quite
probably, Youngman did not specify his proposals further because each research
project needs individual attention and generalisations on questionnaire design may
easily be unhelpful, because the nature of target market is extremely important and
must be borne in mind when designing a questionnaire. This conclusion may seem
obvious to an experienced researcher, but should be discussed more frequently in
literature on methodology and questionnaire design for the benefit of the
inexperienced researcher.
With regard to the two mail surveys undertaken for this project, considerations
about the nature of the target markets were very important but the researcher
became aware of this fact only in retrospect. On the whole, representatives of
business organisations were quite suspicious towards the survey, and in particular
towards questions requesting biographical details (e.g. annual turnover) or insider
knowledge (e.g. the presence/absence of a strategic plan for the SEM and the nature
of such a plan, where appropriate). Many business organisations were opposed to
2 ibid.
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answering mail survey questionnaires in principle and many rejected the notion on
the basis that they were inundated with requests to complete questionnaires and
could not spare the time to oblige. These issues did not distort the response rate to
the questionnaire on Lobbying in the Single European Market and it seemed that
many officials, administrators, politicians, etc., saw it as part of their duty to respond
to the questionnaire that was sent to them. In this respect, the attitudes of the target
groups were quite different and probably help to explain the significant differences
with regard to response rates.
It would appear that the needs of the researcher do not always overlap with the
needs of the target group(s) which poses a fundamental problem to the former. For
example should he/she avoid sensitive questions in the hope that more respondents
will complete the questionnaire or should such questions be included, since they may
produce crucial data, even if the response rate is affected negatively? There are some
drawbacks that the researcher cannot control significantly, e.g. entrenched negative
attitudes towards mail surveys by target group(s) or lack of trust towards the
integrity of an unknown researcher. For these reasons, personal, direct interviews,
which overcome anonymity, may be an intrinsically more fruitful way of gathering
information. In addition to these drawbacks, researchers have to deal with another
problem. Namely, satisfactory questionnaire design requires the researcher to
possess a thorough understanding of the target group(s) and of the objectives of the
research project. Yet, researchers have often little knowledge of either of these
aspects at the outset of their project but time constraints force them to undertake
mail surveys at an early stage of their project. With regard to the questionnaire
survey under discussion, such pressures existed and, regrettably, they were not
constructive. With the benefit of hindsight, it would have been much better to
undertake a complete literature survey, gather, read and analyse written
documentation and carry out a small number of pilot interviews before designing the
questionnaire.
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3.	 Further Reasons for a Low Resnonse Rate
Design faults and target group attitudes do not explain fully the low response rate.
According to Jobber and Saunders' model calculation for the prediction of response
rate, the survey concerned with responses should have yielded an 11% return rate.3
Moreover, the return rate for the pilot was 25% Whatever the limitations of these
two indicators, the expected and actual response rates remain significantly different.
The waste rate helps to explain this difference. Some 25% of questionnaires were
wasted because the addresses were incorrect, or more often, because owners had
mover or business had ceased, or been absorbed, etc. Such changes are notorious to
the food and beverage industries which are characterised by a large number of tiny
enterprises and, subsequently, a very high failure and turn over rate. The number of
very small businesses is so large that Dunn & Bradstreet were unable to deliver even
500 addresses for each country for enterprises with 10 plus employees. Hence, it
was necessary to include smaller organisations, too. Indeed, the survey would have
been even less representative, if they had been left out, although the waste rate
would most probably have been lower.
The size of the organisations affected response rate negatively in other ways, too.
For example, many of the smallest organisations refused to complete the
questionnaire, either because they lacked the resources or felt it to be irrelevant, as
far as they were concerned. There were also a number of entrepreneurs who stated
that they could not complete the questionnaire because they had not been in
business for long enough to have any opinions on, or knowledge of the issues
D. Jobbers & J. Saunders, 'The Prediction of Industrial Mail-Survey Response Rates',
Journal of the Operational Research Society, 40(1), 1989, pp.839-47.
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addressed in the questionnaire. Virtually all very large companies refused to
complete the questionnaire on principle, too. Most of them responded in other ways
though and a lot of usable material was accumulated through these contacts which
did however not show up as questionnaire data.
4.	 Onestionnaire Analysis
With regard to quantitative analysis, there is frequently controversy over the choice
of tests and the subsequent interpretation of these. However, for this survey,
frequencies and cross-tabulations, combined with Chi-square significance testing,
were the only viable options, because other tests would have been meaningless given
the nature of the variables and the low representativeness of the data. Since the
questionnaire contains many nominal variables, it was often impossible to determine
any measures of central tendency or dispersion such as the mean, variance and
standard deviation or the median. Modes and variation ratios could have been
established but, given the problems with representativeness, it seemed pointless to
do so.
With regard to bivariate analysis, non-parametric tests were out of the question, due
to the nature of the variables. In practice, the researcher was limited to Chi-square
tests because other non-parametric tests which can be carried out with nominal
variables, e.g. the McNemar test, are simply not applicable to the survey data. Few
Chi-square tests produced a significance level at .005 and, beyond signalling trends,
the numerical validity of the Chi-square tests was limited in any case by the problems
of statistical significance and representativeness referred to in Chapter one.
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5.	 Conclusion
It has been established beyond doubt that the mail survey on the Effects of the
Single European Market formed a valuable and integral part of this project, although
its design and delivery could have been improved, if resources such as time
constraint, finance, knowledge, etc. had been more abundant at the time of the
design. These shortcomings should however not detract from the wealth of usable
material produced by the survey. This information produced some results in its own
right and also served as the necessary basis for more in-depth interviewing.
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APPENDIX II
Oxford,
RE: LOBBYING AND ThE EUROPEAN SINGLE MARKET
Dear
I am a postgraduate teaching assistant at Oxford Polytechnic, and I am also working on a
doctorate which is entitled The Single European Market and the Food and Drinks
Processing Industries of France, Germany and the UK An integral aspect of this research
is the exploration of lobbying activities of EC institutions. Basically, I am trying to find out, if
such activities have intensified as a result of the Single European Act and its implicaons.
Also, I would like to know if new patterns of lobbying are emerging, and whether or not
lobbying activities have any influence on EC policy-making. Although my thesis specialises
in the food industry, I find it necessary to put the questions about lobbying to a broader
audience, because activities associated with a single sector may not give me a broad
enough insight into current EC lobbying patterns.
I am very much aware of the diffuse nature of this topic and the impossibility of giving factual
answers. Nevertheless, I would be extremely grateful to you, you could complete the
enclosed, Jacrt questionnaire, by simply giving me your views on the issue of lobbying. ft
goes without saying, that all in formation will be treated in strictest confidence, that is,
information will only be used in a way which does nQI reveal any personal details or other
obvious idenfiers.
If you have any relevant documentation on either lobbying and the EC, or the Food and
Drinks Processing Industry and the EC, I would be extremely grateful if you could enclose
such information with the completed questionnaire. I would obviously be equally pleased to
receive relevant documentation, even if you opted not to complete the questionnaire.
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In return for your co-operation you are welcome to a short report on the lobbying issue,
once data has been analysed (qualitatively only) and processed. If you are interested in
receiving a copy of such a report, please state so in the space foreseen on the actual
questionnaire. I have also enclosed a short summary of my entire thesis. Please let me
know, if you are also interested in any other aspects of my work.
As I have to work to a rather tight schedule, I would be extremely grateful, if you could
return the completed questionnaire to me by
Please do not hesitate to contact me at any time should you have any queries. My direct
telephone number at Oxford Polytechnic is 0865 819703; I can usually be contacted there
on Mondays and Thursdays. The relevant fax number is stated above. My home telephone
number is 0604 36921.
I would like to thank you in advance for your much appreciated co-operation and for the
interest you take in my research work.
Yours
Brigitte Boyce (Mrs.)
BA (hons)
end.
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Summary of Thesis
The thesis is entitled 'The Single European Market and the Food and Drinks
Processing Industries of France, Germany and the UK'. It is essentially a study of
Single European Market policy formulation, implementation and impact on the food
and drinks processing industries of the three countries mentioned in the title.
Clearly, food directives are of primary significance but more general directives on
taxation, barrier removal, social policy etc. are obviously also relevant. The study is
centred around two main areas: Firstly, policy formulation, and more precisely the
role and significance of interested parties in policy formulation, i.e. the role of
lobbying. Secondly, the reactions of the food and drinks processors to the EC
directives and the effects of such actions on individual organisations. The first main
area of study is investigated within the theoretical framework of political theories
on lobbying and policy-formulation. The second area draws heavily from
organisational theories and theories on the management of change. However, in
both cases the core consists of original material gathered through questionnaires,
interviews, observation and the scrutiny and analysis of relevant documentation.
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* ** * ** * **** ******** ************************************
*******************************************************
*******************************************************
LOBBYING
AND
THE SINGLE EUROPEAN MARKET
(QUESTIONNAIRE)
*******************************************************
*******************************************************
** *** * * ****** * *** ***** *** ** *** ********* *****
ALL INFORMATION WILL BE TREATED IN
STRICTEST CONFIDENCE
*******************************************************
YOUR HELP IS GREATLY APPRECIATED.
******* **** ***** * * ** **** ** * ** * * * *******
*******************************************************
* *** * * * ** ** * ** **** ** *********** ************************
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NOTE:
By 'lobbying' I understand the attempt to influence EC policy-making before a
directive is adopted by the Council of Ministers. By 'lobbyists' I understand
anybody who attempts to influence policy, and not just professional lobbyists.
*************************
1. Have lobbying activities of any or all EC institutions intensified, since the Single
European Act came into force in 1987? If so, is the intensification directly due to the
Single European Act and its implications?
2.	 Please rank the following four EC institutions in order of their importance as
lobbying 'targets'?
EC Commission	 =
EC Parliament	 =
EC Council of Ministers	 =
ECOSOC	 =
1 = most important 	 2= second most important
3= third most important 	 4 = least important
3.	 Are there any 'unwritten rules of the game' which shape lobbying activities of the
EC institutions? If so, please list these 'unwritten rules of the game' briefly.
4.	 How easy is it for lobbyists to gain iuitiI access to EC institutions?
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5.	 How easy is it for lobbyists to gain repeated access to EC institutions?
6. How easy is it for lobbyists to gain access to relevant EC documentation which has
not yet been made official or which is not made official at all?
7. Is sound factual and/or technical and/or scientific knowledge of an issue in question
a necessary precondition for successful lobbying with EC instutions?
8. How important are personal contacts with EC officials as far as lobbying is
concerned?
9. Does nationality play a role in the outcome of lobbying activities with EC
institutions? If so, what is the exact role that nationality plays?
10. What do EC officiaTs gain from the on-going lobbying activities?
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11. Overall, what skills and factors make for effective lobbying with EC institutions? Are
these the same skills and factors that are required for lobbying national government
institutions in individual EC countries?
12. On balance, do lobbying activities of EC institutions influence EC policy-making? If
so, in what ways and to what extent?
13. Has the lobbying of EC institutions taken on more importance than the lobbying of
national governmental institutions in individual EC memberstates?
14. Is the present lobbying pattern of EC institutions likely to change in the foreseeable
future? If so, how and why?
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15. Is there already, or is there going to be, a typical EC lobbying tradition, which is
recognizably different from the lobbying traditions of the individual EC
memberstates? If so, what are/will be the main characteristics of this EC lobbying
tradition?
16. Please state the function (eg. EC Commission and DG number, MEP, trade
association, professional consultancy etc. etc.) of your organisation:
17. Please indicate your position in your organisation:
18. Please circle below if you are interested in receiving my short summary paper on
lobbying activities in the EC with reference to the food and drinks trade, once it has
been compiled. If so, please also state a contact name, so that the report can be
forwarded as soon as possible.
YES, I AM INTERESTED IN YOUR SUMMARY PAPER.
19. Please indicate below if you are willing to pursue the above issues further in a short
interview, either over the telephone or in person, at a time and place at your
convenience.
* * * **** * ******** ****** *******************
MANY THANKS FOR YOUR MUCH APPRECIA TED CO-OPERATION.
ALL ANSWERS ARE TREATED IN STRICTEST CONFIDENCE.
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APPENDIX III
POOL OF INTERVIEW OUESTIONSL
General Qi!estions to Representatives from Various Backgrounds
In your view, what are the advantages and disadvantages of the SEM?
Is small business particularly disadvantaged, re SEM?
In your view, is the food and drinks processing industry preparing effectively for the
SEM?
Which SEM issues preoccupy you currently most?
What does the future look like for your members! for you! for firms of your type! for
the European food and drinks processors?
How far has the food industry already achieved a SEM?
Is there increased co-operation, or competition, among food industry due to the
creation of a SEM?
Some qualifications are necessary. Firstly, questions from the various questionnaires were also
used when appropriate, but are not repeated here. Moreover, the questions listed may have been
altered slightly, where appropriate, given that some interviews were partially informal. Also for
reasons of manageability, follow up questions, related to answers given by interviewees, are not
listed here. Moreover, questions were refined during the interview period, and increasingly,
they aimed to uncover more subtle processes, such as covered equally by the follow up
questionnaire to the questionnaire on Lobbying and the SEM (see Appendix H) Usually,
interviewees were also asked to provide (an) example(s) wherever possible so as to substantiate
their answers.
To what extent, in your view, is preparation for the SEM mediated by existing
historical and cultural habits?
Please state your views in general on the European Union's approach to law making.
With regard to foodl agriculturall social policy-making in the European Community,
would it, in your view, be better to operate with more regulations and less directives
so as to ensure greater homogeneity with reference to legislation? If so, why?
In view of the creation of an integrated market among EC member states, should
national governments still be allowed to impose stricter rules (e.g. beer purity law in
Germany) on producers in their individual countries? Please give reasons for your
answer.
Are you content about the adoption of the 'principle of mutual recognition
approach'?
In your view, do European policy makers attempt to change legislation that works?
Overall, can EU politicians in your view remain independent of the influence of
lobbyists if they choose to?
When confronted with the term lobbying, what do you understand by it?
How does lobbying and decision making in the European Community work in
practice - please describe in detail what happens and how decisions are arrived at -
formally and informally.
Please describe the attitudes of the Commission, the MEPs, the national civil
servants, based in Brussels, towards the input of lobbyists into European policy
making.
Can high level Commission staff and Commissioners completely overthrow policy
drafts?
Do you have sufficient time to analyse policy proposals and draft satisfactorily?
Can you exploit internal divisions among other policy makers, esp. e.g. within any
one institution such as the Commission? If so, how and with what effect?
What do you make of the growth of professional lobbyists in Brussels?
Assess the relative contribution of national civil servants, both in the member states,
and in Brussels, on the outcome of policy making in the areas of food! agricultural!
social policy making.
Assess the role and influence of consumer/environmental lobbies in SEM policy
making in your area.
With regard to decision-making in the European Union, who is in your view in the
'driver's seat'?
Have you attempted to discover what is going on in Council of Minister meetings?
What channels of lobbying do you use?
To what extent, in your view, is European policy making shaped by existing
historical and cultural attitudes, both among policy makers and consumers, in terms
of consumption habits! - in food policy area
To what extent do technical and scientific issues take precedence over political
issues in the area of food! agricultural! social policy making at the European level?
In your view, how does lobbying affect European policy making in the areas of food!
agricultural! social policy making?
Literature and commentators generally suggest that at present EC lobbying is fairly
open and comparatively 'uninstitutionalised', that is there are no written and few
unwritten rules. Do you consider this to be a (a) true, (b) a satisfactory situation, (c)
a situation that will change in the near future?
Besides the formal requirements, are there any informal contacts between the
Commission and other EU institutions? If so please, describe these and assess
whether they have any influence on the formal policy-making process.
Do you think that the Commission! EP/ COREPER favour certain lobbyists! private
interests over other? If so who? on a permanent basis? why? to what extent? to what
effect?
In your view, is there much conflict during the process of European policy making?
If so, where, how, why? If not, how would you describe the nature of this process?
In your view, is there a corporate culture within the European Commission?
How independent are the individual DGs? Please describe your experience(s) of the
relationships between the DGs.
Are lobbyists more likely to contact EU officials/politicians of their own nationality?
Are EU officials more likely to seek advice for draft legislation from interested
parties/experts who are of the same nationality?
In your view, are there any national groupings within the policy making process that
are likely to ally with one another? Are these always ad hoc arrangements? Are there
signs of any semi-permanent or permanent alignments between national groups?
Do your own political/ideological convictions affect your input in the policy
process?
In your field of operation, how important are European developments to you,
compared to global developments?
Can you please tell me something about the attitudes of food and drinks
industrialists towards the European's social policy programme! environmental
legislation! CAP reform! financial market integration in Europe! attempts to
harmonise VAT?
Can there be a truly integrated market without ftill harmonisation of all indirect
taxes?
In your view, will the European Union at some point have to start discussing
seriously direct taxation so as to be able to have sufficient finding to pursue all its
aims?
Please attempt to evaluate the significance of the following issues compared to the
significance of the establishment of a single European market, from your particular
perspective?
a) CAP reforms; CAP policy making
b) Developments in former Eastern European countries and their
relationship with the EU
c) Developments with regard to international trade agreements such as
GATT
d) Economic and Monetary integration among EU member states
Onestions to Representatives from Industry
In what ways have trade associations! government institutions, etc. been
helpful/unhelpful in respect of information, etc. to assist you with the preparation for
the SEM?
Compared to your other activities, how important is (a) lobbying government/
European institutions and (b) gathering information on new governmentl European
legislation?
What strategies and techniques do you employ to ensure the success of your
lobbying activities?
Has the SEA changed your lobbying strategies markedly? If so how and why?
What connections, relationships, do you have to trade associations! governmentl EC
institutions?
How important are personal contacts when lobbying European decision-makers?
Do you concentrate primarily on lobbying European institutions, or do you also
target national decision-makers?
Do policy makers, nationally, and at the European level, pay enough attention to the
needs of food and drinks processors? If not, what else should they do and why do
you think that they do not pay sufficient attention to the needs of food and drinks
processors?
Does the Europeanisation and Concentration of the Retail Industry affect your
organisation? If so in what ways?
Ouestions to Individual Respondents to the Questionnaire on the Effects of the
SEM on the Europ ean Food and Drinks Processors and on a Small Number of
Relevant Representatives from Trade Associations. These Questions Relate
Directly to Some of the Mail Survey Results
Can you explain the low response rate of food and drinks processors to my
questionnaire? What made you respond to my questionnaire?
Can you explain the
a) limited preparation and the discrepancy between awareness and
preparation levels?
b) the relative lack of interest and awareness of staff in relation to the
SEM?
c) the widespread view that the arrival of the SEM will not significantly
alter the character of (your! an) organisation (concerned with food or
drinks processing)?
Questions to Representatives of Trade Associations. Professional Bodies.
Professional Lobbyists. etc. (at sub-national, national and Euro pean levels)
How do you manage aggregation of opinion within your organisation?
Are your opinions necessarily 'lowest common denominator' opinions?
In what ways do you ensure that your members are kept informed about events!
changes! new legislation related to the European Community? How do you ensure
that information is received and understood? What particular problems and issues
are associated with your function of information collection and dissemination?
What percentage of the.....industry are you representing?
What is the structure of the........industry?
How export-oriented is the........industry? Does the bulk of exports concentrate on
the European Union?
How competitive is the.......industry?
What are the major queries by your members re (the SEM and) food! agricultural!
social policy making?
How much knowledge do your members have of European food! agricultural! social
policy making (and the SEM?) Is this superficial or detailed! in depth knowledge?
What are the main sources from which your members acquire knowledge?
How well are your members preparing for the SEM?
How important is the SEM to your members (objectively and subjectively)?
How much do your lobbying activities depend on pressures, or lack of pressures,
from sub-national! national! sectoral associations! individual members of your
association?
Compared to your other activities, how important is (a) lobbying government!
European institutions and (b) gathering information on new government! European
legislation?
What strategies and techniques do you employ to ensure the success of your
lobbying activities?
Has the SEA changed your lobbying strategies markedly? If so how and why?
What connections! relationships do you have to European level associations!
government! BC institutions?
How important are personal contacts when lobbying European decision-makers?
Do you concentrate primarily on lobbying European institutions, or do you also
target national decision-makers?
Do you, and if so, in what ways, trade information with other trade associations?
How do you trade information with representatives from EC institutions?
Do you have any bilateral contacts with trade associations in other member states?
Do you lobby public institutions/politicians from other member states?
Please explain the politics and activities of the/ surrounding the
a) Potato Regime issue?
b) The Banana issue?
c) Vegetable fat in chocolate issue
d) Breast Feeding issue
e) Additives and Food Colour issue
What do you hope to achieve by opening up an office in Brussels?
Does the Europeanisation and Concentration of the Retail Industry affect your
members? If so in what ways?
Special Additional Questions to Interviewees workin! for the CIZAA and other
Interviewees who were very Familiar with the Reoranisation that had taken
Place in the CIAA in Response to the Challenges Arising from the Creation of
an Internal European Market
What were the exact reasons behind your! CIAA's recent reorganisation?
What do you think that you! CIAA have! has achieved with your reorganisation?
S
How are you! is CIAA tackling the problem of having to represent, at the European
level, a very varied and fragmented industry?
Please describe your relationships and exchanges with the various EC institutions
and other lobbying groups, concerned with food policy making, both at the
European and national levels.
How frequently do you meat staff from the Commission (Parliament; Permanent
Representations, etc.) on a) a formal, b) an informal basis?
Questions to Rep resentatives of Official Government and European
Community Institutions
With regard to food policy making! the CAP reform! social policy making, who is
lobbying you most frequently/intensively? on what issues exactly? To what end?
With what effect?
Constitutionally, the Commission is NOT required to ask outside bodies, e.g.
lobbyists, for their opinion. When does it request the opinion of such groups/people
anyway? Why? What are the answers you are looking for and what criteria are you
using to evaluate the answers?
How do you react if you are approached by an interested party on a topic on their
initiative? Does it depend who it is?
What are your criteria for choosing who you consult?
How do you determine the extent to which you involve organisations/people that
you consult?
Do you always remain in charge of the drafting of legislation, even if you are
consulting heavily?
Is your attitude towards information provided, and demands made different, with
non-institutional organisations/people that you have consulted, as opposed to those
who approach you at their own initiative?
Please explain the politics and activities of the/surrounding the
a) Potato Regime issue?
b) The Banana issue?
c) Vegetable fat in chocolate issue
d) Breast Feeding issue
e) Additives and Food Colour issue
How do MIEPs react when approached by lobbyists?
How accessible are MEPs to lobbyists?
In your view, are MEPs more or less open to be influenced by lobbyists than
European officials?
Do MEPs contact directly experts, if they wish to build up a picture of a particular
policy issue?
Within the European Parliament, what are the relations between the Agricultural
Committee and the Environmental, Public Health and Consumer Committee?
Particularly over the CAP reform and the legislative measures for the food and
drinks industries drawn up under the SEM legislative programme?
If an MEPs' opinion on a policy issues differs from the main stream view of a) the
party grouping in the EP b) the MEPs national party, c) the EP's committee on
which the MEP sits how much freedom has the MEP to persist with his/her view?
As an MEP, are you able to influence your party's views on European policy issues?
Do MEPs feel patronised by Commission officials?
Are MEPs predominantly guided by political or by technical concerns, when trying
to form an opinion about a particular policy issue/legislative draft?
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Additional Questions Asked, and R&iuests 1\1ade, to All Interviewees
In addition, questions from the various questionnaires were used as appropriate and
all interviewees were asked for details of activities, organisational and decision-
making structures as appropriate. They were also asked for any additional written
data, e.g. minutes, reports, documentation and any other information which they
considered to be relevant for the project. In addition, they were asked to provide
examples to substantiate the points that they were making.
11
INTERVIEWEES2
Consultants9 Lobbyists
S. Barber, Head of European Operations, Kent County Council, Maidstone, 1992
N. Barton, Country NatWest, London, 1992
Centre for European Policy Studies, Conference Organiser, Brussels, 1992
J. Ganzevoort, Paris, 1992
K. Gardner, Member of the Economic and Social Committee of the European
Communities and Mars plc,Windsor, 1992
0. Gray, EU Committee of the American Chamber of Commerce and Industry,
Brussels, 1991 and 1992
P. Gray, Adviser to the Commission of the European Communities, Brussels, several
interviews
W.P. Hilverda, Van Spaendonck, The Hague-'s Gravenhage (NL), 1991
Honeywell, Senior Manager, Brussels, 1991 and 1994
Leatherhead RA, Leatherhead, 1990 and 1992,
R. Monbiot MBE, Rotherfield Management Ltd., Henley on Thames, 1991
B. O'Connor, Stanbrook and Hooper, Brussels, 1991
D. Owen, Director, McIntyre - Owen Associates Ltd., London, 1992
R. Pedler, European Cetre for Public Affairs, Templeton College, Oxford, 1991
0. Schmuck, Institut ifir Europaische Politik, Bonn, 1991
J. Schwager, World Economic Forum, Geneva, 1990
G. Stahr, Koln
T. Stocker, Brussels, 1991
S. Symes, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1994
Ch. N. Taylor, Jacobs Suchard, Neuchâtel (CII), 1990
M. White, Consultancy Services, Aylesbury, 1992
2 For reasons of confidentiality, it is usually not possible to give anything but the firm's/institution's
names. Certainly, it would be unethical to mention individual names where interviewees wished to
remain anonymous (in most cases). Given the variety of interview sources, interviewees ranged
from junior to very senior levels and organisational size varied considerably, e.g. between
multinationals and one person enterprises. This variety is thought to be beneficial, as it provides
views from different angles about the same topics.
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Trade Associations
ANIA, Paris, 1992
ASSILEC, Brussels, 1991
Association des Brasseurs de France, Paris, 1992
BEUC, Brussels, 1991
BCCCA, London, 1991
British Poultry Meat Federation Ltd., London, 1991
British Society of Flavourists, London, 1991
Bund fir Lebensmittelrecht und Lebensmittelkunde, Bonn, 1991 and 1994
Bundesverband der Deutschen Spirituosenindustrie, Bonn, 1991
Bundesverband Deutscher Industrien (BDI), (Euroschalter), Köln, 1991
Bundesvereinigung der Deutschen Arbeitgeberverbände, Köln, 1991
Bundesvereinigung der Deutschen Ernahrungsindustrien, Bonn, 1991 and 1993
B undesvereinigung der Deutschen Feinkostindustrie, Bonn, 1991
Bundesvereinigung der kartoffelverarbeitenden Industrien, Bonn, 1991
Bundesvereingung des GroI3- und AuBenhandels ffir Molkereiprodukte, Bonn, 1991
Bundesvereinigung fir Mischfutterhersteller, Bonn, 1991
CAOBISCO, Brussels, 1991
CBI, Brussels Office, Brussels, 1991
CBI, HQ, London, 1992
CMA, Bonn, Koln, London, 1990, 1991 and 1992
CECG, London, on several occasions
CEFS, Brussels, 1991
CIAA, Brussels, 1991 and 1992
CNPF, Paris, 1992
Confédération Générale de PAlimentation en Detail, Paris, 1992
Confédération Nationale de Ia Pâtisserie, Confiserie et Glacerie de France, Paris,
1992
Conseil des Communes et Regions d'Europe, Brussels, 1994
COPA-COGECA, Brussels, 1991
DTF, Brussels Office, Brussels, 1991
DTF, London, 1992
Deutscher Brauer Bund, Bonn, 1991
Deutscher Industrie- und Handeistag, Bonn, 1991
Deutscher Milchindustrieverband, Bonn, 1991
Deutscher Weinbauverband, Bonn, 1991
FDF, London, 1991 and 1992
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Food from Britain, London, 1990
The Gin Rectifiers and Distillers Association and the Vodka Trade Association,
Andover, 1991
Milk Marketing Board, Thames Ditton, Surrey, 1991
PMB, Oxford, 1991
Potato Processors' Association, London, 1992
Scotch Whisky Association, Edinburgh, 1992
UNICE, Brussels, 1991
Union Européenne des Alcools, Eaux-de-Vie Ct Spiritueux, Brussels, 1991
Union Nationale des Produteurs & Distributeurs dejus de fruits et de legumes, de
nectars & de boissons aux fruits de Ia métropole et d'outre-mer, Paris, 1992
Verein zur Forderung des Sul3warenexportes, Bonn, 1991 and 1992; (interviews and
two whole days' participation in the association's annual meeting and deliberation on SEM
strategy; autumn 1991)
Wirtschaftliche Vereinigung Zucker, Bonn, 1991
Zentralverband der Deutschen Geflugelindustrien, Bonn, 1991
Food and Drinks Processors
H. Blechwedel GmbH, Hamburg, 1991
P. Born GmbH, Schokoladenfabrik, Friedrichsdor'Ts. (G), 1991
M. Braurt, Backmittel und Essenzen KG, Hannover, 1991
British Salt, 1992
BZZ b.v., AD Zoetermeer (NL), 1991
Coca Cola Produits, Bergues (F), 1991
Different Delights, Portsmouth, 1991
M. Dimke Fleischwaren GmbH & Co. KG, Monchengladbach (G), 1991
Ebrinke Fleisch, Dortmund, 1991
Ehrmann AG, Oberschonegg im Allgau (G), 1991
H. Eidenschink, Bergader Kasewerk Basil Weixler GmbH, Waging a. See (G)
Fleischspezialitaten, Tannhausen (G), 1991
Foodex (UK) Ltd., London, 1991
D. Guesdon, Saint-Cyr-Du-Bailleul, 1991
Hoisten Brauerei AG, Hamburg, 1991
Kraft General Foods, Brussels Office, Brussels, 1991,
Smith's Superfeed, Stroud, 1991
Millers Damsel Enterprises Ltd., Isle of Wight, 1991
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Nestlé, Croydon, 1991
W.D Millit & Son Ltd., Derby, 1991 (all day visit; several interviews)
A. Oetker GmbH, Bielefeld (0), 1991
A. Ritter GmbH & Co. KG, Schokoladenfabrik, Waldenbuch (G), 1991 (all day visit;
several interviews)
Sauerzweig Feinkost GmbH, Stuhr-Seckenhausen (G), 1991
Schiaderer Spirituosen, Staufen (G), 1991 (all day visit; several interviews)
Seeberger Spezialitaten, Ulm (G), 1991
Spencer & Rae Ltd., Bradford, 1991 (all day visit; several interviews)
Stuttgarter Fleischwaren GmbH, Stuttgart, 1991
Ulmer Schokoladen, Wilhelmshaven (G), 1991
Le Vexin, Vallangoujard (F), 1991
Weimarer Wurstwaren, Weimar (G), 1991
Westfaelische Fleischwarenfabrik, Steinhagen (G), 1991
Public Institutions and Politicians
Bundesministerium ifir Ernahrung, Landwirtschaft mit Forsten, Bonn, 1991
Bundesministerium fi.ir Wirtschaft; 1 992-Auskunftsschalter; Bonn, 1991
The Commission of the European Communities, DG III, 1991 and 1993
The Commission of the European Communities, DG VT, Brussels, 1991 and 1994
The Commission of the European Communities, DG XXIII, 1991
Department of Trade and Industry, 1992 Information Line, London
The Economic and Social Committee of the European Communities, Brussels, 1992
and 1994 (observation and several interviews with vanDLls members and staff in 1992; a further
interview with a staff member in 1994)
The European Parliament, Brussels, 1991 and 1994 (staff and MEPs)
Europaisches Parlament, Bonn, 1991 (stall)
Frau Huhnerbein, assistant to Frau Ursula Schleicher, MEP, Bonn, 1991
Ministère de l'Agriculture et de Ia Forét, Paris, 1992
Ministery for Agriculture, Food and Fisheries, London, 1992
UK Permanent Representation with the European Union, Brussels, 1991
Representation Pérmanente de Ia France auprès de I'Union Européenne, Brussels,
1992
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EXTENSIVE ADDITIONAL WRITTEN
INFORMATION OR DOCUMENTATION
Consultants and Lobbyists
British Standards Institute, BSI Head Office, London
The Corporate Intelligence Group Ltd., Brussels
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Rome
W. Nicoll, EC Fellow, Centre for European Community Studies, George Mason
University, Arlington, Virginia, USA
A.C. Nielsen GmbH, Frankfurt a. Main
A. Robinson, Institute of Directors, London, and member of the ESC, Brussels
B. F. Smith, Impacte International, St-Ilpize (F)
Verein fur politische Bildung, Bonn, 1991
Trade Associations
The British Egg Industry Council, London
The British Meat Manufacturers' Association, London
The British Soft Drinks Association Ltd., London
Bundesverband der deutschen Fischindustrie und des Fischgrol3handels e.V.,
Hamburg
Bundesverband mittelständischer Wirtschaft, Bonn
Centre francais du commerce exterieur, Direction des produits agro-alimentaires,
Paris
Conseil Européenne de l'industrie chimique (CEFIC), Brussels
English Vineyards Association, London
The Hull Fish Merchants Protection Association Ltd., Hull
The Institute of Grocery Distribution, Watford
International Sweeteners Association, Brussels
National Association of Master Bakers, London
Virtually all interviewees provided additional documentation, too.
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Scottish Association of Master Bakers, Edinburgh
The Shellfish Association of Great Britain, London
Syndicat de Ia rizerie francaise, Paris
Union Cooperative de Viticulteurs Charentais, Cognac, 1991
Food and Drinks Processors
Groupe BSN S.A., Paris
Cadbury Schweppes plc, London
Dinan Surgelation S.A., Dinan (F)
Eurodaufruit S.A., Allex (F)
Grand Metropolitan plc, London
Mars Inc., Slough
Rowntree Mackintosh Ltd., York
Pubhc Institutions and Politichins
The Commission of the European Communities, DG V, Director, Brussel
The Commission of the European Communities, DG XVI, Member of the
Commissioner's Cabinet, Brussels
Department of Trade and Industry, T. Sainsbury's Office, London
The European Parliament, Brussels and Luxembourg, MEPs and staff
Northamptonshire County Council
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APPENDIX IV
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
AG
ALTENER
ANIA
ANUGA
ASSILEC
BCCCA
BDA
BDE
BENELUX
BEUC
BLL
BSI
BSI
=	 Aktiengesellschaft (Plc)
=	 Community Action Programme for greater use of
renewable energy sources
=	 Association Nationale des Industries Agro-
alimentaires, Paris (National Association of Food,
and Drinks Processors)
Ailgemeine Nahrungs- und Genussmittel Austellung,
Köln (International Food and Beverage Exhibition)
Association de lindustrie laitière de la CE, Brussels
(EC Daiiy Trade Association)
The Biscuit, Cake, Chocolate & Confectionery
Alliance, London
=	 Bundesvereinigung der Deutschen
Arbeitgeberverbande, Köln (Association of German
Employers)
=	 Bundesvereinigung der Deutschen
Ernahrungsindustrien, Bonn (Association of German
Food and Drinks Processors)
=	 Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg
=	 Bureau Européen des Unions de Consommateurs,
Brussels, (European Consumers' Association)
=	 Bund fiXr Lebensmittelrecht und Lebensmittelkunde,
Bonn (Association for Food Law and Food Policy)
Bundesverband der Deutschen Spirituosenindustrie,
Bonn (Association of German Alcohol Distillers)
British Standards Institute, London
CAUBISCO	 =	 Association des industries de la chocolaterie,
biscuiterie, biscotterie et confieserie de la CEE,
Brussels (Association of the Chocolate, Biscuit and
Confectionery Industries of the EEC)
CAP
	
=	 Common Agricultural Policy
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CBI
CE
CEC
CECO
CEE
CEFIC
CEFS
CENJCENELEC
CEPS
CGAD
CIAA
CIS (countries)
CMA
CNPF
CoM
COPA-COGECA
COREPER
DG
=	 Confederation of British Industries, London
=	 Communauté Européenne (European Community)
=	 Commission of the European Communities
=	 Consumers in the European Community Group,
London
=	 Communauté Economique Européenne (European
Economic Community)
=	 Conseil européen de Vindustrie chimique, Brussels
(European Chemical Industry Council)
=	 Comité européen des fabricants du sucre, Brussels
(European Sugar Manufacturers Committee)
=	 European Standards Committees, Brussels
=	 Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels
=	 Confédération Générale de l'Alimentation de Detail,
Paris (General Confederation of the Food Retail
Trade)
=	 Confédération des industries agro-alimentaires de Ia
Communauté Economique Européenne, Brussels
(Confederation of the Food and Drinks Industries of
the European Economic Community)
=	 Commonwealth of Independent States (non-Russian
Federations of the former Soviet Union)
=	 Centrale Marketinggesellschaft Deutscher Agro-
Industrien, Bonn, KOln, London (Central Marketing
Organisation of German Agricultural Industries)
Conseil national du patronat francais, Paris
(National Council of French Employers)
Council of Ministers
European Farmers' Union, Brussels
Comité des representations permanentes
(Committee of Permanent Representations)
=	 Directorate-General
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DIH
DTF
DTI
EAEC/EEA
EBM
EC
ECOFIN
ECJ
ECOSOC/ESC
ECSC
ECU
EEB
EEC
EG
EHO
EIPA
EMS
EMU
EP
ERASMUS
ERM
ESF
Deutscher Industrie- und Handeistag, Bonn
(Association of German Chambers of Commerce and
Industry)
Dairy Trade Federation
Department of Trade and Industry, London
European Atomic Energy Community
Europaischer Binnenmarkt (Single European Market)
European Community
Council of European Economic and Finance Ministers
European Court of Justice
Economic and Social Committee of the European
Communities
European Coal and Steel Community
European Currency Unit
European Environmental Bureau, Brussels
European Economic Community
Europaische Gemeinschaft (European Community)
Environmental Health Officer
European Institute of Public Administration,
Maastricht
European Monetary System
Economic and Monetary Union
European Parliament, Europaisches Parlament
Outgoing Higher Education Exchange and Co-
operation Prgoramme of the EC, operational since
1987
Exchange Rate Mechanism
European Social Fund
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ESRC
	
=	 Economic and Social Research Council (UK)
ETUC
	
=	 European Trade Union Congress, Brussels
EU
	
=	 European Union
FAO
FCO
FDF
GmbH
GMI
GATT
HMSO
IDACE
IGC
1R
JET
LiNGUA
MAFF
MEP
vB
MNC
MP
PE
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United
Nations, Rome
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
UK Food and Drinks Federation, London
Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung (Ltd)
Grand Marché intérieur (European Single Market)
General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs
Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London
Associations des industries des a1imetits diét&kiues de
la CEE, Paris (Association of Dietetic Foods
Industries of the EEC)
Intergovernmental Conference
International Relations
The Joint European Torus (the largest and most
powerful experiment yet attempted towards the
development of nuclear fusion as a new energy
source)
Outgoing Higher Education Exchange and Co-
operation Prgoramme of the EC for Language
Students and Related programmes, operational since
1987
Ministry for Agriculture, Food and Fisheries, London
Member of the European Parliament
Milk Marketing Board
Multi-national Concern
Member of Parliament, UK
Parlement Européen (European Parliament)
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PMB
QMV
RA
RIIA
SA
SCA
SEA
SEM
SMIE
SOCRATES
sP S S/PC
Thu
UEAES
UN
UNICE
VAT
Potato Marketing Board, Oxford
Qualified Majority Voting
Research Association
Royal Institute of International Affairs, London
Société Anonyme (Plc)
Special Committee on Agriculture
Single European Act
Single European Market
Small and medium sized enterprise
Updated and expanded version of ERASMUS,
LINGUA and newer Higher Education exchange and
co-operation programmes, expected to come on
stream in 1997/8
Statistics Package for Social Sciences, Personal
Computer version
Treaty on European Union ('Maastricht Treaty')
Union Européenne des Alcools, Eaux-de-Vie et
Spiritueux, Brussels (European Union of Distillers)
United Nations
Union des Confédérations de 1'Industrie et des
Employeurs d'Europe, Brussels (European Employers'
Union)
Value Added Tax
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